Staale Sinding-Larsen

**THE BURDEN OF THE CEREMONY MASTER**

*Image and action in San Marco, Venice, and in an Islamic mosque.*

Including the *Rituum Cerimoniale* (Indices, Introductionss and Dominicale) of 1564.

[http://folk.ntnu.no/staalesl/books.html](http://folk.ntnu.no/staalesl/books.html)


*Review by Ruth Simon/Schilling, Institut für Geschichtswissenschaften, Humboldt-Universität, Berlin:*


Additions related to SL, *Burden* and to SL, *Patterns*

End of Part I.4.1

*Addition 2011*

*Scientific foundations, systems idea and the study of art history.*

End of Part II:

*Addition 2011:*

*The Wednesday rite*

IV, 1:

*Addition 2011*


*Preface to this edition.*

More than a decade has passed since the original edition of this book (Rome, 2000), and today I would revise, more or less substantially, numerous points, especially in Part V. Publications of this type represent stages in a process, and work No. B will necessarily bring revisions of arguments presented in A.

We live, fortunately, in the High-Tech age, and having a friend represent-
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The present version is reduced, remaining focused on methodology and theory in view rather than substantive issues. All the original illustrations and graphic models, except Model 2, Programmatic System (IV,1), have been left out, while retaining the references to them (for a listing, see the end of this section). The reader who wants to evaluate the discussion at closer quarters, is referred to the printed edition, to be consulted at any bigger library. In the present internet version the notes have been integrated in the text body. The Appendix with a large section from The Rituum Cerimoniale of 1564 is included, and the references to this Appendix have been kept. The originatl Index referred not to pages but to Sections and has been omitted.

Methodologically speaking, the following personal publications represent follow-ups to this book:

1. Patterns and programs in premodern Rome = http://ntnu.no/bht/arkitekturhistorie, The Norwegian Institute of Technology (NTH/NTNU) 2010 (also to be freely used; largely dependent upon the present text);


Graphic models in the printed version, * for the most important ones

Page references to the printed book (in brackets, to the present net version):

Model 1 (Epiphany ritual): 100f. (131)
Model 3 (General ritual) 165 (216)*
Model 4.1 (Roman "tree") 199 (266)*
Model 4.1.A (*Christ enthroned semantics*) 204 (273)

Model 4.2 (*Islamic "tree")* 206 (275)*

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To Liv Erstad Sinding-Larsen

Ich wil ûch vndervisen / von den kochenspisen, / dersin niht versten kan,/ der sol diz bûch sehen an (Daz bûch von güter spise, Würzburg ca. 1350)

PREFACE

Some years ago I came across an article with the provocative title, Die Grenzen der Koranforschung. My reaction to such a surgical proposition was: So ein Ding müssen wir auch haben (to stay in the language). For in Art History a lot of things are done but one doesn't know very clearly what, since limits of scope and possibility are rarely on the agenda. And yet, in some circles, mostly in the US, there is an increasing discomfort with the way the discipline has been traditionally conducted and still seems to dominate some recent large-scale ventures.

Since the mid-1970s I had at my disposal a large and well-documented material concerning San Marco in Venice: the Rituum cerimoniale in the Marciana library (in my transcription sponsored by the Norwegian Research Council) and the Cicogna 1609 in the Correr library (in photo), both in Venice. I thought such a material would be suited for discussing limitation issues, and the present
book, the first version of which was written in 1996, is the outcome.

My book comments, and presents in the Appendix in the printed book of 2000, the main part of a ceremonial document written by the Ceremony Master of San Marco, Venice, whose name was Bartolomeo Bonifacio (he died in 1564). It took considerable time and care to transcribe the manuscript. This work was sponsored by the Norwegian Research Council for Science and the Humanities: NAVF (when this outfit still seemed able to handle complex texts). The manuscript, *Rituum cerimoniale*, today is in the Biblioteca Marciana, Venice. The document is in great demand among scholars in several fields. It is very hard to read, almost every page containing sections that have been in part over-written, crossed-out or corrected in the margin. Very many additions inserted later than in the sixteenth century have been crossed out; a few additions have been completely obliterated (the other extant copies do not have these illuminating extras). It is my hope that my publication of the *Introduction, Index and Liber Primus (Dominicale)* may be of use to scholarship, even though, as I hasten to add, I publish it as I read it, without any critical apparatus, which it would be outside my competences to provide: on the recommendation of the Rev. Don Bruno Bertoli, rector of the Studium Cattolico Veneziano.

On the *piano nobile* level this book is about research and analysis of complex situations involving visual media; and which situation does not? On the *attico* level, as a consequence, it is about the fuzzy triangular relationship “real world” – *Science* – *the Humanities*. Its main tenet is that all situations are complex. Writing, we create largely unsurveyable universes packed with slippery things. The attitude facing this that is recommend is the attitude taken by Cardinal Nikolas von Kues (*Cusano*; 1401 – 1464) concerning a more measurable but, in his time, equally evasive subject: cosmology. In the summary of the superior historian Marie Boas (in her classic *The scientific Renaissance, 1450 – 1630*), Cusanus is reported as holding such radical views as these (in his *De docta ignorantia* of 1440 – published before cosmology became a dangerous subject): cosmos represents a complexity whose order we cannot conceive; nothing is fixed, all is relative (*the centre is everywhere and nowhere*); all things are in motion, even the centre of the universe; nor is there a constant uniform motion. And Boas comments: *Though Cues worked out his system in some detail, he intended only to show the philosophical necessity for breaking with the concept of an ordered universe ....*

At all crucial points I am using graphic models. The reader should realize that such models are not illustrations to the verbal text but tools of argumentation in their own right; the general picture is a product of the interaction between graphic and verbal discourse.

These models are developed, in terms of metaphors, one might say, from computer-operated models in Artificial Intelligence and Cognition. At this point
I want to note that much of my argumentation touches more or less directly on the Theory of Science (the latter noun in the sense of covering also the Humanities and the Social Sciences). In view of the present-day development of Interdisciplinarity, it has become a critical issue (neglected in all textbooks on the subject that I have come across) to see whether and how manually-operated models may be made commensurable and comparable to the machine-operated ones. My discussion turns on this issue, too.

The gist of what I am trying to say, is this. You cannot deny that the situations we are facing in our ordinary research are at least as complex as I am showing. So you cannot deny that the possibilities for our handling them that I propose represent a maximum of what we can do - in principle, for I am not saying there are not better specific methods than those that I am presenting. Thus scope and range of Humanities and the Social Sciences are severely reduced in comparison with what is being usually claimed or, indeed, taken for granted. Galileo Galilei's realistic attitude is recommendable: we can describe how things work but are not in the position of providing any deeper interpretation and explanation: ... parebemi ardèze, per non dir temerità, la mia, se dentro a gl'angusti confini del mio intendere volessi circumscrivere l'intendere et l'operare della natura (1611; quoted by De Santilana, p. 63). This, let us hope, should reduce the number of pontificating professors on the European Continent.

In the Sciences they take you through an argumentation; in the Humanities they try to convince you. I have opted for the former tack, not wanting to demonstrate anything but attempting to structure an argumentation. This applies especially to the graphic models I am using for monitoring my argumentation. For most cases, there will be available or one may design a vast number of alternative and equally useful graphic models; all of them will be inadequate or insufficient in one or several places, partly because of their static, non-processual character. The purpose of using them in this book is to indicate what kind of structure we are trying to handle. We cannot discuss this if we disregard the very existence of structures, as when, for example, some connoisseurship nostalgics still try to restore the role of the artist against well-documented and professionally indispensable programming ventures on the part of commissioners or their advisors; not grasping the simple fact that the way to “restore” their role is to give them a role instead of a panegyrics; give them a role in an articulate account that doesn’t leave too many crucial issues unexplained.

Approaching historical and social "real world" material is like trying to appreciate some Baroque music: only the external, or top and bottom, levels are fixed and unambiguous, while the middle ones are open to situational variations for which we cannot account in general terms: Bien que les cinq parties [voices] soient écrites, on peut constater de grandes divergences d'une source à l'autre pour les parties intermédiaires, l'essentiel de la substance musicale étant con-
centrée dans les parties de dessus et de basse (Catherine Massip).

The main purpose of my book, then, is to discuss analysis methodology. Some experience in the field of Art History, inciting collaboration with my colleagues Diana Gisolfi, New York, and Åse Ødegaard, Stavanger and Trondheim, Norway, and my numerous rounds of teaching in New York, these factors have all alerted me to the need for clearing up some issues that seem to me crucial and critical in our field of scholarship. I also gratefully acknowledge opportunities for presenting and discussing my ideas granted me by the University of Strasbourg, the École des hautes études in Paris, the Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften (the Krems institute) and a few places in the United States.

I have tried to discuss my views with other people in Art History in Norway, but with varying success: the issue is not a popular one. A colleague blamed me in flaming words for wanting us to re-educate ourselves; but I have always thought this was exactly what scholarship was all about. In a local art-historical association I was met with the comment that it had been more fun if I criticized other people instead of identifying the shortcomings of what I had done myself; and that finding The Truth was the real issue. I asked permission to discuss my views, presented in an Abstract, before an interdisciplinary audience in an Academy of sciences of which I happen to be a member, and was met with the very positive reaction that, yes, they would like something on architecture (my daily job is teaching architecture students in Norway).

Fortunately I have found good helpers, first and foremost the anonymous reader called in by the very helpful Norwegian Research Council. Her or his comments were of such an importance that I shall come back to them in my text. The same applies to comments, linguistic and otherwise, by my colleague and collaborator Prof. Diana Gisolfi: always to the point and blessedly unhampered by traditional art-historical conventions; furthermore a born Catholic and thus having many things at her finger tips with which so few art historians after the last war have even elementary conversance. Collaboration in several other connections, also concerning San Marco, with Prof. Åse Ødegaard, also has been very stimulating and in many respects eye-opening. By literally dragging me into problems of modern art, far beyond my competences, she has made me take issues seriously that I had formerly tried to ignore and which plays an indirect role in the present book: a strong and continuous encouragement for my "modernistic" venture.

To my old friend Herbert Lindenberger at Stanford I have a great debt of gratitude for his continuous presence - across that great distance in miles - and for the inspiration and encouragement I have had from his books, his conversation and letters - and e-mails! He has an uncanny ability of absorbing a mass of ideas and perspectives, digesting them and sending back to you a synthesis through which you discover things about yourself you were not aware of.
Professional help I have enjoyed also from the widely-oriented Prof. Roy Eriksen, who represents a strongly needed interdisciplinary factor at the Norwegian Institute in Rome (University of Oslo). My thanks also to the Director, Prof. Rasmus Brandt.

Staying in institute context, I must record the comradesship and help from the members of the Institute of Architectural History in Norway (my working basis): Knut Einar Larsen, Dag Nilsen, Kerstin Gjesdahl Noach, Astrid Waage and Ellen Woldseth; and the unfailing helpfulness from other staff and colleagues at the Faculty of Architecture of my school in Norway. I will always remember, with thanks, the friendly teaching I have enjoyed from the architects. Collaboration with them also took me into involvements in modern urban problems: a chair job in a "pilot" city renovation project under our Ministry of Environment; a consultation paper on urban conservation in Europe commissioned by the Council of Europe. I mention these urban subjects, for I believe they have helped me indirectly in my attempt to come to grips with such a complex system as presented in this book.

But I have been even more lucky than accounted for so far. I have shared a relatively long life with a person endowed with a series of constructive properties, from human richness over analytical acumen to philological and linguistic expertise, that have been always crucial factors in my professional life. So the book is hers; it is for Liv Erstad (in Sinding-Larsen, as we say in Italy).


S. S.-L.

PART I. FACING COMPLEXITY
1. A SIDEWISE VIEW

One of the titles used in the 1560s by the Ceremony Master of the government church of the Republic of Venice, San Marco, was Magister chori, because the sanctuary with the high altar was his principal working place. Considering his field of action, then, this area is of primary interest. But in fact he had to control rites that spread out over most sections in, and even outside, the building. He managed an enormously complex system of actions and processes and it comes as no surprise that he, as we shall hear later, complained of getting all the blame whenever someone made a mistake: his was, he said, "not an easy burden".

It is my intention to use this system for developing analysis frameworks for visual media, such as pictures and inscriptions, involved in the system. Such an entreprise will inevitably be accompanied by mistakes, but at least I have the consolation that they will all be my own.

Visiting the church of San Marco in Venice today with a view to a pro-
longed contemplation of the interior scenery is quite an adventure

In the morning the building is accessible to participants in prayers and in Mass celebration and no one else (and who wants to disturb them anyway?); later in the day, streams of tourists fill up the cordoned corridors erected for leading them through the church. The only possibility then is to steal in early in the morning and sit silently in a meditative attitude and try to aim one's eyes on the points of interest without drawing attention or distracting other people. This obviously one cannot do right in front of the major "sights". The sanctuary with the high altar is packed with tourist attractions. It doesn't do, in this early morning hour, to try to look meditative in front of this area, especially as everybody else assemble in the north transept, either in front of the much-vene-

rated Nicopeia Madonna or in the Cappella di Sant'Isidoro, where early morn-
ing litanies are recited and masses are celebrated. The most likely thing is to sit slightly to the north of the space in front of the high altar, thus having the Nicopeia Madonna obliquely to the left, almost in front of one, sufficiently in one's focus to lend a plausible air to one's sitting there.

But I want to contemplate the high altar space in order to write the present book and all I get is a sidewise view of it, with essential features concealed. Moving along with the tourists I can certainly at some later time take a look at everything interesting there, or ask the Proto di San Marco, the extremely helpful architect Dr. Ettore Vio, for a special permission to see what I want. But I want to meditate over the scenery and let historical and other associations fill my mind.

What's wrong about a sidewise view that reveals some but not all the features in the contemplated scenery? The undisturbed sidewise view shows me something that a straight frontal one might not. Looking straight and frontally at the high altar scene would strengthen any illusion I might have of gaining complete conceptual control of what I am beholding, of seeing "everything in its right order", creating the same kind of sham reality that the central perspective has been often blamed for by artists and others. The sidewise view shows me something of the main space and also the space right in front of the main scenery. I note that it looks empty and feel that it should be filled with some activity. The high-altar space itself conceals from my view its inner reaches and thus affords scope to my imagination and provokes it. I am driven to supply, mentally, not only some columns, furniture and other things, but also, again, activities, people doing things. I believe that even if I had been able to see everything in there, some essential signs of life would be lacking. Everything not being obvious forces the imagination. And there can be no sci-
cientific account without the employment of our creative imagination. My view, even as I sit here looking sidewise at my object, is conditioned by present circumstances and I must try to get beyond them and figure out what was really going on there at one histor

cal moment

What I see with my physical eyes - on a "retinal view", if you prefer - is this. There are vaults in opaque gold and simple pure colors, mosaics with figures and stories telling something to somebody, all inviting to be filled in by our imagination. Obliquely emerging from the semidarkness of the space is the rood screen, a column system with statuettes of apostles flanking the crucifix, in some golden brownish stone.

In her splendid book, Venetian instrumental music, p.294, Eleanor Selfridge-Field happens on a small mistake when she connects the roodscreen, which she calls an "iconostasis" (in conformity with a very common misuse of the term), with "Byzantine worship practices of earlier times" (my thanks to Diana Gisolfi for introducing me to this publication). The roodscreen served different, and Latin or Roman, practices (see Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and ritual, p. 56, with references).

This seems to tell me that there is something here and something there, in the unseen background. For my unimpeded contemplation, and so also for the congregation participating in the rites through the centuries here, there is, on my side of the main space, a double pulpit, one for recital of the Gospel and one for the Epistles. Below there is one square box erected on the other, in dark glossy stone and supported by dark multicolored shafts of slender columns with brighter bases and capitals. A narrow stair leads up to it, emerging from behind and gradually becoming more evident with its rising side covered by multicolored stone slabs in small blind reddish arches. The upper pulpit is a round lobe-surfaced box in analmost greenish ochre, and, above it, dark red shafts of colonnettes carrying a little cupola with thin ribs running up it, in time-worn gilt bronze. To these warm and subdued tones add the sparkling colors and gold in the vestments used by the clergy we have to imagine celebrating there. Looking further toward the opposite, south, transept, there is, as a pendant to the double pulpit, the great wide open box whose sides are big red slabs in porphyry, the whole resting on ochre marble columns. Here the republic's most important relics were exposed on special occasions in the year, here the newly elected Doge (head of State) was presented to the people (who were supposed to applaud) and here the doge sometimes sat in attendance at Mass celebrated at the high altar behind the rood screen. San Marco was, until the time of Napoleon, not a cathedral but the
government church (Cappella Palatina) of the Venetian Republic.

Looking down to the end of the south transept, I see the door, the so-called Porta Media: here entered the government with the Doge accompanied by the clergy, they all followed "Christ" (a consecrated host or a crucifix) up to the Cappella di San Clemente, next to the sanctuary on the south side. All this scenery seems to be floating on a wavy carpet of incrustated stone floor in mosaic patterns of warm tones.

So here are shells now empty of their historical content (but used very actively today under the new dispensation), shells we have to try to fill with life if we want to gain access to their former significance. Some historical documents may help us in this task. The Master of Ceremonies of San Marco in the second half of the sixteenth century wrote a detailed account of all the rites in his church. Of course, he presents everything as they looked and worked as seen from the vantage point of his duties and his competence, again a sidewise view but a cogent and informative one. He passes lightly over some of the more simple rites while giving us all the details about the complex ones.

No doubt, the Epiphany rites for January 6 belong to the latter, and in this book it will be used, along with other rites, for purposes that will be explained presently. Not only are the actual proceedings complicated but also the significance attributed to them. The Epiphany rite in the sixteenth century took place in front of the high altar. Imagine water and salt being consecrated, a jewel-studded cross being "baptized" in the water like Christ in the river Jordan, and, the doge, the head of the Venetian republic and acting on its behalf, drinking from the baptismal water. The entire rite was intended to evoke three miraculous events: "We celebrate the holy day, marked by three wonderful events: today the star has led the Magi to the crib; today at the wedding, water has been made into wine; today Christ desired to be baptized in the Jordan by John [the Baptist], in order to save us. Alleluia". The Epiphany rite provides a well documented case of a highly complex process.

This book, I should emphasize this point, discusses methodology of research in a field partly constituted by objects that formerly belonged to the more or less exclusive rights of Art History, to develop frameworks for understanding and analysing complex situations involving visual media. Aims, of course, are dependent on what is considered possible or acceptable, so I have to specify them further a little later. As for situations, everything is process; fixation in time and space is an external operative intervention on our part or conceptually on the part of our protagonists. So that situations are patterns of processes described, conceived or configured as units over a shorter or longer time of duration and space extention.

Even if I might be tempted to come up with an account of the function, role and significance of the cross, I certainly could not in seriousness try to
interpret the cross, process and situation I have just referred to. There is, analytically speaking, no front view of this, only sidewise ones, for there is no telling what would constitute a frontal view. For the historical protagonists there is no one correctly reconstructable "their picture", only some sets of shared premises and criterias, such as those established by the rites, by social conventions and so on, premises and criterias for ever-shifting views variable among the people involved.

This may perhaps sound reasonable for the rite just mentioned, but I did start by talking about the area of the main altar as such and later I shall insist on the congregation's frontal focusing on an altar and on images there, including the Virgin image before which the clergy chanted the Salve Regina. How can I say there is no frontal view here? Let us see.

1.1. Points of view

The issue is one of analytical levels. The best way of introducing this term is to quote Richard Dawkins:

*You explain things in a hierarchy of levels. In the case of the computer, you explain the top-level software - something like Microsoft Word - in terms of software one level down, which would be procedures, subprograms, subroutines, and then you explain how they work in terms of another level down. We would go through the levels of machine codes, and we would then go down from machine codes to the levels of semiconductor chips, and then you go down and explain them in terms of physics* (Dawkins in Brockman, *The third culture*, p. 77).

Returning to our topic, on one level we have observable (or documentable, once observable) complex situations and processes of various kinds. Some are almost unsurveyable in "reality" terms, like the Battle of Waterloo (see below), while others are rule-regulated, and this applies to rites and to liturgy especially, with their constitutive and regulative rules (terms from social philosophy) (Hollis, *The philosophy of social science*, pp. 152f.).

There are rules guiding the centralized focusing among the congregation facing an altar and its imagery. These are realities in a common-sense way. Above this level we have the analytical one, with the picture we develop for our handling these situations conceptually and describing them. At this level we have no general rules for viewpoints, as long as we recognize the complexities of situations and processes. But in order to develop methodologies for handling them, it seems useful to concentrate on situations and processes that are to some extent rule-regulated and hence to some extent have preestablished viewpoints. It is with this in view that liturgical cases are being considered in the present book.

Trying to survey a complex situation or process, I often find myself facing what I call the *Waterloo alternatives*. The decisive battle of this name consisted of a number of more or less interconnected time-sequences of events, the whole
aimed at one main goal by each party, that of defeating the enemy, but depending on the attainment of a number of sub-goals concerning specific phases and sections of the battle. We know what happened at the Battle of Waterloo and also more or less its progress over time. Hugo gave an overall view of the whole battle (*Les misérables*), a view that only posteriority has been able to reconstruct but no one present at the battle field could possibly have surveyed. Stendhal, in *La chartreuse de Parme*, saw the battle across a collateral but "emblematic" (as we might say today) episode as witnessed by one person (Fabrice), who had only a very restricted field of vision: all he could really see, was some dead bodies and a couple of generals with attendants riding swiftly by. This is how Stendhal himself referred to a personal war experience: *Nous voyons fort bien, de midi à 3 heures, tout ce qu'on peut voir d'une bataille, c'est à-dire rien* (Stendhal, *La chartreuse de Parme*, introduction by Victor de Litto, pp. XIf. For Victor Hugo: *La bataille, vue par lui, se compose d'une énumération de faits historiquement attestés*, while for Stendhal: ... *pour Fabrice, le champ de bataille de Waterloo se réduit à des détails isolés, sans lien entre eux*..." (De Litto).

Neither of the two cited authors (Hugo, Stendhal) covered more than a fragment of the total event involving thousands and the experience of each and everyone of them, the motivations among many more people than just Napoleon himself and other protagonists. Hugo, in order to tell the "whole truth", had to have recourse to an author's notional omniscience and conceptual penetration à la Henry James: ... *it may be confided to the reader, to whom in the course of our history I shall be under the necessity of imparting much occult information...*(The Bostonians, Ch. 2; but unexpectedly - and illogically - the author does not know: *I know not whether Ransom was aware...*, etc. Ch. 8). From a literary vantage point I must confess to some sympathy for Stendhal, but his method, while attributable to congregation members' situation access and their special view-points, doesn't do for our analysis of the management job of our Ceremony Master. This must be evaluated in its total context (for such "totality", see below). Moreover, his job was particularly comprehensive, since he had to cover the entire situation as far as it was encoded in the written rubrics (instructions of what to recite, sing or do in liturgical books; in red color; rubrus in Latin) and in ecclesiastical tradition.

I can only pretend to invent systems by which to handle the process and the dynamics of the situation - how do things work, how do people handle them? - without claiming to say anything about any "the correct understanding". An anonymous Reader's comment on an earlier version of the present work took it for granted that I went in for interpretation along "hermeneutic" lines and quoted in support an inadequate statement of mine: *Our analysis of a situation should result in a picture that to some extent corresponds, recon-
*structively, to their picture*. I did mean (but did not say so clearly) *picture* in the above operative sense of mental actions or conceptualization processes, not any *the meaning*.

Reader's comments are useful under three headings: 1. by pointing up inconsistencies, unclarities and poor communicative techniques; 2. by understanding the text differently (at least in part) from what the author intended: thus unwittingly alerting the author not merely to logical and communication shortcomings but also, and importantly, to implications and consequences she or he was not sufficiently conscious about; 3. by helping the author see theoretical problems that are not accounted for. These three points in fact describe the development of science and scholarship in general, if we substitute *competing scholars* and *later scholarship* for the Reader.

2. TOOLS OF ANALYSIS

The cited Reader's statement helped me to see that I had misformulated my intention on one point. I am not concerned with interpretation but with frameworks for analysis of scenarios and configurations, treated at greater length in subsequent chapters (see my 13 points in Chapter 4.4.). I do not regard it as possible to go any further than just this.

But before doing this, let me briefly introduce some of my key terms, among them configuration. The corresponding concepts will be elaborated as work proceeds. Visual or visualizable concepts make up a structure: such a cluster is a configuration: a structured cluster of concepts that can be seen and/or visualized; visualizable structures of physical, cognitive, conceptual and emotional features in interaction in patterns of focusing processes. Configurations in this sense are conceptual units conceived as such and as relevant under the "rules" inherent in a person's or group's specific scenario (for rules, see...). We create configurations by focusing processes guided by criteria and goals laid down in specific scenarios. Significant features in these are those that were/are felt as being so by the protagonists themselves and also those that, perhaps not always consciously, they acted upon, both physically and mentally or conceptually. It is clusters of such features, when they are felt and acted upon as if they were to some extent identifiable units that I call scenarios; our scenario, in terms of some framework containing the criteria and premises for approaching reality on the scene. To elaborate, a scenario is the analytical or operational working ground, or the image of one, selectively extracted from the situation or process that the analyst studies or in which the protagonists are involved or feel themselves as being involved, or act as if they were so. Their scenarios, which are operative with regard to specific tasks, goals or requirements, emerge from their relevance situation (for example, a set of rites with some people interacting
within them by some specific criteria of value) and contain premises and criteria for developing configurations. Visual or visualizable concepts importantly in their focus within the specific scenario are configurations. Let me note that I use concept in Putnam's sense (see Part V, Chapter 4), as idea units that are attended by abilities to handle them appropriately (notion as a noun, not as an adjective, I use for rule-regulated or public ideas). Configurations are not a thing but operation on notions and concepts.

A framework is the set of activized and activizable criteria, conditions and goals from which various scenarios are derived for developing configurations connected with the actual scene (see the 11 first among my 13 points in Chapter 4.4.). Frameworks are our set of analytical tools, such as types of models and their theoretical support, our main criterias and goals and the types of scenario they are meant to handle, including the criteria, conditions and goals for the operation. Thus frameworks are in use at every level. And the Ceremony Master and our notional historical protagonists also operate within their frameworks for their different17 intellectual and conceptual operations, such as those regarding specific scenarios for configuration development.

3. INTERDISCIPLINARITY

Complexity today is a theme for research in many fields, and it is high time the issue is taken seriously also in Art History (A useful survey in Coveney and Highfield, Frontiers of complexity; see also Gell-Mann, The quark and the jaguar; and Brockman, The third culture). Complexity comes in at least two versions. One arises from systems awareness. Consciousness of "total" environment, total political representation and participation and also new holistic perspectives in science, such paradigms have alerted modern society to becoming more aware of the interdependency between a great number of factors. Next, loss of simple truths and awareness of the relativity of most things, even the "hardest", do not make things easier to survey. The subject has a long prehistory going back at least to the "loss of certainty" (Morris Kline). (M. Kline, Mathematics, The loss of certainty in mathematics starting already in the eighteenth century, to the recognition of non-euclidean geometries, to Heisenberg's uncertainty principle (Non-technical account in David C. Cassidy, Uncertainty, pp. 227f.), Bohr's Copenhagen interpretation in atomic physics, and Gödel's theorem (1931) about the unsolvability of consistent arithmetic systems by appealing to elements within the system itself (Non-technical in E. Nagel and J. R. Newman, Gödel's proof, and S. G. Shanker, ed., Gödel's theorem in focus). Just after the War, in 1947, Herbert A. Simon, in his Administrative behavior, expressed a deep scepticism against neo-classical economics with its presup-
posed "rationality" and advocated instead a paradigm based on *bounded rationality*, a model by which our allegedly rational behavior is bounded by irrational attitudes that have a decisive effect on our decisions (Herbert A. Simon, Administrative behavior; brief account in his autobiography, *Models of my life*, pp. 85 - 88: *Rationality, then, does not determine behavior. Within the area of rationality behavior is perfectly flexible and adaptable to abilities, goals, and knowledge. Instead, behavior is determined by the irrational and nonrational elements that bound the area of rationality*. A non-technical account in his Reason in human affairs, esp. pp. 19 - 23.). To cap it all, we now have a flourishing "chaos" science, originating in some respects in our weather forecasts, as well as "fuzzy logic" (*Chaos: an excellent introduction is James Gleick, Chaos. Making a new science*). And we have, of course, curious conflations of physics and Zen Buddhism. In architecture the interest was heralded by the important book by Robert Venturi, Complexity and contradiction, of 1966. The idea that so-called "Post-modernity" means a novelty in that this somewhat confused creed has said *Godbye to all that* (Robert Graves' adieu to Victorian certainties), including Newtonian paradigms and belief in objective values and rational thinking, this idea must spring from ignorance concerning deep century-old worries in mathematics and science to which I have just been referring (See for example the contributions in Turner, *Theories of modernity and postmodernity*).

The cited perspectives have led scholarship to a lesser degree to ask "what things are", preferring to find how they work, and over to interdisciplinary focusing on so-called "holistic" perspectives, functionality and use. This shift of accent is a question of frameworks for analysis, a subject that will occupy us throughout most of the present book.

It is not easy to carry on a methodological debate in our discipline when allegedly serious periodicals seem to publish just any simplified account of complex matters. In order to find some hypothetical system in the pictorial program of Praglia Library (near Padua), we had to face the notoriously complicated web of ideas in the debates within the Roman Church in the sixteenth century, at the Council of Trent and outside it, and particularly attempts on the part of the Benedictine Order to come to grips with the situation, while preserving their own monastic traditions as based on the monastic Rule (Gisolfi and Sinding-Larsen, *The Rule, the Bible and the Council*). A reviewer offers the following proclamation: *The scheme makes no great theological demands and must have been developed by the artist within the framework of the triumph of the chosen people.* So only the artist can have succeeded in developing a relatively simple and clear thematic program from the enormous thematic repertoire in Bible, Rule and the-
ology, and managed to make a programmatic statement in the face of the almost unsurveyable complexities and contradictions in the internal self-reassessment of the Roman Church. If the purpose is to “restore the role of the artist” (a fad among nostalgic British art historians), would it not have been more to the point to try to understand his role in a planning process of give-and-take, involving several people on several levels?

Recognizing complexity even in apparently simple cases forces one to shift attitude on some crucial points. First, it becomes meaningless to isolate, under some kind of Gegenstandswissenschaft paradigm, types of objects from their surroundings and looking at the environment as a kind of background. One has to handle entire situations and processes analytically. Secondly, this cannot be attempted without interdisciplinary engagement - an effort that faces us with such problems as how to exploit models created for formalized science in the Humanities.

The notion of interdisciplinarity has several uses, from being applied to conferences in which several people speak in terms of different disciplines and have cocktail together afterwards, over to more integrated efforts.

In discussing interdisciplinarity it is necessary to distinguish between areas of problems and academic fields. In his otherwise excellent and important book, Imagery in scientific thought (Introduction, note 2), Arthur I. Miller appears to ignore this when he warns us that he will omit that dimension of human thinking in which resides personal anxieties, quirks, and vicissitudes that have often contributed to or been in part the catalysts to great works of art and literature. These aspects lie in the realm of psychoanalysis, and I shall address no conjectures in that direction. I don’t think it legitimate to skip a whole range of problems by claiming that the discipline that traditionally deal with them doesn’t concern one.

At any rate, Baumgartner and Payr are certainly right when they note that It is easier to claim interdisciplinarity than to realize it: what does it mean in everyday scientific life?, and they refer to the allegedly super-interdisciplinary field of cognitive science: Can cognitive science really be characterized as an interdisciplinary research program, in which people from different fields work together, or is it instead held together by certain common goals and problems on which the different disciplines continue working as they always did? ( Baumgartner and Payr, Speaking minds, p. 11). Myself I would find it difficult to answer this question on the level of practical work. The only level at which interdisciplinary efforts can be realized is, in my view, the level of frameworks and models, and even here one will continually come up against barriers - a thing clearly visible in the present book (how "clearly" the reader must judge). So it is
probable more a question of goal than of realization.

Nevertheless, the inherent complexity of the material specific to my academic discipline, Art history, makes the need glaringly evident to capitalize on the multi-disciplinary resources that are today available to us. In American Art History there are today numerous activities and research programs of interdisciplinary interest; the situation in Germany (and very much so in Scandinavia) is decidedly more conventional. There is a common belief that a congress at which several disciplines are participating with talks based on the respective experiences, has something to do with interdisciplinarity. This, at best, is an additive affair, whereas what we need is methodological and analytical integration.

This becomes dramatically evident if we enter the hermetic field labelled "visual theory" and "image theory" (It is somewhat sad to note that a recent, big book about *The power of images*, with the subtitle *Studies in the history and theory of response*, does not cite one single publication from modern cognitive involvement with images (Freedberg, *The power of images*). An example: Richard Wollheim's account of *seeing-in* would hardly have been left standing as he presents it, if the notion had been tested against a wider multidisciplinary and less sectarian framework: *Seeing-in is a distinct kind of perception, and it is triggered off by the presence within the field of vision of a differentiated surface. Not all differentiated surfaces will have this effect, but I doubt that anything significant can be said about exactly what a surface must be like for it to have this effect. When the surface is right, then an experience with a certain phenomenology will occur, and it is this phenomenology that is distinctive about seeing-in"; and seeing-in *precedes representation* (R. Wollheim, *What the spectator sees*, pp. 105f). When a thing is right then, expectedly, it is right.

Hardly anything of interest can be stated about any markedly composite visual object or medium without confronting problems that today are treated in a number of different disciplines and research programs. Relevant paradigms line up at our front door insisting on entrance, and we have to see if we can accommodate them. They represent features in meaningful human networks and systems with important bearing upon the world around us, and, by implication, also the world of the Ceremony Master and his contemporaries.

They "line up" in the following sense; and this is a crucial point. Whenever we encounter features or insights in other disciplines that seem to be relevant to or have affinities to problems connected with our subjects, this means that their issues and queries, or, at least, part of them, become relevant and important also for us: their problems become ours. We cannot overlook them just because they emerge in fields academically different from ours. For example, when I find that some of the processes that the Ceremony Master had to han-
dle have parallels in business information theory, I have to consider the possibility that some of the issues in business are also my issues. If I do not take up this challenge, then I would confuse analytical problems with university job classification and budgetary categories.

At the very least, these paradigms and terminologies do indeed stand for insights and research directions that may not always be directly usable in our field, nevertheless they do put at our disposal a vast idea bank.

This is not, however, a case of simply borrowing a cup of sugar from the neighbor. We cannot just copy models from other disciplines. If we try to do that, we cannot ensure - or hope to realize - some kind of coherent account of our material-specific problems. We would simply be doing some sort of addition, the way we see it in interdisciplinary conferences where each participant talks within her or his academic range. We have to develop models dedicated to our particular material, no matter how inadequate our attempts may look in the beginning. And we are just at the beginning.

Even though I shall be exploiting models from other disciplines, they may not be immediately recognized as such, for they are adapted to my specific material and problems and will also be evaluated and used in a context different from where they originated. For example, some of the original models I have exploited are formal, logical and constructed for being run on computers. These models cannot capture more than a very restricted range of features in my material, for most of these features defy quantification. But imitation or "mirroring" of their structural build-up and characteristics seem to me to help me out in my drive toward analytical clarification and precision, usually by displaying constraints to our argumentation. (these issues concerning borrowing and adaptation of multidisciplinary models are taken up more carefully in Part V).

4. A CHOICE OF STRATEGY

In this chapter, I shall try to develop further the main perspectives of the strategy outlined above. In my way of thinking, a strategy is a goal-driven course or guideline to be followed when selecting evidence and arguing that has the shape of a system or interrelated systems (Webster has "4. a plan, method, or series of manoeuvres or stratagems for obtaining a specific goal or result"; I do not like to see "stratagem" within a definition of "strategy"). A strategy can be useful even when it is not the right one, for the history of science is full of examples of defective or downright infeasible procedures leading to new insights or results. It was Saccheri's abortive attempt to prove Euclid's Fifth theorem that led on to Non-Euclidean geometry; and Rutherford's "planetary" model of the atom was wrong but productive. Progress usually means testing results against a strategy and modifying (or rejecting) the latter.

In the traditional discipline of Art History as I was taught it, the primary focus is on the visual object, around which one groups selected elements from
the "background" and the surroundings, often glorified with the name of "context". Usually the term "context" means the chosen sections of the surroundings in the chosen light of one's chosen object by one's chosen conception of it. The problem here is not that one does choose but that it is taken for granted that one object is in the analytical foreground, so that this is the explanandum, the thing to explain, the rest the explanans, the "explaining factors"; but the latter needs explanation just as much. The selection process is guided all through by one's ideas about the visual object itself. These ideas are usually developed by some sort of "hermeneutical" *Verstehen* technique and the procedure of concept selection and systems integration therefore to a large extent defies description and control. And the procedure is contradictory. In view of its functions and significance the cross is just one element in the entire process and situation in which it is being used and we therefore need a way to postulate the totality of process and situation, being well aware that totality is an artificial construct; but so are all models of analysis. The guideline to find such a "totality" cannot consist in our appreciation of any single object but in an evaluation of the active forces that drive the processes and condition the situation. It is here the San Marco case is useful, on account of its well-documented rituals. Such a description of "completeness" of course can only be achieved in analytical terms, by setting up frameworks that are systematic and allow for a number of alternative, even contrasting specifications of real-world events and circumstances.

The procedure I am proposing is reversed in relation to the traditional art-historical one. Having noted that the object in my focus, such as the cross in the Epiphany rite, belongs to a certain situation or process, I forget about the "object" for a while and start out from an analysis of the "total" situation, and try to evaluate the visual object in terms of this analysis: inverting the view. The approach demands but also is a prerequisite for an efficient and meaningful contact with and exploitation of other disciplines.

So my main points are these - and I shall use my empirical material to develop them: 1. There is no correct interpretation for empirical (historical and social), non-formalizable material, for criteria are variable even within restricted contexts (and interpretation on our part will tend to be circular); 2. hence it is not sensible (nor indeed philosophically possible) to try to show or demonstrate something: not "what", only "how"; 3. the most we can do with complex situations (and all situations are complex), is to develop alternative (and never exclusive) frameworks for cognitive and conceptual actions on the material at hand. To repeat: I am not using frameworks and models in order to convince anybody about my treatment of things at San Marco; I am not trying to affirm anything. I am using my treatment to lend substance to my discussion of frameworks (for which see below).
Very often theory discussions pick out their empirical material in the form of small bits of evidence and material from many quarters. This means that the empirical material remains defenceless against one's methodological initiative: for one simply selects what fits and thus collects illustrations rather than establishing a real testing ground. Here is one particular aspect of my effort, however, that I think will recommend itself: instead of having a specific idea and illustrating it by means of an assortment of cases (often revealingly labeled "examples", i.e. resources that are selected because they fit the bill), I am sticking to one context: the rites of San Marco, as the general process and selections from it for my scenarios. This means that critical readers - and I myself - are not confronted with selections made to fit the idea and that therefore so to speak offer no resistance, but with a total, complex and well-documented situation that can stand up for itself and whenever necessary say: no, this doesn't work.

In the present book, two rites within one larger ritual context is used in the Roman case and one normal prayer ritual in the Islamic case. The Roman case consists in the exceptionally well-documented sixteenth-century liturgy and rites in San Marco, Venice. For my purpose, the processes and situations here are primary analytical factors, while the images and other objects involved in them, are secondary ones. A ground is then prepared for others to go over the material with perhaps an improved critical apparatus and turn my experiment to better use.

Many problems are left open-ended, partly because I cannot handle them or because I believe my basic ideas are in need of further debate, with contributions from other people than myself. Other problems, I am sure, are left untouched simply because so far I am unaware of them, as is usual in novel approaches. In my original field, Art History, books and papers are still today too often evaluated for their conclusions: should we say yes or no? While in most other modern scholarly ventures, they are considered as representing ongoing processes. The problem is of course to try to counteract the very natural tendency to present the analyzed situation to my own liking. It is exactly in this connection that systems analysis and appeal to interdisciplinary insights and methodology are not only useful but indispensable.

4.1. Aims and strategy
This book, I have emphasised, discusses methodology of research in a field partly made up of objects that formerly belonged to the more or less exclusive rights of Art History, to develop frameworks for understanding and analysing complex situations involving visual media.

My central concern will be with canonically predefined rituals, especially Roman liturgy, with a comparative excursus into Islamic ritual. As noted
already, the liturgy has extensions reaching out into society and its less formal, conventionally established, social rituals (no precise term but sufficiently workable at this point). Examples of these are intergroup behavior in the church and social behavior while entering into or exiting out of the church. Our analysis, therefore, starting out from the liturgy, must to some extent be able to cover also the less formal and far more evasive rituals, and also the further extensions from them into society. How can a rule-bound formally defined ritual model be made to account analytically for such everyday processes? This problem, of course, will be a major concern of the present book and, arguably, a main point of criticism of it. But the reader will note that, with the tools at my disposal, I can only pose the problem, as I hope, relatively clearly; the query remains without a satisfactory answer; at the very best it may be "satisficing": optimal given the conditions.

As I noted, I consider complex situations out of reach to anybody trying to interpret, to find any the meaning in them and things and concepts involved in them. The scope is limited to frameworks guiding analytical operations on scenarios and configurations that aim at setting up structures of premises and criteria for interpretations on our part and on the part of the historical protagonists - thus pointing out directions for interpretations without ever achieving them. I can refer to the interpretation of a picture, of a text, etc. within an argument context; but I am not equipped to undertake such an interpretation - except at a trivial level: this portrait must represent Mrs Grimani.

My presentation of empirical (historical and social) material and building-up of theoretical and graphic models for treating it aims, in the first place, at lending substance to my frameworks axiom and thus preparing the ground for discussing it, and secondly, to see in what directions and how far my kind of analysis (making verbal and graphic models converge under interdisciplinary perspectives) can be brought to bear on the material.

The material and argumentation presented in this book is intended to supply some backing to making "our" and "their" paradigms and methods converge and - this is almost equally important - to try to indicate the constraints and limitations to this program. I would evaluate my entire effort in this book in the light of this test.

Here the cognitive sciences offer potentially fundamental perspectives. (Here is Patricia Smith Churchland's list of relevans sciences (Baumgartner and Payr, Speaking minds, pp. 25f.): Experimental psychology, linguistics, psychophysics, neuropsychology, neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, computational neuroscience (working with networks, mostly parallel rather than serial), developmental psychology, developmental neurobiology, molecular biology and philosophy (because we badly need to synthesize and theorize and ask the questions everyone else is either too embarrassed or too focused or too busy to ask).
I say "potential" because there is one reservation and one future perspective attached to this idea. The reservation concerns what I would call the bridge problem: we have to try to connect meaningfully two spheres. One of them is empirical observation in such vague contexts as society, religion and "culture", and models developed for the analysis of them. (I like to know whether a computational hypothesis is probably true or not. Consequently, to the degree that a model is constrained by the facts, I am more interested. Speculative models can be fun, and they may have theoretical significance. If, however, a model aims at describing how some mind-brain performance is accomplished and its is constrained only at the behavioral level, then given the vastness of computational space, we will not know whether the model is even close to being right. The point is that there are many, many ways of performing a task such as motion perception, but my interest lies on how brains really do it. Consequently, my work tends to focus on models of fairly low-level phenomena, such as vestibulo-ocular movement, motion perception, perception of 3-D depth [three-dimensional], and so on. And I think what we understand at these levels will help us grasp the principles underlying what is going on at higher levels, such as reasoning and language (Patricia Smith Churchland, in Baumgartner and Payr, Speaking minds, pp. 26f.).

The other is the scientific and partly formal models, hypotheses and insights emerging in the cognitive sciences (see, again Patricia Smith Churchland's comments, pp. 21f., 27f., 30 (The difficulty is that we do not really know very much about what it takes for sensory awareness, attention, and so forth... Consequently, it is easy for people to have unshakable but opposite convictions and to waste a huge amount of time with countless imagined scenarios. The scenarios are all hopelessly underdefined, so no one can make significant progress).

We have an example of this in the Theory of schemes developed by Arbib and Hesse, in a book dedicated to the aim of operating a reduction from cognitive science, especially computer versions, back to cultural and social studies (Arbib and Hesse, La costruzione della realtà, pp. 28f. Recent scholarship is full of Mary-Mary-contrary attitudes, in this case the intention, though the theory of schemes, to depose language from its current primary role in the cognitive sciences. Dunbar, The trouble with science, p. 61, notes that Despite the eulogies on its behalf, language is in fact a surprisingly poor means of communication about the natural world). They try to establish an analytical bridge between cognitive science (with A. and H. a rather strong version of artificial intelligence) and humanist, in their case especially religious, culture. Cognitive science is "autoreflective" (autoriflettente), they note, since it must submit its
own methodology to the same critique that it applies to the fields in focus, and thereby cognitive science has broken with the [traditional] notion of a purely empirical and positivist 'scientific method'.

My response to this challenge lies in a comment on the future perspective. Recent writings on and within the cognitive sciences are blessedly candid about the state of the art. Those people, as they also do in cosmology and in developmental biology, quarrel endlessly over essential questions - which does mean that they discuss essential issues. (see for example Brockman, The third culture, and Horgan, The end of science). Having witnessed the collapse of classical computer artificial intelligence (working with programs on serial Von Neumann machines), one has become aware of the analog and non-digital working of the brain, and this has facilitated the emergence of parallel network paradigms, often in the so-called connectionist version. At the same time, the writers, while stressing that a few things have been achieved, admit that there are vast areas that remain more or less blank because of shortage of scientific capacities so far, but predict that the pace of discovery will quicken considerably. There may be a promising future, and at any rate it does not make sense to rely basically on philosophy any longer. Philosophy is currently expected to initiate queries, which then have to be taken over by the sciences for them to be treated in a reliable manner. Trying to come up with answers in the Wittgenstein way has lost some of its fascination. So we have to prepare ourselves for what may come, and in this sense I consider my present book as a catch-up operation. For we must gradually get into a line with scientific development, try to get abreast of new developments, in order to be prepared for tackling the bridge issue I just referred to, be ready for the time when cognitive science will have something concrete to offer our fields. (Occasionally we hear that one should develop alternatives to present-day cognitive science, "start out by viewing mind as a relation between subjects that is created by their interaction. The question of such possible alternative views, based on the embeddedness of cognition in situation, interaction, and society, could be among those that cognitive science, because of its basic assumptions, cannot even raise" (p. 17 in the Introduction, Baumgartner and Payr). Modelling is an important issue here.

An outcome of my views is also to take seriously the bi-track issue in analysis: we have to account for parallel interacting processes of any number: and it is here that narrative language, being necessarily linear, fails us and we must have recourse to some kind of matrix or graphic model, in other words, images of some kind. I am avoiding to call the parallel use of verbal and graphic by this name, since "parallel" is generally, and importantly, used for
parallel versus serial running in computers and in the brain.
Thus there are also the "metaphors we live by" (so named by Lakoff and Johnson) (Lakoff and Johnson, *Metaphors we live by*) some of which I consider as configurations: patterns of focused imagining processes. We certainly live by them, too, as part of the reality we construe - our construction of reality: a recurrent theme in the literature and to be referred to all through the present book. We do our analysis and research by the metaphors (See A. I. Miller, *Imagery in scientific thought*, Index s.v.: metaphor; and G. A. Miller, *Images and models, similes and metaphors*). Graphic models and lists, too, function as metaphors in some contexts. A methodology's requirements should be applied to itself. *Model abstraction*, which is something we take for granted, then, should reflect "abstraction" of our objects and their interactions, abstraction then in the sense of making a new picture of the object by selected features, which will normally result in a simplification (but not always).

Testing graphic models is another main purpose and an important one, both in the context just mentioned, for general interdisciplinary communication and because in certain respects they represent something fundamental in human beings' handling of their surroundings. But the outcome of my test is not very optimistic (see below), and I believe that what I have to say in this respect also affects negatively certain types of models in current use in the social sciences. It will be noted that I find it important to identify ventures that are not open to us at this stage.

After the above series of preambles, time should by now be ripe for a summing-up concerning my strategy. A minimal set of criteria for a strategy's validity (I am not speaking of the validity of results), would look like this (7 items to follow):

1. It should 1.1. require directly applicable documentation wherever this is available, 1.2. identify areas for which indirect contextual or hypothetically comparative evidence is available and 1.3. identify areas for assumptions derived either from 1.3.1. hypothetical systems consistence ("such and such a functional system would seem to involve, imply, require...") or 1.3.2. freely applied assumptions awaiting future support, confirmation, modification or refutation.

2. It should not blatantly violate or seem to contradict (who can tell in every case?) the rules and constraints of logic and mathematics whenever comparison here works. (compare Chalmers, *The conscious mind*, p. xiii: "...I have tried to keep my ideas compatible with contemporary science, but I have not restricted my ideas to what contemporary scientists find fashionable"). This has to be kept in the negative, since positive claims here will become philosophically much too vague.
3. The same should apply to the strategy's relation to the emergent properties of science paradigms: the "more-than-the-sum-of-the-elements" properties; a term from machine technology: phenomena emerging from a complex structure or process that have no counterpart at any of the lower levels. (See Gregory, *Mind in science*, pp. 86ff.) Again a negative claim.

