At 19:10 18.08.99 +0100, Bård Sandstad wrote:
>Knut Rognes hadde et innlegg i forgårs der han begynte:
>
>> KK-Forum,
>>
>> Hjemkommet fra ferie og etter gjennomlesning av de siste Klassekamper synes
>> jeg den er blitt påfallende taus om kosovo-albansk terror i det siste.
>> Stavanger Aftenblad har hatt bedre dekning. Interesserer ikke
>> kosovo-albansk terror like mye som Nato-terror eller har jeg oversett ting
>> i avisa?
>>
>
>og deretter kom med en rekke interessante bemerkninger om KLA etc. Jeg er
>enig med mye av det du skriver, men ser ikke helt hvorfor du kritiserer KK
>akkurat her. Jeg tilhører dem som er blitt mer og mer kritiske til de ulike
>"nasjonale frigjøringsbevegelsene" den tradisjonelle venstresiden har for
>vane å støtte. Men i akkurat dette spørsmålet synes jeg KK har hatt en god
>og balansert dekning. Avisen har faktisk trykket en del kritiske artikler,
>bl.a. om KLAs pogromer mot sigøyner-befolkningen i Kosova. All ære til
>avisen for det.
Jeg leste avisbunken om igjen og fant en del stoff så jeg går med på at
kritikken kanskje er urettferdig. Men jeg ble egentlig mest provosert av
Astor Larsens artikkel den 12. august side 3 ("Kosovo etter bombinga") der
han f.eks. sier at ideen om en multietnisk regjering i Kosovo er dødfødt,
og at situasjonen "er dobbelt meningsløs også fordi den internasjonale
styrken hindrer kosovoalbanerne å opprette en egen stat, eventuelt å slå
seg sammen med Albania. Ikke merkelig at kosovoalbanerne har begynt å rette
sinnet sitt også mot Kfor-soldatene."
Dette tolker jeg dithen at KKs utenriksredaksjon støtter et etnisk rent
Kosovo og et Stor-Albania, i likhet med KLA (ellers ville vel ikke AL bruke
ordet 'meningsløs'). USA/NATO synes også i praksis å å støtte et etnisk
rent Kosovo, tross retorikk om det motsatte. Og da er det jo i bunn og
grunn ikke så langt politisk mellom NATO og KKs utenriksredaksjon i denne
saken. Hvis jeg har forstått Jan Hårstad rett, har dette også vært hans
poenger i en del innlegg til KK.
Etnisk rene nasjoner er vel ikke noe for sosialister å applaudere?
For å kaste lys over akkurat dette klipper jeg noen utdrag av Israel
Shahaks artikkel "The New Israeli Historians" (Israel Shahak Report No.
150, 12. februar 1995). Artikkelen avsluttes med noen vurderinger av en
viktig ideologisk leder for den israelske kibbutz-bevegelse ved navn
Yitzhak Tabenkin. Her først et kort sitat:
***********Kort sitat start**********
... "already on August 29, 1939 he (Tabenkin)
found that some demands of Hitler were justified, since what
Hitler really wanted was to assemble all Germans in a single
German state". In his diary Tabenkin lists "the ideals of Hitler
which I like: ethnic homogeneity, the possibility of exchange of
ethnic minorities; the transfers of ethnic groups for the sake of
an international order which for me are a particularly valuable
feature". Kafkafi says that earlier Tabenkin had preferred
transfers achieved by "mutual agreement" but eventually came to
the conclusion that if such agreement could not be reached, "let
the aims of Zionism be accomplished by means of a catastrophe".
She comments rightly that for Tabenkin the transfers of ethnic
groups were "an universal value".
**********''Kort sitat slutt*******''
Her er et mer utfyllende utdrag
(gopher://gopher.igc.apc.org/00/peace/mideast.gopher/20). Det er lenker til
flere artikler av Israel Shahak på min hjemmeside:
http://home.sol.no/~knutro/.
*********Langt sitat start*****************
... Let me conclude by including among the "new historians" also
Eyal Kafkafi, whose books and articles have not yet been
translated into English, perhaps because she tends to focus on the
domestic affairs of the Jewish community. For instance, in her
last book "An Optional War. To Sinai and Back - 1956-57", (1994)
she documents the Israeli army's atrocities in the Gaza Strip. But
she is more interested in why the information about those
atrocities didn't reach the Jewish public. After telling of the
censorship ban, Kafkafi writes (pp. 129-130) that in order to
circumvent it a writer published an imaginary story (which as such
couldn't be banned) with transparent references to some of the
atrocities. He was subsequently assaulted by some "unknowns",
rumored at the time to have been soldiers of elite units, and
ruthlessly beaten. Needless to say, the police "could not" find
the assailants. This story incidentally shows why the "new
historians" couldn't appear in Israel until after 1974, when the
atmosphere began to relax.
The subject of Kafkafi's previous book "Truth or Faith"
(1992) is more relevant to this report. The book deals with the
ideological influence wielded by Yitzhak Tabenkin, one of the most
charismatic leaders of the Zionist Labor movement in general and
of the largest kibbutz movement "Ha'Kibbutz Ha'Me'uhad in
particular. Tabenkin can be regarded as the founding father of the
hawkish ideology derived from Labor Zionism. The title of
Kafkafi's book reflects the view frequently expressed by Tabenkin
that Labor Zionism must rely on unconditional faith in the
righteousness of its ideology, to the point of precluding doubt or
search for objective truth, which he regarded as seditious. "Only
ardent faith can make Jewish youth accomplish great deeds", he
wrote (p.27). It is commonly assumed in Israel that Rabin's
beliefs are traceable, via Yigal Alon, to Tabenkin. But
politicians like Rafael Eitan, the leader of the Tzomet party can
also be regarded as Tabenkin's followers. Kafkafi claims that
Tabenkin was influenced by Stalinist and Nazi ideologies,
especially in the crucial period of 1939-1942.
