Jeg legger ut Chomsky's kommentarer til Kosovo-avtalen fra ZNet:
(http://www.zmag.org/peace_accord.htm)
Knut Rognes
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Kosovo Peace Accord (Z, July '99)
By Noam Chomsky
On March 24, U.S.-led NATO air forces began to pound the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FYR, Serbia and Montenegro), including Kosovo, which NATO
regards as a province of Serbia. On June 3, NATO and Serbia reached a Peace
Accord. The U.S. declared victory, having successfully concluded its
"10-week struggle to compel Mr. Milosevic to say uncle," Blaine Harden
reported in the New York Times. It would therefore be unnecessary to use
ground forces to "cleanse Serbia" as Harden had recommended in a lead story
headlined "How to Cleanse Serbia." The recommendation was natural in the
light of American history, which is dominated by the theme of ethnic
cleansing from its origins and to the present day, achievements celebrated
in the names given to military attack helicopters and other weapons of
destruction. A qualification is in order, however: the term "ethnic
cleansing" is not really appropriate: U.S. cleansing operations have been
ecumenical; Indochina and Central America are two recent illustrations.
While declaring victory, Washington did not yet declare peace: the bombing
continues until the victors determine that their interpretation of the
Kosovo Accord has been imposed. From the outset, the bombing had been cast
as a matter of cosmic significance, a test of a New Humanism, in which the
"enlightened states" (Foreign Affairs) open a new era of human history
guided by "a new internationalism where the brutal repression of whole
ethnic groups will no longer be tolerated" (Tony Blair). The enlightened
states are the United States and its British associate, perhaps also others
who enlist in their crusades for justice.
Apparently the rank of "enlightened states" is conferred by definition. One
finds no attempt to provide evidence or argument, surely not from their
history. The latter is in any event deemed irrelevant by the familiar
doctrine of "change of course," invoked regularly in the ideological
institutions to dispatch the past into the deepest recesses of the memory
hole, thus deterring the threat that some might ask the most obvious
questions: with institutional structures and distribution of power
essentially unchanged, why should one expect a radical shift in policy --
or any at all, apart from tactical adjustments?
But such questions are off the agenda. "From the start the Kosovo problem
has been about how we should react when bad things happen in unimportant
places," global analyst Thomas Friedman explained in the New York Times as
the Accord was announced. He proceeds to laud the enlightened states for
pursuing his moral principle that "once the refugee evictions began,
ignoring Kosovo would be wrong...and therefore using a huge air war for a
limited objective was the only thing that made sense."
A minor difficulty is that concern over the "refugee evictions" could not
have been the motive for the "huge air war." The United Nations
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported its first registered refugees
outside of Kosovo on March 27 (4000), three days after the bombings began.
The toll increased until June 4, reaching a reported total of 670,000 in
the neighboring countries (Albania, Macedonia), along with an estimated
70,000 in Montenegro (within the FYR), and 75,000 who had left for other
countries. The figures, which are unfortunately all too familiar, do not
include the unknown numbers who have been displaced within Kosovo, some
2-300,000 in the year before the bombing according to NATO, a great many
more afterwards.
Uncontroversially, the "huge air war" precipitated a sharp escalation of
ethnic cleansing and other atrocities. That much has been reported
consistently by correspondents on the scene and in retrospective analyses
in the press. The same picture is presented in the two major documents that
seek to portray the bombing as a reaction to the humanitarian crisis in
Kosovo. The most extensive one, provided by the State Department in May, is
suitably entitled "Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo"; the second
is the Indictment of Milosevic and associates by the International Tribunal
on War Crimes in Yugoslavia after the U.S. and Britain "opened the way for
what amounted to a remarkably fast indictment by giving [prosecutor Louise]
Arbour access to intelligence and other information long denied to her by
Western governments," the New York Times reported, with two full pages
devoted to the Indictment. Both documents hold that the atrocities began
"on or about January 1"; in both, however, the detailed chronology reveals
that atrocities continued about as before until the bombing led to a very
sharp escalation. That surely came as no surprise. Commanding General
Wesley Clark at once described these consequences as "entirely predictable"
-- an exaggeration of course; nothing in human affairs is that predictable,
though ample evidence is now available revealing that the consequences were
anticipated, for reasons readily understood without access to secret
intelligence.
One small index of the effects of "the huge air war" was offered by Robert
Hayden, director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies of the
University of Pittsburgh: "the casualties among Serb civilians in the first
three weeks of the war are higher than all of the casualties on both sides
in Kosovo in the three months that led up to this war, and yet those three
months were supposed to be a humanitarian catastrophe." True, these
particular consequences are of no account in the context of the jingoist
hysteria that was whipped up to demonize Serbs, reaching intriguing heights
as bombing openly targeted the civilian society and hence required more
fervent advocacy.