4. Argumentation must pass the systems convergence test outlined above.

5. When dealing with humans, it should tentatively not violate current tenets and constraints in the cognitive sciences. Negative again.

6. Then, and this is essential to my view, our strategy should be conceived and elaborated in such a way as allow us to use it for describing and evaluating the strategies of other people and fields, be it for acceptance and partial adoption, modification or refutation. This means the strategy's capacity to accommodate other strategies so as to locate fits, misfits and incompatible factors. For example, the traditional strategy of Art History as I learnt it at school clearly had no room for insights from, say, management, systems theory, information theory (even in its informal aspects) and so on. The strategy I am attempting to develop in this book pretends to accommodate such programs at least to such an extent that the relationships become problematic as a basis for further investigation. On the other hand my strategy, as I see it, has no room for the traditional art-historical catch-words concerning the notion of "influence" or "cross-fertilization": what my strategy can do with it in order to accommodate it, is to change its structure into something very different (the receiving end of the notional and alleged "influence"-line using the "giving"-end product as a chosen resource).

7. The descriptive systems serving as tools in the strategy, that is, lists or algorithms, visualizable charts, matrices and graphic models, will often have their intrinsic, built-in dynamism - creating relevances, priorities and directions for inputs and outputs. Operating the strategy must consist also in evaluating and if possible exploiting this purely methodological dynamism for the formulation of assumptions. So far my seven points. They may seem rather simplistic philosophically speaking, springing out as they do from certain fundamentals that I accept axiomatically.

**Addition 2011**

*Scientific foundations, systems idea and the study of art history.*

Anticipating let me say that I am trying not to consider great nouns like History, Humanities or Science, only argumentation thus qualified. I have proposed an argumentation algorithm in SL, *Patterns*, 1.11, *Structured argumentation*. Note
that *The essence of an algorithm is the notion of a finitely specified, step-by-step procedure to resolve a set of inputs into a set of outputs* (Chr. G. Langton, see J. Brockman, *The third culture*, New York, 345).

To give an idea of what I mean with the term *algorithmic argumentation (AA)*, let me start with offering a counter-example. While the moon and the sun do influence some situations on our Earth on account of their gravitational impact (although I do find it hard to see how it can condition the wine-maker’s work, despite the claims by most Italian wine-writers), the same cannot be said concerning the signs of the Zodiac, whose gravitational impact is about the same as that of the chair you are sitting on. Of course, having learnt in old books or in the popular press what a Waterman should be like, knowing you are born in that sign, I find the same features in you, forgetting about the rest.

*AA* means that both ends of the production line are accessible to analysis and that the line, algorithm or flowchart between them is accessible to description, directly or in terms of some articulate theory that can survive the model test (see below, I.4.4, *Frameworks and models*).

Admittedly, Holton’s *Science and antiscience*, 1993, if read carefully, offers real-life stories focused on scientific programs and *themes* (his term) such that a clearer view can be extracted. But I prefer not to take a top-down view of the issue, starting instead out from specific types of argumentation in abstracto, where one can discuss principles uncluttered by details (on Herbert Simon’s recommendation). The question about the character of *Science* writ large will never be answered because it takes us on a ride into circularity, applying the criteria we will have listed in our characterization. Next, it is more productive to stay on a level of *action: how to do this or that?*

Under the *operational* paradigm I am used to, I have said that no-one ever did mathematics, only work in calculus, number theory or whatever, that is to say, *specific assignments*.

Usually, we will be working with plausible structures or arguments (Long and Garigliano, below), within which field there will be *probabilities* but also *certainties* (water boiling at 100 degrees C). My standpoint is that of ruling out the issues of causality and *analogy* (which is limited to formal logic; see D. Long and R Garigliano, *Reasoning by analogy and causality. A model and application*, 1994, especially chapter 4, *Causality and Analogy*; and I. Copi, *Symbolic logic*, many editions; I am, using no. 5, New York 1973). *Certain in the model appended here is inside probable* because the element of probability is usually present in what is considered certain.
It doesn’t take much acuteness to predict a lonely future for my term AA. The root scient/i- is going to stick. The point is to get out of the muddle of the noun (science) and act upon the moral I have long championed, using the adjective form in combination with a verb: scientific argumentation, or, if a noun, one that indicates action or procedure: process, algorithm, or, simply, work, keeping in mind the productive modality that attends analytical work.

Let me suggest that algorithmic argumentation depends on methods thus construed and controlled: by direct application as, for example, in the case of the DNA double helix (F. Crick, What mad pursuit. A personal view of scientific discovery, New York 1988, notably p. 47) or in a parallel shift from this to conceptual space in terms of reference, using physically attested and supported criteria for construal of operative models in fields usually handled only by verbal, hence unreliable means. Words do not locate in space as visual design and models do.

Words cannot simplify, lacking the necessary formalisms required for a tool (which does not mean they cannot reveal a simplified understanding). Of course they can be translated into symbolic logic, but then several of the properties just cited go by the board. Newton simplified usefully when, to facilitate calculations, he treated Kepler’s ellipses as circles. In “soft” contexts, it is necessary to distinguish carefully between shape and form (SL, Patterns, 0,7, Introduction; referring to Lord and Wilson, The mathematical description of shape and form). The two terms refer to historically different levels (pictorial motif, Canonically established features); or to crucial distinctions between visual appearance and “internal” structure (SL, Operational), and they offer different scopes for simplification, bringing us instruments for controllable determination.

Observation, conceptualization and argumentation in average humans have mostly worked in terms of pictures or some kind of imagery, as has been claimed by authors from Roberto Bellarmino in the late sixteenth century to Arthur I. Miller in the twentieth, regarding, among others, Albert Einstein. The role of visualizing imagination emerges constantly in his and Leopold Infeld’s Die Evolution der Physik, not principally due to the public-oriented character of the book. Specific levels and modalities of image-making indeed seem to be

Most graphical models can be derived from or referred back to aggregates of Venn diagrams. They are controllable, they locate, circumscribe, show structure (Skemp) and can be used for pointing ahead. Most important, they simplify. Often, tree diagrams (while the containing elements are implied not shown) or box diagrams (PROLOG, for example) are easier to use and inspect.

When in German one speaks about *Kunstwissenschsft*, this must be regarded as an innocent leftover from the time when academic style went undis-cussed. For few would hold, today, that “doing” Art History is a scientific enterprise, even though the discipline contains scientific components. The trouble, generally un-noticed, is that people are being taught *Art History* rather than relevant argumentation - hence no methodology nor theory nor system.

In a typically art-historical context, the mosaic decorations in San Marco, Venice, I have substantiated, as I believe, the absolute requirement in any serious dealing with complex subjects, to utilize, directly or metaphorically, *systems operations* (elementary in D. Mason and L. Willcocks, *Intermediate systems analysis*, London 1987; on the systems idea and its root in complexity studies, see Herbert A. Simon, *The sciences of the artificial*, 3. ed., Cambridge (MA) 1996, 183ff.).

Speaking of “artistic influence” and significance: *Even if we accept that there is a case of direct borrowing of concept or theme...*, one can hardly imagine the borrower to have fetched something from somewhere else without having some need for it, and it is this need we have to analyse. This is not explained by pointing to similarities between the model and the end product. - We cannot say ‘this is Byzantine’ or ‘that’s due to an influence from Rome’, or ‘this is the significance of this type of image’, and pretend to be saying anything at all, without presupposing for each statement a complex picture of facts and circumstances and relations between them: a system (SL, *A walk with Otto Demus. The mosaics of San Marco, Venice, and art-historical analysis*, *Acta, series altera*, VIII, of the Norwegian Institute in Rome, 1992, pp. 198f.). Presumed high-level practitioners in the field have been discussing artistic motifs without any inkling about the functional basis for them; the Virgin Mary called up (*assumpta*) from her dormition and Christ risen from his grave being both of them “resurrectional motifs”, one, if need be, supplanting the other. The teaching often focuses on subjects without considering functions.

In my publications, I have tried to be consistent in referring to scientific and mathematical work as justifying factors in soft enterprises. I still do believe
this principle can be applied to our doings, but there are some however. The “foundations” to which we might appeal are a little less biblical than we might wish. One example out of many: Most scientific work uses or is based upon math, but as a warning against taking things for granted, we can read about Ten misconceptions about mathematics and its history (by M. J. Crowe, in W. Asprey and Ph. Kitcher, eds., History and philosophy of modern mathematics, = Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science, XI, 1988, 260 - 277): for example, the misconceptions that The methodology of mathematics is deduction; Mathematical statements are invariably correct; The structure of mathematics accurately reflects its history; Mathematical proof is unproblematic; Standards of rigor are unchanging.

Mathematics is often considered an alien field mostly concerned with complicated formulas and solving equations. And yet, math think determines much of what we are doing. In SL, Operational, I have argued that some form of math permeats much of the material studied by humanists. Even in scientific work, math thinking does not always assume the shape that scares so many. Galileo Galilei, not such a bad scientist, never did an equation in his recorded life, using geometrical and proportional tools beside the dynamic ones (Stillman Drake, ref. in SL, Patterns). Nor is math readily to be defined (as noted by Quine and many others). A perusal of Donald Gillies’ Philosophy of science in the twentieth century. Four central themes, Oxford 1993, will reveal a highly complex multileveled network of approaches frequently with not even tangentially interacting nodes.

Work in the humanities will remain essentially non-quantifying and non-formalistic. So of course there can be no direct mapping. You cannot apply info models directly to Titian. But we can utilize both the general ideas and extract the methodological principles from such “hard” procedures and models. Whenever productive tools are available, not using them amounts to surrender.

END ADDITION.

4.2. Fundamentals ("reality, truth and explanation")
I am going to be concerned with items described in terms of processes, and I believe that the processing dynamics of any specific real-life situation will override many deep philosophical issues as irrelevant for the historical protagonists we are studying and justify my disregarding some of them. I shall be concerned, for example, with the role of names presenting meaningful entities, but I am not going to get involved in discussing such items as "naming and necessity", the title of the book by Saul Kripke, in which he examines, among other things, what is "essential" and what is accidental (a good synopsis in Grayling, Philosophical logic, pp. 83ff.). In my context, the question is more how a name is acted upon than what it might "really mean" or "truly be".
There is much talk about science as a searching for "truth", whether in a philosophical or a pragmatical (working-model) sense, and this sets this group off from the humanities, in which truth can be meaningful exclusively as a working model (speaking now of non-trivial levels): what is the truth about the Battle of Waterloo? Truth tends to come with an appendage: reality. Am I obliged to take a stand on reality? Crick makes short shift of the issue:

Is this world real? This is a venerable philosophical issue and I do not wish to be embroiled in the finely honed squabbles to which it has led. I merely state my own working hypotheses: that there is indeed an outside world, and that it is largely independent of our observing it (Crick, The astonishing hypothesis, p. 12. Niels Bohr, concerning what was later labelled the Copenhagen interpretation of subatomic structure, held that subatomic entities such as electrons have no real existence; they exist in a probabilistic limbo of many possible supposed states until forced into a single state by the act of observation (Horgan, The end of science, p. 81).

It seems to me that "largely" here is a sufficient concession that entails giving up objectivism (a good description of objectivist philosophy by George Lakoff in Baumgartner and Payr, Speaking minds, p. 127: Objectivism makes the folowing claims: first, its makes a claim about what exists, that is, about ontology. It says that the world is made up of objects, these have objectively given properties, and they stand in objkective relation to one another, independent of anybody's knowledge or conceptual system. Categories are collections of objects and properties that share the same properties. Categories not only are objects and properties but they are out there in the world independent of the mind. Perhaps we may remove the words "object..." from this definition by saying that they imply that a concept or anything has a measurable or describable delimitation for which the rules of description and measurement could be altered arbitrarily without changing the absolute values and truth in any of the numerous versions available in the literature as hopeless in empirical research and also letting hopes for capturing empirical conditions in terms of formalizations go by the board. Opting instead for perspectives indicated by what is called ordinary language philosophy and some form of contextual analysis, I shall end up with an account that is frankly relativistic and, at least at some important levels, ad-hoc. Of course, there is always the risk that in relating one element to another, the "interrelation" consists less in analytically viable connections than in the fact that the same person or individual, in this case myself, is doing the operation. Giving up on "objectivity" doesn't remove the problem of customizing too much one's models for one's own convenience and leanings. A warning from Holton:
...in studying the Rhetoric of Assertion of an author in a given work, we discern that he disaggregates into two Authors, engaged in two different soliloquies on the same stage. Actor I is engaged in an internal dialogue with his own recent or more distant past work, out of which the new work is growing. Actor 2 has begun to engage in thoughts that will not come to full fruition for some time in the future. The author's production results in good part from both soliloquies and receives different characteristics from each: on one side, conviction from past difficulties being now conquered; on the other side, conviction from the attractiveness of further successes...

My consolation is at least that I do not try to offer any rhetoric of assertion except to the extent I am insisting on limitations to what we can possibly and productively achieve. One off-limit operation is "explanation".

I am not going to discuss explanation in any of the many formats of the notion, since I find the very idea irrelevant in the face of the analytically much more satisfying option of just describing processes and systems and their interactions, without any preestablished order of causation or procedure from something to something else (Galileo was right there, I think, against Descartes: measuring, no explanation!). "Real life" does not justify any notion of one thing coming about on account of anything else. Patterns of interaction are to a certain extent penetrable, but they do not show priorities in their internal structure allowing us to speak of causal forces. I cannot see how it is possible to adopt some version of the systems idea (see...), nor how to handle systems involving feedback and recursion, if we try to pin down some factors as more "precedent" and important than others in real-world terms. Importance, relevance and being-basic are purely analytical terms viable only in the artificial pictures we construe out of a reality that is far too complex to be captured in descriptions purporting to be realistic or "true". Attribution of importance on the analyst's part must derive from a larger framework of evaluation, a systems view of some type of situation in which different and often crossing goals or sets of goals or purposes will be at play. The analyst must preserve the "total" systems view and cannot, at the overall systems level, pick out specific features and factors as especially important to the exclusion of others. This open-ended attitude toward research programs doesn't have much to offer to politicians who want something firm to guide their decisions or to academicians desiring to found a school. Systems analysis does not favor gurus. The moral was admirably expressed by Luigi Pirandello: Così è, se vi pare.

So my work is intended to discuss ways and means for constructing assumptions under the outlined strategy, epistemological (if my simple attitudes deserves this lofty name) and framework conditions. Theory in principle precedes experience: by now an ancient wisdom. (On Galileo: *La sua posizione
è un rigoroso razionalismo scientifico che antepone la teoria all'esperienza, e va verso questa solo quando abbiamo definito, nei propri termini, il 'cimento'...
(De Santillana, Processo a Galileo, p. 88)

4.3. Constructing assumptions

I shall present some hypothetical systems of various nature (networks, trees etc.) and apply them to my substantive material, mostly from ritual situations in San Marco. For some of these I shall use the term function (and “functionality”) will have to do – and I have, in fact, used it several times already. The term is not entirely plain. Didi-Huberman, in an art-historical context, deplores the imprecise way it is often being employed: giving an impression of being scientifically exact (as if one wrote \( f(x) \) on a painting, he says), the term often only serves as a justification for vague concepts: de simple légitimation pour une conceptualité d’emprunts non réglés, c’est-à-dire pour des pensées finalement assez vagues du point de vue philosophique et donc assez peu rigoureuses du point de vue méthodologique.

For the present context, and without taking up the epistemological issues raised by Didi-Huberman (citing Cassirer and others), let me say that the term is a very comprehensive but, on the surface, relatively simple one and covers any mapping from one analytical model over to another. This works roughly in the mathematical fashion: *a transformation from one set \( S \) (the domain) to another \( S' \) (the range or image set) by means of some rule, formula or other procedure* (Glenn and Littler, p.123.)

The point is that we have a pair of factors related to each other: one internally (within the relation) independent variable, say, the specific needs for the performance of a rite (which are, of course, externally dependent: on religious goals, social conditions etc.), and one internally dependent variable, (mainly) depending on the former, say, some specific response in terms of formalization of the rite, etc. When a work of art has a liturgical function, this means, without delving into the mechanics of the case, that features in the liturgy are being transformed to fit another medium into which the features are then mapped or expressed in such a way that the process of transformation from one to the other is displayed and can be understood; understood, because of knowledge of the rules guiding the process: Christ’s sacrifice may be made tangible in such and such terms, and for these terms, such and such pictorial repertoire is available and acceptable. On one important point the mathematical comparison does not hold: an input into a function yields just one output, whereas, clearly, in our context there will usually be several possible responses.

Verbal and graphic models of various kinds will be used for setting up
assumptions concerning frameworks, and these models have strong enough affinities to the configurations mentioned above to being considered, generally, as equivalent. They imply no kind of "objectivity".

The question arises, what kind of scientific value, if any, we can ascribe to such efforts. For above the documentary ritual level I specify the various items only in a general manner, taking it for my working hypothesis that such and such a parameter is relevant and such and such a concept is valid in the actual context; concept then, let me repeat, in Putnam's operative sense used in this book: an idea or a cluster of ideas attended by our ability to handle them. So the entire argumentation is open-ended. It has to remain so in this text which concerns theoretical aspects of analytic methodology, but in most specific connections the discourse could, if the focus were on empirical research, rather than on methodology, have been substantiated and supplied with documentary evidence concerning liturgical behavior and notions and religio-sociological and psychological issues. Indirect contextual or hypothetically comparative evidence is available from, e.g., ecclesiastical documents (from Councils etc.), from sociology and anthropology of religion, from the social and managerial sciences and so on. With regard to point 1.3.1. above, hypothetical systems consistency (such and such a functional system would seem to involve, imply, require...), hard evidence has of course more or less petered out and we have to have recourse to pure theory aimed at achieving consistency in systemic functionality. My application of the information model is an example of this method - one that is largely used in the new sciences: an apparently consistent method or algorithm of information communication is available from management studies, so let us assume that this mechanism is applicable also to our specific cases, until the idea is in need of modification or must be refuted.

This in turn requires me to be conscious about the relations between science on one hand, and the humanities and the social sciences on the other: 1) those whose basic argumentation is grounded on or can be reduced to formal expressions and operate (mainly) by deduction; and 2) those that primarily rely on non-formalized use of natural languages (to the extent that one may be clear about relations between vaguely outlined areas) and operate mainly by induction - or even abduction (Peirce's term for seeking the best hypotheses). We all seem to be familiar with the notion of "induction" but we don't know how it operates: The problems of induction and abduction are just intractable. We have not yet had a genius who came up with at least a first idea of how to tackle them. It is as if we tried to talk about atomic power at the time of Newton... (Hilary Putnam; quoted in Baumgartner and Payr, Speaking minds, p. 182).

Science depends largely on formalizable rules, many of them mathemati-
cal or logical, which the humanities and social sciences don't supply except occasionally at the margins of the central concern (statistics in sociology etc.). At this point we are facing what I have already referred to as the Bridge problem.

To devise an analytical transfer from models in the cognitive, information (formalized) and management sciences over to our field is frankly very problematic. At the same time the idea seems to be potentially highly productive, mainly on account of the systemic character involved. The material and argumentation presented in this book are intended, let me repeat, to supply some backing to make "our" and "their" paradigms and methods converge and - this is almost equally important - to try to indicate the limitations to this program.

Systems in the cited branches of science and in our kinds of context are widely different because in the former a fair amount of basic formalism is involved; this, makes for precision and lowlevel logic treatment. In a material like the one studied in the present book, we can move around only at relatively high or distant levels of observation where things are partly evasive and where their extremely complex nature does not come into full view (a recommendation this, to follow Simon's advice concerning simplification). We can do so only - at least, essentially, in natural-language terms. It is a crucial insight that this language defies handling of systems in other than metaphorical fashion. It is usually not feasible, or, at least not productive, on a general basis to try directly to transfer rules from the sciences over to the humanities. On the other hand, logic and science paradigms, including many among those of the cognitive fields, may serve as patterns of constraints: arguing in this way or that violates tenets from these paradigms and cannot be accepted. The filter so far is purely negative. We are used to saying that such or such an argumentation is "not logical", meaning it contradicts principles of logic we feel are in the background. This works somehow, while it would be to claim too much to say positively of a normal natural-language argument that it is logical. (Popper's *The logic of scientific discovery* uses "logic" in a somewhat loose way, while Quine's *From a logic point of view*, uses "logic" in the strict sense in which it is treated in the book, regardless of the fact the title was borrowed from a song by Harry Belafonte). The bridge here does not consist of reflecting or mirroring argumentation from science step by step but rather conforming to the morals distilled from the emergent properties of science methodology (For emergent properties, see below...; for now, note Crick's definition (*Astonishing hypothesis*, p. 11): "... while the whole [of a system] may not be the simple sum of the separate parts, its behavior can, at least in principle, be understood from the nature and behavior of its parts plus the knowledge of how all these parts interact).
Theory devised for science can never be entirely adapted to the empirical needs in the study of historical or contemporary social and cultural (including religious, ritual etc.) situations and processes, but their moral can serve as guideline for model development, at least in the sense that we do not seem to violate their highlevel constraints. The "moral" one may think of as respecting the emergent properties of scientific paradigms. This idea, however, clearly needs further consideration. It cannot be concealed that large chunks of my argumentation hinges on this idea. The question is initially one of requirements on two levels: regarding general attitudes to theory and to analytical models, devises or procedures.

Not all of it is negative, however. In science we have sets of rules variably described but of essentially the same general type. Casti's criteria seem typical to me (Casti, *Complexification*, pp. 11 - 15. Casti is a fellow of the Santa Fe Institute in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and participates regularly in the more important conferences on general issues of modern science). *At heart, science is concerned with the question 'Why do we see what we do and not see something else? The scientific answer to this question takes the form of a set of rules, essentially a computer program, by which we can explain what has been observed and/or predict what will be seen next. But rules come in many flavors, and certainly not all of them qualify as scientific... Basically, there are two quite different sets of criteria that must both be satisfied for a rule to have even a chance of being scientific. The first pertains to properties of the rule itself, while the second has to do with the way the rule is arrived at.* For the first set he brings out a checklist whose headings are 1) Explicit, 2) Public, 2) Reliable (recorded success in explaining/predicting a variety of things over a substantial period of time: admittedly a relative claim), 4) Objective (relatively free of investigator bias: observer-invariant, again, of course, a relative property that even for the best case may some day be disproved). For rule development (the second criterium above) "scientific method" is the key requirement and, needless to say, there are many view on this. Casti simply presents the directional triangle model with, at the apices, Observation -> Experiment -> Hypothesis -> (Observation), assignments supporting each other in the process (this is very elementary but can stand for almost all classic notions of method), whether the process starts with observation or, for example, as in particle physics, in which entrance occurs equally often at hypothesis level: *In any case, after a few tours around the diagram we can hope that the process will converge to something.*
Concerning our research programs of the type that primarily rely on non-formalized use of natural languages (humanities, social sciences), we cannot simply adopt the basic principles behind scientific methodologies. There are too many essential points that are incommensurable. Furthermore, we cannot set up experiments concerning Napoleon's mental condition at the start of the Battle of Waterloo (while perhaps at its end it is more obvious); but even in mathematically conditioned science there are comparable difficulties: you cannot experiment with the Big bang or other cosmic events, nor for that matter with evolution and natural selection in our biological history. A much larger, and essentially larger if we may put it this way (and somewhat illogically!), amount of subjects in "our" fields defy quantification and measurement. Surveying a building brings out some numerical data, and they may illuminate construction techniques and also support our intuitions concerning ideologies behind the building. But they are not quantities directly (even if hypothetically) expressive of forces and energies active in the physical structure and are involved in no process about which we want to predict something. Measurement, however, is a big problem in physics, too, and more than that: quantum physics operate with a superposition of two kinds of states formerly kept strictly apart from one another: momentum of a particle and its state; this creates great - and apparently counterintuitive - problems of measurement. (see for example Essay 9 in Cartwright, How the laws of physics lie, pp. 163ff.).

But here one is still concerned with measurement as a fundamental issue in describing the action and momentum of forces and the positions of elements involved in processes.

So theory-development has to remain rather low-key. As a point of departure we may take a mildly rationalist view of the matter (by comparison with those under attack: Feyerabend and Kuhn). For Newton-Smith, these are the criteria of a good theory (Newton-Smith, The rationality of science, cited by Dunbar, The trouble with science, p.80. See the latter's comments on pp. 80f.):

1) Observational nesting (ability to explain the successes of its predecessors);
2) fertility (ability to generate new ideas to guide future research);
3) track record (its achievements in making correct predictions in the past; obviously, this applies to science only);
4) inter-theory support (ability to provide additional evidence in favor of another theory);
5) smoothness (the fact that it needs few auxiliary hypotheses to explain its failures);
6) internal consistency (that it contains few statements that lead to acceptance of logically incompatible predictions);
7) metaphysical compatibility (that it blends well with our beliefs, includ-
Dunbar makes, among others, the following comments: Newton-Smith argues that the anti-rationalists (especially Feyerabend) are trying to foist too grand a goal on to science; on the other hand, Newton-Smith is equally critical of rationalists like Popper and Lakatos, arguing that they have also taken too strict a view of scientists at work. What scientists actually do... is something much more low-key, although it is nonetheless rational: they simply rely on the fact that their theories really do work in the sense that they predict what will happen with reasonable precision....

Of course, the term predict has to stand for other "rational" operations on the material, since not even in physics there is always a possibility of prediction. At any rate, we use models to "predict" how things might have been or may come to be.

4.4. Frameworks and models
A model, to be analytically useful, must contain two main features or layers, one setting out levels, domains, categories etc.; the other integrating the empirical data or metaphors for them. The abstract character may be gained by giving the model a shape in a standard pattern; a flowchart or a rectangular network are examples of this type.

Alternatively, the design shape may not be standardized, while the subdivision of levels, domains, etc. is so. A so-called semantic model answers the latter set of demands (Winstanley, Artificial intelligence in engineering).

One of those introduced here, has three vertical "processes" and six levels (Model 1; not reproduced here; details: see 2.3.4, Monitoring the process); another type, used twice in the following discussion, has the characteristics of a up-side-down flowchart with four levels (Models 4.1 and 4.2; see 4.8.1 and 4.8.2). These models may be considered as structural models.

However, in a preparatory operation, there are other useful models. One is the so-called laundry list, just setting up a list of factors considered important. Another one may be labelled an epic model: a model in the shape of a course of points or nodes, at some of them with branches developing from the main course, that denotes events or factors in a time-dimensioned process, such as a ritual or some other chain of event. My Model 1 is an example of this.

What kind of analytical value should we demand from a model? A model may be considered analytically productive, provided that

a) it brings surveyable order among elements, while evidencing problem relations between them;
b) it can absorb new data and insights,
c) it can be modified, enlarged, or adapted upon intake of such resources, and
d) if, by such intake parts of it are disrupted, it still lends itself to repair and restoring of its consistency, and

if the system under the circumstances just mentioned (a, b, c, d) is capable of generating new theories that demand and can elaborate new empirical material (expanded formulation from Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 160f.).

Analytic reality has to take, step by step in the process of analysis, some bounded and fixed form, be it in a list, a flowchart or in some kind of graphic model. It is necessary to be aware of the problems attending the use of such models. Their consistency can only be assessed by the way they can be made to integrate with one another in a manner that seems to produce reasonable pictures of the cases at hand. At the same time the model unavoidably fixes positions and interrelations rigidly, at least for each step, and this is strictly incompatible both with the idea that there may be several levels for the functioning of any specific factor or relation, and with the processlike character of any situation.

Compounding data, insights and concepts into a designed model, especially, but on principle any model, entails freezing issues artificially. But then it is just this artificiality, in virtue of its capacity of postulating possible features and relations between them without tying us to responsibility toward encroaching realities around us, that triggers new research and, occasionally, novel findings.

Models are fashioned in accordance with some rules to which we think they should conform. Let there be no illusion that the operation devised to ensure this is "objective" and independent of personal and cultural inclinations. Everything we do is "customized", to use salesman's wording. It is partly an aesthetic venture to develop them, no surprise since aesthetic evaluations count even in mathematics. Something that doesn't have a clear, simple and functional look is not satisfactory (Henri Poincaré's view on mathematical creativity and special aesthetic sensibility is particularly well-known; see Miller, *Imagery*, pp. 31, 234). Nobel Prize laureate in economics, Herbert Simon, said that we should work with simplified descriptions that leave out the cluttering details of reality:

*Research in problem solving has shown that the efficiency of problem-solving efforts can often be greatly increased by carrying out the search for a solution, not in the original problem space with all of its cluttering detail, but in an abstracted space, from, which much of the detail has been removed, leaving the essential skeleton of the problem more clearly visible; and further: 'Simple' theories are generally thought preferable to 'complex' theories. A number of reasons have been put forward for preferring simplicity, but the...
most convincing is that a simple theory is not as easily bent, twisted, or molded into fitting data as is a complex theory (Simon, Models of thought, I, pp. 63 and 324f, respectively).

There are pros and cons in the use of models. The graphic models used in this book represent blatant simplification, being narrowed down to the barest skeletal structure. The simpler a model, the clearer the image to work with and the greater the risk of going completely astray: Méfiez-vous des idées claires; elles sont rarement exactes (Georges Bidault).

In addition, an apparent paradox seems to be at work here: narrow delimitations can stimulate increased creativity: Je enger die Vorschriften, desto reicher strömte seine Erfindung” (Marcel on J. S. Bach, Bach, p. 45). The aesthetic argument may seem somewhat circular, for nothing apparently is accepted as aesthetically satisfactory that does not display a relatively clear and graspable functional pattern. In this way, models in fact are quite closely akin to the ideals of the classical French drama of the seventeenth century, se proposant l'idée universelle des choses, les épure des défauts et des irrégularités particulières que l'histoire, par la sévérité de ses lois, est contrainte d'y souffrir (the French Academy à propos la querelle over Corneille's Le cid, 1637).

In fact, modern models, by creating artificial unities, seem to share attitude with the ideal of one place, one time and one action in the famous formulation by Nicolas Boileau (L'art poétique, III):

Mais non, que la raison à ses règles engage,
Nous voulons qu'avec art l'action se ménage:
Qu'en un lieu, qu'en un jour, un seul fait accompli
Tienne jusqu'à la fin le théâtre rempli.

The initial choice of list or graphic model, and more especially: whether flowchart-like list, a free box model, a tree, a semantic model, or a connectionist model, has to be decided on the basis, as I have noted earlier, of an evaluation of analytic levels. What we need at present, then, is a) a list of kinds of factors; b) a picture of their position and relations to one another; and, finally, c) a decision on the general levels on which they operate. This last point comes last of the three in the pragmatics of collecting evidence, but first in the model-building itself. For since we are trying to obtain a general picture of what kinds of factors and interrelations we want to give real content in a next phase, we need to be clear beforehand of a certain ordered progress of things.

Details have to be decided in an intuitive way: there is no general method by which to determine that initial choice which to some extent determines the amount and position of branches, boxes etc., and amount and position of linkages between them: arrows, lines, etc. But a graph has to be selected or sketched out before the items are entered into it, and this means that its general shape has
to be decided ahead of time. At the outset this requires us to inspect the case at hand, evaluate the two decision processes just mentioned in relation to each other, and intuitively make our selection of visual representation of it; a decision that can always be corrected or modified later on.

The same models, however, do display relevant features, tentatively the relevant features, in a functionally interlocking network in such a way that we can survey it and try to fill it in with contents, then readjust it and thus also our understanding; and generally classify various ways of approach and degrees of understanding among the notional congregation. This modelling procedure will force us to question each and every item and interrelation in an insistent and systematic manner that a prose description does not. Reassessing one "node" or relation, we immediately see which other nodes and relations may be affected and can change the model design along with our analytical process; normal prose accounts achieve this only very imperfectly. One may want to "magnify" a section of the model and elaborate further details inside it, selecting one portion of the network and zoom in for a closer look at it. We have an example of this dynamism above, when the image network in Model 4.1.A (4.8.1, end of section) is compared to Model 4.1. A model sets down the state of research at a certain point, at which it becomes clear that further data and explanation of them is required, and the model in this way charts the directions for further research.

By using model structures that are predesigned in some specific formal shape, we may more readily detect flaws in our argumentation more readily than in a verbal description. Predesigning models for substantive use corresponds to letting theory precede experience. All models, verbal or graphic, are defective and a crucial point is to identify the most serious shortcomings. Here graph models are a help because of their capacity of showing structure (to adopt a term from Skemp's *The Psychology of Learning Mathematics*). The primary test, to my view, is that we can make verbal and graphic systems converge: verbally developed systems, according to specific criteria set out in a later section, and graphic models that show, visualize, systems again responding to chosen criteria; make them converge into something whose relations are describable with regard to competing systems in our own field and to systems in multidisciplinary contexts. Let it be emphasized once and for all that we should entertain no illusion that graphic models are clear. They are images and like any other kind of image subject to our partly uncontrollable conceptualizations. But they do simply issues to such an extent as to achieve an approximation to clarity. And of course some graphic models are clearer than others because of extreme simplicity, such as the number line compared, say, to a complex semantic model.

The models used in this book are intended as tools for the analysis of, respectively, frameworks, scenarios and configurations and the processes that
produce them. The models and the problems attached to them will be discussed as work proceeds.

It is certainly no new discovery to realize that matters look different depending on viewpoints; but it is another thing to try to articulate the issue. Our approach will have to be developed within some kind of more general framework. The literature provides us with programmatic theory and framework theory. A programmatic theory provides scientists with a reason for doing a particular experiment or with a particular way of looking at the world: it behaves like a Kuhnian paradigm. Within this programme, scientists generate subsidiary hypotheses that specify how the framework theory works in practice: it is in these that scientists test in detail and accept or reject in a Popperian fashion. Darwin's theory of evolution provides a framework theory for biologists: it encourages them to interpret their observations in a certain kind of way and suggests particular hypotheses to test. The subsidiary hypotheses may or may not be right, but their disproof is not itself evidence that the framework theory is wrong. It merely tells us that the framework theory does not produce its effects in quite the way we supposed (Dunbar, The trouble with science, pp. 22ff.).

The notion of general frameworks will occupy us through most of this book and I shall return to it with a hopefully more careful backing in Part V (Ch. 1, Introd. and 1.2). To borrow a formulation specifically regarding information but generally valid: The task is to decide on a framework within which information systems methodologies may be viewed ... A feature of a framework is that it supports a variety of different concepts, often combined in a number of different ways. Prior to using any information systems methodology, therefore, it is generally necessary to consider how, and within which context, it will be used (Olle, Information systems methodologies).

Randall Collins suggests that rituals could be considered as a special type of frames; I think that is more or less the way they do function. (... ritual involves some type of physical activities, which are given a new [? ] meaning as ceremonial actions. Ritual is thus a special type of framing; Collins, Theoretical sociology, p. 294.

As I have said, rituals will form a central part of the general framework for the argumentation in this book. They provide us - for free, so to speak - with both an empirical system and a theoretical system that may be taken as one kind of framework.

Analysis of real-world (historical and social) processes and situations is a question of selection and abstraction of items and relations and interactions between them that we consider important on various levels. And relevant levels have to be identified. This analytical procedure, which has a tentative, per-
sonally tailored starting phase and will modify issues and definitions all along its course, applies to a series of factors like the following ones: the material itself and relevant data; alternative conceptualizations of its environment, functional and social circumstances and conditions; various methodologies for approaching such issues (the direct connection object-method is conscious). This latter cluster of items involves, among other things, choosing our research goals and, arising from them, our models for how we are to identify, describe and interpret specific features and problems.

The entire system of parameters just outlined and set out more explicitly in 11 of the following 13 points, may be considered as making up the framework for our research. Frameworks, then, are not static.

*Now to my 13 points.*

1. People normally have in mind, when speaking of a situation, a cluster of states and events extending over time and space to which certain properties and characteristic features are being attributed, so that inception and end terms can (but need not) be indicated for it. It is, of course, our attribution of properties that turns the time/space extension into a period with particular significance. Since situations can best be regarded as steps or even parts of steps in processes, processes are my main concern. I consider situations, and also events, as subsumed under the term processes and treated as such: sequences of stages or steps leading to a production or achievement of some goal, or consequence; sequences, however, that should not suffer the simplification of being described as "causal"; instead we have interacting systems working along a time-line and with feedbacks. To repeat, I consider situations as time- and place-located patterns of processes. Fixation in time and space is an external operative intervention. So that situations are patterns of processess described, conceived or configured as units over a shorter or longer time of duration and space extension.

2. Processes can be analysed as systems, if convenient with subsystems: interacting patterns of elements or "nodes" (things, notions, concepts etc.) across modalities of categorization (actions, texts, people, whatever) and levels. Social structures, too, can be described in terms of systems.

3. Processes must always be considered as being complex, at least by virtue of the variables of human conceptualization, different interests, goals and competences which will constitute any number of "realities" on one and the same scene.

4. Categorization in analysis is a matter of methodological choice for which no general rules can be given. Categorization in human terms (on the part of historical protagonists) does not occur by absolute terms but by conceptualization practices and is thus to some extent ad hoc.

5. Systems cannot be delimited (abgegrenzt) in any absolute or objective sense; we set the boundaries in an analytic operation. "Totality" thus has an ana-
lytic significance and nothing more. E. g., some protagonist's configuration may seem to be the whole picture.

6. We cannot interpret complex situations and processes, but work only with analytical "realities" which are artificial products and called, in this book, scenarios and configurations.

7. It takes a stepwise procedure to go from rough scanning of a situation over to extracting a scenario; this process should be monitored and describable. It is exactly this passage or, better, this distinction, that so often, and to the detriment of clarity and accessibility, remains blurred or unaccounted for in the humanities.

8. In stead of interpreting "how and what things are", we construe how people handle them conceptually (and, of course, often physically, too); this is the Object-oriented view: in other words, look at the operative aspects. "Meaning" is a term to be avoided since it usually is either too restrictive to be effective or too wide to say anything. In this book it regards the conceptual handling of a thing. In terms of meaning, to take an example, the Epiphany cross (see Part III, Chapter 2) is the entire process outlined in the model, including the artifact itself. So that the processual meaning of the Cross is the entire functioning network involving it.

9. In accordance with points 6 and 8, all parts of a visual scenario, whether "pictures", things, people, actions etc., are considered as being on the same level of importance. There is no foreground and background established a priori among them on account of their nature, only in terms of respective functions and interactions within a process. "Gegenstandswissenschaft" is an empty term.

10. The above analytical procedures are based on procedures from cognitive science, information and management. "Based on" here does not mean machine-run (or corresponding technical procedures), but imitating the analytical "morals" and, by way of metaphors, some of the models from these disciplines. This also applies to rules in analysis of empirical "real-world" material; which cannot really be considered rules at all in any strict sense.

11. The appeal to the cited disciplines (point 9) poses a "bridge problem": how to transfer features from their models into empirical material treated in natural language? This cannot be solved at present, but, given the present signs of development in some of those disciplines (especially brain studies and new recognition of their importance), we have to be willing and prepared to exploit results as they come in. At present, the idea is to catch up as far as possible and evaluate the process.

12. These eleven points (1 to 11) together with the case-specific references (such as the formal rules of the liturgy, the patterns of authority in an historical context), plus the main argumentation for using these factors and how to use them, make up my framework.

Frames of reference... seem to belong less to
what is described than to systems of description (Nelson Goodman; see p. 241).

It seems to be consistent with the argumentation all through the present book (or so it seems to me) that frameworks concern the ways we analyze, not the subject, but my handling of it. Frameworks are our set of analytical tools, such as types of models and their theory backing, our main criterias and goals and the types of scenario they are meant to handle, including the criteria, conditions and goals for the operation; in this case, constructions derived from (historical) situations and processes. In terms of research focus, my main framework for analysis involves the use of ritual models, whether verbal or graphic. Of course no framework has universal use; different analysts will use different frameworks for different tasks, and the same applies to different historical protagonists. The big and unavoidable problem is that frameworks cannot escape having a "customized" and, to some extent, ad-hoc character. This is the price we have to pay for dealing with empirical "real-world"things, meaning by this term "historical" and "social" in past and present tense.

13. The covering capacity of reconstructed historical protagonist frameworks regards postulated premises and criteria for the handling of situations and processes on the part of our (in this case, historical) protagonists. Their various interpretations are too dependent on a number of variables to be graspable in any sense except poetic intuition on our part; which is not to exclude the creative role of intuition in analysis. Here the goal is "total" coverage in the following sense. Putting "total" coverage, concerning a model for the subject of research, in quotes, of course is an admission that total coverage is impossible. For "totality" will always be a relative notion when applied to an empirically established scenario. So what I aim at is something I will label maximation: collecting and bringing order into as many likely relevant features as the analytical process is capable of handling, the capacity issue of course being critical for the entire picture, an attitude, I believe, somewhat similar to the one covered by Herbert Simon's term satisficing / Simon, Models of man: "satisficing" rather than "maximizing" models of decision-making.)

These pictures do not pretend to mirror anything more than a chunk of reality at some specific level. An artificially "maximized" and in this sense "total" picture is the best tool, and under non-quantifiable conditions, the only one, for approaching the following goals: first, ensuring approximately sufficient coverage; secondly (and importantly), giving some protection against disregarding relevant issues within the framework; thirdly, for sufficient survey capacity with regard to interrelations between the issues. "Holism" can never be achieved - it can only serve as a target marking off a direction. Research on empirical "real-world" material is a matter of approaching not of achieving, motion not conclusion.
Similar analytical framework and scenario developments may be postulated also for our historical protagonists themselves, even though the procedures will usually be less systematical, at least on the surface. Our analysis of a situation should result in frameworks that to some extent could accommodate the premises, criteria and goals, reconstructively, that are basic to their picture or scenario of the situation and their involvement in it. (or a variety of framework types in social and political theory, see Bernstein, *The restructuring*, index: framework). This is, as hinted already, something different from offering proposals for interpretations of what their picture "really" was. As noted above, there is no "their picture", only reference frameworks that are activized in various ways.

An example from sixteenth-century Venice may illustrate this. In his study on the pictorial cycles in the Doge's Palace, a German scholar, Wolfgang Wolters, explains Paolo Veronese's so-called Triumph of Venice (in the ceiling of the Sala del Maggior Consiglio) in terms of a Pax veneta, integrating it into the rest of the cycle and referring to contemporary politics, especially after the victory over the Turks at Lepanto (Wolters, *Der Bilderschmuck*, pp. 236ff.). I do not find it adequate, however, to take the situation after the victory over the Turks at Lepanto (1571) [Lépanto] and other contemporary events as the cause of this ideological program. This idea of peace conforms to Venetian political tradition (indeed to that of many States, even the most aggressive ones). The pictorial cycle leading up to the Pax representation does parallel the religious process initiated with the Last Judgement and culminating with Paradise, with the Pax picture right above it. These parallel processes perfectly mirror the premises and values of Venetian State ideology, as it was deeply rooted, since way back in medieval times, in religious tradition and historical legend. The Republic's life and actions were seen in the light of a religious framework that I have labelled, for short, as one concerning offering (State participation in the supreme religious action) and admission (based on Medieval ideas of the State and its divine purpose). No doubt, the culminating secular theme concerns the peaceful conditions ensuing from the entire double process and acquired new actuality after Lepanto, but the process itself has a wider framework that was gradually construed through the Middle Ages and was confirmed in oratory in the sixteenth century. If Lepanto played a role here, it was as an added "proof" of tradition Venetian political theology. (Sinding-Larsen, *Christ in the Council hall*, Part V).

Using such a framework (or frameworks) as I have just indicated, then, entails a process-like development of the key terms and models connected
with it (them). Starting out with a list of fixed definitions, as Oleg Grabar does in his beautiful and interesting book on Islamic images and calligraphy (Oleg Grabar, *The mediation of ornament*, pp. xxiiif.: "Decoration: anything applied to a structure or an object that is not necessary to the stability, use, or understanding of that structure or object. Applying some wider scopes for what "use" and "understanding" are, one might come to the conclusion that decorations don't exist. His list raises more questions than it answers). This means that he is not working within a framework but on a so-called *platform*. And if the platform is established right at the outset, it must mean that the research process is considered as terminated before the book is presented and that the reader is invited to be told about its results without being allowed to follow the process leading up to it; which is a humanistic tack rather than a science one. *When I listen to people in the humanities, I realize that they have similar problems with regard to communicating difficult ideas. I can't read them line by line, because the language is based on Hegel and Heidegger, or whomever, and it doesn't make any sense to me... One of the differences between the traditions of science and the humanities is that the humanities have become traditions of reading and writing. People in these fields don't talk to each other. They sit at home and they sit in their offices [rarely, though] and they construct sentences and paragraphs, and they don't speak to each other. Scientists speak to each other... Go to a talk given by somebody in philosophy or literary theory. Notice that they invariably will read something they have written, word for word. Very few scientists will ever do that* (Lee Smolin, in Brockman, *The third culture*, pp. 29f.)

How can a heterogeneous material of such dimensions be presented under constant and unchangable denominations? How can one, in analysis and description, display a product without accounting for the production process? A much more healthy attitude in Banesh Hoffmann’s book *About vectors*: … even then we shall find ourselves not wholly satisfied with the definition. But it will let us start, and we can try patching up the definition further as we proceed – and we may even find ourselves replacing it by a quite different sort of definition later on. If, in the end, we have an uneasy feeling that we have still not found a completely satisfactory definition of a vector, we need not be dismayed, for it is the nature of definitions not to be completely satisfactory … (Hoffmann, *About vectors*, p.2).

A framework for analysis, then, is not invariable; it is - or should be - a tool to be gradually sharpened. In fact, one of the primary aims of analytical argumentation is to develop intuitions like the one concerning scenarios into an analytically viable tool by gradually sharpening it. For this very reason no definite nor comprehensive definition can be stipulated at present. The same applies to other "operative" terms in the book, such as configuration.

Because of this outlook, the general model (Model 1), which is the most
concentrated "total" expression of the actual framework as applied to rituals, will not be introduced until Part IV, Chapter 2, even though reference will be made to it in earlier chapters. It also seemed preferable to take the reader through some amount of empirical material before springing graphic models upon her or him. Because of this process-concept of crucial terms and perspectives, some of them will be subjected to a more penetrating examination in Part V and presented under the heading of A look into the toolbag.

4.5. Bi-track working.
Whatever the choice of alternatives for our description, the constraints attached to prose writing in any form of narrative chronicle account make for an extremely unwieldy and space-consuming description. Such a description would hardly convey a notion of unity and coherence, unless we were to abbreviate it into so restricted a synopsis that crucial factors and their interrelations would go by the board. An even greater loss would be incurred with regard to analytical tasks: the chronicle would not leave the case open to inspection of its internal structure; we would have to rework the entire description whenever we wanted to assess some particular aspect of the case, and doing so we would not at the same time gain insight into other particular aspects which might, however, turn out to be directly relevant. Chronicles attract because they can pick out salient point of interest, and you can sit peacefully back and let the things pass by. But they are insufficient tools for explaining how factors interrelate and contribute to picking up several premises and aiming at several goals.

The outcome seems to be that we have to work in two parallel courses, with prose and with graphic models capable of showing structure. Let us imagine our research process in the more formalized terms of a flowchart of a succession of stages of data acquisition, of feedback loops for corrections to this and adding to it at various stages. Skipping, for the sake of simplicity, the feedback loops, such a process with some of its specific stages can be represented linearly as follows from beginning to conclusion:

1(documentary data) ...n-10(interpreting documents) -> n-9(adding information)...->n-5(first overall hypothesis)... ->n-3(interpreting new documents identified on the basis of the overall hypothesis) ->n(tentative conclusion).

Let us say that at present I am at stage n-10. I may know where I am and what is happening there, but to see how this is related to other stages, say, to n-6 and n-2, or, indeed, to all of them, from 1 to n, I would have to make my way through them, one after the other. But usually the process will be much more complex than the one exemplified here, and then I should have problems mastering it. Unless I were a world chess champion or a mathematician of the Gauss or Feynman dimension, I should lose track of some stages as I examine others and never be able to obtain a full survey of what I was doing, never grasp the entire
pattern with its important sub-patterns at the same time.

So, in addition to this process of working by stages, in fact, linearly, according to the premiss of natural language, I have to be able also to make a complete surveys of smaller or larger parts of whole, or a full survey, to see and survey in one glance several or all stages together - however summarily - as one unified system or unified section of it. Some among us may be able to do this to a certain extent (but rarely completely or consistently); and if we do so, then we are thinking in spatial not linear terms, that is, we are thinking in just the way a graphic model will set out. That is to say, I can't get around the necessity of having a visual representation of my knowledge acquisition stage after stage, with all the feedback loops. This is probably best handled when drawn up graphically rather than just trying to figure it out mentally (see Miller, *Imagery*, generally, and especially pp. 229ff. for a comparison between "pro-imagist" and "anti-imagist" arguments. These, however, purport to say how things are. I am using graphic images because they are analytically useful, not because they tell me anything).

