KK-Forum,
At 12:00 05.02.2000 +0100, Oddmund Garvik wrote:
>Knut Rognes har bestemt seg for å halda fram den einsidige
>(løgn)propagandaen om Kosovo. ...
>> Feil: Intervensjonen utløste en bølge av etnisk rensing ingen hadde
>> sett make til før. Kronologien er altså: først bombingen, deretter
>> utdrivelsene. Intet i OSSE-rapporten (eller U. S. State Departments
>> rapporter, eller siktelsen til Krigsforbrytertribunalet) støtter det
>> Garvik her sier, Garviks lesemåte har store mangler. Ingen utdrivinger
>> skjedde før 24. mars, det er dokumentert til overmål av alle.
>
>osb.
>
Han ber meg lese:
>Men gå då til OSSE-rapporten t.d., og les! Han finst her:
>http://www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/hr/part2/index.htm
>
>Og det står m.a. dette:
>
>> This report, and its companion volume, detail the dedicated work of
>> OSCE human rights officers over a full year in Kosovo/Kosova. It was
>> a year in which a long history of human rights violations,
>> persistent and pervasive, culminated in an armed conflict. Well over
>> one million Kosovo Albanians were displaced, across the border and
>> inside, and thousands killed. The large-scale violations committed in
>> the period preceding and during the conflict (December 1998 to
>> mid-June 1999), are documented fully in Kosovo/Kosova: As seen, as
>> Told, the companion report that bears witness to the scale of ethnic
>> violence and the abuse of power by the State that orchestrated that
>> violence. It is a shocking document in its gruesome details and
>> conclusions.
>>
>> This was also a year that saw hope of a new future for
>> Kosovo/Kosova, freed from a past of systematic discrimination, abuse
>> and conflict. The evidence of recent violations, mainly committed
>> against today's minority communities, documented in this second
>> volume (covering mid-June through October) indicates that the cycle
>> of violence has not yet been broken. On the evidence presented here,
>> there is no region in Kosovo/Kosova in which human rights are fully
>> respected. Of course, this must be viewed in historic context. Human
>> history tells us that no society emerges from a traumatic, violent
>> conflict without scars. Deep wounds take time to heal. With
>> unspeakable atrocities, massive humiliation and hardship still fresh
>> in everyone's mind and with thousands of people still missing,
>> feared dead or detained in Serbian prisons, reconciliation can only
>> be achieved with effort and time.
>
>
>Bernard Kouchner skriv i forordet:
>
>> The OSCE is simultaneously releasing another report, As Seen, As
>> Told - An Analysis of the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE
>> Verification Mission (OSCE/ODIHR 1999) which covers the period from
>> December 1998 to June 1999. The OSCE finds in that report that
>> Yugoslav and Serbian forces, along with police, paramilitaries and
>> some civilians, committed extensive human rights abuses and violated
>> the laws of armed conflict. Their victims were overwhelmingly Kosovo
>> Albanians. Some Kosovo Serbs were victims of Kosovo Liberation Army
>> (UCK) violations of humanitarian law, but there was nothing close to
>> equivalence; the Yugoslav and Serbian military, police and security
>> services targeted Kosovo Albanians. Executions, arbitrary arrests,
>> torture, rape and other forms of sexual violence, and forced
>> expulsions characterized the Yugoslav and Serb forces' campaign to
>> expel Kosovo Albanians to other states.
>>
>> Barely one year after the start of the Kosovo Verification Mission,
>> Kosovo/Kosova has experienced these gross and systematic human rights
>> violations, a three month bombing campaign by NATO which resulted in
>> the Yugoslav and Serb forces withdrawing from the province, and the
>> return of the OSCE human rights monitors last June. For the past
>> five months these observers, now numbering about 75, have carried
>> out their mandate to investigate human rights abuses and ensure that
>> human rights protection and promotion concerns are addressed. This
>> report describes the OSCE's work and makes some important findings.
>
>Konfliktane i det tidlegare Jugoslavia er komplekse, men det er
>vanskeleg, for ikkje å seia umogleg å stikke under stolen at det
>serbiske regimet under Milosevic (inkl. deler av "opposisjonen") er
>hovudansvarleg for dei humanitære katastrofane som verda har vore
>vitne til i dette området dei siste ti åra.
>
>Eg gidd ikkje å halda fram denne sterile utvekslinga med Rognes og
>Holen, for dei er forkalka. Eg har endeleg nok av anna å bruke tida mi
>på.
Neivel. Opp til deg, men faktum er at sitatene du lever ikke inneholder noe
om datoer eller kronologi, fordi du siterer fra del 2 som ikke dreier seg
om tidsrommet før bombingene.