By chance, at least a hint of a more credible answer to Friedman's
rhetorical question was given in the Times on the same day in a report from
Ankara by Stephen Kinzer. He writes that "Turkey's best-known human rights
advocate entered prison" to serve his sentence for having "urged the state
to reach a peaceful settlement with Kurdish rebels." A few days earlier,
Kinzer had indicated obliquely that there is more to the story: "Some
[Kurds] say they have been oppressed under Turkish rule, but the Government
insists that they are granted the same rights as other citizens." One may
ask whether this really does justice to some of the most extreme ethnic
cleansing operations of the mid '90s, with tens of thousands killed, 3500
villages destroyed, some 2.5 to 3 million refugees, and hideous atrocities
that easily compare to those recorded daily in the front pages for selected
enemies, reported in detail by the major human rights organizations but
ignored. These achievements were carried out thanks to massive military
support from the United States, increasing under Clinton as the atrocities
peaked, including jet planes, attack helicopters, counterinsurgency
equipment, and other means of terror and destruction, along with training
and intelligence information for some of the worst killers.
Recall that these crimes have been proceeding through the '90s within NATO
itself, and under the jurisdiction of the Council of Europe and the
European Court of Human Rights, which continues to hand down judgments
against Turkey for its U.S.-supported atrocities. It took real discipline
for participants and commentators "not to notice" any of this at the
celebration of NATO's 50th anniversary in April. The discipline was
particularly impressive in light of the fact that the celebration was
clouded by somber concerns over ethnic cleansing -- by
officially-designated enemies, not by the enlightened states that are to
rededicate themselves to their traditional mission of bringing justice and
freedom to the suffering people of the world, and to defend human rights,
by force if necessary, under the principles of the New Humanism.
These crimes, to be sure, are only one illustration of the answer given by
the enlightened states to the profound question of "how we should react
when bad things happen in unimportant places." We should intervene to
escalate the atrocities, not "looking away" under a "double standard," the
common evasion when such marginalia are impolitely adduced. That also
happens to be the mission that was conducted in Kosovo, as revealed clearly
by the course of events, though not the version refracted through the prism
of ideology and doctrine, which do not gladly tolerate the observation that
a consequence of the "the huge air war" was a change from a year of
atrocities on the scale of the annual (U.S.-backed) toll in Colombia in the
1990s to a level that might have approached atrocities within NATO/Europe
itself in the 1990s had the bombing continued.
The marching orders from Washington, however, are the usual ones: Focus
laser-like on the crimes of today's official enemy, and do not allow
yourself to be distracted by comparable or worse crimes that could easily
be mitigated or terminated thanks to the crucial role of the enlightened
states in perpetuating them, or escalating them when power interests so
dictate. Let us obey the orders, then, and keep to Kosovo.
A minimally serious investigaton of the Kosovo Accord must review the
diplomatic options of March 23, the day before "huge air war" was launched,
and compare them with the agreement reached by NATO and Serbia on June 3.
Here we have to distinguish two versions: (1) the facts, and (2) the spin
-- that is, the U.S./NATO version that frames reporting and commentary in
the enlightened states. Even the most cursory look reveals that the facts
and the spin differ sharply. Thus the New York Times presented the text of
the Accord with an insert headed: "Two Peace Plans: How they Differ." The
two peace plans are the Rambouillet (Interim) Agreement presented to Serbia
as a take-it-or-be-bombed ultimatum on March 23, and the Kosovo Peace
Accord of June 3. But in the real world there are three "peace plans," two
of which were on the table on March 23: the Rambouillet Agreement and the
Serb National Assembly Resolutions responding to it.
Let us begin with the two peace plans of March 23, asking how they differed
and how they compare with the Kosovo Peace Accord of June 3, then turning
briefly to what we might reasonably expect if we break the rules and pay
some attention to the (ample) precedents.
The Rambouillet Agreement called for complete military occupation and
political control of Kosovo by NATO, and effective NATO military occupation
of the rest of Yugoslavia at NATO's will. NATO is to "constitute and lead a
military force" (KFOR) that "NATO will establish and deploy" in and around
Kosovo, "operating under the authority and subject to the direction and
political control of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) through the NATO
chain of command"; "the KFOR commander is the final authority within
theater regarding interpretation of this chapter [Implementation of the
Agreement] and his interpretations are binding on all Parties and persons"
(with an irrelevant qualification). Within a brief time schedule, all
Yugoslav army forces and Ministry of Interior police are to redeploy to
"approved cantonment sites," then to withdraw to Serbia, apart from small
units assigned to border guard duties with limited weapons (all specified
in detail). These units would be restricted to defending the borders from
attack and "controlling illicit border crossings," and not permitted to
travel in Kosovo apart from these functions.