Kafkafi thoroughly documents the adulation of Stalin which
was then common in an important segment of the Zionist Labor
movement. Together with Benny Marshak, subsequently known as "the
politruk of the Palmach", Tabenkin forcefully castigated those who
dared to voice any criticism of the Soviet purges. His argument
was that "as the headquarters of the world revolution, the USSR
has the right to enforce order in its own house". The purges and
the collectivization were according to Tabenkin "a triumph of
humanism" over selfishness. Whoever criticized such "triumphs" was
also a sworn enemy of the kibbutz ideals (p. 30). On the last page
(206) of her book, Kafkafi quotes the clearest version of such
views, expressed in a speech to "activists of new kibbutzim" on
November 14, 1947. "After 1917 the Russian intelligentsia was
unmasked as an enemy of the Revolution. This was why it had to be
discarded and replaced by another intelligentsia. The new
intelligentsia has no conflict of interest with the [Soviet]
authorities, because it is comprised only of individuals whom the
regime uplifted and who therefore owe it their loyalty. This is a
most welcome development". Incidentally, the above mentioned
Flapan professed similar views until the 1980s.
This ideology was even more elaborated after the Molotov-
Ribentrop pact and the partition of Poland by the USSR and Nazi
Germany. Tabenkin did not find it too difficult to adjust to new
circumstances. Kafkafi records that "already on August 29, 1939 he
found that some demands of Hitler were justified, since what
Hitler really wanted was to assemble all Germans in a single
German state". In his diary Tabenkin lists "the ideals of Hitler
which I like: ethnic homogeneity, the possibility of exchange of
ethnic minorities; the transfers of ethnic groups for the sake of
an international order which for me are a particularly valuable
feature". Kafkafi says that earlier Tabenkin had preferred
transfers achieved by "mutual agreement" but eventually came to
the conclusion that if such agreement could not be reached, "let
the aims of Zionism be accomplished by means of a catastrophe".
She comments rightly that for Tabenkin the transfers of ethnic
groups were "an universal value". In the process of "world
revolution" there will be plenty of transfers, including the one
aimed at by Zionism, with the effect that the hotly desired ethnic
homogeneity would be a norm (p. 36). At an ideological seminar
held in Ein Harod in November 1939 Tabenkin justified the German
war aims. Since "capitalistic western democracies" had robbed
Germany of its colonies "Germany had no option but to claim its
due by war". The USSR, however, "was acting in self-defense, just
as our assaults on Arab villages in 1936-39 were acts of self-
defense" (pp. 38-39). In September 1940 Tabenkin said at another
seminar that "'for all the difference between Nazi and Jewish
ethics the former retains its validity'. He defined Nazi Germany
as 'a crystallized power, a bearer of an idea'. Through labor the
Nazis create strong and beautiful Germans who represent the Nazi
ideal" (pp. 42-43). The above mentioned Aharon Megged also began
his career by upholding such ideas against the skeptics. Kafkafi
writes that when an opponent of Tabenkin dared to invoke the value
of individual life, Megged answered that "we have to educate our
youth in an unassailable faith that individual life has value only
as part and parcel of a movement" (p. 44).
Kafkafi admits that explicit commendations of Nazi Germany
ceased to appear after the invasion of the USSR. Yet Nazi ideology
continued to exercise its attractions. In 1942, "when German army
approached the outskirts of Alexandria", Tabenkin made a speech
entitled "Schools for War". In his view the chief educational goal
of the kibbutz should be to mold the children to become good
warriors. He derived this idea from what Plato had written in his
Republic about the education of the "Guardians" and from the
traditional Jewish education. The two coincide because "both mold
the child for a predetermined future". He admitted that in some
distant future the world revolution will create a "Union of
Homogenous Socialist Republics". But until that future "all
problems can be solved only by winning wars". Therefore "the
kindergarten children must learn to play with toy revolvers",
whereas the school children should engage in "exercises devised to
guarantee a complete mastery over one's body as needed by every
warrior", while at the same time learning to admire heroism and
self-sacrifice as exemplified by the Bible, Jewish history and
literature. Kafkafi stresses that "in spite of the closeness of
German army to Palestine, Tabenkin meant to educate Jewish
children for the war against the Arabs, not the Germans". He
advised kibbutz educators "to learn how the Nazis and the Soviets
have succeeded in educating their warriors". Tabenkin opposed
inculcation of hatred "even toward the Arabs", because hatred was
supposed to make a warrior less effectual (an idea common in
Israel even now). But he wanted to indoctrinate the children in a
modicum of anti-Arab hatred, only without going into excesses. Due
to Tabenkin's great authority, overt opposition to his ideas was
voiced only "by a single educator devoid of influence, Avraham
Cohen from kibbutz Ma'oz Hayim, a recent new immigrant from
Germany, who said that those ideas reminded him of the Nazi
education". Other important kibbutz educators and leaders either
supported Tabenkin or had merely tactical objections. For example,
one of them objected that too heavy a stress on heroism was likely
to bore the children. This is why the message must be conveyed on
to them gradually (pp. 52-55).
The remainder of Kafkafi's book leaves no doubt that through
the medium of Palmach which in its formative period was located in
"Ha'Kibbutz Ha'Me'uhad" kibbutzim, Tabenkin's ideology strongly
influenced the commanders of the 1948 War. In addition to
clarifying "what happened in 1948", the "new historians" have
contributed a lot to our understanding of the ideological
preconceptions of that time.
***************Langt sitat slutt******************
Knut Rognes