Let us take an example. The *Epiphany ritual* has its resources, actions and objects oriented toward three main goals and at least one collateral goal: displaying, as we have seen, the three wonderful events and, through the doge's (the Head of State's) drinking from the baptismal water, displaying the sanctification of the Republic of Venice. The Epiphany case consists of a dynamic system undergoing process-like changes over time, in which numerous features expressed by actions, texts, objects, colors and so on, are not only lined up in a series of parallel time-sequences, but in which most of them are interacting three-dimensionally with one another at different but interconnected levels, all of this focused on several goals: the baptism of the Cross as end product, and the three miracles as a three-pronged focus in which many features from the entire process are being re-activated conceptually in a kind of recursive process, searching back, so to speak, in order to pick up again features exhibited at earlier stages of the rite or only inherent in its preconditions, like the State ideas behind an act occurring late in the ritual: the doge drinking of the baptismal water.

We might look at these goals of displaying the religious and political ideas as inputs to the entire process and regard the process itself as a stepwise implementation of a program. These steps would follow the time-path of the real ritual, while all the levels excepting the goals, namely Church organization, actions, objects, etc., would be called in where they occur in the process, which will in some instances take place repeatedly. Then we should need at least four parallel and interconnected paths down (or "up"!) the entire Epiphany rite in order to make this model capture the following-up of the goal-directed program;
here again a prose narrative would fall short. In the case of the doge's drinking of
the baptismal water, the model would need a recursion back to the ideological
foundations for this idea; for the ideology would then be inherent in the goal set
up right from the outset.

So my conclusion in the present connection is this. Combined use of prose
and graphic models support what I would call a valid and analytically workable
knowledge acquisition and representation. The two methods should be used in
parallel, with the analyst shuttling back and forth between them:
1) knowing at any stage what is happening at any position in the research pro-
   cess (or not happening);
2) knowing, all the way through, at any stage, how this stage is related to the
   other stages and to the entire process or system;
3) knowing how the entire system looks, so that I can represent it in a condensed
   or simplified format if need be and use it en bloc in my argumentation.

After my descriptive analyses of the selected cases have produced some
preliminary insights, I have to see how - and if at all - relatively simple visual
models can accommodate them. Without the models, which will reflect intellec-
tual or mental models, I should have acquired some data but no knowledge.
Many of the traditional verbal models of description and explanation would
reveal their unrelatedness to systematic knowledge once they were subjected to
this test of parallel processing.

4.6. Criteria of validity
Thus we need to get away from pretense to proving things or disproving them,
except on trivial levels. On nontrivial levels, our models can be nothing than
metaphors that may or may not reflect real conditions or their emergent prop-
erties. As I shall set out later, this means that our approach will remain largely
an ad hoc one, even if it may look somewhat more reflective of principles,
never mind what some people will claim in the name of philosophical in-depth
argumentation. Depth as I measure it reaches only so far down as to wherever
verbal and graphic models may be made to converge and make some sense of
each other. As far as the main concepts and their interrelations and interactions
can be brought out in graphic models, there is some degree of validity in the
procedure. Apparent systems cohesion is the test here, albeit strictly speaking,
as I have said, an intuitive and creative one: this means:
1) that empirical (historical and social) facts and hypotheses about them
   specifically or as types are amenable to being accommodated into some uni-
fied system of description (not "explanation"); that
2) all models in use can be related to one another and embedded in some
   coherent and hierarchical structure; that
3) the relationship between process and system (structure) can be handled
without detriment to the above requirements.

At the same time I feel obliged to adhere to the standard of simplicity set down by Herbert Simon, because there is no way around it: argumentation should be conducted on simplified models, also supported by Daniel C. Dennett's comment on Richard Dawkins: *The algorithmic approach as Dawkins presents it is deliberately oversimple. But Dawkins leaves plenty of room for making it more complex. He puts in plenty of warnings that he's giving you an oversimple version of it* (Dennett, in Brockman, *The third culture*, p. 93).

In this way, concerning our research programs of the type that primarily rely on non-formalized use of natural languages (humanities, social sciences), there are, at non-trivial levels, no exact criteria for validity only relative reliability in systems inspection. As Bertrand Russell pointed out, … *all exact science is dominated by the idea of approximation.*

4.7. Potential evidence.

So what is the value of whatever evidence one might abstract from specific empirical cases? My central sources all derive from San Marco and roughly one specific period (the 1560s). They are written down and so should look solid enough. Unfortunately, history hardly ever provides us with all the relevant sorts of surrounding documentary evidence for any one specific case. And written documents may look different once we know why and for what purpose they were compiled. We have no other way to go than to try to enter the historical scene reconstructively. Whole groups of evidence will remain out of reach that cannot even be accounted for reconstructively. Here we have to have recourse to what I call potential evidence. An example is furnished by my reference to Bellarmino's treatise on sacred imagery, written as late as in the 1580s to 90s and on a Cardinal's writing desk in Rome, between intermittent dispatching of people to the stake, and not in the immediate neighborhood of San Marco and its practical liturgical problems.

Potential evidence is a collection of historically attestable data that are not directly related to the case at hand but which are assumed to exemplify perspectives that may possibly have applied directly to the historical scene and so must be taken into consideration. To continue with the cited example. In a methodological venture, I feel justified in using statements from Bellarmino's treatise in an "as-if" argumentation. Each single specific statement or notion culled from it, can stand for similar or corresponding, but to us unknown, conceptions within the context of San Marco. The altar cross, an object in metal or wood, Bellarmino says, is a *permanent image*, while the sign of the cross is a *transient image* (Bellarmino, *Disputationum*, II, cols. 693 and 742). Bellarmino, following
medieval tradition, is as aware of the role of mental images as modern cognitive science. Bellarmino says that *Whatever man attains cognizance of, whether by his senses or his intellect, he will attain this cognizance through images* (Bellarmino, *Disputationum*, Vol. II, Col. 698 E: *Homo quidquid cognoscit sive sensu, sive intellectu, per imagines cognoscit*). Maybe at San Marco they would not have stated this in exactly these terms, but the reference has analytical relevance in two modalities. Even if the San Marco clergy and participants at the rituals had not even thought about this or a corresponding distinction in abstract terms, they would out of their practice be aware of the difference between a solid object and a gesture, because of common sense but also because the liturgy prescribed different ritual handling of the two cross shapes. Secondly, in San Marco, at least the clergy would have at their disposal a verbal apparatus for distinguishing the various types of images and things. We do not have direct access to this, but we may substitute, in a model of the situation, external statements, like those by Bellarmino, or medieval terminology such as it has been examined by Giampietro Francesconi, to see how this kind of conceptualization might work in the given situation (Francesconi, *Storia e simbolo*, passim). Images had always been important in Catholic tradition (bibliography with further references cited in the present book: Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*; idem, *Some observations*; Belting, *Bild und Kult*; Gisolfi and S.-L., *The rule*; Baschet and Schmitt, *L'image*; Wirth, *L'image*; Ousterhout and Brubaker, *The sacred image*) and the controversies of the sixteenth century concerning images must have alerted the clergy and others to the issue.

Choosing historical sources is never an "objective" operation. Quoting from Al-Ghazali's comments on the *Light Verse* in the Quran, I am drawing on the ideas of a single individual who died in 1111 A.D. His more general validity rests on the fact that his writings became known as the definitive establishment of Sunni Islamic orthodoxy. This does not mean that his way of thinking was the only one; I am also quoting from Ibn Taymiyya about the same verse. These writings represent possible attitudes which are certainly not extreme and which should serve adequately for a methodological venture. When all these reservations are made, however, let it be noted that I have been sticking closely, in the Christian as well as the Islamic contexts, to basic and generally permanent features in the periods and places from which I have fetched my visual media and written sources.

As far as I can see, the technique here outlined is commonly accepted in the discipline of History, and for the same reasons that I have just set out. The crucial question is whether I have to some extent succeeded in using the terminology and concept system put forth by such distant authors for the development
of a better analytical methodology applied to the San Marco and the Islamic cases. Such a venture will always at the very best succeed only partially, and the identification of the parts which are not successful is a constructive and useful task entrusted to the future.

5. MEDIA AND SCENARIOS

In the focus of the perspectives I am presenting, there are the visual media that are involved in the complex processes and situations I am addressing: visual media, in the widest understanding of this word: from physical pictures (paintings etc.) to shared mental images or conceptualizations evoked in the context and constituted by features here. But it is the involvement itself that sets the scenario for my investigation, thereby taking situations and processes as wholes including the media rather than as background for them. Even entire situations or parts of them, as well as parts of the scenery, such as people moving around, particular actions in the liturgy or among the congregation - all these should be analytically considered as visual media.

Significant features here are those that were/are felt as being so by the protagonists themselves and also those that, perhaps not always consciously, they acted upon, both physically and mentally or conceptually. Clusters of such features, when they are felt and acted upon as if they were to some extent identifiable units, I shall refer to as scenarios.

One important assumption, then, which the present discussion sets out to substantiate, is that analysis of the role of visual media should not take place within the limited scope of 'dedicated' visual media - media purposely erected for displaying something visually, but within the larger scope of anything visible or otherwise conceptualized considered relevant by planners or users within the given functional context and situation and in terms of that context and situation. A consequence of this assumption is to accept and try to accommodate analytically situations of great complexity. This means ultimately to accept severe limitations to what we can do. This research attitude is grounded in the use- and context-focused analytical stance adopted in this study. The outcome is to expand our scope from the restrictions of "thing"-specific disciplines such as art history (a Gegenstandswissenschaft) to general analysis issues and to information- and communication-oriented disciplines such as social anthropology, the cognitive sciences and certain environmental research programs (such as Environmental cognition). Object-specificity - limitation to, e. g., "artistic" and "decorative" material - shows, in my opinion, its analytical insufficiency in contributions like E. H. Gombrich, The Sense of Order, taking the author’s opinions for granted, not presenting argumentations but products.

Baumgartner and Payr give the following summary description of cognitive science - while asking whether it is truly an interdisciplinary activity:
Whenever authors try to define what cognitive science is, they point out that it is a joint effort of specific disciplines to answer long-standing questions about the working of the mind - particularly knowledge, its acquisition, storage, and use in intelligent activity. In most cases, the disciplines of psychology, philosophy, Artificial Intelligence (computer science), linguistics, and neuroscience are listed as the five key disciplines contributing to and involved in cognitive science (Baumgartner and Payr, Speaking minds, p. 11. Some useful surveys: A. M. Boden, Computer Models of Mind; Ph. N. Johnson-Laird, The Computer and the Mind; A. Blake and T. Troscianko, eds., AI [artificial intelligence] and the Eye, Patricia Smith Churchland (in Baumgartner and Payr, pp. 25f.) lists the following as relevant for the Cognitive Sciences: experimental psychology, linguistics, psychophysics, neuropsychology, neuroanatomy, neurophysiology, computational neuroscience, developmental psychology, developmental neurobiology, molecular biology and philosophy.)

Generally speaking, I claim the right not to adopt principles of paradigms or programs that I consider functionally or analytically non-productive. Facing paradigms that are taken seriously by sections of present-day scholarship but which I cannot see how to render useful, I feel no obligation to account for my lack of interest; I am studying rituals but can see no profit in proceeding ritually. Yet I shall make an exception concerning Semiotics, since my omission here may bother some readers who might insist that this is exactly the perspective I should have laid at the basis of my whole venture - and since they may be right, after all, in claiming this.

Semiotics, as far as I understand this technically often very clear but analytically often confusing set of programs, starts out (as far as I can see) from use of signs but focuses on explaining the creation and coming into existence of signs etc., what they are, so to speak, right from their inception.

By shifting the focus from use to creation, semiotics omits to focus on the context of use in the wider perspectives of the social sciences and remains staying within its own closed circle. This area seems to become more and more tightly packed with pseudotechnological apparatus. One French colleague at Strasbourg described our mental machinery in terms of isotopes, and Umberto Eco does so by appealing to models from thermodynamics, that is, models borrowed directly from physics, not from the cognitive sciences, management or information. This means they have not wanted to face the "bridge problem" mentioned above.

From its inception by a happy intuition, semiotics has become burdened with too many cogs and wheels that pretent to be rolling along on regular tracks. This does not mean that an exceptionally articulate and in some respects skeptical work like Sonesson's Pictorial concepts does not offer
insights on numerous aspects of pictorial features. As long as he stays within semiotics all seems well; but a system cannot be evaluated from its inside. In his Abstract, Sonesson states that the field of pictorial semiotics studies the laws and regularities attendant on each and every case of depiction. This is quite a mouthful; the present study points up a number of factors that makes "depiction" look rather unclear as a category. The vocabulary of semiotics is much too complex and vague to allow for the formulation of laws and regularities (the backcover of Sonesson's book speaks of warring factions). It is also somewhat surprising that he discusses whether some notion, like "iconicity" is "wrong" or not (e. g. on p. 220). Sonesson also has formulations like: ... we want to know what kind of a sign a picture is (e. g., again on p. 220 - which is not the only page in the book I have read!). So the process purports to link a picture to some preconceived term rather than using terms to analyse pictures. I cannot see the explanatory value of naming things. I would rather have believed that any picture of minimal complexity would include a number of features on different levels that might call up (if that is what we desire) any number among the semiotic nomenclature but which, separately or conjointly, inevitably would relate to an equally complex number of features in the surroundings. If so, speaking of rules ("laws and regularities") concerning a picture or some set of them, doesn't make sense, since the system just referred to would be situationally extremely rich and flexible and defy classification as a whole. The crucial point is simply that we have no rules for the pictures themselves but only rule-like criteria for our analysis of them, how to tackle the material. Analytical methodology develops some such "rules", but only for how to treat a visually or otherwise conceived or perceived object, which is not the same as saying that the object itself is thus constructed. It is construed - never constructed - in our analytical terms. It is the analyst who makes the scenario, hoping that it may fit that of some of the historical or sociological protagonists.

Another problem connected with Semiotics is that it is being developed without calling in the only scientific backing that might reasonably have been claimed as a support, namely the cognitive sciences. The arrival upon the scene of these has revealed the shortcomings of semiotics and left semiotics behind in a speculative landscape in which social life appears to be more or less absent in any analytical sense (despite talk about "the semiotic society"). This seems to be so at least when society is viewed by contemporary social sciences - and semiotics doesn't appear in this literature except in short information paragraphs, for instance along with "deconstruction".

My chief "message" is rather that visual phenomena (this term in an everyday sense), including the "media", are handled by people in the context of and in the reflection of situations and situational processes; furthermore that
interrelations between internal factors in visual media like pictures and inscriptions, on one hand, and the social and context-regulated and -focused use of imagery, on the other, are two things, in the sense that the latter is not necessarily dependent of support from the former. As I see it, human action on visual surroundings cuts through the academically construed features of the semiotic system and establish systems of their own that seem (to me) much more closely related to the paradigms of cognitive science (not merely cognitive psychology), management and sociology (including rituals).

Some such systems are ritual, and when people see Christ on the throne, it is the liturgical interpretation of Revelation that accounts for this, and he sits there in his glory with specific implications for people: his presence in the Mass, his coming back as the Judge etc. The point here is that these relationships between what is seen and what is meant are instable, for the ritual system allows for a number of perspectives simultaneously (a point that escaped Panofsky). It does not help us much to discuss this in terms of the semiotic apparatus, for the Judge acts on people independently of whether we classify his figure as indexical or whatever. They did not evaluate it as a picture, unless professionally equipped and appointed for this, but as a cue to a reality. The framework for evaluating the picture is neither Panofsky's naive lexical lists nor semiotics but the liturgical process active within the Catholic system (the Programmatic system, - Model 2, - for which see Part IV, Chapter 1; a note of 2011: in my Patterns and programs in pre-modern Rome, I prefer Canonical System to cover the idea) and in its specific surroundings and operating on the picture at various levels at one and the same time.

Media in this way are transparent in the sense that situational structures - scenarios and configurations - may be construed out of any selection among the units constituting the media. Seeing a crucifix I may conjure up a liturgical rite using such an artifact, or I may evoke the historical and "salvational" references attached to it, or, finally, I may consider the ecclesiastical situation, in economic, religious and political terms, that accrues in the context of the particular church from the fact that the crucifix belongs to a collection of relics and other treasures (see Dale, Relics, prayer and politics). If the image in question is richer in literary content than such a relatively simple crucifix, the scope increases correspondingly. The image is connected with a complex pattern of notions and concepts that contribute to characterizing the overall situation in which it is involved. We are dealing with relevance situations valid for the historical protagonists and participants of their own devising, partly conscious and planned and, undoubtedly, partly subconscious and habit-determined. Out of this material we can try to reconstruct their scenarios as operative with
regard to specific tasks, goals or requirements.

The consciousness of something that has happened or will happen, an image in front of you, local references to some far-away place (Heaven, Mekka), the crowd of people you are acting within, all such factors of these kinds are equally relevant in building up and handling relevance situations containing, as noted above, the potentials for various scenarios. To repeat, with the latter term I refer to people's - or my own, the analyst's - selective images of situations as they are constituted both conceptually and in terms of behavior and response.

6. IMAGES AND VISUAL MEDIA
In accordance with what I have said so far, to be articulated in later chapters, a single specimen of visual media thus is conceived of as consisting of many separate, often unrelated conceptual systems (cf. my definition of the Epiphany cross, see...). The object-oriented stance, in the non-technical, "moral" understanding of it, is adopted in this book. The gist of it is that we do not define an object but ask what should be done with it; the "it" then consists of a system of attributed properties or features. The crucial idea here is that we are not concerned with the media directly but with our handling of them, or, conceptually or otherwise, the likely or potential handling on the part of the protagonists in the cases we are studying.

Thus I do not think there is any good reason except academic structure and budgetary distribution policies to isolate "paintings" and other ritual artifacts within the field that is sometimes labelled rather ineptly the "Fine Arts". Allow me a little self-indulgence in quoting my conclusion to a paper presented at a conference at Krems, Austria, in 1990:

So, to conclude, on the basis of an analysis of the ritual situations, I want to suggest that whenever these distinctions in media construction have functionally distinguishable effects, this is due to the functional context, the nature of the ritual and behavioral patterns associated with it, and not to the inherent properties of the two media [images and inscriptions] themselves. It would be futile, to my view, to speculate on absolute distinctions between what you can do with a picture and what you can do with writing a text (Sinding-Larsen, Medieval images as a medium).

This claim needs further qualification, and the book as a whole is intended to develop the issue, with a tentative conclusion in Part IV, Chapter 9.4, labelled Prospects for a general image theory.

Visual "media", then, do not call for any definition: whatever is in focus of an operation is structurally a part of a larger structure that can be described in terms of processes and systems. As a consequence our real "objects" are
interdisciplinary models. This is so because analytically, any painting or piece of liturgical furniture or fellow parishioner, is conceived of in terms of the outlined media-concept, which in itself requires an interdisciplinary framework.

7. TOWARD AN INTEGRATION

There are good reasons for calling in science perspectives in humanist efforts. Firstly, there is a richer register of varieties in the discussion of fundamentals in science than there is in the humanities and the social sciences. Secondly, some of its branches, such as particle physics and cosmology, are forced to consider philosophically basic issues because theory development carries the discourse beyond what is measurable and describable and right down to, at some points even exceeding, the borderline, of what is humanly conceivable. Much argumentation goes far beyond the experimental level. Thirdly, many ventures in the sciences reach out to notions we are used to consider the typical prerogatives of the humanities, even of the arts. While I certainly do not believe in any Final Theory (or "The Answer") - simply because I am not equipped for following up this idea - I do feel we should try to work toward a basic if partial unification of the sciences and other branches of scholarship. And I do regard the present-day complex image of science as a challenge, because science in many respects makes propositions about things comparable to those that are preoccupying ourselves.

Choosing a strategy of research is a creative act, at least to a large extent. And all creative acts draw from existing material. Understanding, describing and controlling creativity is notoriously tricky, to say the least. Thus it is not so surprising that current science displays so many epistemological and cognitive differences and uncertainties. Charting the landscape presents a surprisingly rich pattern of contrasting methodological fundamentalisms among scientists from physics over the biological sciences to the social ones. Polemics are harsh, too. Roger Penrose's book on the cognitive sciences is "outrageous", Thomas Kuhn is accused for not believing in his own relativistic philosophy, and so on. Stephen Weinberg has little patience with the idea that physics may reveal "the purpose of the universe" or even "the mind of God" (Hawking), while Richard Feynman seems to have been right when prophesying that, in physics,

*There will be a degeneration of ideas, just like the degeneration that great explorers feel is occurring when tourists begin moving in on a new territory* (quoted by Horgan).

At the same time, some of the most prominent present-day physicists are moving towards some vision called a Final Theory or even The Answer.
Stephen Hawking, holder of Isaac Newton's chair at Cambridge, predicted that physics might soon achieve a complete, unified theory of nature and thus bring about its own demise (Horgan) (See Brockman, *The third culture*; Baumgartner and Payr, *Speaking minds*; and, above all, Horgan, *The end of science* (a note 2011: his general conclusion has been severely criticized, which does not affect the acuteness and usefulness of the process leading up to it).

But the fundamental epistemological frameworks vary greatly across famous contemporary physicists; some are Platonists, others logical reductionists, others again instrumentalists, and so on. We also witness, on the contemporary scene, a tendency developed decades ago, to include aspects from the humanities, even from the arts (see, for instance, Miller, *Insights*; my reference to the crystallographer physicist Smith's appeal to art as a resource for the "hard" sciences, in Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, p. 180.

In a subsequent chapter we shall see how modern computer-modelling cognitive scientists resurrect aspects from so-called "hermeneutics".

My discussion so far should mean that I am free to fetch my cues from wherever my inclinations take me. There is no law, except academic and budgetary convenience and tradition, demanding that an art historian takes them exclusively from his professional field or from very closely neighboring fields. My approach entails no general commitment on my part to correlate my program to whatever occupies today's Humanist Academe. On the more elementary plane, I claim my freedom to choose. If I come across overcomplicated and murky texts like many of those by, e.g., Bourdieu, and I do so with scarce profit, (for an example of his impossibly complicated and intricate way of making a plain statement, see Dunbar, *The trouble with science*, pp. 144f.), I am free to let him and others of his type go (including Merleau-Ponty, at least whenever he writes statements like the following one, which, to adopt Feynman's expression, drive me up the wall: *Un langue est moins une somme de signes (mots et formes grammaticales et syntaxiques) qu'un moyen méthodique de discriminer des signes les unes des autres, et de construire ainsi un universe de langage, dont nous disons par après... qu'il exprime un universe de pensée, alors qu'il lui donne l'éxistence dans le monde* (cited by Sonesson on p. 220), even if it is on pain of unwittingly redoubling some of their statements. Today it is hardly possible anyway to make a statement without finding that someone else also has made it.

I feel free to disregard the hermeneutics debate, too. Bleicher comments:

*Kant did not inquire into the ultimate grounding of science; by contrast, Husserl is led 'back to knowing subjectivity as the primal locus of all
objective formations of sense and ontic validities' - an idea that has great actuality today but whose formulations by Husserl have long since been superseded by new scientific developments (Bleicher, *The hermeneutic imagination*, p. 8).

No doubt such mechanisms act in us all the time and are an essential part of creativity and intuition. But research on typically Humanist issues does not warrant any structured debate of them. Whenever we try to get to the bottom of these paradigms, we find no bottom at all in the shape of basic terms. Instead we see spreading out before us a mush roming system of fractals, one produc-
ing the next with no end to it. Thus the philosopher Daniel C. Dennett:

*I know this jargon problem is there in every discipline, but it's there in spades in philosophy. A lot of the bad artifactual problems that arise in philosophy arise from experts talking to experts ... experts always err on the side of underexplaining. As a result, they tend to talk past each other. They don't realize that they aren't sharing common assumptions. Then you get these tremendous edifices of conflict, which are based on rather simple fundamental misunderstandings on a low level* (cited by Brockman, *The third culture*, p. 229).

The result is that some fields, such as aesthetics, are virtually inaccessible to anyone not brainwashed in an academic tradition. No tragedy, since "access" here often means simply picking up a term and using it in a slightly different way.

It is not, to my mind, because of its "relativism" in itself that the hermeneutic approach does not work; rather it is the level at which it is "relative": *A common charge against it, but It is not instantly plain what the charge implies or that relativism is a Bad Thing* (Hollis, *The philosophy of social science*, p. 203).

No, even physics fights over the issue, at least since Bohr's so-called Copenhagen interpretation (see the many interesting positive and negative comments collected by Horgan, *The end of science*, pp. 49, 54 (Feyerabend), 57 (Kuhn is full of absurd subjectivism and relativism), 63 (particle physics succumbing to relativism) etc.).

But this is a relativism not at interpretation level (regardless of the conventional name for the Copenhagen model), but at the analytic level (for example of measurement). Personally I cannot see any way of escaping relativism at the latter level. One of the new themes in the sciences, according to Lee Smol-
in, is complexity: *that the fact that the world is complex is essential and not accidental, that there's an enormous variety of things and phenomena in the world. Finally, in such a complex self-organized world, all properties of things*
are relational. The notion of absolute properties - of, say, biological species - has become as obsolete as Newton's conception of absolute space and time (Lee Smolin, in Brockman, The third culture, p. 31).

8. OVER TO SAN MARCO
With such a program in view as sketched out in the foregoing sections, there is no other way to start than by selecting some well-documented real-life situations. Because of my previous experience and corresponding orientation, I have opted for a case within Roman liturgy. To repeat, the case of the Ceremony Master in San Marco with his document seems to provide an adequate and sufficiently complex case which can, moreover, be supplied by collateral contemporary evidence. The rationale for my specific selections can only be investigated and perhaps justified in the context of theoretical discussion. This discussion will develop gradually through my text and some crucial points will be put to a final test (as far I am able to carry it) in Part V (A look into the tool-bag), which contains a theoretical retrospection on features discussed in the foregoing chapters.

This book has several protagonists of the first order. On one level, shall we say the empirical one, there is the Ceremony Master of the Venetian government church of San Marco in the 1560s. We shall hear him complain about his burden as a manager of complex liturgical and paraliturgical rites and we shall examine some of these more closely, especially some that involve images directly or indirectly. Clergy and congregation participated here and did their part of management, too, both on the practical and conceptual levels. They managed their respective tasks and they managed their cognitive, conceptual and emotional handling of the complex situations in which they were involved. In the Islamic mosque, too, there is a kind of ceremony master, the Imâm. His management job, however, is considerably less complex, his task being mostly to lead the congregation in community prayer by praying in the correct manner in front of them. Nevertheless, there are sufficient similarities between the two liturgical contexts to make a comparison rewarding. Visual media are involved in both contexts, images in the fashion of what we normally call "pictures" and Arabic inscriptions serving as images.

On the second level, let us say the analytical one, the present author, and his readers to the extent they enter into his argumentation and care to take their stand on it, also are protagonists, trying to come to grips with the situations as they were handled and experienced by the empirical or historical managers and participants, including the Ceremony Master and the Imâm. So the "burden" referred to in the title, is also in part our burden in our task and contingent capacity as information managers. This management concerns things, images, people, ideas, concepts, goals, competences and emotions; taking a cue from
Bertie Woster: "Always think of everything!"

In the following I shall concentrate on some rites and ritual situations in San Marco and in three or four notional Islamic cases (but historically faithfully reported in regard to principles). I am going to present the San Marco cases without consideration of the chronology within the liturgical year. The main bulk of my study consists in analyzing and discussing, first, a relatively but liturgically central aspect of rites in San Marco concerning Christ and the Virgin Mary, secondly, a very complicated process, the Epiphany ritual, and then types of situations involving Quranic inscriptions in mosques.

My main argumentation, after the present introductory part, is subdivided in three parts: Part II: Managing the rites; Part III: Facing images and handling crosses; Part IV: Media interplay. It is my ambition that these three parts, while concerning separate issues, shall constitute, analytically speaking, a unity, bringing to mind the reassuring formula of the Athanasian Creed: And also there are not three incomprehensibles, nor three uncreated: but one uncreated and one incomprehensible. END PART I

PART II. MANAGING THE RITES

Before embarking on our analytical venture, we need a survey of the pragmatics of the Ceremony Master's situation. This is the approach phase and the description will be in a modest style of a narrative, not analytically very sharp.

1. THE CEREMONY MASTER'S DUTIES

Well-documented and complex liturgical rites, like the one for Epiphany at San Marco, seem to provide an excellent testing ground for approaching the issues sketched out in the foregoing sections. My main documentary basis, as we have noted, is the Latin part of the Ceremony Book, the Rituum cerimoniale compiled by the then Ceremony Master of San Marco (I prefer to refer to the Ceremony Master by this title; but the true name of the author of the document reported in the Appendix (not included here) was Bartolomeo Bonifacio, maestro di coro e delle cerimonie (see Giulio Cattin, Musica e liturgia a San Marco, pp. 88ff. and also pp. 33f.).

Bartolomeo Bonifacio, who died in August 1564, edited a very detailed manuscript book of rituals for San Marco, including some earlier texts: the Rituum cerimoniale, today in the Biblioteca Marciana, Cod. lat. III, Coll. 2276. The introduction, content list and Liber primus - Dominicale - are published in the Appendix of the printed book, with additional references from its Italian part (see Cattin, Musica e liturgia a San Marco, I, pp. 88ff. There is a version also the Archivio di Stato, Venice, but the Marciana copy is more interesting because of its extremely numerous marginal corrections and comments (see Fig. 3 in the
printed version). Furthermore, I have drawn from the Orazionale Cicogna 1602 in the Biblioteca Correr (of which I have had a complete photocopy since 1975, thanks to the late Dr. Lucia Bellodi Casanova of the Correr library. More about the documents below). The Ceremony Book, when supplied with the liturgical sources properly speaking (from Missal, Breviary etc.), provides a detailed ritual context for the performance, in the Venetian government church of San Marco, of the liturgy in the canonical sense of this term (Mass, hours, yearly rotation of feasts etc.).

Even a swift perusal of the document will convince us of the complexity of the picture conveyed by it. That is part of its attraction. The rites themselves present patterns of interaction between various categories of people and between them and the visual media including the architectural space. There is here also the problem of protagonist and participant perspectives. For even though the Ceremony Master was supposed to manage and control the entire process, he surely must have seen things from a distinct and restricted vantage point determined by his care especially for the formal patterns of action in the rites. And other people would have their particular vantage points, correspondingly restricted and influenced by their specific roles as well as by social and other personal and groupwise factors. This also applies to myself and any analyst in her or his role of trying to gain as complete a survey as possible. Thus, at the Government church of San Marco in Venice, in the 1560s, the Ceremony Master, as I shall call him (his real name was, as mentioned earlier, Bartolomeo Bonifacio; but in order to emphasize that I am focusing on the job rather than the person, I shall consistently refer to him by his job title) is referred to, in his own document, as Magister ceremoniarum or Magister chori; or indeed: Magister <chori et> cerimoniarum, et chorodidascalus (in the Introduction the Rituum cerimoniale: see Appendix in the printed version).

He directed, controlled and was directly responsible for the correct performance of all rites in San Marco, from the strictly liturgical ones over to the State ceremonies, which extensions from the central liturgy and focused on public participation in this. He saw to it that the various categories within the clergy performed the ritual as prescribed by rules and tradition. In fact, he covered the whole range, from the Doge (the Head of State), the Primicerio (the local pseudo-bishop) or even a visiting Papal legate or the bishop at Castello (when at San Marco on special invitation because he had no formal prerogatives there)(S. Sinding-Larsen, Christ in the council hall, pp. 181ff. with documentation) to the clergy, right down to the expulsor canum (the dog-chaser). The Ceremony Master answered to the Government. In cases of public disturbances interfering with the correct evolvement of the rites, he could ask for appeal to the dreaded Council of Ten (for the functions of the various councils
of the Venetian republic, see Sinding-Larsen, *Christ in the council hall*, Part III, with bibliography, esp. regarding Maranini's basic work).

For his own use, but also, as he frequently announces, for his successors in the job as ceremony master, he edited the manuscript of which the introduction, list of contents and the Liber primus (Dominicale) is published in my Appendix to the printed version).

The clergy was controlled by the government, and when I later on speak of the Church as an organization, it should be borne in mind that this is a simplification on my part. For as an ideological entity, the Church of San Marco would no doubt be considered part of the Roman Catholic Church, while its loyalties to the Republic could be seen, in consonance with Venetian tradition, (Sinding-Larsen, *Christ in the Council hall, passim*) as due to a state that represented the best heritage of the Catholic Church. But simple the relationships can never have been; my simplification is justified by my methodological focus.

The *Rituum cerimoniale* gives us indirect information about the historical situation in which the Ceremony Master had to work. Let us have a much abbreviated survey of typical features concerning the relations with Rome and historical changes. The Introduction to the Rituum cerimoniale and its reference to earlier documents, with observations on the relations to Rome, have been elucidated by Cattin, his collaborators and the scholars he refers to (Cattin, *Musica e liturgia*, pp. 33ff.).

What follows now is scanned directly from the document (citing a number of points that need further investigation). CR stands for *Curia romana*, the Papal Court.

*The Vigils of Ascension (2v/4) and feast of Sts. Stephen, John and the Innocents (3/9) have commemorations as in the CR, whereas Epiphany (as we have noted above) (3/10) has a rite "very different" from the CR. At Septuagesima (4v/2) we do as the CR, but on Ash Wednesday we are at variance with the CR in some respects (5/5), while in others we might adhere to the usage of the CR, but it must be warned against undue innovations (5/4). Compline for Lent, again, differs from the custom of the CR (5v/7), and Wednesday after Passion Sunday deviates from the CR usage (6v/4). For Good Friday, there are a number of points of divergence with the CR: the blessing rite (8v/4), the disposition of the Sacrament (9/4), and of the mixing of wine and water in the chalice (9/5), as well as the rite of hand washing (9v/1), while psalm Misere re is not used, as it is in the CR. Also the reading at the Sepulchre differs from the usage of the CR (12v/1). On Holy Saturday the incense rite differs from that of the CR (11/*
1). Under special coincidences of feasts, the masses on Ascension vigils are not the same as in the CR (15v/5), and on the Octave, there is a duplex mass at San Marco, not semiduplex as in the CR (15/9). For the Saturday after Pentecost (16/3), some rubrics are at variance with those of the CR. And at Trinity the readings are again different (16/5). On Corpus Christi the rite of vestment with the mitre is different (16v/1), and the Octave does not conform to the CR (17v/4), while the feast of Sts. Peter and Paul follows the CR rite (17v/5). Adherence to the CR continues for the Sundays after Pentecost (17v/8), and so also for reading which, in the San Marco Ordinary approximately follows those of the CR (17v/9, 19/5), and biblical "histories" are as in the CR custom (18/1). For Christmas (Nativity), however, the three masses, while following the CR in the main matters, have different prophecies (19v/1), and the Fifth Sunday after Epiphany shows some differences from the corresponding rubrics in the CR (19v/1).

For Ember Week everything should be done as in the San Marco missal and epistolary, which are somewhat at variance with the CR (20/2).

These informations attest to the singularity of the San Marco rites. But all the rites were not static in the historical perspective, as the Ceremony Master tells us, when he records all the cases of "former" (olim) local usages still in memory but not practiced today, that is, in 1564 (and how many had been forgotten?):

Mass formerly, but today no longer, started with the Kyrie on Thursday after Lent (4v/4), while formerly on Lent Tuesday (carnis privi) the cantors were present at Mass; now they are not present (4v/6). On Easter Tuesday the reciting differs from former custom (7/4). The Sepulchre for Good Friday was formerly in the sanctuary wall and is now in the Cappella di Sant'Isidoro (9v/5). And on this day, whereas formerly two priests carried candles in the procession, now there are six to do this (9v/5), and also the personnel assigned to carry the Sepulchre differs from former custom (10/4), and the priest walking under the Sepulchrum umbrella in the burial procession was dressed differently (11v/1). More importantly, the entire rite involving clergy and the doge for the Mass introit on Good Friday, has been changed (12v/1). On the same day, cantors formerly took their position in the Gospel pulpit, now they are in the Epistle pulpit (12v/5). On Wednesday after Easter the paschal candle is set up differently from former custom (13/5). Also the rite taking the clergy of San Marco and the Doge with company to San Geminiano on the Apostle Sunday, across the Piazza, has been changed (13v/5; 14/1): reduced attendance from the clergy, and the clergy does not enter the Palace to accompany the Doge as formerly, but accompanies him on the way back. Furthermore, laymen
have taken the place of parish priests in this procession (14/2), and the church itself has been relocated to another site nearby (14/2). On Ascension Day, in the afternoon, formerly the Pala d'oro was kept closed, while now it is opened up (15/5). On Corpus Christi, the Body is carried in a tabernacle different from the traditional one (17v/2).

Formerly psalms were sung by the small chapel, in Gregorian mode; which is now obsolete. Now two choirs sing (the small chapel no longer existing) (18/4). Formerly there was a cappella parva of singers, now gone (3/7). Since the small chapel is gone, singers from this group are no longer present at the rite of throwing the oselle ["uccelli", from the original rite using birds, now coins] from the western exterior gallery (6v/9).

Also some customs concerning vestments of today differ from former usage: as for first vespers of Epiphany vigils (3v/7); and so were the rite of aspersal of the clergy on the same day (4/1). On Pentecost vigils, coverings for the liturgical furniture is different from how it was formerly (15v/2).

And, finally, on Maundy Thursday women were barred the access to the pergolo on which the relics were displayed; today they are admitted [some progress!] (8/5).

What to conclude from this survey of variances with the Roman Curia and the many "formerly"s? At least we witness a preoccupation to conserve San Marco traditions in the face of changes and Roman challenges. But the situation must have seemed to the Ceremony Master and his colleagues as being rather unstable. Unstable in relation to what? What was the "original" like, behind all these changes and accommodations?

In 1581 Francesco Sansovino, as cited by Flaminio Cornaro (Corner, *Ecclesiae venetae*, XI, pp. 210ff.), claimed that the ordo di officiar (mode of officiating) in San Marco followed the model of the Church of Constantinople - not very different, however, from that of Rome! - ma non però molto differente dalla Romana. So when the learned Sansovino was confused about the issue, this must be a sign of the times. Cornaro, who claims to have studied all the relevant San Marco documents, concludes that the rites were Roman and "Gregorian" in all essential respects (*quod attinet ad substantiam*), but with such variations as were common also in other churches and orders before the reform of Pope Pius V. Papal bullae of 1568 and 1570 accorded re-approval of formerly approved but non-conformed rites older than 200 years.

Modern research, especially due to Cattin, has cleared up the picture to a great extent. But I still cannot see a clear enough pattern to say that "the" ritual of San Marco as it stood in the sixteenth century belonged to one definite and not to another one among the normal classified categories of Roman liturgies in the western world, be it the socalled *rito patriarchino* or the *Aquileian* one. Pre-Tridentine chaos being well-attested (Cattin, *Musica e liturgia*, pp. 29-40;

I can see no reason why those rites of a church under the control of a political government that was amenable to reforms should have escaped modification by government intervention. The *Rituum cerimoniale* appears to attest to such a pre-Tridentine situation.

Added to all this was the chaos of books that the Ceremony Master records in his document. Let me list those that he refers to; at the risk of confusing some of the titles, since references do not seem to be consistent; so I cannot vouch for completeness. Such a list will broaden the picture of the management job assigned to him. I cite them as they are named in the document, but in alphabetical order:

*Anticae rubricae*; *Antiphonarii*; *Breviarium (magnum) camare in sacristia*; *Breviarium romanum*; *Epistolarium magnum*; *Epistolarium parvum*; *Epistolarium propter prophetias*; *Epistolarium Sancti Marci*; *Graduale, alia nostra*; *Gradualia (also: nova)*; *Homelia*; *Hymnarium magna*; *Kalendarium Sancti Marci*; *Kalendarium vetus*; *Legendari*; *Legendarium nostrum*; *Libellum passionis*; *Liber benedictionis aquae*; *Liber benedictionis cerei*; *Liber benedictionis cinerum*; *Liber benedictionis fontis*; *Liber cerimoniarum romanarum*; *Liber "di fundelli"*; *Liber passionarius*; *Liber pontificalis*; *Liber sacrarum cerimoniarum*; *Liber sermonum de Adventu*; *Libri bibliae*; *Libri exequiorum*; *Libri nigri / mortuorum*; *Memoriale antiquum*; *Missale domenicale*; *Missale romanum*; *Missale Sancti Marci*; *Missale Sancti Marci parvum*; *Orationale novum*; *Orationale vetus*; *Ordinario parva*; *Ordinario*; *Ordinarium quod ad fontem utimur*; *Ordo caerimonia*; *Passionarium liber*; *Psalterii*; *Rationale off. divin.*; *Rubricarium*; *Rubricarium romanum*; *Tabula de libris ponendis*; *Tabula Parisina*.

It now becomes understandable that the Ceremony Master, as a help for himself but primarily for those succeeding him in the job, prepared the *Rituum cerimoniale*. It is also easy to explain why the same document is packed full of marginal and inter-linear comments, deleted paragraphs and sentences. The liturgy that he, on his level of authority, directed, was a process in two senses of the word: there is the ritual process itself, and there is the process of changes in it over time. One feels, reading the document, that he was aware of the fluctuancy of the thing he was trying to handle. Rituals are sensitive organs affected by situation imbalance. San Marco was the State Church and Venice herself was in a delicate position in this period. The document presents a pic-
ture of a period of change and of troubled relations with the Papal Curia in terms of liturgical choices. The ancient love-hate relationship to the Papal Court was rendered even more intricate by the now increasing pressures from the Council of Trent. The basic text of the document was edited by the Ceremony Master Bartolomeo Bonfacio, who died in 1564, the year after the conclusion of the Council. Scanning the impressive Cattin volumes (Musica e liturgia, I - III) will give an idea of the enormous complexity of in-depth liturgicological studies. It goes without saying that the present discussion has nothing to offer here, nor does it intend to do so: selecting some features, I have sought to use them for a different purpose.

1.1. Supervising what?
Now let us first take a tentatively systematic survey of the most important factors that the Ceremony Master had to consider in his supervision over the rites. The activities under his competence are distributed over a set of dimensions that can be classified provisionally in the following terms: data-base, actions, object(s), place, time, actor(s), symbolization. These are evidently on different levels; an issue that will be tackled later on.

There is a data-base dimension. This is the only term I can find that seems to cover the whole range of necessary textual sources as well as authoritative, traditional and habitual interpretations of them. The Ceremony Master not only uses them as information sources, he also to some extent must see to the correct handling and placing of them. There are rule texts, like the Tabula Parisina for helping one through the intricacies of the calendar, and, most important of all, the innumerable rubrics in the Missal, orazionale, antiphonal, graduale, epistolary, benedictionary, etc., stating what to do and when to do it all through the liturgy (usually written in red, rubrus in Latin). In addition there is our document itself, the Rituale cerimoniarum (the Appendix to this book). This document was intended to coordinate all the different aspects of what I have subsumed under the name of data-base. One sensitive issue concerning the right data base is kept in mind all through the document: when to stay at variance with the rites of the Roman Papal court (the curia in the document) and when to accept them; an issue of some political consequence (see Sinding-Larsen, Venezia e le componenti).

These features are characteristic of processes of physical actions (to reserve conceptual actions for later consideration) among various categories of people. Often, the choreography directs different people (clergy and others) or groups of people moving in different patterns simultaneously. On other, and very frequent, occasions most of them are moving in procession, relatively
uniformly; I say "relatively", because they also require some functionaries who do not themselves walk in the procession, and the itinerary includes some strategic pauses, with specific rites. These processions travel inside the church and some of them also outside it, exiting and reentering through different doors according to the occasion - and, in case of rain, passing along the covered loggias of the Doge's Palace.

There is an object dimension, "object", then, in a physical as well as a conceptual sense: how and when to handle and light and extinguish candles and lamps, how and when to do something with crosses, incense, books, altar coverings, coverings of crosses, when to open and close the palla or Pala d'Oro on the high altar - including handling something that was hardly considered an "object": namely the Eucharistic species in chalice and patena or the oblate in the monstrance and the reliquaries, how to handle them at the altar or use them for blessing the Doge and others; how and when to turn towards the Doge, the congregation? Furthermore, what sort of liturgical vestments to use for the different categories in the clergy on any the special occasion, which depended on seasons in the liturgical year. When to strike the organ - or one or two of both organs, and how to do it; and similar variables concerning the use of bells within the church or in the belfry.

This brings us to the place dimension. Mass will be said or sung at the high altar or somewhere else. Such and such members of the clergy will sit or stand up in different respective places (attempts at a systematic general description of site occupation and movements in Bill Hillier and Julienne Hanson, The social logic of space). The Doge will sit on his regular seat just behind the rood-screen, or in the big porphyry basin just outside it, the so-called Pergolo grando (in the Venetian dialect). Some parts of the rites are to be performed addressing him directly, wherever he is seated or standing. Also (but the catalog is far from complete), the congregation has to be taken into consideration. Some rites are performed addressing the congregation in the nave. Controlling display and positioning is very much a concern of the Ceremony Master. This or that liturgical book, the missal, for instance, is to be placed in such and such a position on this or that occasion. The reading or singing will be performed from this pulpit or the other one, the singing chorus will perform here or there, e. g., on the great gallery above the main entrance. Two different parts of the choir will sing against each other from two different positions. On the Pergolo the State relics will be at display. And before some big ceremonies, the Master is responsible also for clearing all the passages (expedire vias) necessary for the passing of processions, etc., lay tapestry runners, etc., including external areas.
Then there is a *time dimension*. Recitals, readings, vestments and other paraphrenalia vary through the year, but also according to variable coincidences between rites following the lunar year (such as Easter) and those following the Julian calendar (St. Justine on October 7, etc.) and according to coincidences between calender dates and weekdays.

*When the Christmas Vigil falls on a Sunday, we say the Mass of this vigil, with commemoration as on the fourth Sunday of Advent ... without the Gloria in excelsis... and we say Alleluya as on the fourth Sunday of Advent as in the rubric in the Graduale ... (2/2). On the first Sunday in Advent everything is done according to the local Prayer book and our Antiphonaries, and we do commemoration of Holy Mary at vesper and lauds, whenever it is not a Double feast, and every day we do commemoration of Advent, also on Double feasts as well as in Lent, but at no other time (2/3).* 

*It should be noted that from the Octave of Pentecost until and including the Advent of our Lord, there area maximum of 28 Sundays and a minimum of 24. Thus, when there are 24 Sundays, in any relevant Sunday we use its proper Office and do not allow, because of any other [intervening] feast, that one omits the Sunday commemoration. And since we have 25 Offices, in the last week before Advent, we sing the Mass of the 25th Sunday in whatever free day there is in this week. Sung Office as in the 24th Sunday, as rubricized in the San Marco missal. Particular Epistle and Gospel in the aid missal, and in the Large Epistolary, in the proper place ... etc. (17v/7).*

1.2. Handling people

All this is no chess game in which the Ceremony Master can move inactive pieces around at his discretion, submitting only to a fixed set of game rules. He disposes over, but is also affected by, all the problems concerned with live resources in the actor dimension or, to put it less dramatically: people. They are themselves required to act in a correct way under the variable obligations just outlined, excepting, of course, the invariably structured attention at Mass. The protagonists and participants at various levels and with different roles and tasks formed complex and shifting networks of interaction: clergy, government officials, singers, musicians (Selfridge-Field, *Venetian instrmental music*, appendix, pp. 330 - 348, provides an account of the musical staff of the Basilica of San Marco; detail in the printed versionof the present book) and servants. The Rituum ceremoniale does not give any description of the administrative hierarchy and the command lines. This subject merits a study in the light of modern management theory - for which the present author is not competent.

Some were guided by the Ceremony Master, some followed the ritual of
which he supervised the implementation while having positions and assuming roles far beyond his reach and authority. And they were not "people" generally, since women did not count here, only men, with all their ego and proclivity to taking themselves seriously. This becomes all too evident when the visiting Papal Legate and the local Bishop or the French and Spanish ambassadors quarrel over rank and precedence (*locus et maioritas*). The local bishop resided at San Pietro di Castello (his cathedral in the epoch in question), but also on important occasions visited San Marco - but this strictly on official invitation; he had no prerogatives in the government church. One of them, bishop or legate, because he is forced to impart his benediction and indulgences after his rival has done so, sulks and simply refuses to impart them at all (3/2). Such quarrels of course are not merely personal; official State or Church dignities and positions are at issue, too – being an example of how the Ceremony Master’s field of competence touches, at least indirectly, on some sensitive political matters. On at least one such occasion, the Government chose to stay away from a rite they normally attended, in order to avoid being drawn into the conflict. The document does not specify, but we can guess also what may ensue when selection has to be made for the priest or singer with "the best voice", "best" recital and behavior capacities, etc. Occasionally, as it emerges from the Rituum cerimoniale, that some people simply do not turn up at the appointed hour, or one of the Schools (religious fraternities) does not show up on time, so that the rites have to be carried through with a reduced number of participants. Conditions probably were as we know them a little later, just after 1600, concerning the choir(s):

*Absenteeism was a problem at St. Mark’s, partly because some choir members were also priests at other churches, partly because they were sometimes called away to singing duties elsewhere (for the doge, or at other Venetian institutions) (Whenham, Monteverdi, p. 89.).*

This fluctuating situation also seems to have applied to other members of the outfit – in the context of music one factor behind the well-known usage of scoring a piece of music for a variety of alternative instrumentations, violin or oboes, chorus and organ, or just the organ (Whenman, Monteverdi, p. 1 and Chapter 2).