"Three years after the entry into force of this Agreement, an international
meeting shall to be convened to determine a mechanisms for a final
settlement for Kosovo." This paragraph has regularly been construed as
calling for a referendum on independence, not mentioned.
With regard to the rest of Yugoslavia, the terms for the occupation are set
forth in Appendix B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation
Force. The crucial paragraph reads: 8. NATO personnel shall enjoy, together
with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and
unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including
associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any
areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations. The
remainder spells out the conditions that permit NATO forces and those they
employ to act as they choose throughout the territory of the FRY, without
obligation or concern for the laws of the country or the jurisdiction of
its authorities, who are, however, required to follow NATO orders "on a
priority basis and with all appropriate means." One provision states that
"all NATO personnel shall respect the laws applicable in the FRY...," but
with a qualification to render it vacuous: "Without prejudice to their
privileges and immunities under this Appendix, all NATO personnel...."
It has been speculated that the wording was designed so as to guarantee
rejection. Perhaps so. It is hard to imagine that any country would
consider such terms, except in the form of unconditional surrender.
In the massive coverage of the war one will find little reference to the
Agreement that is even close to accurate, notably the crucial article of
Appendix B just quoted. The latter was, however, reported as soon as it had
become irrelevant to democratic choice. On June 5, after the peace
agreement of June 3, the New York Times reported that under the annex to
the Rambouillet Agreement "a purely NATO force was to be given full
permission to go anywhere it wanted in Yugoslavia, immune from any legal
process," citing also the wording. Evidently, in the absence of clear and
repeated explanation of the basic terms of the Rambouillet Agreement -- the
official "peace process" -- it has been impossible for the public to gain
any serious understanding of what was taking place, or to assess the
accuracy of the preferred version of the Kosovo Accord.
The second peace plan was presented in resolutions of the Serbian National
Assembly on March 23. The Assembly rejected the demand for NATO military
occupation, and called on the OSCE (Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe) and the UN to facilitate a peaceful diplomatic
settlement. It condemned the withdrawal of the OSCE Kosovo Verification
Mission ordered by the United States on March 19 in preparation for the
March 24 bombing. The resolutions called for negotiations leading "toward
the reaching of a political agreement on a wide-ranging autonomy for Kosovo
and Metohija [the official name for the province], with the securing of a
full equality of all citizens and ethnic communities and with respect for
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Furthermore, though "The Serbian
Parliament does not accept presence of foreign military troops in Kosovo
and Metohija," The Serbian Parliament is ready to review the size and
character of the international presence in Kosmet [Kosovo/Metohija] for
carrying out the reached accord, immediately upon signing the political
accord on the self-rule agreed and accepted by the representatives of all
national communities living in Kosovo and Metohija.
The essentials of these decisions were reported on major wire services and
therefore certainly known to every news room. Several database searchs have
found scarce mention, none in the national press and major journals.
The two peace plans of March 23 thus remain unknown to the general public,
even the fact that there were two, not one. The standard line is that
"Milosevic's refusal to accept...or even discuss an international
peacekeeping plan [namely, the Rambouillet Agreement] was what started NATO
bombing on March 24" (Craig Whitney, New York Times), one of the many
articles deploring Serbian propaganda -- accurately no doubt, but with a
few oversights.
As to what the Serb National Assembly Resolutions meant, the answers are
known with confidence by fanatics -- different answers, depending on which
variety of fanatics they are. For others, there would have been a way to
find out the answers: to explore the possibilities. But the enlightened
states preferred not to pursue this option; rather, to bomb, with the
anticipated consequences.
Further steps in the diplomatic process, and their refraction in the
doctrinal institutions, merit attention, but I will skip that here, turning
to the Kosovo Accord of June 3. As might have been expected, it is a
compromise between the two peace plans of March 23. On paper at least, the
U.S./NATO abandoned their major demands, cited above, which had led to
Serbia's rejection of the ultimatum. Serbia in turn agreed to an
"international security presence with substantial NATO participation
[which] must be deployed under unified command and control...under U.N
auspices." An addendum to the text stated "Russia's position [that] the
Russian contingent will not be under NATO command and its relationship to
the international presence will be governed by relevant additional
agreements." There are no terms permitting access to the rest of the FYR
for NATO or the "international security presence" generally. Political
control of Kosovo is not to be in the hands of NATO but of the UN Security
Council, which will establish "an interim administration of Kosovo." The
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces is not specified in the detail of the
Rambouillet Agreement, but is similar, though accelerated. The remainder is
within the range of agreement of the two plans of March 23.
The outcome suggests that diplomatic initiatives could have been pursued on
March 23, averting a terrible human tragedy with consequences that will
reverberate in Yugoslavia and elsewhere, and are in many respects quite
ominous.