Klipper du fra OSCEs _første_ rapport vil du f.eks. finne:
*******************
Security situation December 1998 to mid-March 1999
The fighting in Kosovo in 1998 set a precedent for what was to happen in 1999:
Many villages have been destroyed by shelling and burning following
operations conducted by federal and Serbian government forces. There are
concerns that the disproportionate use of force and actions of the security
forces are designed to terrorise and subjugate the population, a collective
punishment to teach them that the price of supporting the Kosovo Albanian
paramilitary units is too high and will be even higher in future. The
Serbian security forces have demanded the surrender of weapons and have
been reported to use terror and violence against civilians to force people
to flee their homes or the places where they had sought refuge, under the
guise of separating them from fighters of the Kosovo Albanian paramilitary
units. The tactics include shelling, detentions and threats to life and
finally short-notice demands to leave or face the consequences.18
Under the cease-fire agreement called for in UN resolution 1199 of 23
September 1998, as subsequently accepted (see Chapter 1), no ground
advances or confrontations between the UCK and the Yugoslav/Serbian forces
were permitted. This did not prevent a number of reactive operations by the
Yugoslav/Serbian forces against UCK infiltration along the Albanian border
in December 1998.19
Further, in December 1998, the UCK occupied and reinforced former VJ
trenches overlooking the main supply route in Kosovo from Serbia proper by
Podujevo/Podujeve. The Yugoslav/Serbian forces were unsurprisingly not
willing to overlook this action, and immediately announced VJ "exercises"
starting on 19 December 1998 in the vicinity. By 24 December, the VJ were
once again in control of the ground following three days of fighting. The
importance of the main supply routes to the Serbs was reiterated by the
strengthening of positions straddling the Dulje/Duhel Pass (Suva
Reka/Suhareke) on 30 December 1998.
There were frequent small-scale ambushes against MUP forces by the UCK
during the first two-and-a-half months of 1999, clearly breaching any
conceptions of a cease-fire. Tensions were raised further when eight VJ
were held captive by the UCK in the north of Kosovo; Yugoslav/Serbian
troops and equipment were moved into the vicinity. Further reinforced
patrolling took place along the strategic Stimlje/Shtime Pass area
following the death of three police near Dulje/Duhel (Suva Reka/Suhareke)
on 8 January 1999. Fighting subsequently took place in the middle of
January around Petrovo/Petrove and Racak/Recak (Stimlje/Shtime).
Tensions in the province were raised from the end of January through to the
OSCE-KVM evacuation on 20 March 1999, as a result of a series of bomb and
grenade attacks on cafés (both Kosovo Albanian- and Kosovo
Serb-owned/frequented) and on streets and markets (see Part V, various
municipality entries).
(http://www.osce.org/kosovo/reports/hr/part1/ch3.htm)
Open hostilities
...
Part of Kacanik/Kacanik municipality suffered the violent attentions of the
security forces following what was an alleged kidnapping by the UCK of a
Kosovo Albanian local politician at the end of February. Tensions rose
until full-scale clashes took place resulting in the burning of villages
and the displacement of villagers. The operation was completed by 10 March
when verifiers were able to visit Kotlina/Kotline where they found the
residents still there (too frightened to move elsewhere) as well as a
number of IDPs from nearby hamlets. While Kotlina was largely unaffected by
the fighting, the nearby hamlet of Drosec had 10 or 12 houses burned and
the hamlet of Ivaja/Ivaje had 28 out of 40 houses burned. Three male bodies
identified as those of UCK members were also found.26
Problems arose during the incident when the UCK refused the UNHCR access to
IDPs in Kotlina. Although the situation was resolved and an apology issued,
there were indications that the UCK was also responsible for creating a
number of IDPs and using the villages as front line defences.27
The UCK was also clearly responsible for unco-operative behaviour and
escalating tensions in other areas. OSCE-KVM verifiers from the
Rastane/Rashtan field office (west of Suva Reka/Suhareke town) reported
that the UCK commander refused to meet the OSCE-KVM unless they had
"authorization papers". The verifiers informed the UCK that digging
defensive positions overlooking the police checkpoint at Rastane was
considered by the police as provocative and would result in police taking
action unless the UCK desisted.28
The UCK also dug positions west of Suva Reka near Mamusa/Mamushe (Prizren).