Over such problems the Ceremony Master had some help from the *Appunctator*, who recorded attendance and collected fines from late-comers or absentees.

Administrative and financial responsibilities and power were vested in the Doge and the so-called *Procuratori di San Marco*, while some share was also claimed by the clerical head of the church, the *Primicerio*, a setup likely to
create tensions (references, among others, to Betto and Cozzi, in Tiepolo, *Presenze*, passim).

To complicate the routines of the Ceremony Master, this official and high-ranking outfit, which controlled the personnel policies and appointments, took initiatives on their own for special strictly non-liturgical activities in San Marco. As for music, the instructions the Ceremony Master gives in his ceremonial are kept to the bare necessities, especially for timing. Already the fact that many musicians were hired on a free-lance basis must have complicated the scene also for the Ceremony Master (Selfridge-Field, *Venetian instrumental music*, pp. 14ff.). The Procurator saw to the music at a more advanced level. Eleanor Sellfridge-Field records a case that illustrates this.

At San Marco the first efforts toward the establishment of an orchestra (although it was probably not viewed as such) occurred in 1568, when the procurators hired Girolamo Dalla Casa... to give concerts with his two brothers and other musicians in the organ lofts... Reports of instrumental concerts during Dalla Casa's tenure refer to as many as twelve instruments, these being mainly woodwind and muted brasses. Some (perhaps most) of their playing probably had the purpose of reinforcing vocal parts or of substituting for absent singers. The doge's piffari [six trumpetists] were also sometimes present in San Marco, but unlike the orchestra they performed on the main level: Beside being used in concerted motets, instruments were evidently used as substitutes for voices in vocal works (Selfridge-Field, *Venetian instrumental music*, pp. 14f.).

The Rituum cerimoniale naturally is silent about the social subnetworks of loyalties, enmities and alliances - all the hidden powers, to adopt Edith Wharton's phrase - interfering with such decisions and making the burden of the Ceremony Master even more onerous. But this web is impenetrable for us; we know nothing, for example, of the attitudes and behavior of the famous composer, and only non-ecclesiastic or non-political person whose name is recorded in the Rituum caerimoniale, Adrian Willaert (ca. 1490 – 1562).

### 1.3. Handling symbols

The Ceremony Master also has a task that is not formally recognized and about which he may have been only partially conscious. He manages an enormous amount of variously interrelated symbols and symbolization processes. This could be a very delicate matter, since the rites conveyed an essential feature of the Republic's outward image. The foreign Ambassadors were regularly present on the more important occasions. The Rituum cerimoniale itself also refers to the pilgrims who flooded the city on their way to the Holy Land. On the Feast of Corpus Domini, for instance, pilgrims might admire a procession
in which participants were dressed up like prophets, angels and so on, exactly as on Titian's woodcut, *Il trionfo della fede* (Appendix, 16v/7 and 16v/8). (on the woodcut, see S. Sinding-Larsen, *Titian's Triumph of faith*).

Among the "symbols" over which the Ceremony Master had indirect control there were the ritual objects, like crosses and candles, symbolic for heir shape as well as their imagery (interesting notes concerning "taxonomy" with regard to "Renaissance altarpieces" in Martin Kemp, *Introduction*). Even on a pragmatic level, the categorization of "R. altarpieces" as images placed on the altar mensa appears tricky to me. Surely not only altar retabula and apse mosaics but even the huge painted crosses placed on the beam between the altar, the site of a visually and auditively inaccessible Mass canon, and the congregation nave, also functioned as "altarpieces"? Are we dealing with classification of images or of types of public access? For the painted crosses, see Sinding-Larsen, *Some observations*). He cites their use, but not their symbolic value or illustrative reference. The same applies to the mosaics and inscriptions (liturgical, biblical, traditional and synoptical) (for these categories, see Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 72 - 81) that fill up most of the building's walls, vaults and cupolas. Yet all these symbolic and illustrative items created an ever-present message system of which he, as well as the clergy and most of the congregation, was more or less perfectly aware. The religious atmosphere of prayer and meditation was enhanced by this.

We tend perhaps to look at these mostly under two headings: as illustrations and comments on the liturgy and its Biblical background and as works of art. But there is a third factor regarding particularly the Biblical and Biblical-based liturgical scenes and figures: as objects of meditation and prayer. For the new edition of the Bertoli volume on San Marco (Bertoli, ed., *San Marco*, new edition prepared 1998), the Patriarch of Venice, Cardinal Marco Cee, wanted more accent on the role of the mosaics in meditation and prayer. In this he followed solid tradition and, perhaps unintentionally, specifically the advice of the Benedictine reformer of the fifteenth century, Pietro Barbo, as set out in his *De orandi et meditandi*, to meditate and pray while imagining or "seeing" the visual realities of scenes from Christ's life, passion and glory (Cf. Gisolfi and S.-L., *The rule*, pp.76f.; and Dale, *Relics, prayer*, p. 65.). So the operative, active factor applies to pictures, too: they should not only be looked at but entice one to setting one's mind in motion and praying.
2. HIS BURDEN AND OURS

It can hardly surprise us that, at the outset of his sober account of the almost incredibly complicated rites and ceremonies in his moderately schooled Latin, the Ceremony Master appeals for understanding of his precarious position as principal manager: *The burden of the Ceremony Master is no mean affair, for he supervises everybody in the sanctuary but must all the same take the blame for any mishap*: Non est mediocre onus Magistri cerimoniarum qui pro omni-bus vigilat in choro et aequo omnium defectus ascribitur (Appendix, 2/2). We shall have to take upon us some of his burden by following in his track and try to supply some features in some of the many places he left open or empty, especially with regard to the subject to which he, in consequence of his job and mandate, is least attentive: *imagery*. Facing the complex material analytically, we shall find ourselves much in a similar situation as the Ceremony Master; but let me come back to this later.

The Ceremony Master left a lot for us to tackle, partly because of some of the features he did not see and partly since some of them did not come within his competence or mandate. A closer look at his manual will give a more precise idea of the field he was supposed to cover.

2.1. The Ceremony Master and his sources.

On the other hand, he had access to sources that are no longer available to us. He cites a large number of different liturgical books (see the list in Chapter 1), and most of them would have contained ancient material, either in the original or in transcription. This means he would be familiar with historical features concerning the rites and customs of San Marco about which we have no reliable information. This would have given him and his contemporaries a backing we will only be able to guess about. Also historical memories of meaningful changes and developments in the church may have been accessible to him and his contemporaries that we, on our part, can merely in part retrieve from rather sparse sources.

Despite his worry over possible mistakes, the Ceremony Master could follow a preset course of action without having to evaluate his doings in a total situation perspective; he was not paid for such a care nor had he time for it. We, on the other hand, have to follow his course of action and at the same time try to understand the entire situation he managed at any specifically selected point of the proceedings. This is less easy than it may sound, for there is an especially tricky variable called "people". Even when everyone involved, clergy as well as congregation, have their attention focused on the enactment of one rite and its implications, individual and group variances can hardly be avoided: *A common end, unfortunately, however fine as regards a special result, does not make a community impersonal* (Henry James, *The Bostonians*,...
2.2. Competences.
Almost all persons for whom the Ceremony Master's instructions were intended, mostly the different categories among the clergy, would have been familiar with the texts used at the various points of the proceedings. Our aim is to gain complete coverage of possibilities. This is an illusionary goal, but still a goal. We must start out from the capacities and scopes of those protagonists in the ritual situation that are best equipped, and eventually "descending" by degrees to the categories less completely prepared. People with widely varying competences (to say nothing of interests and dedication) would participate directly or indirectly in the rite. Competences of course are, among other things, socially conditioned; I shall return to social classification later (see...).
But using social categories for assessing or hypothesizing about competences with regard to our present material does not seem very productive, since the question is how handling and coping with situations were conditioned within the ritual processes. Having assessed these, we may try to connect our findings with external influences.

The Ceremony Master's account in the Rituum ceremoniale in the Biblioteca Marciana at Venice, as affirmed in the preceding chapter, presupposes a much deeper and wider liturgical and traditional knowledge on the part of the clerical participants in the rites. A rubric of his, for example, merely gives: Psalmus Miserere, but there are three psalms with this beginning, so his clients were supposed to know which one he had in mind. His assignment is to assist in a correct handling of the liturgical process, not to illustrate its significance. His task in compiling the document is not to list the texts used for antiphons, responsories, prayers, etc., which are all recorded in the usual books (to which he in fact constantly refers), but to map out the various stages and points of the proceedings: when exactly to recite what or do what. The texts he does cite serve mainly to indicate the exact points at which the respective actions should take place. For himself and his fellows among the clergy, the account is of course loaded with significance that does not appear explicitly from the written text. They would not only know by heart all the antiphons, responses, prayers, psalms etc. that the rubrics refer to in abbreviated form, but also much of the biblical, theological, traditional and liturgical background to many of them as also to the ritual action itself.

As stated earlier, neither the Rituum ceremoniale nor the Orationale Cicogna 1602 give all the recited texts in detail; in the latter document, for example, we may find rubrics as this one: *O admirabile comertium cum reliquis antiphonis et psalmis suis* ['A wonderful exchange', with the other anti-
phons and its psalms"; cf. No. 15, below], presupposing that the user knows the rest; while our Ceremony Master often expresses himself in even more abbreviated terms, just to remind the clergy, who are in the picture already. For instance, at the Vigil of Epiphany and First Vespers, under the preparations for the blessing (see below), a rubric of his says just Hodie (today); but the Roman ritual has at least twelve texts starting with Hodie.

Some of this material will be offered subsequently to the presentation of the Master's report on the respective rites. With regard to Epiphany, the list of incipits in the Orationale Cicogna 1602 will be given in full. In our present context, much material can be summarized merely in a pars pro toto manner, since a historically satisfactory account would expand my text into volumes. Again, I am after methodological principles and research procedures rather than substantive exploration. My synopses should by no means be taken to pretend to be a liturgicologist account, for which I am not scholarly equipped.

2.3. Public appeal

At a conference at the Ettore Majorana Centre for Scientific Culture, Erice (Trapani, Sicily) some years ago, Hans Belting took me to task for considering the category of people he referred to as the floor sweepers. But responsible clergy were not at liberty to ignore people at large and their reactions. Even the dog-chaser, we have seen, is recorded in the document. If something in the church alienated him or a floor sweep, other people, too, would probably feel embarrassed. The subject of popular alienation had been examined at various Church Councils, such as at Lyons in 1274 and Vienne in 1311 (Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and ritual, p. 9) and again at Trent. Even if some clergy might tend to overlook it, we cannot do so, if we want our analysis to take into account the popular element and be theoretically sufficient; this once more is a question of maximum coverage. When at its 25th session, in December 1563, the Council of Trent admonished the clergy to use imagery for the instruction of the people, the warning must have meant that this was not complied with sufficiently but not that doing so would be a novelty; on the contrary, there is abundant medieval evidence to the same effect.

In the Roman Church (for the following, see Gisolfi and S. S.-L., The Rule, pp. 76ff.) there was a longstanding tradition for the awareness of the cognitive role of images and the role of mental imagery for inspiration, learning and knowledge acquisition. This was reaffirmed by the Council of Trent. An important means for bolstering orthodox faith and practice and a weapon in the fight against heresies, consisted in the pictures themselves. Thus at the said session of the Council of Trent, in December 1563, a statement urged the bish-
Cardinal Roberto Bellarmino, writing in the 1580s-90 (A very useful reevaluation of recent scholarship related to religious imagery in "devotional" contexts in J. Hamburger, *The visual and the visionary*, pp. 161 - 182; also especially on the later fate of the Gregorian tradition concerning the use of images. See also K. A. Wirth, *Von mittelalterlichen Bildern*, pp. 256 - 370.), indeed took the "people", including the floorsweeper, into serious consideration when he affirmed that sacred images were useful also because they held the people's attention lest they (people) be distracted by empty reveries (*continent mentes hominum, ne vagantur inanibus cogitationibus*) (Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, p. 103).

3. SOME RITES AND THEIR SETTING

To ensure maximum scope I shall select my ritual processes or sections of them by the following criteria. One of them must involve a direct focusing on an image; a second one must do this indirectly, by implication; and the third one must involve imagery directly but at the same time embody other focal features, too.

The next question to settle, is where to start. A logical method might be to proceed by the stages just mentioned, starting with the simplest case but involving direct focusing. On the other hand, analytical methodology largely concerns the formulation of frameworks and thus it may be more productive to embrace the larger perspective first. However, and thirdly, it is the relatively simple case that brings us in a first and direct contact with the central issue of the liturgy as a whole, namely the celebration of the Holy Mass. So I shall start here. At any rate, argumentation among such cases as the ones cited will entail some amount of shuttling back and forth between them.

1) Presenting the empirical material first may lend substance to a more principal presentation of the entire Catholic Programmatic System in Part IV, Ch.1 (2011: in my recent book called the *Canonical System*), while it may be helpful already at this point to refer to this. The following factors are thought of as interacting according to a model presented in the chapter just referred to: the Bible (for Rome, the Vulgate version of the two Testaments);

2) the literary and ritual tradition of the Church in a general sense;

3) the official statements concerning the liturgy and its interpretation specifically; and, finally,

4) the special liturgy, which may mean any specific section of it we might chose for our scenario, as in the case of Epiphany, or the sum total of the
Roman liturgy (Mass, Hours etc. for times of day, times of week and times of year) or its emergent properties as evaluated from various specific correlated frameworks, such as a social one.

3.1. Canonical and personalized scenarios
Before proceeding, we need a distinction between reference frames for rituals that we might call, respectively, canonical and personalized.

We use the name canonical for rituals and ritualized processes or parts of them that are directed, rule-regulated and controlled by some authority, like the Roman Church, according to authority definitions, with e intended goals and purposes likewise authority-defined, regardless of personal or groupwise conceptions of them on the part of users and participants. In such a context, perspectives are limited to the field of the formally defined system, such as, for example, the liturgy or some part of it. There is, for example, a set of statements concerning notions that may be subsumed under the heading Christ enthroned or Christ in Glory. Since this seems to be a fixed and well-defined system, crucial notions and configurations can be expressed by formalized codes, with or without attachments of personalized features.

At the other end of the scale we have personalized conceptions which start out from a canonical context or add features to it by way of association and ritual attitude or behavior. These conceptions will usually call up features from real-world experience. Canonically speaking, there is no question of somekind of material “throne” for Christ, the reference being metaphorical and used for communicative purposes. Here, the idea is that the Son shares position next to the Father. By personalized elaboration, experience from specific kinds of real-world chairs, thrones etc. may be called up as a visualization.

I used the term scale for the connection between the two terms with purpose. For even texts that would be considered central to Tradition in the Roman Church, for example Patristic texts, and hence by many authorities be considered canonical, use metaphorical language in a very marked and realistic world-experience sense. So there is no sharp distinction.

**ADDITION 2011:**

*The Wednesday rite*

Most public institutions, Church, state, municipality and guilds, expressed themselves in *rituals* and in ritualized ceremonies. They were all rooted in religion and more or less directly derived from relevant *liturgies*. New political or ideological contexts generated *elaborations* of them. Thus, there were hardly any “civic rituals” to be neatly distinguished from their liturgical origins.

One example may be cited here. The spectacular *Wedding to the Sea* in Venice had its basis, let me note, in the goverment procession, carrying the *Christ*, each Wednesday to the old government chapel of St. Clement Pope and
Martyr, in San Marco (with political inscriptions, and, until the early fourteenth century, with the Doge’s throne).

Long before 1480 (a definite ante quem), two individuals, a martyr and the pope were knocked into one (De sancto clemente papa et Martyre; thus in the 1564 Rituum cerimoniale) (Sinding-Larsen, Christ in the Council Hall, 1974; and Burden, 269). In the Sacramentarium gelasianum (eighth century), Clemens is just sacerdos et martyr (No. 1067, LXV, p. 163, in Liber sacramentorum romanæ aeclesiae ordinis anni circuli, ed. Mohlberg, Eizenhöfer and Siffrin, all OSB, BRome 1981 [= Rerum eccles. doc., Series <maior, Fontes, IV]).

His martyrdom had provoked a miracle at the bottom of the Black Sea, qualifying him as a patron of a sea republic like Venice. "Pope" Clement’s martyrdom in the sea was recorded in the liturgy (Dum iter ad mare coepisset…; Lodì, Enchiridion eucharisticum fontium liturgicorum, Rome 1979, 891). In Venice, Bibl. Correr, Orazionale Cicogna, 1602, fols. 277-8, we read: Dedisti Domine habitaculum martyri tuo Clementi in mari in modum templi marmorei angelicis manibus preparatum…: an event illustrated in a twelfth-century fresco in San Clemente, Rome. This is part of the liturgy regarding the individual protecting saint, later forming the Breviary reading for the specific day. This rite, like all the hagiographical readings, builds on the general appeal to all the protecting saints in the Mass Ordinal: Oramus te, Domine, per merita sanctorum, tuorum, quorum reliquiae hic sunt, et omnium sanctorum... (see below).

Thus the paraliturgical ceremony of the procession to the chapel, is an elaboration of a two-steps basic liturgy whose content and actions were verbally codified, and hence transferable to imagery. The Wedding ceremony at San Nicola del Lido, is a further elaboration of comparable thematics for public appeal and community consolidation and for diplomatic propaganda. There seems to have obtained no formally codified connection between the paraliturgical Wednesday procession and the Wedding ceremony; only a concept or idea transfer from the former in support of the latter. The ceremony was rooted in a well-attested while variously expressed religious-political tradition in the Republic, one among whose anchorage points consisted in the formalized Wednesday ritual (on the San Clemente area, see Sinding-Larsen, Christ in the council hall, 203; SL, A walk with Otto Demus, Acta of the Norw. Inst. in Rome, vol. VIII, series altera, 1992, 194ff.).

END OF PART II

PART III FACING IMAGES AND HANDLING CROSSES
Two rites in San Marco, one directly facing an image, the other one involving an "illustrating" object, a cross, will now be reported and later used for analytical development.
1. SHOW YOUR FACE
In the Roman liturgy and in traditional understanding of the Quranic texts used for mosque inscriptions there are notions of being face to face with God. In the church, there will be an image depicting the idea of facing Christ and through him God (Figs. 5, 11). (Until Daniels vision of the *antiquus dierum* came to be used in the fourteenth century for depicting God as an old man, the image of Christ, complete with the cross halo, and the Lamb (as attested by inscriptions, e. g. in the Scarsella of the Florentine Baptistery, were used as representations of God).

In the mosque, of course, there are no such pictures, but we shall see that Quranic texts amount to a manifestation of God. There is thus some basis for comparison between the two kinds of situation, even though the media are different: images and inscriptions. This comparison will occupy us later. But it will presuppose some very specific information, and conveying this, especially with regard to the Islamic context, will require quite detailed conversance with the material. To present this and to discuss some aspects in preparation for the main attack, is the purpose of the present chapter, and Chapters 2 (on the Epiphany rite) and 3 (on the Islamic material).

1.1. Chanting before the Virgin
One section in the Ceremony Master's account (Appendix I, 18/5) explains “How to sing Salve Regina on Sundays”, and this was recited in front of an image of the Virgin Mary, probably the so-called Nicopeia Madonna in San Marco; see also Moore, *Venezia favorita*). His instructions here are short and to the point and the case might look simple enough; in fact, even to anyone used to liturgical imagery, it is highly complex. After having reported what the Ceremony Master has to say and having identified the prayers and other texts he refers to, I shall try to extract what seems to convey the essence of the entire rite. With "essence" here I mean a reconstructive account of the crucial features inherent in the scenario or scenarios valid for the clergy and other well-informed contemporary people. Such an "extraction" is in itself a rather tricky analytical operation, for it is by no means obvious how this is to be done. In what follows, I shall present a synopsis of the text of the rite so close to the original as to amount almost to a full translation (including the many additions).

On every Sunday from the Octave of Pentecost until Advent, whenever we do the whole Sunday office ..., after Vesper we always go in procession to the image of the Virgin Mary, singing Salve Regina (for the text, see below) in plainsong, intoned at the high altar by two clerics. And the cantors sing
those three versicles [which must refer to the two versicles and the
response cited below] in 'cantus figuratus' to the said image, with the cho-
rus responding alternately, as usual. [cancelled: And after the prayer for
the Mother of God {pro parae: Deiparæ} has been said, the lectern with
its napkin is removed from the choir, while the priest is praying, and is
brought up before the said image.] [Addition: and the prayer book (Oratio-
nale) <brought> by the priest] [Addition: on a lectern brought there by the
supervisor before the Vesper], for saying the prayer after Salve Regina, the
versicle Sempiterne Deus, qui gloriosa. And the clergy say the versicle
Dignare me with the response Da mihi virtutem. Thereupon prayer as
above [the prayer for the Mother of God (pro parae: Deiparæ)], and when
the procession returns, ... Maria mater gratiae and Gloria tibi Domine are
intoned, and that is all. [Addition: And on all feasts for the Virgin Mary,
when the icon (anchona) is set upon the altar, and when it is brought back
to the sacristy, always, going in and returning, Maria mater gratiae and
Gloria tibi Domine are sung, either by the appointed clergy or by the Cere-
mony Master...].

Let us read the texts in synopses (originals in notes) (I am using the following
collection of prayers: Giovanni Battista Albrizzi, ed., Officium beate Marie Vir-
ginis). A rendering of the Salve regina might run as follows: Hail queen,
mother of compassion, life, well-being (dulcedo) and hope for us, hail. We
appeal to you as the exiled children of Eve. We sigh before you and weep in
this valley of tears. Hail you, then, our defender, turn your compassionate eyes
upon us. And after (the end of) this exile, show us Jesus the blessed fruit of
your womb. O charitable, o pious, o sweet Virgin Mary (Salve Regina, mater
misericordiae, vita, dulcedo et spes nostra, salve. Ad te clamamus, exules filii
Hevae. Ad te suspiramus gementes, et flentes in hac lacrymarum vale. Eia ergo,
avocatam nostram, illos tuos misericordes oculos ad nos converte. Et Jesum bene-
dictum fructum ventris tui, nobis post hoc exilium ostende. O Clemens, o pia, o
dulcis Virgo Maria). This is followed by the versicle Sempiterne Deus, qui glo-
rious: Almighty eternal God, who made ready the body and soul of the glori-
ous Virgin Mother Mary for meriting to be worthy as a dwelling for your Son,
with the cooperation of the Holy Spirit: make it so [O God] that we may
rejoice in her remembering <us> and that we may be freed, through her pious
intercession, from evil occurrences and from perpetual death. Through the
same Christ our Lord (Omnipotens sempiterne Deus, qui gloriosae Virginis
Matris Mariae corpus et animam, ut dignum Filii tui habitaculum effici merer-
tur, Spiritu sancto cooperante, praeparasti: da, ut cuius commemoratione laeta-
mur, eius pia intercessione ad instantibus malis, et a morte perpetua liberemur:
Per eundem Christum Dominum nostrum). Thereupon the versicle Dignare me:
Make me worthy of glorifying you, Virgin made holy, with the responsory Da
mihi virtutem: give me strength before your enemies (Dignare me laudare te, Virgo sacrata. (Responsory:) Da mihi virtutem contra hostes tuos). The prayer to the Deipara or Mother of God referred to above, is probably the oft-repeated Deus, qui de beatae Mariae Virginis utero Verbum tuum: God who willed your Word to assume (human) flesh in the womb of the Virgin Mary, as announced by the Angel (Gabriel): grant that we who are invoking you will believe that she is the true forthbringer of God and that we shall be helped by her intercessions before you (Deus, qui de beatae Mariae Virginis utero Verbum tuum, Angelo nunciante, carnis suscipere voluistis, ut qui vere eam Genetricem Dei credimus, eius apud te intercessionibus adjuvemur. Per eundem etc.). When the procession returns, ... Maria mater gratiae and Gloria tibi Domine are intoned, "and that is all": Mary mother of grace, sweet parent of charity, protect us from the enemy and embrace us in the hour of death; (second strophe of the hymn Memento, rerum Conditor: Maria Mater gratiae,/ Dulcis parens clementiae, / Tu nos ab hoste protege, / Et mortis hora suscipe) and: Yours is the glory, O God (The ending words, here used as a responsory, of the antiphon Magnum haereditatis mysterium, prominent in the Office of the Virgin: Magnum haereditatis mysterium! templum Dei factus est uter us nescientis virum: non est pollutus, ex ea carnis assumens, dicentes: Gloria tibi Domine (The mystery of the great heritage! the womb of one not having (ever) known a man has been made a temple of God: he remains unstained as he took flesh from her: all peoples are coming, saying: the glory is yours. O God).

Introducing the Ceremony Master's account of the Salve Regina rite in front of the Virgin image, I said the rite sounds almost trite, and the image was probably simple, too, if measured by pictorial tradition exclusively. For, as mentioned already, it is likely that the image in question was identical with the so-called Nicopeia Virgin (In any case we may be fairly sure that it must have been a small image, if it was regularly to be carried back and forth between the sacristy and the altar, and hence almost certainly an image of the same general design), in the Republic of Venice considered an "original" portrait of the Virgin herself and hence a prototype for an extremely common type: frontal half-figures of Mary with the Child on her lap and in an immobile attitude, except for her pointing to the Child. Bellarmino has a name for this kind of image: images without any indication of historical events.(Bellarmino, Disputationum, II, Col. 699 E: Imagines... solas Christi, vel Sanctorum sine ulla notatone rerum gestarum.... In any case we may be fairly sure that it must have been a small image, if it was regularly to be carried back and forth between the sacristy and the altar, and hence almost certainly an image of the same general design). For easier reference, let us call this morphological type (Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and Ritual, pp. 116 - 125 on functional and morphological types) the
en-face type bust, speaking now only of the design features; using "en-face" for the entire figure appearance, even though in many cases she may turn her face slightly sideways.

The contemporaries of the Ceremony Master would be familiar with this type of picture. Renaissance occurrences of the small, bust type Madonnas with Child, such as those produced by the Giovanni Bellini firm and many others, have been rather inadequately dubbed “close-ups”, as if they represented something new. The type was common all through the Middle Ages: most Roman churches has a miraculous one of this type (see, e. g., the selection of early Medieval images in Amato, De vera effigie Mariae) which may explain their later popularity. The type became usual also in later ordinary portraiture, even though in the latter context, three-quarter views were more common, implying, as it were, a stronger notion of mobility. The close-up effect comes from the framing not the figure design. Neither theology nor liturgy settles the issue of nearness or distance, the question being one of different focusing processes, as we shall see later on.

The type, which was to be mass-produced in Venice (by Giovanni Bellini and others) and elsewhere, corresponds to the numerous miraculous Virgin-and-Child in mages in Roman churches and was probably seen as a Roman type of image. When we label the Nicopeia "Byzantine", Venetian tradition would associate it with the Roman heritage (Sinding-Larsen, Chiesa di Stato e iconografia musiva, pp. 26ff)

Clergy and congregation, facing the image of the Virgin Mary during Mass or during the Salve Regina as described by our Ceremony Master, would work their way through texts referring to her and her role. The same applies to the rites concerning any saint, even if he or she is merely evoked in the general list of "all the saints". It should be superfluous to insist that such a necessary reference mechanism applies to images of Christ. The liturgy embraces, in most cases directly, any theme or subject ever found in so-called altarpieces (including apse mosaics, antependia and the like).

To see how this creates an inescapable unity of the entire range of thematics, we should repeat that this embracing liturgy does not consist of separate pieces of rituals and texts but forms a coherent unity, a framework. It may be described as a system of concentric circles with the sacrifice of the Mass in the centre, and extending outward to embrace also the apparently more remote parts contemplated in the Breviary readings. Also, any one of the special sections of the liturgies has numerous cross-references to notions elaborated more fully in the section thus referred to, so that in any particular section there are usually direct, references to the central core of the lit-
urgy, the Sacrifice of the Mass, the mechanics of salvation and intercession by the saints. The clergy, but also other educated people, and in fact any regular participant would know these texts and actions from daily, or at least, weekly practice.

It should be noted that the liturgical texts as a basis for pictorial renderings of events versus static conditions come in two types: distinctly narrative in contrast to those that invite hieratic and more or less motionless renderings of the kind discussed here. I am not sure I understand Cynthia Hahn's comment, in her excellent account on *Icon and narrative*, that the liturgical materials are arguably the most 'iconic' of the textual versions of the life of any saints... and that the liturgical texts evoke the saint in static, primarily descriptive attributes...(Hahn, *Icon and narrative*, p. 76). For it seems to me that most lives of the saints in the Breviary (or corresponding earlier compilations) while abbreviating and summarizing merely the most important among the saint's virtues and actions, certainly remain narratives.

A human bust figure in the specific frontal position and apparently motionless attitude, the Virgin figure, to concentrate on this, may be compared to bust portraits of living or dead people in surrounding society. But it differs markedly from such portraits not merely in literary content (in a "protocol" sense: being the Virgin and not Mrs Grimani), but also in terms of its cognitive potentialities and in the effects expected from communicating through it. These terms, we shall see, make it hard to exclude from them narrative features, at least by conceptual imputation. Let us see how (8 points to follow).

1) The image identifies the Virgin Mary about whom certain specific things are considered as given facts (virgin mother of God/Jesus, now in Heaven, chief intercessor next to her son, oft-appealed-for helper, chief patron of the Republic of Venice - and of a number of other States such as Siena and Florence).

2) The liturgy directly, but also through its implication of references to the Church (both the heavenly and the earthly), effects a communication with the Virgin in Heaven for the clergy and the congregation.

3) Communication via the image with the prototype or "model" (in this case the Virgin Mary) may occur: a notion underpinned by the doctrine that devotion before sacred images referitur ad prototypa: is transferred to the model.

- So far so good: by substitution of specific features and social rituals for the liturgical ones and a social system for the ecclesiological one, functionally speaking the above points 1 to 3 might be applicable also to a portrait of Mrs Grimani. However, points 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are definitely not applicable to a "social" portrait.
4) Seeing the picture of the Virgin conveys a mental reference, not to one's equals or superiors in actual society, but to an invisible and humanly untouchable person "out there", beyond our reach by means of normal human faculties. A divinely instituted and supernatural liturgy is needed for obtaining contact with her. The invocation of divinity or a saint before an image may transcend the local site and its boundaries (walls of the church, etc.) and reach "out there", to heaven, beyond the rationally accessible world.

5) The image of the Virgin is being used within a regular rite connected with the hope of salvation (before being installed for this use, the picture also has been blessed and sprinkled with holy water for this use; but even cattle and cars were (are) occasionally similarly blessed. It is not this that makes such an image "work" (David Freedberg, *The power of images*, pp. 89f., claims that it is), but the ritual involvement. It appears to me that this scholar has omitted central functional aspects of liturgical imagery from his account of "power" (in itself a rather sweeping term). To address the image under these conditions, involves the hope and the belief of a possible salutary or salvation effect on the beholder herself or himself beyond one's life on Earth: that this act will strengthen the chance of a benevolent intercession by the Virgin herself. No such intercession with its hoped-for outcome is expected when complimenting Mrs Grimani with looking reverently at her portrait. Any immobile figure (Mrs Grimani) can impress one as if it were active (she is my bullying boss). One is reminded of Pirandello's story with the widow's new husband feeling himself "welcomed to it" by the portrait of her former husband, *la sant'anima*, saluting him from the mantelpiece. But there is no publicly shared and rule-formulated framework activization here as in the liturgical case.

6) By implication, the heavenly "living beings", the *viventes* (in addition to Divinity, already included with the Child: the saints, angels), may become conceptually present within the physical space of the image itself, because the "prototype" is addressed through the visual appearance in the image, and because this presence is an extension from the Real Presence in the Eucharist.

7) By implication, the portrayed holy person, in this case the Virgin, may be locally present in terms of her favorable attention to the site, its participants and the occasion in which her image is honored; the Virgin may choose to reward veneration of her image with particular attention to it and to those addressing it in veneration: this being a question of fulfillment.

8) A correlated effect is that the liturgical site where people are assembled when carrying the image or acting in front of it, conceptually becomes invested with a wide range of values not attestable in just any room enclosed in an architectural shell, whether furnished with portraits or not. Space and image
together have emergent properties; being totality effects not attestable in single elements that they do not show separately.

In what further terms does such a simple, frontal and apparently rigidly posed image like the Nicopeia (Fig. 4, in the printed book) relate to these parameters (1 to 8, above)? There seem to be two main points to consider.

Firstly, there is its rigidity and frontality of position, frontality coming at the closest to what might be felt as characteristic of something unrelated, if that were possible, to the surroundings. Thus it may look from a general "naturalistic" view-point. From a ritual one, as we shall note, the opposite may be the case.

Secondly, the image does not, in terms of design features, show any of the factors listed from 4 to 8, except for the implications of her direct gaze at the faithful. This feature at least should in any case denote explicit attention to them. So far the most part our above parameters, to a varying extent, are realized conceptually by the faithful themselves, supported in this by liturgy and exegesis, but without any explicit support from the design structure: the five last points (4 to 8) mostly make up a set of imputed significances. (For imputed significance, see Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, p. 58. A typical case cited there is Titian's Pesaro Madonna, created for the altar of the Immaculate Conception at the Frari, Venice, and hence associated with this idea - without there being a single design feature to support it (some miserable attempts to associate the two big columns that were added later with the idea can safely be overlooked).

By seeing the image in the ritual context, to the extent that this is known and understood, people will impute the relevant significances and thereby also construe its relation to the surrounding, thus covering also point 1. above.

The idea seems to be that such conceptualizations or grasp of an idea draw from more or less the entire functional situation and process. Therefore their modalities will be diversified among people according to their capacities and competences in accessing greater or lesser parts of what is going on.

In terms of liturgical conception the type is not to be distinguish from the face-to-face images of Christ/God. As we have noted, the Nicopeia icon includes a frontal representation of the Christ Child. The functionality of the type of image is understandable in the basic context of the corresponding type of representations of Christ, from which the Virgin image and similar images of saints represent so to speak an extension.

1.2. Facing Christ
The notion of facing a saint, for instance the Virgin Mary, is vicarious in the sense that its efficiency lies in that of facing God or Christ through the mechanism of intercession on the part of saints, headed by the Virgin Mary. Some
alterpieces in fact show a saint - without any Christ figure, enthroned in a frontal position; e. g. Vivarini-Basaiti's St. Ambrose altarpiece in the Frari in Venice. In the case of San Marco, the enthroned God, seen "through" the enthroned Christ, as he would normally be according to medieval custom, is hovering above the altar in the apse mosaic and, on the great feasts, also in the centre of the Pala d'oro, the "golden altarpiece" (The traditional argument being, as also used by Bellarmino, that man, and hence also Christ, is an image of God; you may depict man, and hence also God in the same form: *homo est vera imago Dei, sed hominis potest pingi imago, ergo et Dei*: Bellarmino, *Disputationum*, II, Col. 701 E. But Bellarmino, writing in the late sixteenth century, accepts the immediate comparison God-Man-as-image-of-God, without always mentioning Christ as intermediary, a technique justified in part by Daniel, in chapter 7, who saw the ancient of days; and you may paint a vision).

The situation of "facing" Christ is, as we have noted above, a crucial component of the setup determined by Mass liturgy. This idea of facing is notable also in terms of special periods in the ecclesiastical year, primarily - a matter-of-course - at Advent with the commemoration of the Coming of the Lord, the adventus Domini.

The texts of the Advent liturgy do not involve special actions concerning images or "illustrating" artifacts (such as a cross), but such features are mentioned in the Ceremony Master's instructions for this liturgy. It is hard to imagine that the themes just listed could be evoked so manifestly and so elaborately without the participants being conscious of the images of the Present Lord hovering above the stage set up for these recitations. There is the enormous enthroned Christ in the apse: the Rex cunctorum (King of all) and another enthroned Christ on the Pala d'oro whenever this was opened on fixed occasions in the ecclesiastical year, and when it was closed there was (in our period) another similar representation on the so-called pala feriale (the weekday altarpiece). (For the apse mosaic, see Ödegaard and Sinding-Larsen, *Observations on the mosaic*; for the opening and closing of the Pala d'oro, see Sinding-Larsen, *Christ in the council hall*, p. 184).

In addition to the above-mentioned images on the high altar of San Marco, in the cupola over the altar there is the Emmanuel ( = God with us) and over the crossing, right in front of the high altar, there is the Ascension with the virtues - traditionally valid also as an illustration of the coming or advent of the Lord. (Sinding-Larsen, *Titian's Triumph of faith*, pp. 330f. with references to Kantorowics and Gutberlet).

The texts of the Mass Ordinary and Canon repeatedly invoke the presence of Christ - in specific modalities (Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and Rit-
ual, Index: Christ, God, Eucharist; idem, Some observations.) - and through him of God and the notion of the Mass sacrifice being celebrated before the countenance of his majesty. One presence modality is a transcendent one: its site is the heavenly altar. Numerous accompanying texts spell out the idea of enthronement. The Mass sacrifice is enacted on the altar table and is thus a local event. But the presence perspective just noted ensures that the specific locality is integrated in the heavenly space; this is affirmed in the Common Preface of the Mass and in comments on it by St. Gregory the Great and later writers (Documentation in Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and ritual, pp. 24, 26f.; see further the same author, Titian's triumph.; Some observations.; and A walk, 163f., 183f.). The idea, as also the iconography, of enthronement is connected with this concept (see the cited contributions).

There are five aspects to this notion of divine presence: that of the Realpräsenz; of Christ's presence at the altar as high priest; that of the Trinity "filling the Church"; of Christ's omnipresence in the Church connected with the notion of the Mystical Body; and, finally, the notion of God present at the heavenly altar and the conjunction between the earthly altar and the heavenly altar through the celebration of Mass (references in Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and ritual, Index: Presence). Integrated with this system there is that of the heavenly liturgy celebrated by angels and saints (we recall the music-making angels in many altarpieces) before the Trinity: a subject set out in paintings such as Jan Van Eyck's Ghent altar-piece and Raphael's Disputa (the latter occasionally misspelt "disputà", a word non-existent in Italian (the accent is on the i - disputa). The central reference to the heavenly altar and to the idea of worshipping before God's countenance is found in the prayer Supplices of the Canon of the Mass, and a full quotation here will serve later on for a comparison with the Islamic ritual (in which there is no question of a prayer ritual being defined as an event connecting earth and heaven, man and God):

\textit{Humbly we ask of you, almighty God, to command that these gifts [i. e., the bread and wine] be carried by the hands of your holy angel up to your altar on high, before the face of your divine majesty, so that those of us who by taking part in the sacrifice of this altar shall have received the sacred body and blood of your son, may be filled with every grace and heavenly blessing: through the same Christ our lord.}

Prayer is communicated through Christ, \textit{per Christum}, etc. - and medieval artists depicted Christ in order to show God (the crucial formulation in the Latin version: \textit{iube haec [dona] perferri per manus sancti angeli tui in sublime altare tuum, in conspectu divinae maiestatis tuae...}).
The notion of the sacrifice - enacted through the Mass - takes place before the divine countenance and of a unification between the liturgies in heaven and on earth, was developed by St. Gregory the Great (d. 604) and is described, in almost identical words, by Lothar of Segni (later Pope Innocent III: 1198 – 1216) in his treatise on *The Mystery of the Holy Altar* and again by the French bishop Guillaume Durand (d. 1296):

*We cannot doubt that we are reciting the Mass Preface because heaven and earth are conjoined through this sacrifice <of the Mass> and so with the angels in the highest we are asking to be saved* (Guillaume Durand, bishop of Mende, in *De prefatione* (On the <Mass> Preface): *Postremo hic cantica Angelorum* [the "chant of the angels": the Preface] *canimus, quia per hoc sacrificium terrena iungi caelestibus non dubitamus, et ideo cum eis in excelsis salvari clamamus*. A central notion is expressed in the following terms in the *Common Preface*: that God may let our voices be admitted with theirs (i. e., the angels, dominions, etc.): *Cum quibus et nostras voces, ut admittit iuebas deprecamur*. References and texts in Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 8f., 24, 27).

*The focus is not on what is what but on what to do, on action.*

The Roman doctrine concerning images did not envisage them as formally tied up with dogmatic notions but rather as flexible media for display of the potentials of functional situations; the constructs pertaining to theology and ecclesiology being processed through the medium of liturgy and congregation-directed teaching. This contingency would account for the many cases in which we may find what superficially seems to amount to a redundance of motifs or subjects in Roman liturgical imagery. It is important to note that imagery in the Roman Church is more concerned with divinely ordained action than with dogmatic statements. Here lies the root of iconographic flexibility. One image may satisfy different ritual demands and to one specific ritual idea a number of images may seem relevant. The Church in its public teaching and management of iconography stressed activity and participation rather than dogmatic (Sinding-Larsen, *A walk*, pp. 157f.) and the idea of *Good Works*, of which the Mass was paramount, enhanced this functional rather than dogmatic aspect (for the good works, see Gisolfi and Sinding-Larsen, *The Rule*, with further references). I hope I may be excused for quoting myself here: / (Sinding-Larsen, *A walk*, pp. 163f., 186).

*In attributing a purely referential and non-realistic role of images with respect to Divinity, the Roman Church appears to have sponsored functional rather than dogmatic programs for church iconography and hence to have kept*
options open for varying the pictorial idioms rather freely. Especially from the twelfth century and on, Christological imagery connected with the altar and hence with the Mass took a variety of forms and shapes: figures of Christ in more or less complete Scripture-based representations from Revelation; a bust of Christ with book and gesture of benediction; this configuration expanded to become an entire human figure either enthroned or standing, or even connected with a more or less fully developed Ascension iconography; various elaborations and extensions from the motif of the Ascension, and so on. We see examples in mosaics like the one in San Clemente, Rome, in paintings in Anagni and Rignano Flaminio, and on numerous painted crucifixes such as those in Sarzana, Spoleto (references in Sinding-Larsen, Some observations, pp. 193 - 212). This alternation between thematically related but Biblically and synoptically derived configurations, all of them focusing more or less precisely on the notion of the glory of Christ means that any one of them is conceived of as a"kinetic" image which may serve several purposes (I have collected some references concerning the apparently wide range of applications for the Ascension image, in Sinding-Larsen, Some observations, pp. 193 - 212; and Titian's Triumph, pp. 315 - 351). As the liturgical process unfolds through regulated stages with different liturgical and theological focusing, focusing on the image will impute the respective corresponding notions to the image: the Lord is hailed by mankind and the hosts of heaven at the Sanctus; he is locally present at the prayers Unde et memores and Supra quae; he is transcendentally present at the heavenly altar at the prayer Supplices te rogamus; he reveals himself at the ascension of the Man and his glory during Ascension liturgy, and so on. This richness and flexibility probably grew out of the Church's commitment to meeting popular demand for a more close and direct contact with the manifestations of the religion, much as the Church also had to satisfy somehow the popular "desire to see the Holy Eucharist" (E. Dumoutet, Le désir de voir l'Hostie; for "popular" aspects, see also G. Nickl, Der Anteil des Volkes; further several studies by Hans Belting, including Icons and Roman society, 27ff.).

It is the sacramental action that preconditions the face-to-face relation, which is the basis for images. A versicle repeatedly recited during Advent reads: Ostende faciem tuam, et salvi erimus: Show Your Face and we shall be saved. This versicle is not cited by the Ceremony Master in his instructions for the Advent celebration (Appendix 2/3 - 2/5), in which he merely conveys the "strategic" points as reminders, as he consistently does all through the document. But we have noted that familiarity with the texts among the clergy and people with a good education is taken for granted. The features not mentioned
in the Ceremony Master's record are listed fully in documents like the *Orazionale Cicogna* 1602. But even in his short account, there are some four or five formulas expressing the idea of the coming of the Lord (see the printed Appendix 2/3: First Sunday in Advent): *Behold, the Lord is coming* (*Ecce Dominus veniet*; - *Ecce Dominus veniet, et omnes sancti cum eo: et erit in die illa lux magna, alleluia* (Zach. 14 : 5, 7). - *And who is about to come* (*Et qui venturus est; - Qui venturus est in mundum. Miserere nobis*) - *Behold, the Lord will appear* (*Ecce apparebit <Dominus>; - *Ecce apparebit Dominus, et non mentetur: si moram fecerit, ex pecta eum, quia veniet, et non tardabit, alleluia* (Habakkuk 2 : 3) - *His time is approaching* (*Prope est ut veniat tempus eius; - Prope est ut veniat dies Domini* (Is. 14 : 1). ) - *And the day will not be far off* (*Et dies non elongabatur*) - *Hurry and do not delay, Lord* (*Festina quaesumus ne tardaveris, Domine*).

He does not come alone; the saints are with him: and with him the saints in their thousands (*Et cum eo sanctorum millia*), this providing one of the many texts justifying the integration of saints in the iconography and contributing to creating a functional unity between the images of the coming, appearing or present Christ/God and the images of the saints in a church, including sidewall narratives of the kind we find in the Upper Church of San Francesco, Assisi.

Furthermore, the Orazionale Cicogna 1602 lists the rest; among these: *Behold, the Lord comes, and all the saints will be with him, and on that day there will be a great light* (*Ecce Dominus veniet, et omnes sancti erunt cum eo, et erit in die illa lux magna*) - *Behold, the Lord will be seen above white clouds* (*Ecce apparebit Dominus supra nubes candidas*) - *And the days come, says the Lord, ... and the king will reign, and will show his wisdom, and make judgement and justice upon earth* (*Ecce dies veniunt, dicit Dominus, et suscitabo David germen iustum; et regnabit Rex, et sapiens erit, et faciet iudicium et iustitia in terra*) - *Behold, the Son of man is coming in the clouds of the sky* (*Ecce in nubibus caeli filius hominis veniet*) - *Behold our Lord comes with (his) power to (en)lighten the eyes of his servants* (*Ecce Dominus noster cum virtute veniet ut illuminet oculos servorum suorum*) - *From heaven comes the commanding Lord, and in his hand are honor and might* (*De caelo veniet dominator Dominus, et in manu eis honor et imperium*) - *Over you, Jerusalem the Lord rises, and his glory shall be seen in you* (*Super te Hierusalem orietur Dominus, et gloria eius in te videbitur: Isaiah 60 : 2*) - *Let them glorify the Lord, and announce his praise in the islands, for behold, he is coming without delay* (*Ponent Domino gloriam, et laudem eius in insulis nuntiabunt, quia ecce veniet, et non tardabit: Isaiah 42 : 12*).

As we have just seen, in the liturgy of the Advent, the idea of the Lord's
coming is linked up with that of his showing himself to us, allowing us to face him. Scanning the Orazionale Cicogna 1602, we find, among others, the following texts setting out the latter notion: Show your face... (Ostende faciem tuam, et salvi erimus; already mentioned) - Raise your eyes, Jerusalem, and see the King's might, behold, the saviour comes to free you from (your) fetters (Leva Hierusalem oculos tuos, et vide potentiam regis, ecce salvator veniet solvere te a vinculis). According to Acts 1 : 11, Christ will return the same way that he ascended. Also used as antiphon in the Ascension liturgy (Cicogna 1609): Viri galilei, quid aspicitis in caelum [in the Bible: quid statis adspicientes in caelum?], hic Jesus. qui assumptus est a vobis in caelum, sic vemet, <queen modum vidistis eum eum euntem in caelum. alleluia. Full Biblical text read as chapter at none); the focus here is traditionally on his so-called second coming, at the Last judgement. Nevertheless, the ascension culminated in Christ's being seated next to God, on his right side (sessio a dextris), in his glory, from which position one main aspect of his liturgical presence is envisaged and illustrated in the Glory and Presence iconography (bibliography the in preceding notes, and Sinding-Larsen, Some observations, passim, esp. 201ff., idem, Iconography and ritual, pp. 22, 26, 49, 64f., 67f., 71). Scanning the San Marco Orazionale Cicogna 1602, we read some of the texts conveying the notion of Christ's presence in heaven: antiphon: While they saw him, he was raised up, and the cloud accepted him in the sky/heaven (Videntibus illis, eleuatus est, et nubes suscepit eum in caelo, alleluia); versicle: The Lord in heaven (Dominus in caelo, alleluia); response: He prepared the seat for him (Paravit sedem suam, alleluia); versicle: Who ascends above the stars (Qui scandis super sydera), antiphon ad Magnificat: O, king of glory, Lord of virtues, who today as a triumphator ascended above all heavens (O rex gloriae, Domine virtutum, qui triumphator hodie super omnes caelos ascendisti...) – which is one of the text foundations for the Ascension with the Virtues in the Ascension cupola of San Marco.