To be sure, the current situation is not that of March 23. A Times headline
the day of the Kosovo Accord captures it accurately: "Kosovo Problems Just
Beginning." Among the "staggering problems" that lie ahead, Serge Schmemann
observed, are the repatriation of the refugees "to the land of ashes and
graves that was their home," and the "enormously costly challenge of
rebuilding the devastated economies of Kosovo, the rest of Serbia and their
neighbors." He quotes Balkans historian Susan Woodward of the Brookings
Institution, who adds "that all the people we want to help us make a stable
Kosovo have been destroyed by the effects of the bombings," leaving control
in the hands of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army). The U.S. had strongly
condemned the KLA as "without any question a terrorist group" when it began
to carry out organized attacks in February 1998, actions that Washington
condemned "very strongly" as "terrorist activities," probably giving a
"green light" thereby to Milosevic for the severe repression that led to
the Colombia-style violence before the bombings precipitated a sharp
escalation.
These "staggering problems" are new. They are "the effects of the bombings"
and the vicious Serb reaction to them, though the problems that preceded
the resort to violence by the enlightened states were daunting enough.
Turning from facts to spin, headlines hailed the grand victory of the
enlightened states and their leaders, who compelled Milosevic to
"capitulate," to "say uncle," to accept a "NATO-led force," and to
surrender "as close to unconditionally as anyone might have imagined,"
submitting to "a worse deal than the Rambouillet plan he rejected." Not
exactly the story, but one that is far more useful than the facts. The only
serious issue debated is whether this shows that air power alone can
achieve highly moral purposes, or whether, as the critics allowed into the
debate allege, the case still has not been proven. Turning to broader
significance, Britain's "eminent military historian" John Keegan "sees the
war as a victory not just for air power but for the `New World Order' that
President Bush declared after the Gulf War," military expert Fred Kaplan
reports. Keegan wrote that "If Milosevic really is a beaten man, all other
would-be Milosevics around the world will have to reconsider their plans."
The assessment is realistic, though not in the terms Keegan may have had in
mind: rather, in the light of the actual goals and significance of the New
World Order, as revealed by an important documentary record of the '90s
that remains unreported, and a plethora of factual evidence that helps us
understand the true meaning of the phrase "Milosevics around the world."
Merely to keep to the Balkans region, the strictures do not hold of huge
ethnic cleansing operations and terrible atrocities within NATO itself,
under European jurisdiction and with decisive and mounting U.S. support,
and not conducted in response to an attack by the world's most awesome
military force and the imminent threat of invasion. These crimes are
legitimate under the rules of the New World Order, perhaps even
meritorious, as are atrocities elsewhere that conform to the perceived
interests of the leaders of the enlightened states and are regularly
implemented by them when necessary. These facts, not particularly obscure,
reveal that in the "new internationalism...the brutal repression of whole
ethnic groups" will not merely be "tolerated," but actively expedited --
exactly as in the "old internationalism" of the Concert of Europe, the U.S.
itself, and many other distinguished predecessors.
While the facts and the spin differ sharply, one might argue that the media
and commentators are realistic when they present the U.S./NATO version as
if it were the facts. It will become The Facts as a simple consequence of
the distribution of power and the willingness of articulate opinion to
serve its needs. That is a regular phenomenon. Recent examples include the
Paris Peace Treaty of January 1973 and the Esquipulas Accords of August
1987. In the former case, the U.S. was compelled to sign after the failure
of the Christmas bombings to induce Hanoi to abandon the U.S.-Vietnam
agreement of the preceding October. Kissinger and the White House at once
announced quite lucidly that they would violate every significant element
of the Treaty they were signing, presenting a different version which was
adopted in reporting and commentary, so that when North Vietnam finally
responded to serious U.S. violations of the accords, it became the
incorrigible aggressor which had to be punished once again, as it was. The
same tragedy/farce took place when the Central American Presidents reached
the Esquipulas Accord (often called "the Arias plan") over strong U.S.
opposition. Washington at once sharply escalated its wars in violation of
the one "indispensable element" of the Accord, then proceeded to dismantle
its other provisions by force, succeeding within a few months, and
continuing to undermine every further diplomatic effort until its final
victory. Washington's version of the Accord, which sharply deviated from it
in crucial respects, became the accepted version. The outcome could
therefore be heralded in headlines as a "Victory for U.S. Fair Play" with
Americans "United in Joy" over the devastation and bloodshed, overcome with
rapture "in a romantic age" (Anthony Lewis, headlines in New York Times,
all reflecting the general euphoria over a mission accomplished).
It is superfluous to review the aftermath in these and numerous similar
cases. There is little reason to expect a different story to unfold in the
present case -- with the usual and crucial proviso: If we let it.
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