The commander of the UCK element told the OSCE-KVM that he had been
instructed by higher UCK command to build defensive positions.29
On 11 March, the security forces conducted a joint operation against the
UCK in Jeskovo/Jeshkove (south-west of Prizren). The VJ deployed in Hoca
Zagradska/Hoce e Qytetit, Bilusa/Billushe and Bijac/Bllaq. Approximately
eight tanks with armoured personnel carriers, artillery and mortars were
used by the VJ. The OSCE-KVM verifiers observed a heavy bombardment of
Jeskovo and reported buildings burning. The UCK was reported to have
responded by mounting an attack in the area of Zociste/Zocishte (Orahovac)
using mortars and heavy machine guns. The OSCE-KVM Prizren Regional Centre
commented that the UCK had infiltrated into Jeskovo, a previously deserted
village, approximately one week before. Residents in Hoca Zagradska had
informed the OSCE-KVM of their concern at this UCK move. The UCK was made
aware by the OSCE-KVM that locals and the security forces both saw their
presence in the area as a provocation.30
On 12 March, OSCE-KVM verifiers were invited by the police to visit
Jeskovo. The verifiers saw the bodies of seven armed men in black UCK
uniforms. All had been killed by small arms fire, according to the police,
during the security force operation. The teams were not able to conclude
that the UCK members had been killed where they were lying. During the
investigation OSCE-KVM verifiers reported seeing approximately 20 to 25
members of the PJP.31
In such a security force operation, when overrunning an enemy position it
is likely that weapons would have been removed out of the victim's arm's
reach regardless of whether the victim appeared to be dead or not, and the
bodies given initial searches. It is therefore not surprising that bodies
appear to have not been found exactly where they were killed and moreover,
weapons may well have been placed back close to the bodies in an attempt to
project the impression the Yugoslav/Serbian forces felt was needed to be
seen by the verifiers.
Verifiers from Pec and Prizren OSCE-KVM Regional Centres reported a large
security force operation centred on Svrhe/Sverke and Dus/Dush (Klina/Kline
municipality) on 14 March. The operation included the use of tanks, mortars
and a special combat police unit. The OSCE-KVM teams reported a heavy
exchange of fire during the morning. Verifiers gained access to the
villages in the afternoon and described heavy damage in Svhre. Four bodies
were observed in Dus that appeared to be those of UCK members.32
Again south of Kosovska Mitrovica, approximately 50 VJ soldiers supported
by four tanks and two anti-aircraft artillery vehicles attacked
Vrbnica/Vernice on or around 15 March. Artillery impacts were observed near
Balince/Balince (Vucitrn/Vushtrri municipality) and four houses were seen
burning. Approximately 30 rounds of artillery hit the area of
Glavotina/Gllavotin and Bivoljak/Bivolak. Bradas/Bradash (Podujevo) was
seen to be shelled on three separate occasions on this date and local
sources stated that one person was killed and two wounded.33
In the south of Kosovo, Korbulic/Korbuliq (Kacanik) was found by OSCE-KVM
verifiers to be nearly deserted, the four remaining residents who were
about to depart claimed that the VJ had told them to leave on 15 March.
Although this could not be confirmed, observers noted that the school had
been vandalized, houses looted and some set on fire.34
The official Yugoslav news agency Tanjug reported that the Yugoslav Army
had extended by 30 days the military service of soldiers currently due to
be demobilized. The soldiers were to form part of the Army reserve forces.
The measure was said to be a result of "threats of military intervention".35
On 17 March 1999 the OSCE-KVM Prizren Regional Centre reported a rise in
tension with the start of a combined VJ and police operation against
Korisa/Korishe and Kabas/Kabash (north-east of Prizren). The operation
appeared directed at a unit of perhaps 20 UCK troops who were reported to
have moved into Kabas a month earlier. Verifiers observed VJ and special
combat police supported by tanks and anti-aircraft artillery.
The VJ became more obstructive towards the OSCE-KVM, denying it access to
the VJ position at Dulje, one of the three authorized Combat Team locations
as agreed in the 25 October Agreement. It was the second time access had
been denied, when in the past they had been co-operative.
In effect, Yugoslav preparations for a confrontation with NATO and
operations with the aim of defeating the UCK through piecemeal operations
were well underway.36
Chapter 5:
Violations of the right to life feature extensively in this report, from
numerous single arbitrary killings to mass killings involving scores of
victims. Particularly in the period after 24 March 1999, communities in
Kosovo were subjected to a state of lawlessness precisely at the hands of
those authorities charged with the maintenance of security and law and
order, and those authorities demonstrated a sweeping disregard for human
life and dignity. The loss of life of large numbers of Kosovo Albanian
civilians was one of the most characteristic features of the conflict after
24 March and accounts for a very high number of reports and witness
statements received by the OSCE-KVM.
Bemerk:
"In effect, Yugoslav preparations for a confrontation with NATO and
operations with the aim of defeating the UCK through piecemeal operations
were well underway.36
"Particularly in the period after 24. March"
Hvor i disse kildene finner du at FRY begynte utdrivelser før 24 mars, dv
at jeg driver med løgn? Si fra når du finenr noen.
Det er ingen som har sagt at serbiske forbrytelser ikke ble begått, men du
benekter ansvaret NATO hadde for begivenhetenes utvikling.
Knut Rognes
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