To clergy and practicing Catholics, today as in the times of the Ceremony Master, the notions of coming and appearing before us, would as a matter of course be connected with the very same notions as set out repeatedly and with extreme clarity and emphasis in the Ordinal and the Canon of the Mass. The Mass, we have just noted, is celebrated before your holy countenance, a theme elaborated in a number of different formulas (to avoid a lengthy recording of well-known circumstances, let me refer to my account of this, with Latin and English texts in parallel, in my Iconography and ritual, pp. 20 - 26). This means that, even though the liturgy does not formally refer to any artifact image, it will stimulate or even encourage some degree of focusing on it, directly or mentally, by the participants. The biblical basis for this primarily
In Exodus 33, *The Lord spoke to Moses face to face*, and Moses implored: *If I can find your grace by facing you, show me your face* (partly literally quoted in the above-cited liturgical formula); and: *Show me your glory*. (Loquebatur autem Dominus ad Moysen facie ad faciem... (33 : 11); Si ergo inveni gratiam in conspectu tuo, ostende mihi faciam tuam...(13); Ostende mihi gloriam tuam (18).

) In 2 Paralipomenon 18 : 18, Iosaphat said: *I saw the Lord seated on his throne* (also in 3 Kings 22 : 19) (*Vidi Dominum sedentem in solio suo...*), while Isaiah (6 : 1) saw the *Lord seated on his sublime and lofty seat* (*Vidi Dominum sedentem super solium excelsum et elevatum...*); and in Psalm 46(47) : 9, *God is seated upon his holy seat* (*Deus sedet super sedem sanctam suam*). In Amos 9 : 1, is recorded the experience of "seeing" God in a way that could be taken literally as referring to God being close to the altar in a church or, which is probably more in agreement with tradition, to his standing at the heavenly altar: *I saw the Lord standing above the altar.* (*Vidi Dominum stantem super altare...*).

The reference to the Mass also raises the issue of the Roman doctrines and notions concerning so-called sacred images. In the present discussion of analytical methodology, some degree of simplification is necessary, even preferable, and I shall speak of "the" Roman rule (there is better justification for a "the" in the Roman context). By this I refer to the oft-repeated official statements concerning the veneration of images as if these were fully espoused by all practicants and as if they had a determinating influence on liturgical practice (for "practical" aberrations, see Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, 103 - 104; and, with special cases, Trexler, *Florentine religious experience*, pp. 7 - 42).

In the relevant passage of the *Niceanum II* (A.D. 787) we read that the honouring of an image is transferred to the prototype and that, whoever adores a (sacred) image, adores the substance depicted therein, and essentially the same statement is repeated in the Tridentine decree of 1563: Veneration addressed to the image does not regard the image itself but refers <directly> to the holy person portrayed in it (relevant texts: Nicea: *imaginis enim honor ad primitivum transit: et qui adorat imaginem, adorat in ea depicti subsistentiam* (I bring the Latin version rather than the Greek one, since the former is the most relevant one in the Roman context); Trent: *honos, qui eis [imaginibus] exhibetur, refertur ad prototypa, quae illae representant: ita ut per imagines, quas osculamur et coram quibus caput aperimus et procumbimus, Christum adoremus, et Sanctos, quorum illae similitudinem gerunt, veneremur. Id quod Concil-
iorum, praesertim vero secundae Nicaeanae Synodi [cf. above], *decretis contra imaginum oppugnatores est sanctum*" (H. Denzinger - A. Schönmetzer, *Enchiridion*, Nos. 601, 1823, respectively).

A cult situation is thus being envisaged in which the worshipper optically and emotionally addresses a visual representation of or reference to Christ (or a saint). At the same moment, but on a different ritual and emotional level, while mentally focusing beyond the image or even in quite a different direction, the participant addresses the entity that is represented or referred to (if Christ, then also, and through him, the Trinity; but let us pass over this further complication). At the same time, especially during Mass or Sacrament exposition, Christ's presence in loco is being manifest before his eyes by sacramental definition.

This mechanism presupposes a mental activity on at least two levels in the worshipper addressing the image, particularly so on specific occasions in a sacramentally consecrated situation of time and space. The apparent paradox between the idea of God's omnipresence and specifically local presence is being resolved, one may assume, on the ritual level by accentuation of the latter. Here the visual conceptualization of local presence is a reinforcing factor. In fact, in particular ritual situations (especially during the Canon celebration), the visual conceptualization would reinforce the notion of divine presence in all of its five aspects and its celestial perspectives.

Attitudes in this area among authorities and congregations depend also on the way the authorities tried to explain the cited "prototype doctrine" (repeated by the Council of Trent), and on the conceptions formed among various classes and categories in the congregations themselves. Having myself collected documentation and bibliography concerning these issues (Sinding-Larsen, *Some observations*, Chapter V. Official and popular conception of liturgical images. Gisolfi and Sinding-Larsen, *The Rule*, gives a carefully argued documentation of this complex situation, which defies unified and comprehensive definitions. The term "Counter-reformation" is applicable exclusively if referring to the **final and official** statements of the Council of Trent and whatever followed them to the letter. I shall abstain from further comment on this.

All the cited liturgical and biblical texts or, at least, their main ideas, must have been taken for granted by the Ceremony Master and his clients at San Marco - and also by most of the congregation: every Sunday, at least, they would face the Lord at the altar in the different modalities of divine presence during the Mass. For these modalities, see SINDING-LARSEN, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 34, 36, 45, 48f. 57, 134f.: 1. real presence in the Eucharistic spe-
cies of bread and wine; 2. presence by facing the congregation from the heavenly altar (mentioned in the Canon); 3. presence of Christ as high priest acting through the celebrant; 4. perpetual presence with the Church.

To sum up our account so far: the images would acquire their significance in terms of the ritual process in which they were involved (for this, see Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 95ff.; and *Some observations*).

Bellarmino offers a synopsis of the traditional paradox involved in these pictorial representations:

It is usual to depict those who are absent, because one does not see them; God, however, is present, but we do not see him, and therefore we depict him, as if he were absent, and these images do not represent God but are there *in order to lead mankind into some understanding of God through analogical comparison*: action again (*...pingi solent absentia, quia non videntur: Deus autem licet sit praesens, tamen non videtur, ideo pingi potest, ac si abesset... At imago Dei, et Trinitatis, ut a nobis pintitur...neque habetur pro Deo a nobis...sed ad perducendum homines in aliquam Dei notitiam per analogicas similitudines* (Bellarmino, *Disputationum*, II, Cols. 703 E - 704 A).

1.3. Modalities of abstraction or transformations of states?
We have before us just a frontal bust representation of the Virgin, with the Child in the same position (like the Nicopeia in San Marco). The image doesn't tell much in terms of recordable features; she looks immobile and nothing seems to happen to her, she is just staring at us, showing the Child. So the efficiency of the image comes from "outside", that is, from the situation in which she is involved, and this is the liturgy, primarily that of the Mass, with its Christological nucleus, and secondarily the rites that came to be collected in the Breviary. Efficiency here means that participation in liturgical or devotional veneration before the image is thought to activize contact between her and whoever prays; not that merely seeing the image makes an impression on the prayer. She is mentioned and appealed to many times in the cited liturgies, which call up each and every important theological and ecclesiological dogma, doctrine and notion concerning her. The artist or the commissioner himself might conceivably have been intent on depicting his mistress, somewhat like the case of Fouquet's Melun Madonna with the royal mistress, Agnès Sorel, to whom the commissioner, Etienne Chevalier, was emotionally attached. This would not affect the functioning of the picture as an altarpiece for people at large, even though those who might happen to know the woman herself could become disturbed or excited. Huizinga makes the point very clearly:

*The excesses and abuses resulting from an extreme familiarity with things*
holy, as well as the insolent mingling of pleasure with religion, are generally characteristic of periods of unshaken faith and a deeply religious culture (J. Huizinga, The waning, 145f. Huizinga continues: The same people who in their daily life mechanically follow the routine of a rather degraded sort of worship will be capable of rising suddenly, at the ardent word of a preaching monk, to unparalleled heights of religious emotion. Even the stupid sin of blasphemy has its roots in a profound faith. It is a sort of perverted act of faith, affirming the omnipresence of God and His intervention in the minutest concerns).

Official Venetian doctrine concerning the "originality" of the Nicopeia portrait of the Virgin Mary might, at least to some, have underpinned the feeling of reality even concerning those face and body features that we might call "abstract" in the conventional sense of this word. Hubert Schrade's collection of evidence from Medieval portraiture, which looks abstract at least to us (in the conventional sense), with princely houses sending portraits to each other for documentation concerning prospective marriage contracts, introduces another kind of ritual, a courtly one, that ensures similar effects (Schrade, Vor- und frühromanische Malerei, pp. 84ff., 89ff.).

Concerning facial likeness, we should remember that portraits thus endowed are, historically speaking, exceptions linked to specific types of society, the Classical Roman and European Renaissance and post-Renaissance. The traditional criteria concerned types rather than what we would regard as a "real portrait".

If we now consider the simple image of the Virgin Mary facing us face to face in relation to "reality", it might seem that for people to gain mental and conceptual access to it, they would seem to have to be able to accept abstractions, again in the conventional sense of this term or the state-changing sense used in this book: transformations of state. But abstractions from what? If they were used to portraits that focused on the typical rather than the individual, the problem would not arise.

What precisely do we mean by the term, anyway? (For a logical and philosophical discussion, see Bob Hale, Abstract objects, esp. Chapter 3 on the Distinction between abstract and concrete objects). If we consider the term abstraction as it is currently being used, we might say, first, that there are objects, figure arrangements and depicted situations that some people will think of as reflecting their conception of visual reality or visualizable reality (if the "reality" is transcendental or heavenly), while, secondly, out of some of these objects we can extract and isolate specific features we consider as important or relevant within some more specific framework. Clusters of such fea-
tures will commonly be thought of as abstractions from objects or mental images. Or, alternatively, we start out with clusters of features and think of them as simplifications from some notional concrete object or from some conceptual system or narrative surrounding the prototype depicted. This argumentation is not however consistent. For the very static and frontal appearance, as in the images of Christ and the Virgin we have been discussing above, may very well have been thought of as representing situational reality in the context of liturgy and veneration. Then what we would consider the "real" human appearance attributed to the persons Jesus and Mary would be an abstraction from the conditions of heavenly and ritual reality that look abstract by the conventional definition. Similar or related ritual attitudes probably also attended the exchange of marriage and other diplomatic portraits in the Middle Ages. That ritualization mechanism can work both ways, as just hinted, would explain how commissioners and churches could, in one go, combine crassly realistic images with academically idealist ones, as in Santa Maria del Popolo, Rome (the Cerasi Chapel), with Caravaggio on the side walls but Annibale Caracci on the altar, or in Sant'Agostino, Rome, with Caravaggio over the altar and Cavaliere d'Arpino on the side walls. The Mass, we know, brought heaven and earth together, a reality that can be approached from both sides.

Here the term abstraction in the sense of a simplification or formalization from "reality" is not very useful; it hardly makes sense. We rather seem to be concerned with different kinds of state transfer, of depictions of states that are seen as transformations from other states - without generally pre-supposing a change from complex to simple. So the analytical assignment is not to say whether a thing is abstract or not, or more or less so (an even more frustrating job), but to evaluate changes in state or modality. This should become even more evident, I believe, if we examine a more complex case than the simple images just considered.

1.4. Ritualization and abstraction

Up to this point we have been discussing rather simple liturgical images and precisely because of this simplicity, there are limitations to how articulate an analysis can get. Let us therefore see the type in the light of a "shell", an image including the same features but in which they are embedded in other features that introduce some less standardized and perhaps even "realistic" elements. Giorgione's Castelfranco Madonna, on an altar of the cathedral of Castelfranco Veneto (Treviso), provides a useful case.

The painting shows the Virgin and Child on a throne atop a high platform or dais, and they are flanked by two saints, Sts. Liberalis (?) and Francis.
The painting was, and still is, an altarpiece in the Cathedral of Castelfranco Veneto, a minor township some miles inland from Venice. It was painted in the early sixteenth century specifically for an altar first right of entrance in the fifteenth-century church (which was later modified into the present state and the painting installed on another altar) (The painting was originally placed on another altar in the same church and was relocated after enlargement of the building; but the altar context of course remains the same in the new position. See Anderson, Some new documents. Thanks to Diana Gisolfi for this reference). From a functional point of view, its position today does not seem to differ substantially from the original one, except that today there are not any sixteenth-century people around anymore. So what did they see?

People going to Mass at that altar in the sixteenth century would have had before their eyes a group of most natural-looking people, one of them even an example of a somewhat reticent female beauty, and a natural-looking landscape with some correctly represented buildings in the background, and also a quite common tile pavement of the period for two of the persons to stand on: all of it in the naturalistic idiom of the day.

But the portrayed persons are behaving in a very particular way: they just seem to stand there in rather indistinct postures, apparently doing nothing, and not communicating between themselves, just being content with letting themselves be seen by the congregation. In this they seem to behave in the same manner as the protagonists of the images mentioned earlier, e. g. the Nicopeia Madonna. The situation, however, is less clear because of some additional features, already hinted at. Let us take a closer look.

A particular aspect of pictorial rendering arises when we see a scene that causes expectations in us from our real-life experiences, but expectations that the scene does not seem to satisfy.

The design of figures, architecture and landscape is distinctly naturalistic by the canonical idiom of the time. Congregation members seeing Giorgione's Madonna with four very natural-looking human figures in it, in a naturalistic landscape with realistic buildings, might have expected, just because of the naturalistic character, that the human figures in it had assumed attitudes that humans would normally take when being in company of one another. Their immobile and detached poise, as if they were utterly unaware of each other, seems to require an explanation as something special. Or does it, and if so, to whom?

The Castelfranco Madonna at the same time seems to involve - at least from a modern rationalist point of view - a sheer absurdity because of the logically impossible position of the very natural-looking Virgin in very natural-looking surroundings, seated on her towerlike throne: how did she get up there
in the first place; will she be able to get down again in any ordinary way? (The following discussion is based on a lecture at a methodology course at Pratt Institute, New York, in 1993 (my thanks to the course leader, Diana Gisolfi).) The Castelfranco Madonna seems to represent a critical case because it puts our capacity of understanding to a test and thus possibly also the understanding of some contemporary people (S. Sinding-Larsen, *La 'Madone stylithe' di Giorgione*).

When seen through the liturgy, however, the scene does not seem illogical.

Any scene with the Virgin and Christ Child enthroned among saints, as in the Castelfranco Madonna, belongs to the heavenly region, a supernatural level, which allows for any irrational features, such as the peculiar behavior of the protagonists and the Virgin's position on the throne. (This is amply proved by early texts and by liturgical support for the pictorial type as well as for many specific features in images of this kind, such as the music-making angels from the heavenly liturgy (see Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and Ritual*, with further references: pp.17, 23ff., 26, 34ff., 57, 65, 79).

The heavenly liturgy is supranatural, timeless and eternal, removing the obligation to respect real-world conditions and this would seem natural to people of the sixteenth century. Hence it is fitting that it is not an event but rather a state or a condition (without bothering at present about the purely linguistic distinction between event and state: "Anne swims", "Anne is swimming", for which see Galton, *The logic of aspect*, pp. 24ff.) that is represented in the painting, which refers to no past and no future for the painted figures themselves - but certainly a hoped-for eternity for people assembled in front of the picture. This aspect is further enhanced by the geometric structure of the painting, a triangular symmetry that, as has been noted by Sydney Freedberg, is itself an abstraction. (Freedberg, *Painting in Italy*, p. 179.)

The congregation thus saw an abbreviated image (a pars-pro-toto one) of the time-less celestial liturgy of which the real-world liturgy before the altar is a reflection. The timelessness is evident in paintings like the Castelfranco Madonna, on account the multifigure structure and the unexploited narrative potentialities; less so in simple images like the Nicopeia Virgin.

The idea of enthroned authority flanked by attendants and supported by the symmetrical structure would make the image a potent one. We may note that this idea might have been taken directly from worldly experience, such as State rituals, without having recourse to the liturgy. Liturgy, however, does justify the image in the given setting, and the sedes and thronus notions occur so frequently in the liturgy that awareness of other sources would play only a subsidiary role.

This kind of pictorial situation had, by the sixteenth century, many cen-
turies of tradition behind it. It could be perceived and understood in an unambiguous manner within the liturgical setup. The holy persons behave as they are expected to do when the church congregation is praying to them or venerating them or - more generally - whenever the congregation is participating in the divine service. The face-to-face model, in the present case concretized in the figure of the Virgin, is central to the liturgical purpose and provided the traditional background. The immobile figures, and the eventless state within the painting of persons just sitting or standing there in the full view of the public, matched the attitude and behavior expected by people assembled in front of the altar with the painting on it, unless, as in Titian’s Pesaro Madonna, votive requirements on the part of the commissioner projected a narrative element into the scene.

Under such conditions, realistic evaluations of the Virgin's chance of getting comfortably down from her throne again, do not arise: there is no time dimension and thus no question of a sequel to the scene. The design is ritually conditioned. The painting was intended to be in focus, as a cult image, more or less directly, for the people themselves who are actually assembled in front of the altar, and during the regulated but limited time when their attention was directed towards what is going on at the altar itself. This, for many people, would have made real-world references less urgent or even irrelevant.

Comparing now the Nicopeia Madonna and the Castelfranco Madonna, we may try to break down the modalities of change of state ("abstraction") sketched out above, into some more tractable pattern.

All images are abstractions in the sense that they represent a simplification, complication or other changes in relation to what they purport to refer to, including the most "naturalistic" ones; as is also any description in words or symbols aimed at denoting a subject or a structure.

There is thus no question of abstraction or no abstraction, (It is not necessary to argue for this by way of some awkward term like "seeing-in" (Wollheim, *What the spectator sees*, p. 121).), nor, to my mind, between "old" and "new" abstraction in paintings and drawings (Podro in the same publication), but modalities of relationship between the object or image and the participant's idea of “reality", both conditioned by the functional situation: for short, let me call this transformations of states, which is supported by the de-intellectualization and absoluteness conditioned by the ritual. The label just suggested is rather a heavy one, so I shall continue using abstraction as a noun, but then as referring to transformation processes, i. e., an action, as just noted. Picasso's Kahnweiler portraits are examples of this, since they, so to speak, represent a transition between trivial “reality” and some other state or condition. It may be useful to single out cases in which there is no obvious transformation from one state to another: this regards what we are used to label "non-figurative" shapes.
and patterns: some cupolas (for this reservation, see below), a telephone, for example. I would reserve abstract (even "purely abstract" to stress the point) as an adjective for such patterns and shapes.

In both Madonna images (the Nicopeia and the Castelfranco) the transformation modalities involve figure arrangements that to some people might have seemed to make the figures unapproachable or unresponsive to fervent address while people were praying. To others again, the face-to-face relationship would seem active - as it was intended to by the liturgy. This, however, depends on extremely complex patterns of conceptualization in the individuals at several levels, which, to make matters even less tractable, often intermingle: first, whether one looks at the picture merely as a picture, simply bypasses it mentally and thus does not deduct from the one to the other; second, whether one takes an image as an expression of crucial features in the portrayed protagonist (now in Heaven) and feels closeness on account of this (like the old lady I saw in San Clemente, Rome, who scolded the big wood crucifix because Christ had failed to attend to her needs); third, whether one complies with the liturgical injunction and mentally establishes some kind of effective conceptual relationship between the image and the protagonist in Heaven.

This simple pattern of alternatives seems to mean that one cannot generalize on any individual or mental level, for here each of them, especially the second and third, involves huge complexities that, as far as I can see, defy orderly analysis: again, no question of interpretation, merely one of charting directions. It is the functional setup that creates the premises and criteria for connections between the ritual situation and the prototype in Heaven in such a way that apparently unresponsive, unapproachable and artificially conceived figure arrangements are sufficiently efficient by being accepted as focus for relevant and urgent encounters. It is this functional setup or framework that is analytically accessible. The liturgy conjures up for the participant's real ("retinal") vision as well as for her or his mental ("internal") vision interrelated patterns of terms, notions, concepts, situations, and aspects of humans and of divinity and saints. Parts of this overall pattern are traditionally established or at any rate predictable, and pictorial and other "material" imagery is set up so as to match important features in the pattern.

But the mental pattern itself cannot be fixed and is never unambiguous; many features, even crucial ones (the alternative aspects of divinity, for instance), may be vaguely outlined, unstable or fuzzy. Material imagery, or iconography, matches some features directly (God's countenance <---> a face-to-face representation of him). In other cases, which may be fuzzy or involve alternatives, it pins down or fixes just one state of the matter, providing the whole process of conceptualization or imagination with focal points, such as the Virgin's face or a cross. Even in the case of the Nicopeia, in which no
throne is to be seen, the ritual situation might have conjured up comparable situations from real-life experience of enthroned authority and also of related cases like the Castelfranco Madonna.

Alerted as we are today as to imagery's potential role, both retinally and mentally, for creative thinking, we might look on the matter in the following way (Miller, *Insights*, is a recent account. While there is almost general agreement that imagery is crucial for thought, the question of how is answered in a number of different ways. One may of course ask if one can say "that" without being sure about "how"...). In the ritual situations we are contemplating, the imagery by focusing or filtering my concepts into some canonical pattern, makes things easier and safer for me, facilitating my communication with other congregation members who receive the same messages, and also with the clergy. But such didactic imagery may also restrict and to some extent reify ideas.

While the focusation process as intended by the liturgy can be studied, the mental trappings accompanying it and being stimulated by it, remain outside our reach.

These observations concerning abstraction in design and figure arrangement are not very innovative, but they seem to entail that the term is meaningless without the specific cases being studied in terms of how they are functionally and situationally embedded. Again, it is the graspable "totality" of the situation, elaborated in terms of scenarios and configurations, that injects message relevance and efficiency into any image, sign or symbol. It does not seem possible - at least, not profitable - to categorize between these media except in trivial, technical and economic terms.

On account of the liturgical context, the visual patterns are connected with verbal items in the process. If verbal terms are crucial in users' scenarios, then it would come fairly naturally to go a step further and ask, whether real verbal inscriptions might present functional characteristics comparable to pictures. In terms of visual display, inscriptions in churches and chapels accompany images and name them and explain them (typically, so-called synoptic inscriptions, are rhymed, with a mnemotechnical purpose) (Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, Chapter 5). In a focusing perspective they recede into the background leaving the field to the pictorial representations. These inscriptions are not comparable to and at the same level as the pictures they comment on. Quranic inscriptions in mosques, in contrast, in a number of respects do the job of images in-focus; so let us try them out. Before doing so, a note on a purely abstract shape, in the word's conventional understanding, will discuss some framework perspectives concerning that issue and the question of inter-
pretation. A more systematic comparison between texts and pictures will be addressed in Part IV, Ch. 9.

1.5. Must a shape mean something? - a visit to Sant'Ivo
Before leaving the subject of visual, non-verbal shapes in the form of more or less standardized images, there are gaps to be filled. For the reader will have noted that I have kept at a safe distance from the tricky issue of artistic creativity. A corollary issue is whether it is incumbent on us to believe that the artistic creation of necessity is connected with some meaning outside the work of art and to which this unavoidably has to refer, symbolically or otherwise. In other words, can we conceive of an artistic creation that does not demand an interpretation?

No approximately sufficient account can be given of the cited works of art by stipulating artistic inventiveness without seeing the creative venture as an integrated element in the functional situation and processes for which the works were intended. The artist has to work within this setup. Whether she or he adjusts traditional pictorial idioms to personal taste or comes up with new pictorial inventions that fit the setup satisfactorily, is a task for Art History to decide. But if the discipline isolates pictorial form from pictorial functions, then this occurs on pain of loosing sight of circumstances that must have seemed crucial to the historical protagonists who were directly concerned, including the artist.

In the cases from San Marco discussed here, the problem is not on the agenda, simply because the portable objects and images involved were all much older products created for circumstances that were no longer completely relevant. Furthermore, most ritually used objects adopted and modified only slightly the standard models, so that the scope of creative ideas on the part of commissioners or artists remains relatively narrow. Perhaps one might claim, by way of a working hypothesis, that the more loaded with contents the ritual object (tool, instrument, image etc.) is, the more tied are the two creative agents to conventional models. A bust portrait of the Virgin or one of Christ, or a processional cross, do not allow great variations. For the cross, the authorities may decide to include the figures of Mary and John flanking the Crucified, and of course such figures are subject to stylistic variations. But these cases do not seem to make up the field in which to look for the creative leap in artistic immagination or principally novel concepts on the part of the authorities. Not even such a case of much-acclaimed artistic inventiveness as Titian's Pesaro Madonna in the Frari, Venice, seems to imply any great story of artistic
creativity. Quite apart from his now documented shilly-shallying over the architectural setting in those long years the young artist took to finish the work (1519 - 1526), and the evidence that the columns are later than the two versions with the painted vault (Sinding-Larsen, *Titian's Madonna*; Valcanover, *La Pala Pesaro*; for a likely post-1551 dating of the columns of the Frari Madonna, see Gisolfi, *L'Anno veronesiano*), he arranged his figures exactly as prescribed by the crossing interests of the liturgical setup and family interests: Christ with the Cross for the altar as the site of Mass; priority of the Virgin with the dedication of the altar to her (the Immaculate Conception); prominence of St. Peter, who was the chief commissioner's patron and representative of the papacy on behalf which Jacopo Pesaro had won the battle in a victory celebrated in the same painting. No amount of art-historical adulation over the genius of Titian can gloss over these crude facts (references in Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 58, 67 – 70, 109f., 168 168 – 170, 174 – 177. Rosand's idea, that the oblique perspective of the painting was determined by a lateral view by whoever walked up the nave of the church from the main entrance is invalidated by the position of the columns and colonnettes, which impede such a lateral view. No one would ever, in any case, plan an altarpiece for a lateral view. The oblique composition was a traditional solution for "votive paintings" (Virgin and Child, and/or saints with society portraits) way back into the Middle Ages.

As long as the artist and the commissioner respected pictorial conventions valid in the period for this kind of representation, they could be fairly confident concerning the reactions of people assembled before the altar in the church where the painting serves as an altarpiece. They would react according to the Church's officially determined notions, apprehend the presupposed, appropriate ideas and assume "correct" attitudes, be suitably stimulated by them and capture the ideas concerning the religious reality connected with the altar. To some extent the artist and the commissioner, in their preparatory cooperation, (the relation commissioner – artist – work will hardly ever be linear: we must reckon with a great deal of exchange of ideas and concepts in patterns that will usually be too evasive to be described by the historian. Even the existence of written contracts, as in the famous case of Engarand Charonton, does not reveal at which stage and under the influence of whose ideas such an agreement was finally reached). must have imagined or foreseen the public's reactions to the painting, an operation referred to as explorative prevision.

The artist could hardly have gained acceptance for just any free formal invention - say, in an extreme notional case, of an Art-nouveau shape. If the
shape violated tradition, it would stick out too prominently as an artifact and no longer conform to its role as a tool used in a process that either involved it as a subordinated instrument, such as an incencer, or as an object in focus, fixing values determined by the rite as a whole, like a cross or an image of the Virgin. The question of the acceptance by the patron and the church for a very popular altar in a small industrial city like Volterra of Rosso Fiorentino's extremely abstracted and - by normal sixteenth-century standards - distorted Deposition from the Cross, remains unsolved. No talk about "mannerism" or about Rosso's "persona" is of any help here.

Whatever the ideas entertained by the artist, the object, by adhering to standard models accepted for the intended ritual use, would carry the meaning attributed to it by the ritual without any control on the part of the artist. One and the same cross could be carried in procession and represent Christ's triumphal way to Jerusalem, while on another occasion the same cross might be used for illustrating his baptism, as in the Epiphany ritual in San Marco. This expansion of scope occurs independently of the artist's creative ideas and work; he can only influence it negatively by creating something that would be unfit - but which would also be rejected.

Purely abstract forms (not forms "abstracted" from something natural), may seem to offer greater scope for artistic inventiveness, since they are not usually accompanied by verbalized or verbalizable content, so that eventual ritual connections make less demand on them. A simple cross without human figures remains a cross with all its Golgotha and Mass-sacrifice associations, but it does not spell out the story of the crucifixion at Golgotha. On the other hand, calling it "abstract" we might lose sight of the fact that it does represent a transformation, namely from the concept (often visualized) of the original cross at Golgotha (whatever its exact shape may have been). Architectural shapes like, say, the small cupola surmounting the double pulpit on the north side of the San Marco roodscreen, are also abstract. But they too will appear meaning-laden to informed people, who would associate them with the notion of martyrium and Jerusalem traditions, thus again representing a transformation. (References in Sinding-Larsen, St. Peter's chair).

This condition will apply to most features surrounding or being used in liturgical rites, a circumstance that, as noted above, must have set certain restrictions to artistic creativity.

Rituals, exemplified by the liturgy discussed in this book, evoke a wide range of notions, concepts and ideas inside and also outside of the actual performance site. Therefore, it may seem natural to ask whether all shapes involved in ritual contexts were considered as bearers of some reference meaning that associates them with something else, some idea or some historic case.
Can we state such a contingency almost as a law? If so, then a "pure form" created for a ritual situation would have to carry a significance by referring to something outside itself.

One case is available on which this claim can be tested, even though it brings us far away from San Marco. The case may turn out to present, in a ritual context, a manifest novelty for a purely abstract form in terms of artistic creation: *Borromini's helical spire for the University church of Sant'Ivo alla Sapienza in Rome*. The spire is a visual focusing object at the far end of the courtyard, which is hemmed in on the other three sides by two-story loggias.

Here, the ritual context is a double one: the combined ecclesiastical and academic patterns of attitudes, behavior and interaction ensured this. Let us look more closely into this case.

As Wittgenstein said, anything can picture anything, and so can even apparently contentless shapes or pure form. The only viable meaning I can find to apply in an understandable way to the latter term is to say that a pure form is one that is only describable by quantification (I am not talking of emotional attributions; one may get excited even over an equation, one way or the other, usually the other!). It is not very practical but it is certainly possible to describe a painting by Wassily Kandinsky or Malevitch in terms of pure quantification. Any shape can be so described, but such a description would be objective, non-selective and total, without levels or internal priorities, that is, it would be entirely non-analytic and hence useless.

We have two alternatives for forms, as we noted above. One is an abstraction, being transformed from something that at the outset had another, for instance a "natural" shape; the other starts out as an abstract form, e. g., some version of a mathematical helix, like Borromini's helical spire on Sant'Ivo (for the definitions of a helix, see now, 2011, S-L, *Patterns*). This cannot be reduced back to anything else than a helix (unless we think of its material build-up). The specific design of the helical spire can be referred specifically just to one thing, a mathematical helix (if not to material, workshop procedures and so on). But admittedly the spire looks peculiar and so has attracted art-historical interpreters by the score. Its strange look does not arise from its shape in itself but rather from the surroundings, or context, in which it is placed. The question is: must one always attribute some meaning in the sense of a content or attribute some kind of Panofskian disguised symbolism even to this kind of shape?

The answer given to this question is usually "yes", and so even Borromini's spire has been celebrated with meaningful "content" by many scholars: it "means" a papal tiara (three-crowned headcovering, since the helix has a laurel wreath, the student's way up to his laurea, Italian for a final exam at the uni-
versity. Some building documents refer to the spire in terms of *le tre corone*: "the three crowns". But this is a compound of technical terms and does not call for any interpretation at all. In fact, the term "corona" was a current one for any surmounting embellishing feature of a building; as is nicely summed-up by Tommaseo: *Corona dell’edificio dicesi dagli Architetti la più’ alta parte, che gli dà grazia e finimento*. The plural (*tre corone*) in the present case is natural enough if we take into account that in this period each full rotation of the curve of a helix system (*cochlea*) was considered as one full helix. Guidubaldo del Monte, for example, discusses the case, *nisi cochlea duas habens helices* (Guidubaldo Del Monte, *Mecanicorum liber*, p. 97 verso and f.). By contemporary terminology, Borromini's spire in fact consists of three full helices: a triple crowning piece.

So one idea is that the spire marketed the Papal Sapienza University in its competition with the Jesuits' Collegio Romano nearby. Or the spire "means" Philosophy", since “Philosophy” is surrounded by a stair-like helix in Cesare Ripa's *Iconologia*; or it may mean Wisdom, for Borromini on a drawing referred to the Biblical words about Wisdom building itself a temple (*Proverbs* 9:1-2: *Sapientia aedificavit sibi domum*).

Ripa's *Iconologia* entry concerning divine wisdom is no primary source and would hardly count as an interesting piece of information in the Roman context: with regard to the Lamb and the Dove, Ripa merely labors the obvious. Displaying the two sets of figures is one quite normal method for a visual conceptualization of essential truths of the religion (many art historians, however, who are unfamiliar with these matters, tend to take ordinary features for much more than they purport to convey). These truths belong to the very predicates of God's wisdom and are fundamental notions that are being communicated, through participation in the Church and her Sacraments, to the human level of wisdom. When the two configurations are placed on or in a church building, in the present case Sant'Ivo, they spell out their essential message by virtue of established tradition, and any particular notion of "wisdom" one might wish to store into them, will be subordinated to the predicates of Divinity. The source for all this is in theology, ecclesiology and liturgy, in short: the Roman Tradition, not in Ripa. I very much doubt that Ripa's amateurish concoctions would have had any say in the planning of a papal university church (see also Gisolfi and Sinding-Larsen, *The rule*, Chapter VII).

But this Solomonic reference gives no specific clue at all, regardless of art-historical enthusiasm over it. The architect or whoever supplied the text, chose his inscription well, citing a commonplace in ecclesiology and church dec-
oration. Furthermore, "wisdom" would seem to be, against all evidence, a fitting epithet for a university. The first prayer on Sunday of Pentecost Quatember sounds like this: ... cuius [Spiritus Sancti] et sapientia conditi sumus, et providentia gubernamur, making the congregation confess to their being "fitted out" by the wisdom and directed or guided by the providence of the Holy Spirit. There is no doubt, then, that the inscription on the drawing was to the point; a fruit of the regular training as a Catholic. After all, Proverbs, 9, was invoked almost everywhere including the Roman Cathecism. The Romans themselves take a more relaxed attitude to the issue, calling the spire il cavaturaccioli: the corkscrew.

It is not profitable to delve into all the competing interpretations, only to make the following observations: The helical spire itself can hardly be given any precise meaning at all. But the surroundings so to speak embed it in a meaningful context, which is determined by the liturgical repertoire. It is surmounted by the Cross and the architecture supporting it is adorned with just normal church-iconographic features; the Holy Spirit, the Lamb of God, and images referring to light a triple sets of flames, torches with flames and “jewels”. Flames and other symbols of the divine light occur frequently in the liturgy (e. g. in the Ordinal of the Mass). Light is also a prominent feature connected with the idea of the Holy Spirit and becomes a current theme in relevant iconographies; and so also in the case of Sant'Ivo, where light is alluded to in figures of flames, torches and jewels. In a Mass preparatory it is recited: Ure igne Sancti Spiritus inflammet, not to forget a secreta for St. Philip Neri: Illo nos igne Spiritus Sanctus inflammet, quo beati... cor mirabiliter penetravit. The idea is of course intimately connected with that of Pentecost; so that it does not make sense when a scholar "rejects" the relevance of a Pentecost reference in the case of Sant'Ivo: it cannot be rejected for any church. Churches are public buildings for which one should be prepared for finding primarily normal or standard thematics.

The triple groups of flames would, in the given context, unavoidably be associated with the Trinity. Such a tradtional triumphal symbol as the laurel wreath surmounting the helix again is an obvious case.

If it is considered incumbent to find a prototype in another work of art, and one s not satisfied with having perfect prototypes in the function of the object we are studying, then we do not have to walk more than a few blocks away from Sant'Ivo. On the Column of Marcus Aurelius there is a combination of a helix and a laurel wreath celebrating the emperor's triumphs. The helx is cochlea on Sixtus V's inscription on the base; helix in Latin is also called a cochlea. Thus Borromini could easily have found support or additional justification for an ecclesiastical and university triumphal emblem from a classical
triumphal monument a few blocks away from Sant'Ivo (note 2011: a special chapter is dedicated to this issue in S.-L., *Patterns*).

A question of higher interest is, however, this one: must the spire refer to this or to anything else? Must a work of art always have a content in terms of external reference, pointing out to something else?

While working with the problem in 1989 and studying the mathematics of the period, I found that Evangelista Torricelli was an amanuensis at the Sapienza when Borromini was busy with Sant'Ivo. Contemporary mathematics struck me as relevant on account of its interest in what we today call pre-calculus: a new branch of mathematics developed in order to face the problems of calculating such things as strange curves, surfaces and volumes and specific ones such as the calculation of ballistic curves, of water running, etc. Typical achievements were Kepler's calculation of volume in wine-casks, Descartes' chapter on strange curves appended to his *Discours de la méthode* of 1637, and, at the Sapienza herself, Cavalieri's development of his particular version of pre-calculus (Baron, *The origins of the infinitesimal calculus*, pp. 122ff. (on Cavalieri). Interest in "strange curves" is manifest also in contemporary painting, in which saints in vault paintings are often whirling upwards in helix patterns (which we, of course, then see from the helix base). This has been kindly brought to my attention by Prof. Maria Colliva, Rome). What is particularly curious is the fact that Torricelli got wide publicity not only because of his barometer, but also because he succeeded in calculating the volume of a helix. Torricelli, *Opera geometrica Evangelisti Torricelli*, of 1644. He elaborated Bernardo Cavalieri's pre-calculus notion of *indivisibilia* and presented solutions to numerous problems concerning conic sections, as is indicated also by the titles of some of his contributions: *De cycloide, De infinitis spiralibus, De motu gravium naturaliter descendentium et proiectuum, De dimensione parabolae, and De infinitis hyperbolicis*, as well as the long Appendix to his above-mentioned book of 1644, *De dimensione Cochleae*. Torricelli was particularly celebrated for the determination, in 1641, that the volume of an infinitely long solid, obtained by revolving about its asymptote a portion of the equilateral hyperbola, was finite (Carl B. Boyer, *The history of the Calculus*, p. 125, who affirms, however, that the notion had been known earlier). Gilles Personnierz de Roberval to Marin Mersenne, at Paris 1643, with ref. to Torricelli: quae <propositio> est de dimensione cochleae, quam ut ardua est ita veram esse certissima demonstratione perspexi, ita ut ex ea unica Authorem [sic] inter praestantes huius saeculi Mathematicos enumenare non verear (Gratias ago quod inter alios numeret). See the important reevaluation of Tor

Torricelli’s procedures involve stereometrical motions, such as rotation. Curves and motion in combination are key concepts and problems in mathematics, physics and cosmology in this period.

I have never believed that Borromini attended Torricelli’s lectures or had his text as bedside reading. He was probably not equipped for following contemporary mathematical debate. Torricelli’s Latin text is very hard to understand for anyone not familiar with the mathematical writing style of those days; and his drawings, too, may easily confuse non-experts. My point is simply this: both achievements, Torricelli’s helix measurement and Borromini’s remarkable architectural shape are both symptoms of an interest that was quite widespread in the period and also a confirmation of the modernistic involvement of those participating. Borromini’s architecture attests to an interest in "strange" and dynamic geometrical curves and shapes, such as ovals or parts of ovals that are not ellipses. The most striking feature is inside the cupola of Sant’Ivo. Here there is a smooth, stepless transition - something today accounted for by calculus or even better by matrix mathematics - from a convex vault surface into a concave one (on account of the convex wall sections: a transition had to be effected from them up to the necessarily concave cupola interior). In San Carlino the bands over the lateral niches twist like a Möbius band, and there are ovarium-shaped pseudo-ovals. These cases are almost literal statements of the preoccupation in the late sixteenth century and early seventeenth about "strange" and apparently intractable curves and surfaces. This interest issued in the efforts toward infinitesimal calculus.

If Borromini approached the new problem graphically but without much formal knowledge, it should also be noted that no less a mathematician than Gilles Personne (or Personnier) de Roberval *seems to have remained satisfied ... with methods based on geometric intuition and incomplete induction ...”* etc.; while Cavalieri, too, accepted, initially, before being criticized for it, "geometric intuition alone* (Baron, *Origins of the infinitesimal calculus*, pp. 153 and 123 respectively).

A display like that of the Sant’Ivo spire, of preoccupations in contemporary mathematics could easily be accepted by the Church; indeed, it might be very welcome, since it could be interpreted in purely mathematical terms. In those days, physics and thus also cosmology, belonged to philosophy, so that mathematics were unhampere d by the Scholasticism-Aristotelian conflict between the Church and the "Copernicians" and "Galileans". An innocuous show of scientific "modernity" in an neutral field might seem very opportune
to the Church of Rome and her university in a period when she stood in danger of being considered stupidly reactionary, especially in the light of her handling of the Galileo affair. And in this case the total picture of contemporary mathematics the context as the spire is sufficiently abstract to detach itself from the ideological repertory of religious ritual, while at the same time the helical shape gave the spire a technically convenient form for displaying the various symbolic objects (cross, flames, laurel wreath, etc.). Therefore, the image was acceptable even though it might be considered an expression of extraordinary artistic inventiveness. But what exactly is this inventiveness?

The very act of doing the work lends it with a very significant meaning; the product being a sign of an engagement and an achievement much in focus in those days. The meaning rests in the doing.

Art History as an academic discipline quite naturally focuses on the artist and tries to attribute as much as possible to him (lately even to her!). It is more or less taken for granted that if we deprive the artists of some of their alleged freedom to decide and act, we restrict our focus too much, whereas to my mind we do exactly the opposite. Setting our bets on the initial creative moment within an artist's brain gives us the narrowest possible ground to move on. Nothing whatever is known concerning the creative moment in artistic production; what we know more about, is the production process after the first idea had been conceived (But there are many theories in circulation, see for example: Johnson-Laird, *The computer and the mind*, chapter 14; Boden, *The creative mind; Dimensions of creativity*). The creative moment - before elaboration sets in - must surely be sought in the grey zone between what is called "consciousness" and uncontrolled brainstorming.

But what is consciousness? No one so far can tell us and nor can anyone say what kind of creative "storms" fire up things in our brains. One big book about the subject, Dennett's recent one, with the optimistic title *Consciousness explained* (1991), had circulated for a only a couple of years before the next big book about the subject, Roger Penrose's *Shadows of the mind* (1994), all but ignored it and started anew (Dennett, *Consciousness explained*; Penrose, *Shadows of the mind: attempting to address the question of consciousness from a scientific standpoint*, p. 7. See the critical evaluations of both scholars (and others) in Horgan, *The end of science*). These were followed and severely criticized by Chalmers' *The conscious mind* of 1996. And now new ones are on the market.

Ridding ourselves of the interpretation fad, we may concentrate on the artistic value. Borromini seems to have taken, avant la lettre, a cue from Jean Philippe Rameau. The French composer stated that you can start out from all
the rules of music when composing, but you may prefer instead to consider all
the sounds that are available and create new music from this unsurveyably rich
repertoire (Anthony, *French Baroque music*, p 163). Borromini appears to have
attempted this, only descending into traditional architectural grammar whenever forced to respect it.

Such an attempt on his part would seem to be an adequate expression of
the widening perspectives in human questioning, theory and knowledge in the
period.

The spire, we noted, was indirectly connected with rituals in that it
served as a place-marker for a site on which rituals, including liturgy, evolved
on various levels. There is one point of comparison between the visual media
that are directly connected to the liturgy, such as a face-to-face image of
Christ, or a cross, and those that are thus indirectly connected, like the spire.
This distinction may be set out tentatively as follows. In the former cases there
are specifically describable features that can be referred to specific notions or
terms in the liturgy, like the examples of the face and the cross. In the latter
cases, the visual shape is neutral in the sense of not being linked in this manner
to a rite, but only to a general scenario or framework, such as that of the liturgy
and those concerning mathematics or cosmology. In the latter cases, therefore,
the shape would seem to be open for being imputed with any significance that
the surroundings might impose upon it. For, as we noted, the specific design of
the helical spire can be referred specifically just to one thing, a mathematical
helix (if not to material, workshop procedures and so on), but such a descrip-
tion would be objective, non-selective and total, without levels or internal pri-
orities, that is, it would be entirely non-analytic and hence useless.

This distinction is, however, less clear than one might wish for. The
helical spire for many would be connected with specific enterprises, such as
that of the liturgy and Torricelli and described in specific texts. The image
would thus be taken as referring to specific loci in the relevant process. Vice
versa, the closed references, such as those attributed to the Virgin’s face, for
many would imply an idea of a religious scenario or framework that seemed
much more general than the canonical liturgical references.

So again, the term abstraction does not mean anything definite, except
when understood as covering some transposition between states or conditions.

2. THREE WONDERFUL EVENTS: THE EPIPHANY RITUAL

The *Epiphany* rite leading up to and including the "baptizing" of the Cross is
the one among the rites in San Marco described by the Ceremony Master that
offers a system intricate and dynamic enough to serve for developing an
approach to complexity analysis. In the following sections, therefore, I shall devote considerable space to this rite.

An antiphon for the Epiphany begins with the words Tribus miraculis (by/with three miracles/wonderful events) and a synopsis could give this account of it:

*We celebrate the holy day, marked by three wonderful events: today the star has led the Magi to the crib; today at the wedding, water has been made into wine; today Christ desired to be baptized in the Jordan by John [the Baptist], in order to save us. Alleluia.*

This antiphon conveys the central themes of the entire rite, excepting the "appended" message conveyed by the doge's drinking from the baptismal water. But let us proceed in convenient order, starting with the Ceremony Master's description, of which I shall now give a synopsis following very closely the original (references to the Rituun ceremonia by page/section; my comments in square brackets [...]). Titles of readings, versicles etc. are written in Italics; this style is omitted in the - often longish - text quotes, trying to keep the text body as simple as possible..

- The Vigils of Epiphany and First Vespers.

Preparations for the blessing:

[3/10] Our Mass for this vigil is very different from the Mass as it is given in the missals of the Papal Court. Therefore one should take care that the celebrant [the priest at the altar] is given the missal for the rite of our church and not one according to the Roman Court. For in our graduals this Mass according to our rite is such that the choir joins the celebrant. And this Mass is the same as on ordinary weekdays.

[3/11] In the First Vesper the antiphon O admirabile commercium [see below, in the list from the Orazionale Cicogna 1602, No. 1], all the <five> Laudate psalms [see below, No. 6] are not sung by the choir because of the length of the office of the Blessing of the Water [simple recitation is quicker], unless they are ordered to do so by His Highness the Doge [my translation of Serenissimus Princeps or Dux] or anyone else among the Lord Procurators <of San Marco>, who would desire to attend the Solemn Vespers. After the prayer, at the sounding of the organ and singing of the motet for thanksgiving
to God [Pro Deo gratias in the original: no title but any suitable motet], four priests with two candles procede to the Sanctuary [3v/1] where the Deacon and the Subdeacon are; after changing vestments, they go back to the Choir. After the Vespers, the Lord Canon who celebrated the vesper recites the Responsory and the Verse Hodie [see below, No. 26], as in the Antiphonary (and the Benedictionary for the Water Blessing) and the Chorus continues. The Deacon and Subdeacon, arranging themselves in front of the Lectern in the centre of the Choir, sing the versicle with Gloria Patri [see below, No. 36] (as in the same book). Then the Canon sings the antiphon Vox Domini [The voice of the Lord over the waters, etc., from Psalm 28; see next item]. When this is finished with the participation of the Chorus, the priests recite the psalm Afferte [Psalm 28 (English Bible: 29) : 1 - 2] and the organs sound. [The psalm is a glorification of God and a statement of his power and his protection of his people. Psalm 28: Adferte (or: Afferte) Domino, filii Dei, / adferte Domino filios arietum, / adferte Domino gloriem et honorem, / adferte Domini gloriam nominem eius: / adorate Dominum in atrio sancto eius. / Vox Domini super aquas, Deus maiestatis intonuit; / Dominus super aquas multas. / Vox Domini in virtute, vox Domini in magnificentia, / vox Domini confringentis cedros. / Et confringet Dominus cedros Libani / et comminuet eas tanquam vitulum Libani, / et dilectus quemadmodum filius unicornium. / Vox Domini intercidentis flammam ignis, / vox Domini concutientis desertum, / et com-movebit Dominus desertum Cades. / Vox Domini praeparantis cervos, et revelabit condensa, / et in templo eius omnes dicent gloriem. / Dominus diluvium inhabitare facit, / et sedebit Dominus rex in aeternum; / Dominus virtutem populo suo dabit, / Dominus benedicet populo suo in pace.]

After the three psalms and antiphons, the Canon recites Exaudi nos, Domine [Hear us, O Lord; several alternative prayers] with Gloria Patri, and the Deacon and Subdeacon sing the Litanies kneeling on the steps of the high altar. Having concluded up to and excluding Ut nos exaudire digneris, the Canon sings three times, each time raising his voice, Ut hanc aquam, et hoc sal benedicere et santificare digneris [That you will deign to bless and sanctify this water and this salt], with his right hand making the sign of the cross over the water and the salt, while the Hebdomadarian [the officer for the week] and then the priests continue with Ut nos exaudire digneris, etc. After the litanies,
the Canon gives his place to the Hebdomadarius and proceeds to the lectern, which is on the lefthand side of the vessel [put(h)eus] for the water to be blessed. And there, having first said the Pater Noster reciting its first and last words, he sings those three verses as in the Benedictionary, with the chorus responding.

- The blessing rite:

  [3v/2] In the sanctuary [sacrarium] there should be prepared a table with a very clean napkin [mantile] on which there are two candlesticks with candles to be lit before the blessing starts. [3v/3] In the centre of the table there should be the Cross with the jewels [Crux granatarum; for which, see below], there should be salt, and a cloth [lintheus], a silver bowl [crater] to collect the water flowing from the wooden cross [de ligno crucis], when it is three times lowered into the vessel (with the water) and conferred upon the His Highness the Doge... and an empty silver stoup (situlus) with its aspersorium. This table is to be brought in front of the high altar, while the motet for thanksgiving to God is being sung by the cantors. [3v/4] Already the morning of the Vigils (the day before) the vessel [puteus] has been placed in the centre of the choir [in medio chori] and it stands on a plinth/platform with a square lower and a round upper part, with auleis, spalerijs and with four candles.

  After most of the Preface has been said or sung, the deacon and the subdeacon with four candles [obviously borne by four persons] enter the sanctuary and with utmost reverence receive the cross in which the wood from the Lord's Cross is inserted, and this cross is incensed, accompanied by clergy with candles, leaving the high altar on the right side (and the lectern has been placed on the side of St. Peter [i.e. to the North of the altar], for it should stand near the vessel for the cantors). [3v/5] When the deacon and the others arrive at the water, that is to say, at the vessel, the Canon kneeling receives the cross from the Deacon who is standing up, but thereupon kneeling. The Deacon, having delivered the cross, kneels, and the Canon stands up and immerses the cross three times in the water with the words from the Benedictionary: Qui aquam amaram [probably: Qui (Deus)] te (aquam) in deserto amaram ... fecit esse potabilem: You (God) who made the bitter water of the desert drinkable] and blesses the fount with the cross ... after which the cross is handed back to the Deacon who receives it kneeling down; after this, [4/1] follows the rite of aspersion, with the cross and candles placed in front of the pulpit [facing the congregation].

  While doing so, Omnes de Saba [see below, No. 10] is chanted by the priests in the choir, and then aspersion takes place (on those present),
with recital of Asperges me [Sprinkle me with your hyssop, and I will be clean; rinse me and I will become whiter than snow. Alleluia. Turn your face away from my sins, and do away with all my injustice. Alleluia. Make a clean heart in me, God, and renew the spirit of righteousness in my inside: Psalm 50 : 9]. Thereupon the Gospel is sung, as it is done when all people are being baptized ... and then the Deacon and Subdeacon sing the verse Reges Tarsis et insulæ, etc <munera offerræ> [see below, No. 33], and the responsory Reges arabum, etc., <et Saba dona adducenct> [see below, no. 34] and the Canon chants the prayer for the day preceded by the Dominus vobiscum.

- Thus goes the Ceremony Master's Latin record of the Epiphany rite. But the Rituum Caerimoniale contains a very extensive Italian appendix, possibly in part due to the same ceremony master, but at any rate most of it roughly contemporary. Here, some more information about the Epiphany rite may be gathered, and supplemented by information from the San Marco Canon, Giovanni Stringa (1610) (Sinding-Larsen, Christ in the council hall, p. 214, gives the texts referred to here).

The baptism of the Cross involved a piece of the True Cross in a cross fatta alla patriarchina (Stringa) (i. e., with two horizontal cross-bars) and thus associated with Greek or Constantinopolitan, that is, in the traditional idiom, Rome. It was, as stated above, immersed three times in the water. The Rituum cerimoniale (fol. 56v) speaks of the cross with the garnets in the centre, the cup with white salt, the cup with lid for the doge to drink of; ... the cross is immersed three times in the water - and each time the water is collected with the cup underneath the cross to be given the doge to drink of ... (Rituum caerimoniale, Italian part following Latin part published in the Appendix, fol. 56v: "...la croce dalle granatte in meso, la tazza col sal bianco, la tazza couerta [coperta] del dose [doge] da sumar l'aqua...merga la croce tre volte in aqua - et ogni volta suma l'aqua con la tazza sotto la croce per dar à beuer al dose...:].

The ceremony was performed in front of the high altar and after each immersion the water was offered to the Doge to drink.

2.1. Three wonderful events: getting familiar with the texts
The Ceremony Master, we have just seen, recorded some texts accompanying the Epiphany rite, mostly by way of mnemotechnic indications for himself and for the celebrating clergy. We need a complete picture of the texts used in the rite and their role and so shall review them carefully.

Now, in order to complete the Ceremony Master's account, let us work our way through the Epiphany ritual as it is set out in the roughly contemporary Orazionale Cicogna 1602 of 1567. To facilitate references, I have num-
bered the entries from 1) to 66). For this Orazionale, see Cattin, *Musica e liturgia*, I, pp. 49ff., and, with a content synopsis, II, pp. 158 - 309. For the following, I have used not primarily this synopsis but a full set of photos of the document acquired in Venice in 1975.

A survey of technical terms is indispensable for following the account. So here is a brief review of some of key terms used in the account, particularly the liturgical subdivision of the day and night in seven canonical hours, and also the categories of texts used in the liturgy. In Chapter 16 of his Rule, St. Benedict states: *The Prophet says: 'Seven times a day have I praised you" [Psalm 118(119) : 164]. We fulfill this sacred number of seven if we satisfy our obligation of service at Lauds, Prime, Terce, Sext, None, Vespers and Compline ... Concerning Vigils, the same Prophet says: At midnight I arose to give you praise [Psalm 118(119) : 62]...*

First a few words about the more complex term *vigil*, whose changing significance is linked up with the set of canonical hours.

A vigil (*vigilia*, night watch) is the day preceding and preparing for a greater feast:

(a) the eve of a festival, especially when the eve is a fast;
(b) a devotional watch kept on such an eve;
(c) plural: devotional services held on such an eve (Webster).

Already St. Benedict (died 547) describes the beginning of the vigils (*St. Benedict's Rule*, Ch. 9): *Vigils begin with the verse: 'Lord, open my lips and my mouth shall proclaim your praise [Psalm 50 : 17]'. After this has been said three times, the following order is observed: Psalm 3 with 'Glory be to the Father'; Psalm 94: Venite, exsultemus Domino [English Bible 95; O come, let us sing unto the Lord...] with a refrain...; translation T. Fry, see *The Rule: Ut ait prophetæ: 'Septies in die laudem dixi tibi'. Qui septenarius sacratus numerus a nobis sic implebitur; si matutino, prima, tertia, sexta, nonae, vesperae completorique tempore nostræ servitutis officia persolvamus, quia de his diurnis horis dixit: 'Septies in die laudem dixi tibi'. Nam de nocturnis vigiliis idem ipse prophetæ ait: 'Media nocte surgébam ad confitendum tibi'. Ergo his temporibus referamus laudes creatori nostro 'super iudicia iustitiae' suae, id est matutinis, prima, tertia, sexta, nona, vespera, completorios, et nocte surgamus ad confitendum ei; the refrain referred to being an invitatorium (invitation to praise God) interrupting the psalm between the single verses. Then follows the recital of psalms and readings. Since the 12th century, the vigils were celebrated mostly either in the very early morning or before midnight. Shortly before the 16th century, the vigils became commonly "anticipated" and celebrated in the early afternoon. After the vigil had been shifted from night to daybreak, the name matins was used instead, as the first of the seven canonical hours cited above (with the nocturns with appropriate readings of prophets, gospel, etc.), and this
was connected with, and preceeding, the lauds. 

*The combination of matins and lauds brought the number of public prayers back to the ideal seven* (Van Dijk and Walker, *The origins*, p. 16).

The lauds may also be considered apart and named for the *second of the canonical hours*.

At *matins*, until recently, at ordinary weekdays, twelve psalms were sung, on Sundays eighteen, and at the special feasts, nine.

*Vesper* - deriving its name from the Evening Star: *Vesper* - is evening service, while *compline* is, as the Latin name makes clear, the completion to the hours: *Completorium*. St. Benedict counted the Vesper among the hours of the day office; in later liturgical calculation, the Vesper is connected with the next day. But since the Vesper on a feast day usually became connected with the feast itself and was celebrated in full daylight, this festive Vesper was called, at least since the 13th century, the Second Vesper; whereas the Vesper on the preceeding afternoon, is called the First Vesper. The Vesper culminates in the Magnificat: the Virgin Mary's hymn: *Magnificat anima mea Dominum*...: "My soul does magnify the Lord, and my spirit has rejoiced in God my saviour..." (Luke 1: 46 - 55).

The prayers, readings, chants, etc. of these hours, consist of psalms and canticles (like the Benedictite), hymns (mainly from medieval authors like Venantius Fortunatus), readings, consisting of lections from patristic texts (for example, by St. Ambrose), Biblical chapters, and prayers (orationes). There are also shorter formulas: the versicle, a short verse spoken or chanted by the priest, the antiphon and the response (Lechner and Eisenhofer, *Liturgik*, p. 356).

- The *versicle* is usually a verse from one of the psalms and it is recited as a connecting element (*Mittelglied*: Eisenhofer-Lechner) between single sections of the prayers, for example between the psalms and the readings at Matins.

- The *responses* are prayerful meditations on the readings that have just been heard (Eisenhofer-Lechner).

Today, they are appended to versicles, recited by the clergy, in a so-called responsorial chant (in the gradual of the Mass, the responsorial "anti-singing" still remains, even though it is somewhat curtailed). The responses are usually shortened versions of given texts; but even shorter versions of these abbreviations came into use, and these were (and are still) called responsoria brevia (short responses). - The term *antiphon*, from Greek *antiphoné* (counter-song), refers basically to verses sung by two choirs, at an early date arranged as a *schola cantorum*, or two parts of the monks. The problem was how to involve the congregation, who would not usually know the psalms by heart and could not participate in the antiphonal recitation of them. Therefore,
short verses were appended to the psalms that also the people could sing. In later usage (and at the time of the Rituum cerimoniale), an antiphon means a short text, culled from the Bible (often a psalm) or the life of some saint, that expresses a notion or a theme dominant in the psalm to which the antiphon is an introduction (originally placed here to help the choir to take the right tonality).

Many of the examples cited below show how short formulas used in one reading are further condensed for use in other readings (Nos. 17, see 12; 25, see 15; 31, see 28; and: Nos. 43, 47, etc.) and how one biblical text may be split up for two different short readings (Nos. 8 and 12; 10 and 11).

An excerpt from the traditional Epiphany liturgy according to the Roman Breviary (edition of 1876) may give an idea of the position of the various text.

To achieve a clear and easy reading of the admittedly lengthy catalog, I have used the following conventions: the rubrics are in capitals (rubrics are original instructions concerning choice of texts, what to do etc., written in red, Latin: rubrus); the exact wording of the texts in the documents are in bold; my comments as usual in square brackets [...]; my completions to abbreviated references, are marked, as usual, by <...>; synopses and translations are indented. Whenever a rubric gives just the incipits, an English translation or a synopsis is appended; when given in full in the rubric, a translation or synopsis is supplied, except for some lengthy but easily accessible texts (psalms, biblical chapters); for less accessible long texts (hymns, patristic readings), short synopses are given. Not to produce too messy a visual image, I have put the Latin texts in bold rather than italics.

Now to the Orazionale Cicogna 1602 (fols 19 – 22) (typographical conventions changed with respect to the preceding sections).

MATINS. First nocturn.

ANTIPHON: Afferte Domino, filii Dei, adorate Dominum in aula sanctae eius [beginning of Psalm 28 (29) : 2: Give unto the Lord the glory due unto his name; worship the Lord in his sacred hall].

PSALM: Afferte Domini... [Psalm 28 (29) is sung, and other antiphons and psalms follow; then, preceded by the appropriate antiphon, i. e., verse 7 from Psalm 46 (47), which follows immediately].

PSALM: Omnes gentes... [46 (47): O clap your hand, all you people, shout unto God with the voice of triumph... etc.].

VERSICLE: Omnis terra adoret te, et psallat tibi [Psalm 64 (65): 4: All the earth shall worship you, and shall sing unto you].

RESPONSE: Psalmum dicat nomini tuo, Domine [Let the psalm be said to
your name, O Lord; a non-Biblical composition].

In the **VIGIL of EPIPHANY:**

**LAUDS**

1) **ANTIPHON** *O admirabile commertium* < Creator generis humani, animatum corpus sumens, de Virgine nasci dignatus est: et procedens homo sine demine, largitus est nobis suam Deitatem.>

   **Synopsis:** A wonderful exchange; the Creator of the Human race has assumed a body with a soul and descended to be born by the Virgin; he came forth not from a seed as a human being and has donated his Divinity to us.

2) with the remaining antiphons and its psalms. [probably the following, starting with supplication of help: versicle: Deus, in adjutorium meum intende; response: Dominus ad adjuvandum me festina. Gloria Patri etc. Sicut erat in principio or Laus tibi, Domine; Dominus regnavit (Ps. 22), Jubilate Deo (Ps. 99), Deus, Deus meus (Ps. 62), Deus misereatur nostri (Ps. 66)] 3

3) **CHAPTER** *Apparuit benignitas*, et humanitas Salvatoris nostri Dei, non ex operibus iustitiae, quae fecimus nos, sed secundum suam misericordiam salvos nos fecit> (Titus 3 : 4-5);

   **Synopsis:** The benevolence of God our savior came forth, and his human nature saved us, not by virtue of works of justice on our part, but because of his mercy.

4) **PRAYER** *Deus qui salutis aeternae* <beatae Mariae virginitate foecunda, humano genere praemia praestitisti: tribue, quaesumus; ut ipsam pro nobis intercedere sentiamus, per quam meruimus auctorem vitae suspicerem, Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum Filium tuum. Qui tecum vivit.>

   **Synopsis:** God who gave eternal life to mankind through the fruitful virginity of Holy Mary; make us feel her intercession that we may receive by the lifegiver, our Lord Jesus Christ. Who lives with you.

**VESPERTS**

5) **ANTIPHON** *O admirabile commertium* [see above. No. 1], with the remaining antiphons.

6) **PSALMS:** The five *Laudate* psalms: Laude pueri Dominum [Ps. 112] - Laude Dominum omnes gentes [Ps. 116] - Lauda anima mea Dominum [Ps. 145; this at San Marco, instead of Ps. 134] - Laude Dominum quoniam bonus [Ps. 146] - Lauda Hierusalem [Ps. 147 instead of Ps. 150], (The reader
is referred to her or his Bible, since quoting the psalms here would occupy too much space).

7) CHAPTER **Surge illuminare Hierusalem; quia venit lumen tuum, et gloria Domini super te orta est; quia ecce tenebrae coperiunt terram, et caligo populos; super te autem orietur Dominus, et gloria eius in te videbitur** [Isaiah 60 : 1]

   *Synopsis:* Arise and shine, Jerusalem; for your light has come, and the glory of the Lord has risen upon you. For behold, the darkness shall cover the earth, and gross darkness the people; but the Lord shall rise upon you, and his glory shall be seen upon you.

8) RESPONSE **Stella quam viderant** <Magi in Oriente, antecedebat eos, usque dum veniens staret supra, ubi erat puer. Videntes autem stellam gavisi sunt gaudio magno valde> [Matthew 2 : 9, 10]

   *Synopsis:* The star that the Magi saw in the East, preceded them until it stood right over the site where the Infant was. When they saw it, they were filled with joy.

9) HYMN **Hostis Herodes impie** [also called Crudelis Herodes, a slightly different version]. Hostis Herodes impie, / Christum venire quid times? / Non eripit mortalia, / Qui regna dat caelestia. / Ibant magi, qua venerant, / Stellam sequentes praeviam, / Lumen requirunt lumine, / Deum fatentur munere. / Katerva (Caterva) matrum personat / Collisa deflens pignora, / Quorum tyrannus milia / Christo sacravit victimam. / Lavacra puri gurgitis / Caelestis agnus attigit, / Peccata qui mundi tulit, / Nos abluendo sustulit. / Miraculis dedit fidem / Habere se Deum patrem, / Infirma sanans corpora / Et suscitans cadaveras. / Novum genus potentiae! / Aquae rubescunt hydriae, / Vinumque iussa fundere / Mutavit unda originem.

   *Synopsis:* Herod, enemy, in your faithlessness (impie) are you afraid of Christ's coming? He who grants the heavenly realm does not take away the world of the dead (non eripit mortalia). The Magi walked the way that the star showed them; they sought the light within the Light (Lumen requirunt lumine) and recognized God in what was given them (Deum fatentur munere). The crowd of mothers are crying in their fight (Caterva matrum personat / Collisa) over the hostages (pignora = the infants to be slaughtered) of whom the tyrant offered thousands for the sake of Christ (Christo sacravit victimam). Cleansing by the purifying stream touches the heavenly Lamb, who bears the sins of the world and cleansing us has taken them away (Nos abluendo sustulit). By wonderful happenings (miraculis) he conveyed the belief that God is the Father, healing sick bodies and raising the dead. A novel kind of power (Novum genus potentiae!) The water in the vessels turns red. Water made wine is flowing, the fluid is changed at its source (Mutavit unda originem).

10) VERSICLE **Omnes de Saba venient** <venient, alleluia, aurum et thus def-
erentes, alleluia, alleluia> [Isaiah 60 : 6]. Everybody from Saba came, bringing gold and incense. **Alleluia**

11) RESPONSE *Aurum et thus deferentes*. [see versicle above] Alleluia.

**MAGNIFICAT**

12) ANTIPHON *Magi videntes stellam* <(or Videntes stellam Magi) gavisi sunt gaudio magno; et intrantes domum, invenerunt puerum cum Maria matre eius, et procidentes adoraverunt eum: et apertis thesauris suis, obtulerunt ei munera, aurum, thus et myrrham.> [Matthew 2 : 10 - 11]. When the Magi saw the star, they rejoiced with exceeding great joy; and when they had come into the house, they saw the young child, with Mary his mother, and fell down, and worshipped him: and when they had opened their treasures, they presented unto him gifts; gold, frankincense and myrrh.

13) PRAYER *Deus qui hodierna die unigenitum tuum stella duce revelasti; concede propitius, ut qui iam te ex fide cognovimus, usque ad contemplandum speciem tuae celsitudinis perducamur. Per eundem <Dominum>.*

**Synopsis**: God, who on this day, with the guiding star, made known your firstborn to the gentiles; by your grace, give that we who know you by our faith, shall be led to beholding the view of your glory. Through the same <Lord>

**LAUDS and HOURS**

14) ANTIPHON *Ante luciferum genitus, et ante saecula Dominus salvator noster hodie mundo apparuit.*

**Synopsis**: Existing before the Morning Star and before all ages, the Lord our saviour on this day revealed himself to the world.

Laetamini iusti, in Domino: et confitemini memoriae sanctificationis eius).

Synopsis [there are three Psalms beginning with Dominus regnavit: 92(93), 96(97) and 98(99). Traditionally, and in the Roman Breviary, it is 96 and so probably also here]. The Lord reigns, let the earth rejoice; let the multitude of isles be glad. / Clouds and darkness are round about him: righteousness and judgement are the habitation of his throne. / A fire goes before him, and burns up his enemies round about. / His lightnings enlightened the world: the earth saw, and trembled. / The hills melted like wax at the presence of the Lord, at the presence of the Lord of the whole earth. / The heavens declare his righteousness, and all the peoples see his glory. / Confounded be all they that serve graven images, that boast themselves of idols: worship him all you gods. / Sion heard, and was glad; and the daughters of Judah rejoiced, because of your judgement, O Lord. / For you, O Lord, are high above all the earth; you are exalted far above all gods. / You who love the Lord, hate evil: he preserves the souls of his saints; he delivers them out of the hand of the wicked: / Light is sown for the righteous, and gladness for the upright in heart. / Rejoice in the Lord, you righteous; and give thanks at the remembrance of his holiness 16)

16) ANTIPHON Venit lumen tuum Hierusalem, et gloria Domini super te orta est. Et ambulavit gentes in lumine tuo. Alleluia. [Isaiah 60 : 1,3; see above chapter: 7]. Your light has come, and the glory of the Lord has risen upon you. For behold, the darkness shall cover the earth, and gross darkness the people; but the Lord shall rise upon you, and his glory shall be seen upon you. And the Gentiles wandered in your light. Alleluia.

17) ANTIPHON Apertis thesauris [Matthew 2 : 11, see antiphon, above, 12] When they had opened their treasures, they presented unto him gifts; gold, frankincense and myrrh.

18) ANTIPHON (“alia antiphona”) Maria et flumina benedicite Dominum; hymnum dicite fontes Dominum. Alleluia. [from Daniel 3 : 78, 77]. Oceans and rivers, praise the Lord; wellheads/springs, sing a hymn to the Lord.


Synopsis: This star illuminates like a flame and shows God, the King of Kings. The Magi saw it and brought offerings to Christ the King.

20) CHAPTER Surge illuminare Hierusalem [se above, No. 7]

21) HYMN Hostis Herodes [see above, No. 9]. “And today, in Lauds, and also for Lauds infra octavam, we sing the hymn Enixa”.

22) HYMN Enixa est puerpera [source ?]

Synopsis: The woman in labor has borne...

25) **RESPONSE** *Omnes angeli eius. Alleluia.* [from Psalm 96; see above, No. 15 and note]. All his angels. Alleluia.

*Ad BENEDICTUS* (= Luke 1 : 68 ff.: canticle of Zechariah, recited at lauds)

26) **ANTIPHON** *Hodie caelesti sponso iuncta est ecclesia, quoniam in Jor- dane lavit Christus eius crimina, currunt cum muneribus Magi ad regales nuptias; et ex aqua facta vino laetantur convivae. Alleluia.*

*Synopsis*: On this day the Church is united with the heavenly bridegroom, for Christ washed away her misdeeds in the Jordan (river), and the Magi come running to the regal marriage feast with their offerings; and the guests enjoy the wine made from water. Alleluia.

27) **PRAYER** *Deus qui hodierna die* as above [see above 13]


Glory to you who came forth on this day, with the father and the Holy Spirit, in all eternity. Amen.

**PRIME**

29) **ANTIPHON** *Lux de luce apparuisti Christe cui Magi munera offerunt. Alleluia. alleluia. alleluia.*

*Synopsis*: Christ, as light you came forth from light, to whom the Magi brought offerings. Alleluia, etc.

30) **SHORT RESPONSES**. *Christe fili.*

31) **VERSICLE** *Qui apparuisti hodie* etc. [see above, No. 28]

Who came forth on this day.

**TERCE**

32) **CHAPTER** *Surge illuminare.* [see above, No. 7]

33) **SHORT RESPONSES**. *Reges tharsis et insulae munera offerent.* [Psalm 71(72) : 10]. The kings of Tharsis and of the isles shall bring presents.

34) **VERSICLE** *Reges arabum et Saba dona adducent.* [psalm 71(72) : 10]. The kings of Arabia and Saba shall offer gifts.

35) **RESPONSE** *Munera* Gifts.

36) **VERSICLE** *Gloria Patri* <et Filio, et Spiritui Sancto. Sic erat in principio, et nunc et semper, et in saecula saeculorum>. Glory be to the Father, and to the Son and to the Holy Spirit. As it was in the beginning, is now, and even shall
be, world without end.

37) RESPONSE Reges
   Kings.

38) VERSICLE Omnes de Saba venient. alleluia [see above, No. 10]

39) RESPONSE Aurum et thus derefentes. Alleluia [see above, No. 10]

40) PRAYER “as above”. [see above, No. 13]

SEXT

41) CHAPTER Leva in circuitu oculos tuos, et vide; omnes isti congregati
    sunt, venerunt tibi; filii tui de longe venient, et filiae tuae de latere surgent. [Isaiah 60 : 4]
   Lift up your eyes round about, and see: they all gather themselves together,
   they come to you: your sons shall come from far, and your daughters shall
   arise beside (them).

42) SHORT RESPONSES Omnes de Saba venient [see above, No. 10]
   Alleluia Alleluia

43) VERSICLE Aurum et thus deferentes [see above, No. 10]

44) RESPONSE Alleluia

45) VERSICLE Gloria Patri [see above, No. 36]

46) RESPONSE Omnes de Saba [see above, No. 10]

47) VERSICLE Adorate Dominum Alleluia [see above, No. 24]

48) RESPONSE In aula sancta eius. Alleluia [Psalm 28 (29) : 2, "Afferte",
   see above, ...] <Give unto the Lord the glory due unto his name; worship the
   Lord> in his sacred hall.

49) PRAYER Deus illuminator omnium gentium, da populo tuo perpetua
    pace gaudere; et illud lumen splendidum infunde cordibus nostris, quod
    trium magorum aspirasti. Qui viu<is> [= Deus, qui vivis]
   Synopsis: God, who enlightens everybody, let your people enjoy endless
   peace; and pour into our hearts that splendid light, with which you
   enlightened the souls of the three Magi. (God,) you who are living.
   NONE

50) CHAPTER Omnes de Saba venient; aurum et thus deferentes; et lau-
    dem Domino annuntiantes. [see above, No. 10]
   (As above)...; and proclaiming the praise of the Lord.

51) SHORT RESPONSES Adorate Dominum. Alleluia Alleluia

52) VERSICLE In aula sancta eius [see above, No. 48]

53) RESPONSE Alleluia

54) VERSICLE Gloria Patri

55) RESPONSE Adorate

56) VERSICLE Adorate Deum. Alleluia

57) RESPONSE Omnes angeli eius. Alleluia [see above, No. 25]
58) PRAYER Presta quaesumus, omnipotens Deus, ut salvatoris mundi stella duce manifestata nativitas nostris revelatur semper, et crescat. Per eundem <Deum>.

*Synopsis:* Give, we ask of you, almighty God, that, with the star leading (us), the birth of the Saviour of the World will always be revealed to our minds and that it will increase (in its effect). Through the same <God>.

**VESPERTS**

59) ANTIPHON Tecum principium in die virtutis tuae, in splendoribus sanctorum; ex utero ante luciferum genui te. [Psalm 109(110) : 3]. With you the lordship in the day of your strength, in the glory of the saints; before the Morning Star I have borne you from the womb.

“With the rest of the antiphons and melody of the {versicle? [illegible] }, see *Carta 14*”.

[Supplement: Page 14 -14v in the Orazionale, Nativity:(It would require too much space to give originals and synopses of the following series of psalms and the antiphons extracted from them; the reader is referred to the Bible. Further on, I shall cite some of the formulas and themes separately.) SECOND VESPER: ANTIPHON: [with musical notes] Tecum principium... [as above].

PSALM: Dixit Dominus [Psalm 109(110)]. VERSICLE: Redemptionem misit Dominus populo suo, mandavit in aeternum testamentum suum. [Psalm 110(111) : 9; see next rubric]. PSALM: Confiteor [Psalm 110(111)].

ANTIPHON: Exortum est in tenebris rectis corde: misericors et miserator, et iustus Dominus [Psalm 111(112) : 4]. PSALM: Beatus vir qui timet Dominum [Psalm 111(112)].


ANTIPHON: De fructu ventris tui ponam super sedem meam. [Psalm 131(132) : 11]. PSALM: Memento. [Psalm 131(132)]. "The foregoing antiphons, that is to say, Tecum principium and the rest, with its psalms, are to be said dayly at vesper until and including the Octave of Epiphany, except that in the Vigil of Epiphany one says the antiphon O admirabile commertium, as is noted for that rite (sicut ibidem notatum est)” (End of supplement).

60) CHAPTER Surge illuminare. [see above, No. 7]

**OCTAVE OF EPIPHANY**

61) HYMN Hostis Herodes [see above, No. 9]

62) RESPONSE Dies sanctificatus illuxit nobis: venite gentes, et adorate
**Dominum: quia hodie descendit lux magna super terram. Alleluia.**

A holy day enlightens us; come, you people, and adore the Lord; for today a great light has descended on earth.

63) VERSICLE Reges **Tharsis** [see above, No. 33]
64) RESPONSE Reges **arabum** [see above, no. 34]

**MAGNIFICAT**

65) ANTIPHON Tribus miraculis ornatum, diem sanctum colimus: hodie stella Magos duxit ad praesepium: hodie vinum ex aqua factum est ad nuptias: hodie in Jordane a Joanne Christus baptizari voluit, ut salvaret nos. Alleluia.

**Synopsis:** We celebrate the holy day, marked by three wonderful events: today the star has led the Magi to the crib; today at the wedding water has been made into wine; today Christ desired to be baptized in the Jordan by John (the Baptist), in order to save us. Alleluia.

66) PRAYER Deus qui **hodierna** [see above 13]. NB Continuation omitted here; mainly repetitions, except, again, reference to *Carta 14* and the addition of: Capitulum Obsecro vos per misericordiam Dei, ut exhibeatis corpora hostiam viventem, sanctam, Deo placentem, rationabile obsequum vestrum.

*Having scanned the list from No.1) to No. 66), we might now give a synopsis of the main themes. We shall see that they emerge clearly from the interpretation tradition.*

2.2. Three wonderful events: getting familiar with history

This concludes the review of the text of the Ceremony Master's Rituum caerimoniale and the *Orazionale Cicogna* 1602 of San Marco concerning Epiphany. Clearly the more competent and learned among the San Marco clergy would be familiar also with the historical and traditional significance of the rites. How can we try to reconstruct their precise knowledge? Conceptions articulated realistically in various categories of people among the congregation defy precise description; we have to establish typical scenarios reconstructively. We fare somewhat better with respect to the clergy, for here we can count, at least at important levels in their consciousness, on their acquisition of authoritatively imposed, canonical values.

The modern accounts concerning such values that I am going to cite should cover the clergy's stock of essential ideas. The modern accounts, after all, are based mostly on the same medieval exegetical texts that the Venetian clergy of the sixteenth century would have been familiar with. So I am going to follow Jungmann, Pascher, Righetti and a few others. (Pascher, *Das litur-
The three wonderful events were central in ritual tradition for the celebration of Epiphany. Guillaume Durand (died 1296), in his work on the Roman liturgy, writes that *There are three Gospel readings for this solemnity. One is about the Baptism, namely Factum est; the second about the Magi, namely Cum natus esset Jesus, which is recited at Mass; and the third is about the Wedding (Trias sunt evangelia huius solemnitatis, unum de baptismo, scilicet Factum est; secundum de Magis, scilicet Cum natus esset Jesus, quod dicitur in Missa...; tertium est de nuptis (Rationale divinorum officiorum, ca. 1285; cited by Righetti, *Manuale*, II, p. 106)).* 

The traditions for the Epiphany celebrations were established from the fourth century on, with the following principal features, which were to remain dominant in the liturgy (Jungmann, *The Early liturgy*, pp. 149 - 151).

The feast was celebrated on January 6, and the Greek term *epiphaneia* referred to the incarnation of the Word of God in human nature, a notion set out in the Mass preface for Epiphany: "your only son came forth in the substance of our mortality" (unigenitus tuus in substantia nostrae mortalitatis apparuit). We may note in the above report from the rite in the Cerimoniale Cicogna 1602 how often the crucial word appear occurs as applied to Christ. Reshaping to some extent Jungmann's account (and interpolating from others), for easier access, we obtain the following heuristic picture (I say 'heuristic', for the system I am setting up is my system for which no endorsement from sixteenth-century clergy is ensured! But it mainly follows the three cited modern scholars).

- 1.1. Incarnation of the Word (Logos) signifies:
  - Son of God appearing in the world as man (epiphaneia).
- 1.2. Coming of a divine being.
- 1.3. With this, the true light has arisen.
- 2. Historically, 6 January also was a pagan feast at which "springs yielded wine instead of water"; the Church chose to celebrate the Wedding at Cana on this day (trying to overcome popular belief).

2.1 The Marriage of Cana, at which water was turned into wine, is
celebrated in the rite of the Roman Church. "In the antiphon to the Benedictus of the Epiphany feast, the focus is on the idea of marriage, in an ecclesiological and salvational interpretation of the event; Christ is the bridegroom of the Church: Hodie caelesti Sponso... [see above, 26]"

- 3. Historically, with the same end in view, the Church also introduced the idea of baptism into the same feast (but not the baptismal rite itself; this came in connection with Easter; see Appendix I, 11v/1, Holy Saturday). Jungmann writes: The waters of Baptism really do possess miraculous powers; they have the power to enlighten man; indeed, Baptism was called photismós (enlightenment). In this way at the same time the connection with the idea of light was made and thus also a certain unity in the significance of the feast was established: the illumination of the world by the Son of God ... The fundamental idea of Epiphany is the Incarnation just as this is the basic thought of Christmas: it is the feast in honor of the God-man. But after both feasts had come into being, it became necessary to differentiate them to some extent. The differentiation was made in such a way that on Christmas the fact of the birth of Christ is considered mainly from the standpoint of His weakness and the poverty of His human nature, while on Epiphany it is viewed from the standpoint of the divine majesty shining through the human nature of Christ and illuminating the world. Jesus' Baptism in the Jordan and the miracle at Cana also fit nicely into this concept of the feast's mystery: 'Jesus made known the glory that was His' (John 2:11) (Jungmann).

3.1. Because the Western Church refused baptism at Epiphany, the Latin rite <of blessing the water> remained just a blessing of the water (Pascher, Das liturgische Jahr, p. 421).

3.2. The Greek custom - but not the corresponding ritual – of immersal of the Cross in the blessed water (Righetti, Manuale, II, pp. 111f; cf. also Pascher, Das liturgische Jahr, p. 421). became practice also in the Roman Church (as we see in the Rituum Cerimoniale, see above,... and cf. No. 26: ANTIPHON Hodie caelesti sponso, etc. (...Christ washed away her misdeeds in the Jordan...).

3.3. The theme of the light illuminating the world is referred to in the passage by Jungmann just quoted (under #III). The theme is prominent in the Epiphany ritual we scanned above; so in No.29: ANTIPHON Lux de luce apparuisti Christe cui Magi munera offerunt, etc. (Christ, as light you came forth from light...); and No. 62: RESPONSE Dies sanctificatus illuxit nobis: venite gentes, et adorate Dominum: quia hodie descendit lux magna super terram. (A holy day enlightens us; come, you people, and adore the Lord; for today a great light has descended on earth).

- 4. The themes of the Magi and the star also became crucial in the Roman rite of Epiphany (Pascher, Das liturgische Jahr, pp. 407 - 423), as we
have seen above (Nos. 8, 9, 12, 13, 19, 26, 29, 49, 58, 65, and, by implication, in versicles and responses like 10) Omnes de Saba venient <venient, alleluia, aurum et thus deferentes, alleluia, alleluia> (Everybody from Saba came, bringing gold and incense) and 11) Aurum et thus deferentes).

4.1. Subordinated to this, or, rather, a consequence of it, is the theme that Pasz cher calls the 'R e v e l a t i o n of the 'Coming of God', B i r t h to the p a g a n s ': Besides Epiphany', the term 'Theophany', arises, and the Royal theme is so strongly enhanced that January 6 liturgically becomes a feast of Christ's Royalty (Wenn von der Geburt des Herrn gesprochen wird, geht es um die Offenbarung der Geburt an die Heidenvölker. Neben 'Epiphanie' taucht auch die Bezeichnung 'Theophanie', 'Gotteserscheinung', auf; und das Königmotiv tritt so stark hervor, daß der 6. Januar liturgisch ein Königsfest Christ ist)

4.2. Connected with #IV and #1 is the theme of the n o n - C h r i s t i a n p e o p l e s generally, by implication from the reference to the "Tharsis" and the "Arabs", who are offering tokens of s u b m i s s i o n to C h r i s t: as is spelled out in the following above-cited sequence: 33) SHORT RESPONSES. Reges tharsis et insulae munera offerent. (The kings of Tharsis and of the isles shall bring presents). 34) VERSICLE Reges arabum et Saba dona adducent. (The kings of Arabia and Saba shall offer gifts). 35) RESPONSE Munera (Gifts).

Now let us consider a more general aspect of the rite, which subsumes all the ideas reported in the foregoing sections. In his Liturgisches Erbe und pastoral Gegenwart, Jungmann has a chapter on the extended celebration of Epiphany in the Roman Missal. (Jungmann, Pastoral liturgy, Part II, Chapter 5.

The gist of it seems to be that the Sundays after the feast are marked not so much by the event of Epiphany itself as by the ideas underlying it:

We can sum up by saying that the Epiphany-thought in the Roman liturgical year...is not concerned with a certain appearance of Christ; but, in contrast to Christmas and to the original Eastern feast of Epiphany, both of which have for their subject, the Incarnation or the coming of the Redeemer; [it is concerned instead:] with the manifestation of divinity in Him who has come to us in the form of a man. The power [Jungmann especially refers to the use of Dominus regnavit, the Lord reigns, in Epiphany context; see above, No. 15] and the Wisdom of God have appeared in Christ ... It is therefore, not a particular event which is being celebrated, but a concept of faith; at any rate, a concept which is visibly expressed in a whole series of events and which never appears in abstract isolation (Jungmann).

2.3. Three wonderful events: picturing the process
At this point we need a synthesis of the Epiphany rite as presented in the preceding sections, with an account of how the entire process is related to its pur-
pose of conveying the messages of the three wonderful events as well as the appended message concerning the Venetian Republic's role; this was conveyed through the doge's drinking from the baptismal water.

2.3.1. Venetian perspectives

The "objectival" focus of the entire rite is the Jewel Cross, a jewel-studded cross reliquary containing a piece of the True Cross. It must have belonged to the Republic's prestigious collection of relics, among them numerous caskets, bookcovers and crosses with pieces of the True Cross, many of them displayed in San Marco on special annual occasions (from the so-called Pergolo grando, the large box to the south of the roodscreen) (Sinding-Larsen, *Christ in the council hall*, p. 184; with ref. to Stringa's almost contemporary report). Unfortunately, the cross is not identical with any of the extant cross reliquaries. The *Rituum cerimoniale* gives two pieces of information: it was a jewel-studded cross (crux granatarum) containing a piece of the True Cross (see ...).

Stringa, reporting on the Epiphany ritual in his publication of 1610, says that this cross was made con doi gradi (two transversal sets of arms, in the Greek manner) and was fatta alla Patriarchina.: Stringa (*Chiesa*, p. 223): ...

...vn'altra Croce con doi gradi, pur con parte del Santo Legno [the holy Cross] fatta alla Patriarchina; & era quella, che portar si faceu a già dauanti il Patriarca di Costantinopoli, posta nella cima d'vn'asta. Questa viene vsata la sera dell'Epifania nel benedir, che si fà dell'acque, riceuendosi quelle, che da lei cadono, (poiche con essa sono segnate, e benedette), in vna tazza d'argento, la quale poi viene dal sagrestano, che è di settimana, presentata al Prencipe [the doge] in commemorazione delle acque, con le quali fù il Signor nostro Gesù Christo batteggiato da S. Giouanni nel Giordano: onde S. Serenità [the doge] riceuutala è [sic] per diuotione beuuotne di quella vn fiato, ne ritiene il resto per riiueraenza presso di se.. This is all. None of the cross reliquaries cited by Tiepolo, Corner, Pasini, Frolow, Hahnloser and Cambiaghi fits the description. The reliquaries cited by these authors are either boxes without jewels or crosses without the second cross-bar (My thanks to Diana Gisolfi who spent considerable time in Venice consulting this literature for my benefit (see Cambiaghi, Corner, Frolow, Hahnloser, Pasini, Tiepolo). The only one that might fit is one cited by Tiepolo in his publication of 1617, but he tells us that it had been recently re-discovered. This could hardly apply to a cross in use in the 1560s (the *Rituum cerimoniale*) and just before 1610 (Stringa). So the only thing I can offer the reader is a diagram representing the cross with jewels (see below). The Greek or Constantinopolitan type of cross, must have been associated with the Roman tradition (see below).

A curious phenomenon that however does emerge from Tiepolo and
Pasini is the disappearance and rediscovery in San Marco of important relics of the True Cross and of other holy objects. This reminds one of the "rediscovery" of the body of St. Mark. A symptom of plain disorder and of inflation in relics, or, as Diana Gisolfi suggests to me, "events" invented in order to excite the public? To say nothing of the sale on the private market of some of them, especially after the fall of the Republic in 1797.

The baptismal rite in San Marco was a leftover or a borrowing from Greek tradition, and the Venetians probably felt that this "Byzantinism" signified in fact a Roman tradition, like other aspects of Roman tradition such as the mosaic style of San Marco, and the Greek type of cross, fatta alla Patriarchina, may have been associated with the Eastern "Rome" (See, e. g. Frolow, *La relique*, Nos. 68 (Holy Sepulchre, Jerusalem) and 164 (the Great Palace, Constantinople/Istanbul), with information about the rite and with reference, among others, to Constantine Porphyrogenetos' Ceremony Book. Frolow notes how the documentary evidence is not homogeneous. Sinding-Larsen, *Venezia e le componenti; A walk*).

In San Marco, there must have been a notion, conveyed by the Epiphany rite, of a connection between this Roman heritage connected with Constantinople, supported by the government's involvement and with the baptism of the people. At its core, however, the rite must have been conceived of as a confirmation of the State's relations to Christ and its purpose of preparing, through a kind of covenant with Christ, its citizens for Paradise (Sinding-Larsen, *Christ in the council hall*, p. 154, citing Thomas Aquinas and his pupil, Ptolemy of Lucca).

The rite took place in front of the high altar, right beneath the Enthroned Christ in the apse vault, proclaimed REX CUNCTORUM (King of Everybody), accompanied by an inscription on the arch above, affirming the patronage and support of the Republic by St. Mark: ITALIAM LIBIAM VENETOS SICUT LEO MARCE / DOCTRINA TUMULO REQUIE FREMITUQUE TUERIS: St. Mark, like a lion you protect Italy, Africa [Libia] and <the Republic of> Venice with your teaching/doctrine, your tomb [in San Marco], your peace and your roaring, and with the choice of "national" and "political" saints on the apse wall as a backdrop (Dale, *Inventing a sacred past*; see Sinding-Larsen, *Chiesa di Stato*, p. 34, where, on the advice of Don Bruno Bertoli of the Curia Patriarcale, Venice, *fremitus* was translated as *ruggito* (roar) instead of *fame*, as I had translated it in an earlier publication. Thus also the warlike notion is being evoked).
2.3.2. Message and participation

Thus the central message of the rite clearly combined general religious, ecclesiological and state-political ideas. The problem is, however, to see how this information was developed, supported and conveyed through the mechanism of the ritual process. While the synopsis just offered may be acceptable, it certainly does leave a lot of loose ends in our picture of the Epiphany rite as a whole and in the perspective of its management. There are also other probable implications not accounted for so far.

While the officially stated rules concerning this and similarly complex rites are relatively simple to describe, the personal element in the congregation as well as in the clergy carries with it some very fuzzy aspects, all depending on levels. One of them regards the tricky problem of distinguishing between individuals and groups. A way out of this impasse would be to focus reconstructively on typical scenarios representative of various typical individual and group attitudes at different levels instead of starting out from social classification. This is the approach I have adopted.

We also have to reckon with cases of lack of interest and even hostility, such as is attested in the "Lutheran" reaction amongst the congregation of San Marco against the Indulgences dispensed there (for San Marco, see Gisolfi and Sinding-Larsen, The rule, Chapter V) or the "alienation" from ecclesiastical rites lamented at the Church Council of Lyons and Vienne and referred to above. Lack of interest may lead people to focus more on performance, management, class stratification and power structure, than on the religious act itself and its effects for their salvation. Conversely, with clergy focusing just on interclerical competition, jealousies, etc., some protagonists may have taken the core of the rite rather routinely (cf. Julien Sorel's Seminary experiences in Stendhal's Le rouge et le noir).

2.3.3. Seeing graphically

Intuitive considerations of the Epiphany ritual have led me to try out graphic models. Further comments and explanation of such models will be more convenient after we have used it for an analysis of the Epiphany ritual (see ...). This rite is illustrated in Model 1 on four figures representing a continuous process from Section No. 1 to No 4; this model is an "offspring" of Model 3, to be presented in the later chapter just mentioned. Let me present them, commenting briefly on their contents; and then comment briefly on their abstract nature. In Model 1, in four sections (see below) the factors of organization (Church, State, San Marco clergy and administration), of resources (liturgical texts and traditions), and of management (the Ceremony Master and others) are not explicit. Actions and probable attitudes and concepts representing
them are expressed through the entire process or more specifically at certain points of it. The primary liturgical goal - the ritual is primarily liturgical, secondarily a State ritual - is expressed at the outset, being the "three miracles" that inform the whole process and are expressed through the whole of it (a survey of my models: IV, 3…).

The model is intended to capture a complex rite. This can mean several things, depending on attributed vantage point and protagonist scenarios: is it seen from that of the authorities (Church and government) or from that of some group among the congregation or even the dog-chaser (the expulsor canum)? Clearly, the vantage-point attributed to the present model is that of the authorities: how they expected the process to run and what kind of messages they intended it to convey. This, not hypothetical reconstructions of individual or group-wise conceptualization, is the only point we can start out from. On this basis, the entire process as analyzed here should function like a message exchange and information machine.

The model (Model 1, Sections 1 - 4) has no predesigned shape or format, but it monitors the various phases of the ritual and the connections and interrelations occurring in its thematics, the whole picture designating a "downward" time-flow (from No. 1 to No. 4). The various "nodes" in the network, represented as the four alternative rectangles etc. specified below, are horizontally interacting (roughly indicated in the model) and downwards (with the time-flow) activating the next node, so that one job done, the next one is taken care of. Obviously this is not a model for something to be run on a computer, but the morals of a computer model provided the structure for it: a so-called "connectionist" model (described succintly by N. J. Avis, *Computer architecture*, pp. 418f. A careful technical account in Bechtel and Abrahamsen, *Connectionism*. Numerous publications voice scepticism concerning connectionism, but this does not affect my use of its "moral" and especially because I do not pretend to use it to "represent" the operations of the human mind, but merely to analyse the salient features in a ritual process).

Here a network with nodes and connections between them is run through by one node activizing the next one by making its output the next one's input; "weightages" following selected routes ensure a correct running-through pattern throughout the network. This network characteristically is not pre-programmed in any sense; this means that positions for specific kinds of information are not pre-established in its structure, the network being wholly homogeneous without indications of levels (being totally contentless); hence it is flexible enough to take up any kind of relevant information. This is the moral also of the ritual process presented here: any feature that is relevant to the construction of the intended meaning pattern is integrated into it regardless
of its functional level (organizational, textual, personal, etc.).

This may seem to be contradicted by a principle introduced below, to the effect that models should not be entirely free but must incorporate right from the outset a distinction of levels. But there is a difference among the cases under analysis.

At present I am not setting up (presetting) some general framework model into which to put markers for levels and processes of general application (as later on, in Part IV, Chapter 2, Model 3). Instead we are monitoring a real ritual process that provides some apparently adequate if not basic "levels" all by itself, whereas in the later case just referred to, the entire structure of the case pictures a general analysis process of my own devising. Here, of course I have to decide beforehand about levels or other crucial distinctions: otherwise I would not be able to decide where to put what.

MODEL 1, Nos. 1 and 2.
MODEL 1, Nos. 3 and 4.

2.3.4. Monitoring the process
Now let me present the four sections in Model 1 and comment on them one by one, making it clear that they represent the ritual in a much simplified manner, which should not compromise my argumentation, since I am after analysis methodology rather than substantive research on ritual history. But first I give some explanations of Model 1, with its four Sections (1 - 4).

The internal numbers, such as No. 1, refer to the supplemental synopsis of ritual texts in Part II, Chapter 1. Long skinny rectangles = text; short rectangles = actions; short rectangles with diagonals = concepts, ideas; while ovals = objects. While the significance of the arrows should be clear, the thin lines should be explained: they mean both transition from one stage to another, some person's moving from one place to another, etc., and interrelations between actions (on Sec. No. 2, placing the table, placing the basin and chanting the Preface as one group of actions/texts) or between concepts (as between the State ideas on Sec. No. 4). The specific cases should make the significance in each case sufficiently clear. Now, when e.g. the Deacon moves from one place to another, this does not only indicate action but also an interrelation between positions which has each their role and significance. In this way, it is possible to consider all the lines including the arrows as indicative of interrelations and the entire model as one conveying information about messages.

Model 1, Sec. Nr. 1.
The three miracles or wonderful events, issuing from the general faith concept topping the figure, are indicated in the three top left entries; the inherent ideas are explicated in the text No. 1 (referring to the above synopsis in Part II, 3.1): *O admirabile* and further developed in other texts like No. 3: *Apparuit benignitas*. The Cross is the same one all through the rite, but is differently qualified (Sec. No. 2: "Jewel Cross", "True Cross", just "Cross" etc.) in order to achieve completeness of reference (at one point its containing a piece of the True Cross is especially important, at another, its status as a Byzantine-"Roman" object, and so on).

The five *Lauda psalms*, marked off also with a skinny rectangle indicating texts, are listed as No. 6 above (Part II, 1.1.): all beginning with *lauda* or *laudate*: praise <God, the Lord>! in singular or plural. Next to this item, there are an open rectangle indicating action and one with diagonal pattern indicating concept or idea. This means that a specific action (the Doge's choice) and a (simplified) concept or idea (glorifying God) are applied to the same group of psalms. The *Exaudi* and *Ut exaudire* refer to *Exaudi nos Domine and Ut nos exaudire digneris*: Hear us, *O* Lord; several alternative prayers. Model 1, Sec. Nr. 2.

The jewel-studded cross of Greek type with a piece of the True Cross probably was associated with Eastern "Roman" heritage. The Roman interpretation of Byzantine references in Venice is attested in several connections. The "Roman" heritage was important for Venice as for other Italian city republics (Sinding-Larsen, *Christ in the Council Hall*; *Venezia e le componenti*; *A walk*). The cross must have been seen in connection with the other and more famous cross reliquaries of San Marco, among them *Frolov 450*, which was claimed to have belonged to a patriarch of Constantinople or even to Constantine the Great; another one was made for one of the Christian "emperors" of Constantinople after 1205.

Model 1, Sec. Nr. 3.

Texts Nos. 10, 33 and 34 regard the Eastern non-Christian nations and, by implication, all non-Christian peoples: here a preparation for the baptism of the people to follow later on (Sec. No. 4). The perspective of Venice's mission is attested in several contexts (Sinding-Larsen, *St. Peter's chair*).

As a Venetian State relic, the Cross probably, together with many others, was exhibited on the great porphyry basin in front of the sanctuary on special days during the year (Sinding-Larsen, *Christ in the council hall*, p. 202). As for Venice's unwritten but implied "covenant" with Divinity and the republic's
religious mission, this is a recurrent theme in early and also sixteenth-century official writings (Sinding-Larsen, *Christ in the council hall*, with refs.). The mosaic program of the apse, with Christ the king in the vault (Ödegaard and Sinding-Larsen, *Osservazioni sul mosaico*) and the national saints on the wall, as well as on the Pala d'oro all turn on these same issues (Dale, *Inventing a sacred past*, pp. 61ff.; see also the same author, *Easter, Saint Mark*, passim). Model 1, Sec. Nr. 4.

Very few adult people appear to have been baptized at the time of our Ceremony Master, since he records just one, a young Turkish captive; but the symbolic act was no less important for that. In order to fill in the feature, the authorities probably hunted around among the many captives from the intermittent Turkish wars for one who could be enticed into being baptized. The State-ideological themes referred to in Figure 4 are all discussed in recent literature (Sinding-Larsen, *Christ in the council hall*, with refs.; and the contributions by Dale just noted).

The idea that the State should prepare its citizens for their prospective and hoped-for reception into Paradise, is an old notion especially enhanced by St. Thomas Aquinas and his pupil, Ptolemy of Lucca (see above). The Venetian government's intimate connections with the Dominican and the Franciscan Orders right since the thirteenth century is a well-documented fact. (See, e.g., Demus, *The Church*, p. 18; cf. The numerous doge's tombs in the Dominican SS. Giovanni e Paolo and the Franciscan S. Maria gloriosa dei Frari).

2.4. Over to the mosque
To return to our main subject, the function of visual media. Inscriptions, too, seem to operate on two levels, in the sense that they carry content notions and at the same time undeniably display pure form. The Quranic inscriptions in mosques that we are going to study in the next chapter, however, makes this distinction seem rather less clear than one might hope for. Here the borderline between shape and what the shape tells us is considerably blurred. This, however, makes the material challenging.

3. APPROACHING ALLAH
The complexities of the material in this chapter have made it advisable to change some typographical conventions.
Islamic prayer ritual, whenever it is being performed in an architectural mosque invokes the subject cited or referred indirectly to in the mosque inscriptions (only very rarely are there none), but certainly it does not refer directly to these inscriptions, any more than the Advent liturgy in the church refers to the images
whose subject is constantly evoked in the ritual. So far, the two cases seem comparable (a "mosque" is not necessarily a building; any place that is canonically clean, in which ritual prayer is performed correctly and with serious intent, is a valid prayer place and thus a mosque).

In this section an attempt will be made to describe the principal features of what we may now, after the above discussion, and with reference to a theoretical discussion in Part IV, consider the liturgical space conditions and focusing processes in the specific area of Sunni (main tradition) Islamic liturgy of prayer and worship. In the interest of analytical theory, the same attitude to simplification will govern this section as the previous one. The material will require a certain amount of philological awareness; and in a couple of cases a somewhat more extended evaluation of problems in vocabulary has proved unavoidable. Some fundamental - but not always unambiguous - terms in the Islamic faith must be presented as reference for our comparison between inscriptions and "pictures". Readers familiar with Islam or Arabic will of course find much of this rather elementary.

For an understanding of specific features in the Islamic liturgy and the traditions behind it, we have mainly three kinds of sources to go by:

- the Quran (Qur’ân: hereafter simplified as Quran) itself (seventh century; text locations given by a simple Q plus chapter and verse);
- an enormous number of written Traditions called, in singular, hadîth, plural aḥâdîth (collected mainly in the ninth century and partly somewhat later); and
- individual authors, for example the philosopher al-Ghazâli (died 1111 AD) (the transliteration norm applied here is adapted, observing computer limitations, from that of Wehr-Cowan, A Dictionary).

I have simplified the spelling of frequently cited names. I present terms in Arabic in Italics for more convenient reading. The form ča, čb, etc. indicates the letter āyn, a mere contraction of the throat. ĕ is comparable to a weak English h, while č corresponds to the German ach; kh a more rasping version of this.

Since I shall be staying within Sunni tradition in Islam, it may look rather awkward that I include material from medieval writers representing what seems very different attitudes. Attitudes, however, frequently overlap or dovetail and render it even more risky to exclude cases that may seem relevant.

The cited Traditions, collected by Bukhari (his name thus simplified): in Bukhâri, Al-sahîh = "Abdullah Muhammad ibn Ismā‘il al-Bukārî, sahîh al-Bukârî") and other "traditionists", are reputed to originate with the prophet Muhammad and his closest followers and thus to preserve a pattern of sayings, behavior, attitudes and thought approved of by the messenger himself (I omit citing from the vast modern literature on this subject, referring merely to the special study in G. A. Juynboll, Muslim tradition).
Often this claim does not stand up to modern historical criticism. A number of such traditions, *ahadîth*, were subjected to harsh polemics (see, for an example, Ibn Furâk's - 11th century - *Bayan mushkil al-ahâdîth: Explanation of the difficulties concerning the hadîths*).

We can only be sure that they reflect possible attitudes and prescriptions accepted in some quarters in the ninth through the tenth centuries, when they were published.

3.1. Community prayer

Allah accepts repentance and prayer (Q 42:25, 26); he is the hearer and the seer (Q 42:11: *al-samîc al-bâsîr*: the listener, the seer: frequently repeated.) and his mercy is all-comprehensive (Q 4:40, and in other verses). Prayer to Allah cannot be directed towards somewhere in space where he is to be found more manifestly than anywhere else. The institution of the *qibla* confirms this.

This is so because the *qibla* indicates the direction, wherever in the world one may be at the moment, towards one fixed geographical spot to which all Muslims shall turn while praying, namely the cubic *Ka'âba* (*ka'âba* = cube) at Mecca; *qibla* being a noun form of the verb *qabala* which, in some of its aspects, means to stand opposite, confront, meet, face, encounter. The *Ka'âba* is a block-like building with the Black Stone inserted into one of its corners; a building allegedly erected by the first Muslim and the father of Jews and Arabs alike: Abraham (Rubin, *The Ka'âba*, pp. 97ff.). The Black Stone incorporated in the exterior of the building is the focus of particular veneration and in this respect is comparable to the numerous holy stones - many of them named for pre-Islamic deities such as Hubal, Allat and al-\(^{3}\)Uzza - who were revered in pre-Islamic times in the Arabian Peninsula including Mecca. It is important to note that these stones were not fetishist cult objects in the sense of being sacred themselves; rather they were focusing objects: *L'objet matériel n'est pas vénéré comme tel, mais comme siège, soit d'un être personnel (divinité, esprit), soit d'un force*... *Le terme 'litholâtrie' exprime donc une idée fausse et repose sur une incompréhension totale des rites* (Dussaud, quoted by Henninger, *Arabia sacra*, p. 20.). There is no idea inherent here of God residing inside this House of God (as the *Ka'âba* is metaphorically called) nor that he is present in the Black Stone, while there is of course no accounting, here as in Christendom, for popular conceptions trespassing the boundaries of orthodox doctrine (Sinding-Larsen, *Some observations*, Chapter V).

In order to ensure that prayer in the mosque respects the rule of *qibla* or direction towards Mecca, all mosques and other kinds of prayer room have a wall 90° to the direction towards Mecca; the prayers simply face this *qibla* wall
which stands transversally to the correct prayer direction. It often has a niche in the middle (occasionally several, if the wall is exceptionally long in relation to the depth of the prayer hall). This niche is called a mihrâb, usually with the most important Quranic inscriptions inside and around it (a word of quranic provenance - Q 3:36; but of uncertain ethymology; Q. 3:36: Zechariah enters the mihrâb to see Mariam (usually translated "sanctuary", "place of worship"; for this niche generally, see various articles in Papadopulo, Le mihrab). In front of this is the place for the prayer-leader or imâm (whenever such a person is present to lead the prayer).

In most cases, then, the imâm will be performing in front of this mihrâb, with the congregation following him. Visually, from the point of view of the congregation, the imâm with the mihrâb appearing like a frame for him, will constitute an active (moving and gesturing) local focal point, the qibla towards Mecca indicating the far-away focus. The qibla wall and also the mihrâb bear Quranic inscriptions in most extant cases, the mihrab serving as a centre-piece for Islamic mosque "iconography". Also small portable mihrâbs often bear such inscriptions.

The injunction of using a common focus for praying for all believers, a universal qibla, is religio-sociological and religio-political rather than dogmatic: a factor of unification and hence self-identification for the Islamic people or umma; a people also frequently identified as the 'ahl al-qiblati: the people "of the direction" (towards Mecca; in the first phase of the Quranic revelation, the qibla was towards Jerusalem). Addressing the Ka'aba also means encompassing mentally the notion of pilgrimage to Mecca and the rites centering around it and reinforces the notion of Islamic unity.

Some fundamental - but not always unambiguous - terms in the Islamic faith must now be presented as reference for a further examination of the liturgical conditions for the relation of worshippers to visual representation, whether these are inscriptions or just a decorated niche dominating the qibla wall. Our principal concern is the role in this respect of the Quranic revelation and thus also of the Quranic text, a subject we shall return to, after the following introductory remarks.

The term for divine revelation addressed to mankind in general, through the archangel Gabriel, a prophet or other mediator, is wahy (whereas ilhâm is individually directed inspiration). Another important group of operators in this connection consists in verbal and noun derivatives of the verb nazala, to descend. Both sets are applied to the text codification of the final divine revelation through Muhammad, namely the Quran; a noun (qur'ân), derived from the verb qar'a, to read, rehearse, declaim, recite, peruse, study. More important in our context is the nature of this revealed text and its relation to its source, Allah, and to the central theological dogma concerning Allah. The mainstream tradition -
the Sunni one as distinguished from the Shi'a (hereafter simplified to Shia) - considers the Quran to be eternally manifest and uncreated, to have existed with God (Allah) from eternity to eternity. The Quran was considered to have been extant in the highest heaven from eternity, written on the Preserved Table near the Throne of God, and it is now held by all orthodox Muslims to be eternal and uncreated (Klein, *The religion of Islam*, p. 9.). Some rulers, especially in the beginning of the Abbaside period (750 - 1250), contested the idea of uncreatedness, apparently for political reasons (a much-debated theme: Makdisi, *Meditations and sermons of Ibn 'Aqîl*, pp. 149f.; Van Ess, *L'autorité de la tradition prophétique*, pp. 211 - 226). The Calif Al-Ma'mûn in 827 proclaimed the createdness of the Quran and the negation of any vision (somewhat like the Christian *visio beatifica*) of Allah in heaven as State dogmas (Roman, *Une vision humaine des fins dernières*, p. 11). The Calif Al-Mutawakkil in 847 restored the Sunna conception of the uncreatedness of the Quran (Larkin, *The theology of meaning*, pp. 8f.).

As already mentioned, the institution of the *qibla* has architectural consequences, involving a structure that is usually the place for the most important quranic inscriptions. This situation of geographically directed prayer sets the stage for distinguishing Islamic space-conception from Christian space-conception in connection with visual media, whether images or inscriptions. Any place, provided it is clean, is fully valid for any part of the Islamic worship, while a fully valid Christian service (in the Roman tradition) requires the sacramental efficacy called forth in the liturgy and connected with a consecrated altar and space, which only consecrated priests are authorized and competent to effect. Islam, in the Sunni tradition, at least, does not use priests, only *imāms*, prayer-leaders with quranic and ritual proficiency but no state of consecration. The imâm is chosen by the community or by the authorities just because of these characteristics. His presence is a practical need whenever the praying assembly is large enough to require "choreographic" leadership; on Fridays, moreover, it is often he who pronounces the sermon or *kutba*.

We have here, as we noted, a liturgical situation that is markedly different from that of Roman sacramental liturgy. There is a corresponding difference also regarding the site of prayer and liturgical performance (in Islam, mainly prayer, Quran recitation and, on Fridays, preaching). The mosque or other kind of prayer room, such as the *zâwiya* (lit. corner) of some Sufi brotherhood, is no sacramentally identified site nor is it a consecrated building. Its sacredness consists in its being used for ritually correct prayer by seriously intended Muslims. In fact, there is a mosque wherever a Muslim prays in the prescribed manner and with serious intent, and one may improvise some rudimentary *sutra* or front marker as a provisionary *qibla*, by placing in front of oneself when praying almost any kind of object: a spear (which the prophet is said to have done), a cam-
el bag, a kalashnikov or something similar, thereby providing for one's private *qibla* "wall".

In the Christian service the congregation participates actively, and so do the Muslims in their prayer ritual, but they are not defined as a sacramental community. In the Roman Church a sacramental transformation of a sum of individuals into a supernatural entity is supposed to take place. In the mosque the community is made up of a summation of all the right-believing, intentionally sincere and correctly performing *individuals*. In Islam the identity as God's People or *Umma* is not sacramental; there is no consecrated priest who acts on behalf of God, as in the case of the Roman Catholic priest celebrating Mass, who also represents all Christianity (a curious consequence in the history of Baroque music: *... the musicians could be situated at the west end of the nave, causing the congregation to turn their seats towards the performers and ... their backs to the high altar. This partial dissociation of music from the rite ... was possible in Catholicism, where the validity of the rite depends on the acts of the celebrant and his assistants, not on the participation of the congregation* (Michael Talbot, in Sadie, *Companion to Baroque Music*, p. 8)). Nor does the *imâm* represent in any formal sense the entire People of God. The institution of the *imâm* or leader in public prayer is a direct expression of the community conception (again we are concerned with Sunni not Shia Islam). Prayer in Islam is strictly personal and individual and the unity simply consists in an adding-up of *n* individuals doing the same thing. There is no sacramentally present God and no sanctification of the proceedings like in the Christian liturgy: it is the force of the believers' sincere intention - *niyya* - that sanctions the validity of the prayer service.

In Islam the "additive" community aspect is displayed and sustained through common regulated actions - everyone imitating the *imâm* in front of them, if there is one present. Numerous traditions going as far back in history as to the ninth century and perhaps even further back (a matter of dispute) accentuate this community feature and ascribe the definition of it directly to the Quran and to Muhammad's comprehension of the text.

The Islamic community institution is explained and its conceptualization expanded in terms that activize the concepts of space and the occupation and use of space. Some Traditions (*ahâdîth*), for example, relate how the Prophet taught that congregational prayer is superior in value (in fact, seventeen times!) to individual prayer or prayer in private houses (Bukârî, *Kitâb* 15, Bâb 2 = Vol. I, p. 231): *salât al-jamâ'i tafdîlu salât al-fadî...*; and you should prefer communal prayer to praying alone each of you separately (Bukârî, *Kitâb* 15, Bâb 3 = Vol. I, p. 232): *tafdîlu salât al-jamâ'i salât aḥâdikum waḥdahu*. Furthermore, during the public services, espe-
cially on Fridays, an almost military space order was imposed upon the praying congregation. The ranks of participants had to be filled from up front near the qibla wall and towards the back, leaving no "holes". No man was allowed, during the public services, to pray alone, outside the tightly filled rows of prayers. **Even out your ranks, for evening out the ranks is part of doing the prayer** *(correctly)* (Bukhari, *Kitâb* 15, Bâb 45, lemma 690): *sawwû sufûfakum, fa-inna taswiyat al-sufûf min 'iqâmat al-salât*.

3.2. The right way

Islam presupposes for the individual believer an active sense perception and intellectual relationship to the real world, distantly as well as locally. We shall see this in the verse from Chapter 67: do you find any flaw in God's creation? take a closer look!

This required mental activity is also appealed to throughout the Quran in order to lead God's People on to the right path - corresponding almost exactly to the *giusta via* in Christian tradition as evoked by, among others, Dante Alighieri. This in fact is a major theme and it is sustained and activated by the behaviorally right direction of valid prayer. The notions of ideal space directions and of physical as well as conceptual focus and spiritually following the right path and also of apprehending worldly and spiritual realities through one's senses and intellect are predominant in the choreography of Islamic prayer as well as in the religious and spiritual constitution expected from a true Muslim.

As for the Quran, our interest is not directed upon its constitution and redaction into its present arrangement, but upon the **specific definitions and injunctions regarding the liturgy and the spiritual attitudes expected to inform the participation in the rites and religious attention in general**. From the reading of the Quran a specific space-related pattern emerges; "space", then, is taken in its physical as well as its conceptual (or spiritual, or "extra-worldly") sense. It all adds up to what we might call a space-focused action program for the believer.

In an almost rhythmically repetitive manner the Quran insists on the notion of Allah's way, meaning the path of duty or obligation to God (*sâbil Allâh*). **(*A long parenthesis on terminology:*** see the dictionaries: Penrice: *The path of duty to God*; Steingass: *way, path, road, manner, method, means and ways*; Wehr: *Weg, Pfad, Zugang, Mittel, Möglichkeit, fî sabîl Allâh: für die Sache Gottes, um Gottes und der Religion willen*; Reig: *chemin, route etc.*, *sâbil Allâh: la cause de Dieu*. See also Muhammad bin Abi Bekri ʿAbd al-Qader al-Razî, * Muktar al-sîhâh*, Damascus n. d.; many editions, 284. Graham, *Divine word*, p. 143, translates *fî sabîl Allah as in the cause [lit., way] of God*. **Way, path, road remain the basic significance**; furthermore, the way of those acting uprightly; *al-sirât al-mustaqîm*; the right direction of the way (*sawâ’a as-sâbil*), guidance (*hudan*), derivations from the verb *rashada* (guide rightly) **end parenthesis**.
All together we are facing a steadily repeated, and in a very limited vocabulary, insistence on conceptual direction and focusing as prescribed for the believer: setting him into a state akin to that of the Christian viator, or traveller towards Paradise, but with far stronger accentuation of what one might call the vectorial dimension of approach to the divine. The Catholic Christian, after all, will always have divine manifestation right before his eyes at the altar during the celebration of Mass, while for the Muslim, the manifestation, apart from the non-localizable notion of his being "everywhere" (Allah mawjûd fi kulli makân), the distances are unmeasurable and humanly insurmountable, so that conceptional and emotional direction acquires a more significant value - as some among numerous Quranic texts will show us (see below). A very common term in the hadith literature is fi Allâh: in/with/by God. Classical Muslim commentators usually gloss this with fi sabîl Allâh: in the path/way of [duty to] God (Graham, Divine word, p. 143).

The whole process of addressing God (Allah) consists in steady repetition of formalized prayer informed by a limited number of dogmatic statements, most of them in oft-repeated formulas, and also illustrative statements making appeal to the believer's senses and understanding. The process is sustained by constant contemplation and remembrance (dhikr: recollection, remembrance; naming, mentioning; invocation of God) of Allah, and inspired by the consideration and understanding of Allah's "signs" and miracles: âya, plur. âyât: a term used also for the verses of the Quran because they are considered to be miracles of revelation. A special value is attached to the recitation of the first chapter of the Quran, the so-called al-fâtiha (Graham, Divine word, pp. 182f. citing a hadîth). In order to render human beings capable of following (tabî‘a, a verb used incessantly) this lead, and not turning away or deviating ('afaka, tawallâ, dâllâ: also steadily used all through the Quran), constant appeal is made to human knowledge and understanding, perception and reflection, as well as to the use of the senses of hearing and seeing. We are almost constantly reminded of the right path (e. g., 1:5 and passim) and of those who go astray (e. g., 1:7 and passim).

The following selections of formulas that appeal to being guided, going straight and using one's senses, are all taken from the initial verses (up to verse 97; there are 286 in all) of sura or chapter 2 (The Cow or Heifer; al-baqara), to give an impression of the relative frequency: not followers of the right direction (2:16); on the right course <learned> from their Lord (2:5); a covering of their eyes (2:7); Allah took away their light - they do not see (2:17); those who go astray instead of in the right direction (2:16); deaf, dumb and blind, so they
will not turn back <to the right direction> (2:28); lightning almost takes away their sight; every time the light <helps> them, they walk therein, and when the darkness grows on them, they stand still. And if Allah willed, he could take away their hearing and their sight (2 : 20); Allah causes men to go astray (2:26); Allah leads many aright (2:26); there will come to you a guidance (2:38); whoever follows my guidance (2:38); we gave Musa [Moses] the Book ... that you might walk right/ be guided right (2:53); and turn to your Creator (2:54); then you turned back (2:83); exceeding the limits (2:85); guidance for the believers (2:97); See also the hadîth about going astray and being led by Allah reported by Graham, Divine word, pp. 205f.; and about idols causing one to go astray: p. 211).

Thus, a direct connection is effected institutionally or canonically between spiritual conceptions and real-world sense perception and experience, a mechanism familiar also from the Bible.

On the opposite side of the rightly guided ones, we meet the transgressors: and Allah does not guide the transgressing people (Quran, sura 61, verse 5 (hereafter: Q 61:5, etc.; wa Allâhu là yahdi al-qawm al-fâsiqîna)); and we meet those who disobeyed and exceeded the limits (Q 2:61; kânû ya k t aduna). These concepts, too, are mostly couched in terms of space direction and area delimitation. This is the case also in the Traditions, for example in the following saying: Whoever falls into doubtful things is like the herdsman who grazes his cattle on the borders of a reserve - he is likely to enter it. Know that every king has a reserve, know that Allah's reserve is what he has forbidden (Bukhâri, Al-sahîh, Kitâb 2, Bâb 37 (Vol. I, p. 28). Indeed, whoever sticks to unbelief instead of faith, he has lost the right direction of the way (Q 2:108; fa-qad dalla sawâ'a al-sabîl); but then thus does Allah make clear to you his signs/ miracles ["communications" in a recent Iranian Quran translation] that you may follow the right way (Q 3:102: kadhalika yubayyinu'llâhu lakum âyâtihi la c allakum tahtadûna).

3.3. Ritually face to face
Several passages in the Quran must have elicited in the believers an emotionally (though not canonically) sustained notion of praying face to face with Allah, rather as a non-sacramental parallel to the Roman notion of celebrating Mass in conspectu maiestatis tuae: before your holy countenance. The Throne Verse and other references to Allah's "throne" as well as his "niche of light" (see below) provided mental imagery in support of this idea. This should also apply to the numerous references to Allah's "face" (see the list in Masson, Monothéisme coranique, p. 90: Allah's eyes denote the attention and protection he bestows on his servant Noah (Q 54:14); they denote his attention to the construction of the Ark (Q 11:37 and 23:27), and to the
education of the young Moses (Q 20:39), to Muhammad's mission (52:48). Masson cites other parallels from the Old Testament and goes on to note: *La face de Dieu exprime, d'une façon générale, son Etre lui-même en tant que manifesté par sa présence dans l'univers et au Paradis. A sept reprises, le Coran évoque le désir de l'homme, sa recherche de la face d'Allah (wajh Allâh).*

In the famous and often-cited *Throne Verse* (Q 2:255) we learn: *His throne extends - wastc a kursiyuhu - over the heavens and the earth and he feels no fatigue in guarding and preserving them, for he is the most high, the supreme.* At this point fear of anthropomorphism sets in, and commentators try to escape the notion of someone sitting bodily on something (see below). But some traditions take care of that: the angels, told to summon Allah's servant, asked how they could do that since the throne was above the seven heavens. For answer they avoid the issue as irrelevant: advising us to let them just say *There is no god but God* (Graham, *Divine word*, p. 155, citing a hadîth). In a recent Iranian (Shia) translation of the Quran (Tehran 1980s), *kursî* (chair, throne) is translated as *knowledge* in a deviation from the lexical norm, but this is rather common in Sunni tradition, too; witness the *Commentary of the two Jalals*: the throne, by virtue of Allah's majesty, contains both heaven and earth, and is thus immaterialized and turned into a cosmic symbol rather than a "chair" (*it is said: his knowledge/wisdom encompasses/contains both [heaven and earth] and it is <furthermore> said: the chair/throne by itself comprises/contains both of them by virtue of his majesty (qîl 'ahâta cîlmuhu bi-hîma [i.e., heaven and earth] wa qîl al-kursî nafsihun mushtamil calayhima li-âc zamatihi:* from the steadily reprinted Tafsîr volume: *Qur'ân karîm wa bi-hâmishihi tafsîr*, p. 56. A similar interpretation in Al-Qayrawani's *Risâla*: Bercher, *La Risâla*, pp. 20, in Arabic, 21, French transl.; but see below). To some commentators *kursî* means a "ceiling" or a "roof". On the other hand there is talk of platforms/mimbars of light, *manâbir min nûr,* evidently special positions of special honor in Paradise (Graham, *Divine word*, pp. 144f.).

The beginning of the *Throne verse* is often quoted in mosque inscriptions, but usually not the very words citing the throne (*kursî*) itself. Traditionalists like Ibn Qutayba (died 889 AD), stuck to the hadîth traditions and criticized the "theologians" (authors in the *kalâm* - Word Theology - paradigm) for using this "strange" interpretation of the Quran: *Some of them translate the notion of the extending chair (*kursî*) into his wisdom* (Lecomte, *Le traité des divergences du Hadîth*, No. 85, p. 75. For some, there is a clear distinction between *kursî*, throne, and *'arsh*, chair as a piece of carpentry (ibid., No. 304b, p. 320).

Nevertheless, normally schooled people knew the Throne verse and could hardly see a quotation of a part of it without mentally calling forth the rest, in-
cluding the *kursi*. The throne image cannot be explained away: if a visualizable notion like that of a throne is employed, for whatever end, then the purpose must have been to elicit the concept of a throne (excuse the tautology!), and the only likely way in which to imagine a throne is to see it as a mental image (for want of pictures of it) based on real-world experience of one kind or another. Al-Qayrawani (922/3 AD - ca. 992/3 AD), in fact, after employing the conceptualization of the throne or *kursi* by way of association to images or reality, in the same context also uses the definitely more material-sounding *carsh* (chair), and concludes: everything is inscribed in the Manifest Book [*kitâb mubîn*: the Quran], *that Allah is seated on his throne, and that his power [mulk] extends all over the cosmos* (Bercher, La Risâla, p. 21).

On the other hand, persons with a deep and long involvement with Sunni Islamic religious practice and thinking might well be used to fathoming a vague cosmic concept when hearing or reading the Throne verse, having trained themselves to dispel the more material connotation. Thus, the precise mode of conceptualization in this case would seem to be dependent not only on theological outlook (traditionalists versus the men of the *kalam*) but also on educational direction and status. Some would think in cosmic terms, others in a figure of a throne as known from political life - or even from the *mimbar* chair in the mosque. In consideration of the almost everpresent appeal to our senses, hearing, seeing, etc., in the Quran and reflected also in numerous *hadiths* (as the one cited above), it would seem that the "factual" conceptualization of the throne, as well as the light, lamp and niche named in the Light Verse (see below), would gain preponderance or at least would come naturally to most people, even learned ones. We know from the Roman world how difficult it has been, even for clergy, to keep out the more tangible aspects of images in spite of contrary teachings.

The beautiful *Light Verse* is also remarkable in that, like the terser Throne Verse, it seems to favor the notion of facing Allah through a tangible object symbolization (Q 24:34): *Allah is the light of the heavens and the earth; a likeness of his light is a niche in which is a lamp (mathalu nûrihi ka-mishkwa fi-ha miṣbâḥ), the lamp is in a glass <and> the glass is as it were a brightly shining star, lit from a blessed olive tree, neither eastern nor western, the oil thereof almost gives light through fire though fire touches it not; light upon light: Allah guides to his light whom he pleases, and Allah sets forth parables [amthâl] for men, and Allah is cognizant of all things* (the idea of light from light is familiar also from the Gospel of St. John).

Texts like this one naturally came as a godsend for Islamic mysticism as it developed since the late ninth century; any support of the notion of a direct face-to-face contact with God was just what they desired. Al-Ghazâli (died 1111) wrote a treatise based on the *Light Verse* and named after it
(mishkwat al-anwâr: niche of light), in which various different modalities of vision are dealt with extensively (Deladrière, Ghazâli; Vecchia Vaglieri and Rubinacci, Al-Ghazâli; Goldziher, Die Richtungen, pp. 184f.: Ähnliche Gelegenheit zu mystischer Ausdeutung bot die auch in ihrer wörtlichen Erklärung viel umstrittene Erzählung von der Theophanie in Sure [Quranic chapter] 53... Und ganz ungesucht bietet sich auch 2. v. 109 [Gottes ist der Orient und der Okzident und wohin ihr euch immer wendet, dort is Allah's Antlitz] für mystische Anknüpfungen an).

In an account of the Islamic liturgy, the mystical element can never be entirely excluded. The Quran itself contains passages that might be taken to suggest the idea of a "path" similar to the path in Sufi tradition: Prostrate and draw near <to God (Q 96:19; usjud wa iqtarib [derivation from qurb].. A matter to be treated with caution, however: as to qurb, 'proximity', the Sufis have always been eager to define it other than spatially; it is an ethical proximity... (Schimmel, Mystical dimensions, p. 133). Their insistence on this point may mean that such a repeated reminder was necessitated because of popular misunderstandings - much as the Roman Church had to renew the reminder that an image of Christ was nothing more than a reference to the prototype.

Similar notions appear to be connected with the quranic term sakinah (2 249; 9 : 26, 40; 48 : 4, 18, 26) and derive from, among others, the following hadith: when one of the Prophet's companions was reciting from the Quran, his horse tried to bolt away; why did this happen? The Prophet replied: That was the sakinah that descended with the recitation. In these contexts, sakinah, derived from the root sakana (to dwell), but probably influenced by the Jewish shekhina, appears to assume the sense of the active presence or manifestation of the presence of God (tulka al-sakinah tanazzalat bi-l-qur'ân (Graham, Divine word, pp.13 and 21, notes 13 and 14, with references). A perusal of the standard Arabic dictionaries supports this interpretation of indwelling.

The more rationalistic mainstream Sunni tradition - represented perhaps most consistently by the Hanbalite school - and the mystical trends quite often are in touch with one another: The traditional idea [i. e., "traditional" in modern research] that Hanbalite rigorism and mystical emotion are mutually exclusive can no longer be maintained (Schimmel, Mystical dimensions, p. 89).

Mystical poetry did accentuate emotional closeness to God through a verbal imagery full of spatial metaphors. This poetry employed not only conceptual models and mental imagery, but often couched them in terms of true visual images or pictures; and the Ka'ba naturally reappears as a significant feature in this imaginary iconography. Conceptions of vision are often central, e.g., in Muhasibi (died 857; A. Roman, Une vision).
In order to substantiate this, I am going to cite some cases that involve quite a complex vocabulary. I shall cite them here and not relegate the material to a note or appendix, because by looking through it the reader will acquire a sense of the richness of possibilities and allusions but also of the difficulties of making exact sense of some key notions in this context. The world would have been easier to cope with if most words each had just one translation. But words like pictures often invite a rich assortment of meanings, and poetry, especially Persian poetry, consciously exploited ambiguity and opacity with a view to making a book difficult and claiming time for its absorption and hence a lasting treasure (Thiesen, *A manual of classical Persian prosody*, p. XI).

In his Persian poems, the *maulanâ* Jalâl al-Dîn Rumi of Konya (Turkey), who founded there a dervish order and died in 1273, generally uses - in the relevant contexts - two Arabic words: *naqash*, meaning, in Arabic: to variegate, paint, chisel, engrave; and as a Persian noun: a painting, engraving, picture; as well as *sûra*, from Arabic: *sawwara*: to form, shape, paint, draw, illustrate, make a picture; represent, portray (see the meticulous exposé in Larikin, *The theology of meaning*, pp. 110-131), meaning, as a Persian noun: image, form, figure; face, effigy, visage; appearance, semblance, resemblance; picture, portrait; apparition, manner, fashion, shape (I am using Steingass, *Persian-English dictionary*, 6th impression, London, 1979).

Let us hear how the *Maulanâ* of Konya uses his verbal imagery (in Persian):

*Every form [naqash-râ] you see has its archetype [jins-esh; jins: Arabic for genus, kind] in the placeless world [ze lâmakân-ast]; if the form perished, no matter, since its original ['asl-esh] is everlasting* (Nicholson, *Selected poems from the Divâni Shamsi Tabrôz*, No. XII.). And *This house... What means this idol-form [îin surati], if this is the house of the Ka'aba?* (Nicholson, *Selected poems*, No. XV): *I am a painter [surat-gar], maker of pictures [naqash-am]; every moment I shape a beauteous form [but in Persian: Steingass, Persian-English Dictionary]. An idol, an image, any figure that is an object of adoration and then in your presence [speaking now to God:] [dar pîşî tu = chez toi] I melt them all away. I call up a hundred phantoms [! sad naqash] and indue them with spirit; when I behold your phantom (Nicholson, *Selected poems*: "phantoms"; alternatively: figure, image: *chûn naqasi turâ bînam: when I behold your image), I cast them in the fire (Nicholson, *Selected poems*, No. XXX-IV).*

By obliterating the ego, the mystic achieves, if not the complete unity with Allah as expressed in Al-Hallâj's *I am the <divine> truth* (*anâ al-ḥaqq*; Nicholson, *Selected poems*, No. XXXVIII). Passages like these, however, carry us too far along the "Path" of the Sufis. Even the "extremist" al-Hallâj could express himself in more moderate terms: *Mon regard, avec l'œil de la*
science, a dégagé le pur secret de ma méditation... Mon coeur... montant vers Celui que, si l'on m'interroge, je masque sous des énigmes" (transl. Massignon, Husayn Mansûr Hallâj, Diwân, p. 49.); then at least some feeling or idea of closeness. Again, speaking to God, the Maulanâ declares: you and I, with two forms and with two figures, but with one soul, you and I (quoting with modifications the translations in Nicholson, Selected poems, Nos. XV, XXXIV. XXXVIII).

3.4. Allah's word

This section will focus on the notion of divine manifestation in quranic inscriptions.

It is highly relevant for our purpose to note that the Quranic text was intended as and understood to be non-cryptic and accessible to everybody: the words were "sent down" in a clear and understandable vernacular: literally in Arabic (Q 20:113, 26:195); A qur'ânan ārabîyan, lit. an Arabic quran: Q 20:113, et al.; ārabî mubîn : lit. in a clear Arabic: 12:1, 26:195, et. al. My reading "vernacular" for "Arabic" would not be endorsed by all arabists. For the formula sent down in Arabic Beeston gives the following list of four possible interpretations. These options may affect the argumentation concerning the issues under discussion at present (Beeston, Baidawi’s Commentary on surah 12, p. 56, note 4.):

1. We have revealed to you it, namely a portion of the revelation in Arabic;
2a. We have revealed to you it, by way of an Arabic Qur'an;
2b. We have revealed to you it, by way of a thing to be recited in Arabic;
3. We have revealed to you it, it being a thing to be recited (and) it being in Arabic.

While the text was sent down, the Urbild (supernatural model) of the book remains with Allah: with him is the Mother of the Book (Q 13:39; wa āindahu ummu al-kitâbi). Thus there is a close connection between the text whenever it is read, recited or inscribed, and Allah himself.

The book reveals the Word of Allah: kalâm Allâhi, a concept intimately connected with the central dogma concerning the nature of Allah. This dogma affirms the absolute oneness and unity of God (Allâh, or rabb = lord), so that the usual term for "dogmatics" is tawhîd, or <study of> One-ness, a verbal noun of wahada, to be alone, unique, singular, unmatched, without equal, incomparable (ıtrodutcly: Gibb and Kramers, Shorter encyclopaedia of Islam; Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic theology and law).

Chapter 112 in the Quran invites the believer to learn and to repeat this dogma in a short formula: Say: he, Allah, is one. Allah is he on whom all depend. He begets not, nor is he begotten. And none is like him.
Short yes, but how precise? A major general problem facing anyone who reads the Quran in Arabic shows up even in this short chapter: typically, the word *samad* here translated as "dependable" possibly should rather be translated as "eternal". There is no "the correct" translation of the Quran and we should not think that all Quranic inscriptions on the walls of a mosque are generally unambiguous. Thus many of them share with true "pictures" the characteristic that they can be given different significances, depending on who reads them in what circumstances and for what purpose: there are contextual and social dimensions to account for even here. But on the official side, Sunni scholarship, expressing itself in theological treatises and in the literary genre of comments on the Quran called *tafsîr*, has established fixed meanings for most terms.

As a prerequisite to proceeding further, the nature of inscriptions with Quranic quotations must be examined in some detail; on the other hand, I shall omit the highly sophisticated Sufi speculations on letter symbolism and just refer to the relevant literature, above all to Schimmel (*Mystical dimensions*).

As we shall see, any notion of being somehow face to face with Allah is reinforced through the operative force invested in the Quranic inscriptions in the mosque or *zawiya* (smaller prayer building or room) or other prayer area. The quranic text itself, every word and sentence within it, is a direct manifestation of Allah, so that quranic inscriptions communicate something essentially divine, obliquely corresponding to a Greek conception labelled *participation en-tative* by Schönborn (*L'icône du Christ*, pp. 191ff.).

Inscriptions with quotations from the Quran are commonly to be found inside and on the exterior of most types of public buildings and also mosques and other kinds of prayer-rooms (an extensive if far from complete survey in Dodd and Khairallah, *The image of the word*). In the latter category, we will assume that the inscriptions placed inside, around and above the mihrab niche in the qibla wall and, secondarily, extending from this, are the most important ones. Apparently, there is some consistency in the choice of quotations for these locations, but this is a question in need of further investigation. What we are seeing here is not words written down by a prophet as a report of what he has experienced and of the revelations he has received from God, as in the prophetic books of the Old Testament. The very Word of Allah is conveyed to us, letter sequences that are emanations from Allah's essence; so that the messenger Muhammad did not, according to Islamic dogma, report and sift what he heard and experienced: in this respect he is nothing but a trustworthy communication vehicle. *The difference between the Qur'an and the precepts* [i.e., the Traditions - *ahadiths* for which see above] *lies in the fact that the former contains the very words of God, while the precepts were delivered in the Prophet's own language. One result of this difference is that the words (naẓm) of the Qur'an have a spiritual value and significance apart from what they lay down. Abu Hanîfa, how-
ever, is reported to have said that the words are not a necessary constituent of the Qur'an, and therefore, if in saying his prayer a Muslim used Persian words to convey the same meaning as certain verses of the Qur'an, such prayers would be valid. It appears that he subsequently changed his opinion, and the accepted Sunni view is what I have indicated (Abdur Rahim, Muhammadan jurisprudence, p. 71). There was a similar concept in Jewish tradition: Wie im Allerheiligsten des Tempels, so ist Gott oder seine Schekina (= Gegenwart) im Torah-Schrein im Gestalt der Torah-rolle gegenwärtig... dabei geht es nicht nur um Buchstaben, Worte und Sätze. Immer erscheint Gottes Wort nur vordergründig in Laute oder Schriftzeichen umgesetzt, deren Sinn zu erfassen feswegen nicht alles ist. Daneben gilt es zu realisieren, daß Gott selbst in den Laut-und Buchstabenkombination gegenwärtig wird, seine Wirklichkeit dem Stoff einprägt, der die Worte trägt, und jede Bescäftigung mit einem Gotteswort zu einem Vorgang quasi-personaler Interaktion erhebt (Hoheisel, Wort Gottes im Judentum, pp. 81ff., 88f.).

The Word is the principal vehicle of revelation (Tout l'effort pour connaître le vrai (al-haqq consiste donc... en une soumission totale (taqlîd) à l'autorité du texte coranique dont l'immanance linguistique est nécessairement confondue avec la transcendence de la Volonté de Dieu (Arkoun, Essais sur la pensée islamique, Ch. 5: Logocentrisme et verité religieuse dans la pensée islamique, pp. 185 - 231). Allah taught man by the pen (Q 96:4, ‘callama bi-al-qalami); and if all the trees on earth were pens and the oceans <were ink>, with seven oceans behind it to add to it <'s supply>, yet would not the words of Allah be exhausted (Q 31:27). This attitude perhaps is in the background of an attitude towards texts allegedly transmitted from the Prophet and his circle, the so-called traditions or hadiths, which is strongly deplored by Ibn Furak. In his Bayan (Explanation), he criticized adversaries in the polemical context for caring merely for the words in the traditions and also in the Quran itself, without considering the content or meaning of the statements. This is not acceptable, he affirms, even though it (admittedly) is a pious action to recite the Quran, whether one understands its meaning or not (Köbert, Bayan, 8ff.; in Köbert's translation: Wenn man also bei der Überlieferung von Traditionen nur die Wiedergabe ihrer Worte vorfindet, ohne dass man einen Sinn verstehen kann. so darf man einen Mangel, an dem der Prophet unschuldig ist, nicht auf ihn zurückführen, nähmlich diesen, dass jemand Worte wiedergibt, mit denen er nichts sagen will, und dass die Leute überliefern, was sie nicht verstehen. Ebenso ist es auch, wenn die Irrlehrer wegen der dunklen Koranstelle (3. 5) die Verteidiger des Interpretierens angreifen... [philological details follow; this attitude is erroneous,]... obwohl doch die Lesung des Korans eine fromme Handlung, eine Sunna und ein Werk der Übergebühr ist, mag jemand ihren Sinne verstehen oder nicht. Die
Traditionen und Überlieferungen aber werden nur wegen ihrer Bedeutung und ihres Sinnes tradiert, nicht wegen ihrer Worte allein.

In fact, as noted by W. Wright, *the rules of Arabic orthography were fixed by the Kor'an which was originally written down in the Hig'az in the local pronunciation.* <But> this pronunciation did not ultimately prevail over the Arabic area, but the old pronunciation could not easily be tampered with, having the character of a sacred tradition, the result being that the quranic language does not completely correspond to the Classical Arabic (Wright, *A grammar of the Arabic language*, pp. 72ff., note).

Thus the Word in writing or inscription is the nearest one can come to any notion of visual representation of Allah ("representation" for the time being taken in its plain and general dictionary sense). The writing is sacred in itself, regardless of one's understanding it or not: thus medium and communicated content are separable entities. Ahmad ibn Hanbal (died 855) asked Allah in a dream: *Lord, how have those who have drawn near to you* [cf. Q 96:19, quoted above] *achieved their nearness?* Allah replied: *'By my speech...'* I enquired: *'Lord, by understanding your speech or without understanding it?* God replied: *'By understanding as well as without understanding'* (Quoted by Al-Ghazâlî, *'ihîyâ cîlûm al-dîn = Revival of the religion*, from now: *Ihiya*, Vol. I, pp. 272 - 288: on Quran recitation, p. 274; see also Quasem, *The recitation*, pp. 25ff.; the key terms: bi-kalâmî: by my word - bi-fahm, bi-ghayr fahm: with/without understanding. See however Bukâri, below). These conceptions of the quranic text form the background for the attribution of healing powers to quranic quotations, as they were used on paper shirts for the patients or on cups for them to drink water from, as in the Nur al-Din hospital at Damascus (âAlî al-Qayam, *mathaf al-tibb*).

Al-Ghazâlî himself, a moderate Sufî who kept close to Sunni tradition on fundamentals, affirmed as follows: *we say that reading from a written Quran [a mushaf] is better <than reciting from memory>, for <in the former case>, to the action of reading are added looking at the mushaf, thinking about it, and carrying it; so the reward of Quran reading will increase because of the addition of these. It is said that reading the Quran once from the mushaf is equal <in value> to reading it in its entirety seven times from memory [a quite ordinary capability among schooled Muslims], because looking at a mushaf is also an act of devotion to God* (translation Quasem, *The recitation*, pp. 52f. *Ihiya*, p. 279: wa qad qîl al-katma fi-l-mushaf bi sabî li-anna al-nazr fi-l-mushaf 'aydân fâbâda).

Indeed, Ghazâlî a fixé pour des siècles l'orthodoxie musulmane. Réfusant les sciences qui prennent leur indépendance par rapport au dogme musulman, il a voulu accueillir toutes leurs vérités susceptibles d'enrichir l'orthodoxie (Caspar, *Traité*, Vol. 1, p. 200); and *L'ortodossoia andava ad ogni*
costo salvaguardata. Egli quindi da un lato consigliò le pratiche del sufismo che potevano rinovigire l'Islam, dall'altra infeurope un grave colpo alla filosofia e alla eterodossia (Vecchia Vagliani e Gherardini, Al-Ghazali, p. 8.; e Abrahamov, *Al-Ghazâlî's supreme way*, 167: *Al-Ghazâlî's supreme way to know God is not Sufic, although he gives the impression that it is so. It is a philosophical system which sometimes appears in Sufic disguise*).

We have just heard Ibn Furak affirm that reading the Quran is an act of piety even if one doesn't understand its the significance. The recital of the Quranic text is also commendable because the sounds have become *like* the body and dwelling-place for divine wisdom, and divine wisdom has become *like* the soul and spirit for the sounds ... so the sounds of divine speech are considered noble because of the divine wisdom that exists in them (*fa kâna al-sâwt li-l-hikma jasadan wa-maskanan wa al-hikma li-l-sawt nafsan wa ruhân... fa kadalika 'asūt al-kalâm tuṣarrâf li-l-hikma allâti fi-hâ;* Quasem, *The recitation*, p. 59; *Ihiya*, p. 281).

Indeed, Allah's speech is his eternal attribute existing with his essence (trans. Quasem, *The recitation*, p. 56; *Ihiya*, p. 280): ...*kalâmihi, alladhî huwa șifa qâdîma qâ'ima bi-dhâtihi;* and the believer should contemplate Allah's kindness towards his creatures in descending from the throne of his majesty to the level of their understanding" (*fa inna al-şajam alladhî lâ yafham ma'na al-qur'ân*...).

Therefore, *reading the Quran in a slow and distinct manner is praiseworthy not merely because it assists pondering over it, since for a non-Arab who does not understand the meaning of the Quran it is also praiseworthy to read it in a slow and distinct manner with pauses between the sentences, because this is nearer to the reverence and respect and stronger in its impression on the soul than babbling with haste* (transl Quasem, *The recitation*, p. 43; *Ihiya*, p. 277).

Thus listening to the sounds of the Word exerts some good effect on the soul even in a person who does not understand the words semantically; at the same time listening is an act of reverence. It goes without saying that this translation and my summary of Al-Ghazâlî's claim in the last two sentences are grossly simplified; for a thorough historical understanding of it in the context of a study on Al-Ghazâlî, we should have to know more about the terms here translated as "reverence and respect" and "impression on the soul".

Thus our perception of the Word is effective and brings us close to Allah whether we understand it or not. On the other hand, this faculty determines a distinction between individuals: *The prophet ... said: 'The best of you is one who has learnt the Quran and has taught it'* (Bukhari, *al-ṣâhîh*, Kitâb 69, Bâb...
21, Vol. IV, p. 1919: kayrukum man ta'allama al-qur'âna wa 'allamuhu), to cite just one among numerous Traditions (ahâdîths) of the same tenet. The context here is prophetic tradition considered valid and mandatory for society at large; whereas the context we are concerned with when reading Al-Ghazâlî is a particular philosophical-religious theory. Certainly, a person who knows the Quran by heart, that is, as the current expression goes: who is a "preserver" of the holy text (a hâfiz), has always been accorded a special status in Islamic society, and this has usually been one of criteria for the election or appointment of an imâm. It is important, then, to distinguish between, on the one hand, the potential religious effectiveness of the Quranic text in bridging or at least narrowing the gap between man and God, and on the other, the religio-social classification arising from differing conversance with these texts.

3.5. Terms of approach

Some of the texts cited above, such as the Throne and Light verses, might give rise to the idea that there is an anthropomorphic (human-like) element in the approach to Allah and celestial things. In fact, Muslim theologians were aware of this and took great care to make orthodox sense of it: God is spirit and cannot be described in human terms. Since we are going to be concerned with inscriptions as representations of Allah, this is an important issue. We also note that there can be no man-made images of Allah in any anthropomorphic sense of the term, as there is no idea of an incarnation involved, while human vision cannot comprehend him (only in an eschatological context, as a sort of visio beatifica. According to Nagel, however, the general prohibition of living images is post-quranic (Nagel, Die religions-geschichtlichen Wurzeln des sogenannten Bilderverbot im Islam, pp. 93ff.). In Islam as in the Hebrew religion there can be no pictorial representations of God in any anthropomorphic or human-like way: no attempts at introducing human features into visual media in order to convey the idea of Allah are allowed. God never became man as God did in the Christian religion, so there is no divine Man to depict as the Christians could do, nor is there any prophetic vision of God like Daniel's vision of the Antiquus dierum (the Ancient of days), which justified depiction of God as an old man in post-medieval Christian art. Allah cannot be conceived of or perceived in any visual terms except through his Word and through those terms that denote his creation: Vision comprehends him not, and he comprehends <all> vision (Q 6:104; là tudrikhu al-'âbsâr).

In fact, a hadîth or Tradition cited by Al-Ghazâlî in his 'Ihyâ (Revival) reports that the Prophet blamed someone for gazing up at heaven during prayer: Let them stop raising their eyes toward heaven during invocation, otherwise they lose their sight! (Cuperly, Temps et prières, p. 53; 'Ihyâ', Vol. IV, p.
Rule No. 3, concerning direction toward the qibla: lâ yarfu c u ba s ruhu ilâ al-samâ’. The verb baṣura/baṣira is quranic and means to look, to see and to comprehend, understand, grasp.

This does not mean that the Qur'an is not packed with expressions for God that could easily be taken in a human-like sense; and so a great debate over this went on throughout the Middle Ages.

Normal human vision cannot comprehend Allah nor can human intelligence comprehend his totality. He manifests himself before mankind through his Word and through his Creation, which, all of it and distinct parts of it (the elements, nature, animals, rain, thunder, the sun, and so on), the Quran calls constantly and with great poetic power to witness for Allah's oneness, unity, perfection, might, majesty, justice, goodness and mercy. A prose translation of a part of Chapter 67 (Tabarak) of the Quran will convey the flavor of this: He who created the seven heavens, one above the other; no want of proportion [perfection] will you see in Creation; so reconsider it [literally: turn up you eyes]: do you find any flaw?

He is nowhere locally present in the sense of sacramental presence as is God in the Christian context, but he is closer to man than man's jugular vein (Q 50:16). In several Sayings [ahâdîth] there is a pronounced stress upon the bond of love (mahabbah) between man and God and the nearness (qurb) of God to man (Graham; Divine word, 98f.; pp. 130f.: God said: 'I am with my servant whenever he remembers me [dhikr] and his lips move [in mention of me]. For nearness, see also Quasem, Salvation, 39f.).

In an ancient hadîth al-qudsi, Allah is reported as saying: Nothing brings me near to me like the performance of that of which I made obligatory upon them, and through supererogatory acts my servant [i. e. man] comes even nearer to me until I love him. When I have bestowed my love on him, I become <as if it were> his hearing with which he hears, his sight, with which he sees, his tongue with which he speaks, his hand with which he grasps, and his feet with which he walks (Quasem, Salvation of the soul, p. 39. For the hadîth al-qudsi as type, see Graham, Divine word).

So far we have had some straight readings from the Qur'an - and we have noted how humanlike attributes are applied to Allah; this caused problems for Moslem exegetes. It does seem natural to imagine that in Islam as well as in the Roman world, all such hints, or terms that could be so interpreted by unschooled people, would have supported hopes for or feelings of a direct approach to someone, namely Allah. He, after all, might be approachable in some ways similar to the ways we are used to among ourselves. And in Islam, there is no consecrated priesthood acting as intermediate; on principle, the way from individual to God is straight and direct - but the theologicans discussed the
problematic passages with a view to rejecting any notion of anthropomorphism with regard to Allah.

Recalling that my brief survey of my sources at the beginning of the present chapter was accompanied by the proviso that selection was guided by analytical and not historical guidelines, I shall now present three Sunni writers as representatives of interest and preoccupation with three subjects respectively: Al-Jurjâni (died 1078 or 1081 A. D.) on meaning, reference and terminology; Al-Ghazâli (died 1111 A. D.) on general terms of approaching and conceiving Allah; and Al-Qâsim ibn Ibrâhîm (died 860 A. D.) on the problem of anthropomorphism concerning God.

For Al-Jurjâni I rely on a recent publication by Margaret Larkin (1995) on his theology of meaning and theory of discourse (Larkin, *The theology of meaning*). Al-Jurjâni adhered to the Ashârî school. Unlike the Mu'tazilis who viewed the Qur'ân as created of the same speech as that employed by human beings, the Ashcaris distinguished between the internal speech or word of God and its external expression in sounds and letters. The former, referred to as kalâm nafsî or internal speech, eternal and uncreated, exists as an attribute in the divine Essence. The outward linguistic expression (kalâm lafzhî) of that inner speech is what we experience in the words and sounds of the *<quranic>* Text (Larkin; *The theology of meaning*, p. 9; for the following references, see pp. 9ff.). A point of debate was whether meaning or content (ma'ânî) or the wording (lafz) was the most important in discourse, especially in poetry. A third parameter of evaluation is (literary) composition (nâzm), and hence grammar (Larkin, *The theology of meaning*, pp. 53ff.: *To explain the excellence of a text, one must... look to the characteristics (âhkâm) that come of composition and construction... <a> key notion of connection; and the superiority of the Qur'ân derives, at least in part, from its inimitable composition.* I have underlined the adjective here, because his (and others') conceptions of the cited terms converge upon the issue of the inimitability of the Quran, *îjâz al-qur'ân*. It is important, because the quranic text could never be viewed as pure literature (excellent observations on classical Arabic literary criticism in Larkin, *The theology of meaning*, pp. 6ff.), to note that Al-Jurjâni cannot appropriately be viewed strictly as a literary critic, whose ideas derive from and apply solely to the world of letters. Indeed, any attempt to do justice to his work demands that we recognize and evaluate the theologian in him directing his rhetorical views (Larkin, *The theology of meaning*, p. 13.). It is necessary to study language generally to see how it is being used inimitably in the quranic text: *the Qur'ân was so superior linguistically that they [people] were unable (*îjazâ*) to approach its excellence.*
A keystone to Al-Jurjâni's theory is his distinction between inner speech and wording: *It is this notion of kalâm nafsî [speech of the soul], so central to the Ashârî view of the Qur'ân, that furnishes the linchpin in al-Jurjâni's whole rhetorical edifice* (Larkin, *The theology of meaning*, p. 58.). Crucial to composition and the use of grammar is the distinction between composition in terms of arranging things in order, in a string, for instance, and composition in which the arrangement of the elements of discourse is consciously considered and choices among the features of syntax are deliberately made (Larkin, *The theology of meaning*, p. 22). His theory of meaning (*maqṣûd*) is further based on a distinction between meaning as a lexical item and meaning concerning the intended object (*maqṣûd*): taking his point of departure in linguistic usage (readers of Wittgenstein will feel at home with much of what Al-Jurjâni is saying). He notes that much discourse and use of terms refer to image established in his mind (...) (Larkin, *The theology of meaning*, p. 66).

Related to such images is the linguistic use of metaphors, and the problem of the metaphor (*majâz*) was more than a literary concern: *At the heart of the matter ... was the issue of how the text of the Qur'ân was to be interpreted ... The basis on which the receiver of the discourse reasons is knowledge of the circumstances or situation that forms the larger context of the discourse ... in his treatment of majâz, al-Jurjâni undertook not only to construct an overall theory of majâz that accounted for the exigencies of theology, but also to elucidate the cognitive mechanisms underlying the individual rhetorical devices* (Larkin, *Theology of meaning*, pp. 73 - 75).

The term is applied to linguistic metaphors, carefully defined. There are religious motivations for stressing this. He presents a more restricted account of metaphor than other schools, who think either in purely literal terms or in terms of a fusion between the metaphor and reality, and he is concerned with doing so, since the Quran abounds in metaphors and it is inconceivable that <God> would confuse reality in this manner (Larkin, *Theology of meaning*, pp. 168f.; one is reminded of Descartes’ claim that God would never fool us).

The parables (*mathl, amthâl*) of the Quran are mostly visualizable illustrations. Larkin concludes her book by noting, among other things, that *Al-Jurjâni's understanding of the Qur'ân as the expression of God's kalâm nafsî [*"inner" speech] resulted at once in elevating this text on an emotional level and placing certain limitations on the kind of criticism to which it could be subjected. The faithful Muslim could experience the text as a more personal statement from God, in which the wording was God's deliberate choice intended to express His truths in the best possible way to his servants. The sense of God's per-
sonal presence was heightened by the notion that the text was the claiming... or putting forth by the speaker of the knowledge/truths/belief/representations he held and wished to express (my emphasis; Larkin, *The theology of meaning*, p. 169). The case of Al-Jurjânî attests to the preoccupation, at the highest intellectual level, with the verbal status of the quranic text as related to its inimitability and, and for him and the majority, also to its uncreatedness.

With *Al-Ghazâlî* we find ourselves at a broader conceptual level where the writer is concerned with a whole specter of alleged realities in the approach toward God (Veccia Vaglieri, *Al-Ghazali, Introduction*, who relies on a study of his philosophy by Farid Jabre (1958. I am generally following her and Deladrière, *Ghazâlî*, in the present paragraph, except for a couple of references to Cuperly's anthology *Temps et prières*).

He uses parables, metaphors, anecdotes and images abundantly to render his discourse more digestible (Veccia Vaglieri, *Al-Ghazali*, p. 10), for it is his concern that the argumentation should reach "everyone". It is characteristic that he generally keeps within the bounds of the science of religious practice accessible to everybody (*mučâmala*), hardly ever breaking through the boundaries of the science of the revealed things (lit., the hidden things: *mukâshafa*), which can be grasped only by an élite (Veccia Vaglieri, *Al-Ghazali*, p. 17). He recommends simplicity and accessibility and wants this applied to ritual practice. One of the ten rules in the fourth volume of his *Iḥyâ* or Revival, is concerned with absence of affection in the prayers (Cuperly, *Temps et prières*, p. 55; Al-Ghazâlî, *Iḥyâ ʾulûm al-dîn*, IV, pp. 305f.). And he brings in an example of how a simple and sober language (instead of a rhetorical and abundant one) may be more to the point. God has taught us to use no more than seven words in an invocation to him.

*Al-Ghazâlî* distinguishes between doctrine and practice. Religious truth is defined as everything transmitted by the prophets, and the fundamental doctrines concern the Unity of Allah, the conviction that there is reward for obedience and punishment for deviation. A third basic point he makes is the intrinsic knowledge of the presence of God (cf. the following formulation from the *Iḥyâ* as translated by Cuperly, *Temps et prières*, p. 105: Sache que ceux qui voient les choses à la lumière de la vision intérieure savent pertinemment qu'il n'y a pas d'autre salut que dans la rencontre de Dieu...). His method of exposé is, apart from plain logical reasoning (usually in simple terms), extensive use of interpretation (*taʿwil*) - more so than in traditional theology, in which pure verbal-logical treatment of dogmas predominated. For to him, there was no contrast between how things appear to our senses and the hidden meanings of
things, accessible through inspection, for the latter is complementary to the former and its perfection (Vecchia Vaglieri, Al Ghazali, p. 19: *Non v'ha opposizione... fra senso apparente e senso nascosto, perché questo è il complemento di quello, ne è la perfezione.* See also Deladrière, Al Ghazali, pp. 16f.; however: *Le sens intérieur n'est admissible que si existe entre le sens littéral et lui une correspondance symbolique naturelle ou indiquée par la Tradition*). In fact, following the eminently "pedagogical" ways he indicates for approaching the truths, we are facing two reigns. For our heart has two doors, one open upon the kingdom of humans (the "real", visual and sensible world), the *mulk* and the kingdom of God, the *malakût* (a term of the same root as the former), where the eternal Text is preserved (the Quran). Our heart is informed by an internal light that opens the way of approach, almost an ascension, to the heavenly reign, which is reflected in it in all its intensity of light (Deladrière, Al Ghazali, p. 24, translates from Al-Ghazâlî’s *Al-munqidh: *... *la prophétie désigne une 'phase' où l’homme acquiert un oeil doté d’une lumière spéciale, et c'est dans cette lumière qu’apparaissent le monde caché ainsi que des choses que la raison n’atteint pas*). For this introspection to be effective, however, it takes full information in the dogmas and practices of the religion. On your way to the mosque (to pray), you should say: *My God, set a light in my heart, set a light on my tongue, set a light in my hearing, set a light in my sight, set a light behind me, set a light before me, set a light over me. My God, give me a light* (Cuperly, *Temps et prières*, p. 82; 'Ihyâ’, Vol. IV, p 323. The noun for light here is *nûr*).

The idea of light showing the right path is constantly evoked in his writings: the Quran is springtime of my heart, light of my heart. Often we also learn about the light of God's face (so also in Ibn Masûd, *Tafsîr* [comment and elucidation of the Quran] (which has not been available to me), cited by Ibn Taymiyya [died 1328], *Tafsîr surat al-nûr* [comm. and elucidation on the Light verse], Aleppo 1977, p. 193: *Inna rabbukum laysa ‘indahû layl wa lâ nahâr nûr al-samawât min nûri wajîh*: there is no night or day in God<’s essence>, and the heavens have their light from the light of his face).

In his *Mishkât al-anwâr* - *Niches of light*, his comment upon the Light verse, Al-Ghazâlî distinguishes, in consonance with what has just been noted, between various accepted meanings of the term *light*. In fact, he uses the Verse to make just these points, defining exterior and interior vision and the terminology and symbolism applied to the distinction between them. The five images in the verse of niche or tabernacle, glass, lamp, tree and olive oil correspond to five cognitive faculties in humans, the sensible faculty, the imagina-

Know that all these faculties are lights! The oil stands for prophetic faculty of insight. Indeed, this faculty enables the prophets "almost" to do without the assistance of angels. The subject is always the way toward, the approach, the "almost": *ce 'presque' marque toute la différence entre la spiritualité et la simple introspection* (Deladrière). In the heavenly kingdom (the *malakût*) there are luminary substances named angels (Al-Ghazali, *Mishkât*, p. 154).

God is manifest - his "quiddity" (*mâhiyya*) visible through his light and through his actions (Deladrière, *Le tabernacle*, p. 67; Al-Ghazali, *Mishkât*, p. 155. The reference is to Moses and Pharao)

And Al Ghazâlî goes on: *Let us raise up to the Lord's Presence (hadrat al-rubûbiyya, from rabb, lord)! In this presence there is something with which our understanding sets its marks on the substances available for receiving it (our understanding); and its symbol is the pen (*qalam*). Among these substances one takes primary position: the quranic tablets, parchment, etc. This gives the form or image of Divine Presence (a rather crude summary of Deladrière's subtle but not easy translation, pp. 69ff., from an equally difficult passage, p. 158, in the *Mishkât*. "Form" here is *sûrat*). The essential point seems to be that the quranic text is a manifestation of God's presence.

We have seen that not only the Quran, by a straight reading (e. g. Q 20:5 *The All-compassionate sat Himself upon the throne*, Arberry's translation cited by Abrahamov, *Anthropomorphism*, p. 5); but also various theologians seem to imply some kind of reachable presence of God and use very concrete and "worldly" images to capture this. We have noted a corresponding situation in the Roman Church and the consequent popular understanding in terms of a human-like or anthropomorphic presence. Muslim theologians of course also noted this, were indeed preoccupied by the possibility of a too human conception of Allah. One among them, Al-Qâsim ibn Ibrâhîm (died 860 A. D.), dealt at length with the issue (Abrahamov, *Anthropomorphism*).

I shall not go into this very detailed prescription of various methods to avoid unorthodox notions here, but only note that the problem did exist and that, if the highly educated might have access to and understand the argumentation laid down by this and other theologians, the attitudes of ordinary people would hardly be affected by it.

I think the essential insight into the issue of God's presence in all the available writings is that, from the view point of mankind under earthly conditions, it is a question of never reaching but always *approaching*, of moving along one.
of the ways or paths toward a manifestation of the presence. So we should probably also understand the manifestation in the quranic text itself.

3.6. The writing on the wall

The notion of *contemplation* may be taken as a cue to the general issue of usage in the traditional mosque. Some of the inscribed texts refer directly to prayer, while it is obvious that the prayer ritual is the climax of mosque activities, so that this is the moment when any Quranic quotes attain their maximum relevance. But the mosque also, partly because of straightened housing conditions among the people, served as a general parlor, a meeting place between family members, as a place for doing one's school lessons, meeting one's lawyer, and so on, and also, indeed, for elders to do their Quranic recitations. Thus many daily activities took place in front of the inscriptions; as they still do today.

Having introduced some basic aspects concerning the prayer service in Islamic mosques and the use of inscriptions in them, we shall now return to the problem of understanding, in the analytic context of the present study, inscriptions used on the *gibla* wall, or especially in the *mihrâb* niche of it. In the foregoing section we have seen how the quranic text could be subjected to linguistic arguments aimed at interpreting the dogma of its inimitability (Al-Jurjânî). Now it must be noted that, quite apart from such sophisticated discourses, it does not take much intellectual acumen to make sense, along ordinary lines of conceptual appreciation, of most quranic quotations. So that, to the extent that the calligraphy did not resist penetration, most people would get approximately the essential out of any inscription.

Added to that comes the typically *paratactic* structure in Arabic prose (and Semitic languages generally; noted by Veccia Vaglieri in her excellent introduction to Al-Ghazâlî, *La nicchia delle luci*, pp. 9f.: *Quante volte non ci è avvenuto di scoprire attraverso una nostra prima traduzione che doveva esserci un collegamento sintattico tra frasi anche distanti l'una dall'altra...*). One thing follows the other on a string without the Indoeuropean (or Turkish!) complexities of hypotactic or "hierarchical" text structures, with main clauses, subordinate clauses etc. This seems to mean at least two things. First, it makes for easier reading of any quoted piece of writing, even when taken out of context; and the "editors" of architectural inscriptions did not have problems of choice here, and did not have to resort to synoptic or "summarizing" inscriptions like the Latins (for this classification of inscriptions, see Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 75ff.). Secondly, since the linguistic context of any singled-out expression gets lost (except to those who have stored the texts in their heads), any quotation of relatively limited length will appear out of context. This makes the reading still easier but not necessarily more correct. Thus there is an unpredictable flexibility to people's reading and conceptualizing of many a quranic inscription, as is also the case with Roman imagery. In spite of the extreme
sophistication of Arabic linguistic and philosophical argumentation, to say nothing of the poetry (with its sixteen metres), many writers, among them Al-Ghazālī, apparently saw the importance of what today we would call the user interface.

We shall look anew at the inscription of the Throne verse as we find it on the qibla wall, or even around or inside the mihrāb niche in it; and evaluate it in comparison to two other similarly placed inscriptions. I am choosing inscriptions with the following motivations.

The Throne verse (Q 2:255) offers points of conceptual divergences and parallels to the image or "depiction" of Christ enthroned. It refers beyond the local space up to God in Heaven (Qala'wun's tomb in Cairo; mihrāb in the mosque formerly at Ürgüp, Anatolia; today in the Ankara Museum).

By contrast, the Mihrāb inscription (Q 3:37; mihrāb in the Muradiye mosque in Edime, Turkey; eastern mihrāb in the Ummayad mosque in Damascus; Sokollu Mehmet Pasha in Istanbul) does refer to the local site, the sanctuary of the mosque itself, in which the niche in the qibla wall from early times took on the name of a mihrāb: Whenever Zachariah went into the sanctuary [mihrāb] where she was, he found that she had food [rizq]; the meaning being, roughly, that praying in the sanctuary of God, man will find nourishment. Food and nourishment are common symbols for the provisions and gifts that Allah grants to everybody who submits to him (the term rizq, provision, nourishment, is quranic, and one of Allah's names is that of the "Provider": ar-Rizâq) - a conceptual parallel to the nourishment of the sacraments in the Roman Church, but of course not a religious equivalent, since Islam does not have sacraments. According to Q 3:38: he stood praying in the mihrāb; 19:11: Z. exited from the mihrāb (after having communicated with Allah): texts frequently used in mihrab inscriptive decorations. So the niche presents itself primarily as a sanctuary, or part of one.

For comparison let us choose yet another inscription, this time not referring, at least not directly, to Heaven or to the sanctuary, but to the congregation, somewhat like Christ addressing the congregation by looking in their direction and raising his right hand in benediction or blessing: Allah's wish is but to remove uncleanness far from you, O Folk of the Household [of God: meaning the believers submitting to him], and cleanse you with a thorough cleaning (Q 33:33; Tomb of Sayida Ruqayya, Cairo). The Nourishment inscription may be classified along with numerous others stating God's appeal or warning to mankind.

The Light verse discussed above, apparently was not usually placed on the qibla wall (and never, it seems, in or near the mihrāb niche). The verse is to found, however, in other positions, such as at the entrance to the madrasa or school at the mosque of Sultan Hassan at Cairo. The avoidance
of the focal position in the prayer room was probably motivated by the consideration that in an inscription in such a position it might be taken to entail an unacceptably physical interpretation of the light and niche symbol of Allah and a "reification" of it in terms of the architectural mihrâb niche (when the Light verse is very common on medieval and later mosque glass lamps, the reference would be to the light, for which God is certainly the source, rather than to a niche).

But there must have been a conceptual connexion nonetheless since there were oil-lit glass lamps hanging right in front of the wall and the niche - as we see, for instance, on Al-Harîrî's miniature "snapshot" of 1237, with the male congregation in front of the mimbar with the imâm reciting his khutba (for the Al-Harîrî illuminations in th Baghdad Museum, still there?, see Grabar, The illustrated Maqâmât).

The notion of light is fundamental.

Now let us evaluate the three Quranic inscriptions in the focal (mihrâb area) position - the Throne, the Mihrâb or Nourishment and the Cleansing (thus labelled for short) - and discussed in the foregoing chapter from the point of view of visual media, in terms of the conceptual networks to which they seem to belong. This discussion will then be used for comparisons. (Part IV, Chapter 9).

We have noted already that the most important quranic inscriptions are usually concentrated in and around the mihrâb niche in the qibla wall. This system makes up a striking and commonly shared visual focus that leads conceptually on toward Mekka and, ultimately, toward Allah.

We have seen that, according to a writer like Al-Ghazâli, who belonged to the major tradition which saw the Quran as an uncreated eternally existing text, the very written words from the Quran were media for a manifestation of Allah. The texts are manifestations of Allah in a more specific sense than his Creation; some of Allah's glory and might emanate from them.

But we have also recorded the distinction, postulated by al-Jurjânî and others, between Allah's inner speech and its external expression, as well as between the statements in the Quran and its text composition; furthermore also the theological discussion about metaphors, much like theological concern in the Roman Church. On the whole, the distance between probable popular ideas concerning realities behind the inscriptions and expert handling of the issue in Islamic theology and philosophy seems to correspond roughly to what is known from the Roman context (for the latter, see Sinding-Larsen, Some observations, pp. 208 – 212).
Now let us look more closely into the context for each of the three selected inscriptions, the Throne, the Mihrāb or Nourishment and the Cleansing (thus labelled for short).

The Throne verse (Q 2:255) must have called forth, depending on a person's education and religious imagination, a number of hadiths and famous writings glossing this and other Quranic uses of the terms for throne and chair: kursi and ʿarsh. Here God's glory and might is the predominating idea, as we would have expected on account of political experience. Imagination, beside the senses, is appealed to in the Quran and in religious writings. Al-Muhāshibī's kitāb al-tawahhum may be cataloged as The book on the use of one's imagination, for the great majority of the paragraphs in the lengthy text start with the summon to activize it: tawah-hum!, imagine!. The reader, after having "imagined", with the author's rather insistent tutorship, the grisly details of Hell and the male-consumer delicacies of Paradise, ends up with facing the Throne: .. and look, here they approach the Lord's Throne, and they see with their eyes his veils and his light... (Q 198; a controversial issue was whether the saved in Paradise would see God or not. Also the Roman Church had their controversies concerning the visio beatifica; starting in 1331 under Pope John XXII). Imagine! Their [the saved's] assembly in beauty, dignity and grace - the illumination of their faces from the East [the sunrise], how they are illuminated by the light of the Throne of his [God's] glory and greatness, and his veils illuminated from the East (Q 204) (Roman, Une vision humaine des fins dernières, pp. 72f. (French transl.), Arabic Nos. 198 and 204. M. uses the word ʿarsh here).

But as we shall presently see, a conjuring up the vision of God's Throne would also have found conceptual on-site support in the mosque in terms of the chair of the mimbar next to the mihrāb. The words conveying the notion are couched in terms by which members of the congregation can conjure up a mental visualization which, in many cases would be referentially concretized by visual and also often literary memory of real-life things (chairs, thrones, etc.). Here, as in comparable Roman cases, complex patterns of directed attention would ensue.

The most obvious visual support would be found in the mosque itself, in the mimbar (or minbar, plural: manābir) throne or chair (on top of a stair, placed next to the mihrāb). This linkage is important because the sermons or kutbas recited from that chair always contained Quranic and other religious quotations. The mimbar was the subject of hadith sayings; in a famous one belonging to the important category of hadith qudsi (direct quote of what God himself had said, usually to the Prophet), the mimbar is connected through the
concept of light to that of Allah's throne: Those who love one another in God shall be upon platforms of light [manâbir min nûr] in the shadow of the Throne (fi zill al-GRESS: ('arsh being roughly synonymous with kursi when the latter means "throne") on a day in which there will be no shade except his [God's] shade (Graham, Divine word, pp. 144f., with comments. The intended context is probably Paradise. For the Throne above the seventh heaven, see Graham, p. 155.). That is to say, there will be all light, only God's protective shade; probably a parallel to the protective shade in Solomon’s Canticle. In the hadîth qudsi category of traditions, there are frequent references to God's throne, such as: The Apostle of God [Muhammad] said: 'When God finished the creation, he wrote in his Book [kitâb], which is there with him, above the throne [fawq al-GRESS: ]: 'Verily, my mercy overcomes my wrath' (Graham, Divine word, p. 184).

According to Al-Ghazâli, here following a traditional trend, the idea of light is to accompany the believer on his way to the prayer, for then he is to pray for the enlightening of all his senses - again, as we have noted earlier, the appeal to our senses: ... for when he leaves <his home> to go to the mosque, he says 'Put into my heart a light, ( ajc al fî qalbî nûran, etc.) put on my tongue a light, put in my hearing a light, put in my sight a light, set a light behind me, a light before me, a light above me. My God, give me a light'.(Al-Ghazali, Ahîyâ cGRSC5 ulûm al-dîn, p. 323; in Arabic; French translation in Cuperly, Temps et prières, p. 82. Cuperly’s book is a translated anthology of scattered pieces from the last two chapters of the first volume of Al-Ghazali's Revival of religious learning; unfortunately the editor has omitted references to the original).

As mentioned earlier, the senses are appealed to constantly, especially sight. (for example: Graham, Divine word, p. 180, sight of Paradise would strengthen striving for it and sight of fire would strengthen fear of it. For hearing, p. 185, hearing and sight, pp. 117f., 133).

In the Throne inscription there is thus a double focus on God: on his manifestation locally by virtue of its Quranic text status, and on his glory and might on account of the throne symbol. This connection between the local site and transcendent divinity must have been enhanced by an effective symbol on the local site itself: the mimbar "throne" with its celestial and luminous symbolism or, at least, reference. What such light -> lamp and throne -> mimbar references would seem to amount to, is a sanctification of the ritual space by associative - not sacramental - means. Since both lamps and mimbar come rather late, the reference system is certainly not stipulated in the Quran but comes as a possible by-product; which may not have made it less effective.
Now it is not the inscription all by itself that sets forth these notions; it is also ritual practice and Quranic exegesis.

The *Throne verse* and the situation surrounding it in the notional mosque and the Roman situation, with Christ enthroned or in one of the *Presence* iconographies, present some important common features but also notable differences. Roman liturgical images focused on *divinity* function potentially in a similar manner to the Throne verse. For the images of Christ of his Presence, Enthronement (as in the Pala d'Oro in San Marco) or Crucifixion, through their subjects being evoked in the liturgy, will all be understood as focusing on glorified divinity, while at the same time these images associate with the local site: especially the altar, as a place of Divine Presence, sacrifice and a reflection of the heavenly altar. The actual altar in front of us, we know, is an image of the one in heaven. In the Roman church the rites are sacramental, lending a sacramental color to the space itself; while in the Islamic mosque the common prayer takes place in front of manifestations of Allah, in the Quranic inscriptions, and the prayer and reciting of the Quran occur on divine injunction and leadership. In the Roman case, the situation as a whole, by being ritual under a sacramental disposition, is a manifestation of *God's presence and action*. The idea of divine action on the site is not so clearly stated in the Islamic case, if at all (the implications here are not always completely evident). But then we should recall the Islamic insistence on using one’s imagination and sense perception.

Thus, apart from what regards the canonical aspects and the explicitness of a notion of local action, the remaining principal differences between the two contexts seem to concern the finer nuances (which may indeed turn out to be important and should be explored) in God's/Allah's local manifestation of his essence at the local site. Of course, it is hard, if not impossible – except in highly abstracted model terms – to assess differences and nuances in the mental and psychological effects.

Rereading the *Mihrâb* or *Nourishment* inscription, *Whenever Zachariah went into the sanctuary [mihrâb] where she was, he found that she had food*, we note again that *food* here covers all gifts from God, material and spiritual. The words are a manifestation of God, and they, as very many other Quranic texts, tell a story (however short); a story about historical persons, and a story with a moral: pray in the mosque or in any condition of sincerity that will create a sanctuary state of spirit, and by praying sincerely, you will benefit. For prayers completely performed and from sincere will and as a voluntary action on the part of the believer (and not merely out of duty):  
*tatawwu‘* (see Graham, *Divine word*, p. 197), *hadîth* with commentary: the accent is upon the sincere intention, which can make up any flaws in the performance of the prayer ritual.
When this text is quoted in an inscription on the mihrāb itself (as it very often is), then, besides being a local divine manifestation, it refers directly to the sanctuary it is embellishing, while referring somehow transcendentally to an interaction between historical persons and God. We needn't bother about the purport of this transcendentality, however. For the story is being transposed "down" to the local physical site because the inscription is placed on a site with the same traditional name - mihrāb - as the place in which the reported event originally took place. This is something different from a story printed on paper, in which case the paper is not identified with the site of the event. At the same time the inscription message is addressed to the reader/prayer in front of the mihrāb, advising him to pray sincerely and thus receive benefits.

The Nourishment inscription (to use this shorter title), again a text manifestation of Allah, defines the very site in which we find it as a sanctuary, one in which we may, by extension, obtain divinely granted nourishment, spiritual and material. This sanctuary is not sacramentally marked off, but it is sanctified by the rites ordained by Allah. The crucial difference in the Roman context consists in the notion of Christ's Real Presence in the celebration of Mass. The Presence images denote local presence in a way with which the manifestation in the Quranic inscriptions might seem to have strong affinities. In the Roman case, the image itself does not carry any weight (at least in canonical doctrine), but it functions within the field of forces created by the real presence of Christ's body and blood. The Quranic inscriptions are manifestations of Allah, but it is necessary to explore nuances in order to see the relationships of this notion to the "reality" in the Roman case. Again - to repeat a claim made all through this book - I believe this question cannot be answered once and for all, since it is open to somewhat unpredictable perceptions in different theologians and users. But the issue deserves a closer inspection than is being undertaken here.

The Cleaning inscription, we recall, reads: Allah's wish is but to remove uncleanness far from you, *O Folk of the Household* [of God: meaning the believers submitting to him], *and cleanse you with a thorough cleaning* (Q 33:33) (*folk of the Household*: *ahl al-bayt*, literally, "people/family of the house"). The context of the quote concerns prayer and submission: *Be regular in prayer, and pay the poor-due, and obey Allah and his Messenger. Allah's wish...* Again man is to benefit from his sincere prayer and submission, but this time God is addressing him directly, and the inscription facing the prayer addressing them directly. An interaction between God and his people in a universal perspective is being transposed on to the local site: the inscribed words in the mihrāb speak to those praying or contemplating in front of it.

In the next chapter, we shall draw some provisionary conclusions concerning the Quranic inscriptions as compared to Roman imagery.
4. INSCRIPTION AND IMAGE

Now let us evaluate the Quranic inscriptions examined in the foregoing chapter from the point of view of visual media, in terms of the conceptual networks to which they seem to belong. This discussion will be used for comparisons with the Roman cases, as a basis for comparing the images and inscriptions.

What consequences and implications do the recorded circumstances have for the individual's appreciation of visual media, such as inscriptions? It partly depends on the character and functions ascribed to the same visual media and to the architectural space itself. This is, among other things, a question of structuring in terms of liturgy and ritualization, a subject we shall presently examine in more general terms (Part IV, Chapters 4 and 5).

The Cleaning inscription, we saw, contains an injunction to submissive prayer in a condition of cleanliness, in a spiritual as well as physical sense. Here is something that a Roman picture cannot say, except indirectly by showing an example to be followed (story from the life of some saint: for example St. Francis renouncing worldly goods or marrying Poverty). The scope of interpretation here is, however, more open than what is indicated in a written injunction. The mere presence of a Roman cult image, in its ritually conditioned state of abstraction, will call up associations with a cult situation, and this should reinforce the local ritual effects and potentials. But the picture cannot, whatever Wittgenstein says, impart instructions for the actions and behavior of the congregation, except, as I just noted, by conjuring up models for general types of attitude and state of mind.

We might seem to have arrived at a perhaps crucial distinction between showing and saying. Stating a thing in so many words should probably be different from implying the idea through an evocative example? But perhaps not, for the depicted "example" must be an example of something, and this something, including the example itself, will always (and has to) be communicated in some text (e. g. in the Breviary), either written or remembered. So, instead of having the text in front of us, we have an image bringing a text, or the gist of it, into our focus. On the other hand, especially so in liturgical contexts as rich and articulate as the Roman one, most pictures will potentially call up not one but several more or less interrelated texts.
In provisionary conclusion we might draw up four points.

1. The Quranic inscriptions display evoke subtle modes of manifestation of Allah, while in the Roman case imagery evokes divinty does this indirectly by being linked up with the notions of the Real Presence at the altar and the canonically defined transcendent presence at the heavenly altar, i.e., through intake from statements in the liturgy.

2. The difference, from terminals across a scale, between canonical and personalized notions and features, as set out above (Part II, Chapter 3.1.), may operate a distinction, since terms expressive exclusively in word (or text) seem to reduce exclude the latter parameter.

2.1 The image of Christ enthroned is developed from canonical formulas, but will normally call forth personalized features related to real-world experience, to personal, non-canonical, scenarios and configurations, so that learnt worldly conventions are projected into the notion of Divinity beyond the world. The words, Christ enthroned, in its turn, call forth the image or some corresponding visualization, with approximately the same projection.

2.2. The written name of God in Islam, Allah, a canonical code, is approached either by scanning, reading letter for letter (subject access, see Part IV, Chapter 9) or, in the case of illiterates, as a whole picture, characterized by certain an array of three tall “fence-poles” and a rounded-off termination on the left (system access). There is no explicit real-world, experiential feature here, the expression being completely canonical, which of course does not exclude real-world associations. If the word throne (of Allah) is added, this calls forth real-world relations, probably leaving the divine name purely canonical. The conclusion seems almost tautological: whenever a name or a term cannot call forth any visualizable object in the world, then it remains within a closed system of conventional or, eventually, canonical, codes.

3. While Roman liturgy guides the congregation step by step though the conceptual and focusing processes, Islamic ritual makes strong appeal to immediate individual imagination, perception and mental elaboration in a more open mental space. And yet, the distinctions are not absolute, it is a question of
accent and degree.

4. Nevertheless, in both cases, images and inscriptions call up, by rules or by potential associations, complex patterns of focusing goals and directed attention in the conceptual space, thereby blurring the distinctions between texts and images. This contingency will occupy us in Part IV, Chapters 7 and 8.

PART IV. MEDIA INTERPLAY
As a follow-up from what was just noted concerning inscriptions and images in ritual contexts (the Roman and the Islamic), we shall now take a closer look at general characteristics of rituals and, especially, liturgy. This should form a basis for further analysis of the Roman and the Islamic cases.

1. LITURGY, RITES AND RITUALIZATION
In order to analyse the subjects treated in the foregoing chapters in their functional context, I now turn to the general issue of rituals, and I shall discuss the position of Roman liturgy in this system. This is necessary because the liturgy strictly defined is not an isolated concern but branches out through communication and information into society in general in ways that have to be accounted for. There are social and political extensions based on liturgical participation that range into ritualized factors around the formalized canonical liturgy itself. This entire system forms a framework in the sense this term is used in the present book, and it includes on other ("lower"?) levels, other frameworks, such as the formal liturgy or, again, sections of it. For the purpose of discussing this issue, Model 3 will be referred to repeatedly. This is developed from so-called semantic models.

We have to be able to distinguish between canonically defined formal liturgy and paraliturgical trappings accompanying it (II, 3.1.), on the one hand, and convention-determined social rituals on the other, both to keep the idea of their common features and to keep the two clearly apart and make it possible to describe their interrelations (Carefully set out in Sinding-Larsen, Iconogra-
There are two modalities to this. One concerns the extensions through participation into social and political life; the other concerns social ritualized requirements that may insert themselves into the workings of the liturgy itself, at least in its marginal features.

Most normal processes and situations of some complexity are hard to delimit conceptually in duration, depth and extension. Normal everyday processes will almost always involve some amount of ritualized actions and behavior. For this reason, the artificial social situations created by formalized ritualization, as in a liturgy, would have enough in common with the everyday cases to serve as a point of departure for studying the latter. The social-anthropological perspective is discussed, with an accent upon the difficulty of drawing sharp distinctions, in Skorupski, *Symbol and theory*, passim and especially 69f.; 90f. on ritual "interaction code" (somewhat loosely defined levels and functions, as e. g. in a formulation like: "IC behaviour rests on a vast base in which the feelings and attitudes of interacting parties towards each other are expressed, recognised and related to at a purely natural and undesigned level" (my emphasis).

Ritualization in the verbal sense of doing something in a rule-bound, preestablished, formalized and repetitive way, captures both formal processes and conventionally regulated everyday occurrences and the variations on the scale between them. The verbal term, instead of a definition of ritual as a noun, also suits better the object-oriented perspective adopted in this contribution: that we do not ask what a thing is but what important features it consists of and what kind of handling they require or invite, and what they are used for. (Booch, *Object-oriented analysis*, p. 83: Thus, it is useful to say that an object is something that has crisply defined boundaries, but this is not enough to guide us in distinguishing one object from another, nor does it allow us to judge the quality of our abstractions. Our experience therefore suggests the following definition: An object has state, behavior, and identity; the structure and behavior of similar objects are defined in their common class; the terms Instance and Object
are interchangeable.) I do not ask what a ritual is or is not, but how it works 
(Witness Skorupski’s struggle to work out adequate definitions in his Symbol 
and theory).

. So when I speak of rituals, what I have in mind is processes of ritualization 
in an operative active sense. Indeed, even canonical liturgy is dynamic, both 
on account of its process character and, under the aspect of historical develop-
ment, especially with regard to its surrounding trappings, like, for example, the 
use of music in the Mass: note the difference between a Palestrina Mass and 
Francesco Cavalli’s Messa Concertata of ca. 1644!

In order thus to evaluate our Roman cases in its wider functional con-
text, we shall look at the main components of what I call the Programmatic 
system. For this I developed an extremely simple framework model (Model 2) 
on an earlier occasion (Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and ritual, Fig. 2, p. 162.), 
with four interrelated categories of sources for any chosen special liturgy, or, 
better, levels:
1) the Bible (for Rome, the Vulgate version of the two Testaments);
2) the literary and ritual tradition of the Church in a general sense;
3) the official statements concerning the liturgy and its interpretation specifi-
cally; and, finally,
4) the special liturgy, which may mean any specific section of it we might 
chose for our scenario, as in the case of Epiphany, or the sum total of the 
Roman liturgy (Mass, Hours etc. for times of day, times of week and times 
of year) or its emergent properties as evaluated from various specific corre-
lated frameworks, such as a social one. The alternatives under 4) depend on 
the scope of our particular research object or area; corresponding choices of 
specific material will occur under the other three headings, too. These items 
are interrelated as on the model.

It is important to note that there is no indication of direct rela-
tionship between the Bible and the Special liturgy. Scholars occasion-
ally make the leap straight from the one to the other, with inadequate 
results.
MODEL 2. The programmatic system (notion developed in SL, *Patterns*, as the Canonical System)

*Addition 2011*


The visual manifestations of the Roman Church were anchored in complex interlocked *systems* of functional patterns, text traditions and rituals, together constituting an orderly, systemic and officially sanctioned grid or structure; here labelled the *Canonical System* (survey with extensive bibliographies in SL, 1984; the cited terms not in use here). This structure consists of the following intimately interrelated factors basic for the teaching and the action of the Church: *ecclesiology, theology, Tradition (with a capital T) and liturgy (especially the Mass liturgy)*. This system, developed over the centuries, is perhaps one of the most complex, consistent and well-running virtual machines ever created by man.

What makes such systems meaningful and *functional*, is the fact that underneath their dynamics complexities such as we see them with our eyes and experience them in organizational terms, there is an orderly, coherent and officially sanctioned grid or structure, which was to a variable extent and depth accessible to and understood by all who were directly and often indirectly involved - as they were meant to. END OF QUOTE
There are still today Lutheran theologians, tied up as they are with the tradition of straight Bible reading, who will connect even Roman Catholic iconography directly with its texts, leaving the liturgy out of focus or even ignoring it entirely; this tendency has a certain influence, since Art History to a great extent is dominated by non-Catholics. This means approaching the issue by alien criteria.

For the liturgical significance of the biblical texts is a function of their being filtered also through the literary and ritual traditions and through the official statements, which in their turn interact with one another very intensely. This process was to some extent variously colored from one period or place to another. The system contains the functional and semantic cohesion among the chief features in the theological-liturgical system illustrated in the model. This consists in the dogmas and doctrines concerning Divinity and its operations with respect to the world, and the role of human nature and the salvation "mechanism", all expressed in the liturgy of the Mass and of the hours, distributed over the week and the year and backed up by centuries of theological and ecclesiological Tradition (For a liturgy-focused summary description of this, with bibliography, see Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and Ritual*, pp. 18f.).

Take as an example the notion of Divinity (I am speaking of our analytical notion of Divinity, not of Divinity). It appears, as we shall see, as the end product of the entire process and as defined in terms of the structure of this process. The sense of this is that, from the vantage point of what humans can handle conceptually (not what may be theologcally right), "divinity" is defined in terms of the entire approach process (for the factor of "approach", see below). Much also depends on the conceptual patterns that characterize the congregation or sections in it; Marcel reminds us: "Es kam doch nur auf die Gläubigen selbst an, daß der Ritus kein leeres Schauspiel würde, sondern ein mächtiges Hilfsmittel zur Stärkung des Glaubens" (Marcel, *Bach*, p. 35.).

The Programmatic system – or, if you prefer so, the Catholic system, and especially but not exclusively as this is formulated in the liturgy, determines the iconographical setup and is the source for it. Understanding of this principle would have reduced the number of art-historical attempts at making “discover-
ies” in obvious cases.

1.1. The omnipresent liturgy

Before examining the relations between the rites and imagery at closer quarter, it is necessary to clear up some misunderstandings that are almost universally attestable in Art History. One concerns the source base not only of the rites themselves but also of the iconography accompanying them. This issue has two aspects, one concerning the text base in itself, the other concerning its general cultural importance.

Studying Christian iconography, a number of authors, with Panofsky in the background, have declared that every feature in a picture has a specific definite significance, despite the fact that liturgical principles are operating with multilevel significances and simultaneous imagery. In fact, liturgy acts as a flexible framework, in the sense of the word used in this book, for the iconography. Furthermore, we have been taught that the Bible is the direct reference basis to the same iconography, despite the fact that it is the Bible interpreted through the liturgy that counts here, as can be ascertained at almost every point in the repertoire. In a recent book, entitled *Only connect*, John Sherman takes Leo Steinberg to task because a statement by the latter concerning a Deposition from the Cross does not fit the biblical story: there are angels carrying the body, but this is not so in the Bible. No, of course not, the Evangelists did not know anything about the angel of the Mass.

It is the Breviary and not the Bible that is the basis for Caravaggio's Calling of St. Mathew and his original version of St. Matthew writing the Gospel in Hebrew. Apocalyptic iconography remains meaningless if linked up only with the Bible and not with the liturgical reelaboration of biblical texts. All imagery within a liturgical setting - church, chapel etc. - was interpreted as illustrating or referring directly or indirectly to the crucial features of the liturgy itself, as set out in readings, recitations, and actions, with the sacrifice of the Canon of the Mass at the centre. * Sidewall and other spatially lateral areas usually have scenes and narratives which reflect the Missal and Breviary readings or even antiphones , etc. that were considered especially important in the
given context and period. * In an earlier contribution (Iconography and Ritual, 1984), I showed (something that every schooled Catholic would know) that the Roman Missal (or the earlier corresponding collections) and the notions and concepts traditionally attributed to its readings, recitations and actions, constitute the basic elements of any pictorial representation that could ever be accepted for a liturgical context, with thematic extensions culled from the Roman Breviary (or earlier corresponding collections). Pictures have not been so much a Bible for people who could not read but an account of the liturgy for them.

The cultural role of the large body of liturgical texts is widely underestimated. For instance, one may come across students of “Renaissance Humanism” whose subject contains religious features. They will then look out for religious features in the specifically “Humanist” texts and their historical background, say the Hypernotomachia Poliphili or some Neoplatonic exercise, without noticing the ever-present liturgical background. Year in, year out, on every Sunday and feast, great or small, the same texts were recited, directly available for people who knew Latin (and Church Latin is simple!), indirectly, through catechism education, for everyone else. This body of texts, which is richly “illustrated” with visualizable concepts, was familiar to most people, and when the “Humanists” never mention them, this means they were too much taken for granted.

The second problem is this. There has been a certain tendency in art history to interpret "theology" as the central concern and liturgy as an appendage to it. It is still quite common to regard liturgy as something apart from the rest of religious life, and liturgical references in pictures are considered special cases, if, indeed, such references are taken into account at all. In a reference to my Iconography and ritual (1984), Martin Kemp, in a recent contribution (Kemp, Introduction, p. 11) states that "the imagery in altarpieces could be closely associated with the liturgy of the Mass, as has been stressed recently" (my emphasis). I take his comment gratefully as a challenge. This close relation will always and inescapably hold, for reasons I have set out in my earlier publications. The "indispensable" reference to the Mass is an issue of refer-
ence from image to the altar. The Mass itself does not require images. Given the ritual cohesion in a consecrated room centering on a consecrated altar, reference also works in the opposite direction. It has been recently claimed that an altarpiece was not prescribed as part of the altar either by canon law or by the liturgy (Kemp, *Introduction*). This statement is correct up to a point. Chapter 2, Part II, in the present contribution is dedicated to a liturgical rite that does indeed involve an image in the formal sense: the procession to and chanting before the Virgin image. More to the point generally, however, is the fact that altar crosses were indeed prescribed and used in the liturgy since their gradual introduction through the tenth to eleventh centuries, a custom that became canonized within the liturgical rule-system (References for altar crosses in the bibliography cited in Sinding-Larsen, *Some observations*, p. 194). Also, at the same time there was an increase in the usage of signing with the cross, also likewise confirmed. There is no principle-jump from a cross to a liturgy-relevant picture, except for the fact that the latter was not generally confirmed by law.

A recent very careful study of the mosaics of Santa Prassede in Rome (Wisskirchen, *Die Mosaiken*) gives an exemplary account of all the subjects and themes in this very complex pictorial system, citing an impressive number of sources and modern studies. Almost everything stated about all the subjects and themes seems unassailable. There is however no reference to liturgy, only to the Bible (this is usual) and some patristic texts (also customary). And yet, every single theme identified by the author (and by the scholars she follows) is present in the liturgical texts and the actions they prescribe, especially those that were later to be assembled under the name of *Missale romanum*. And not only "every single theme": the system these make up, too, is depicted in the liturgy, and the cited author would have been able to reconstruct the thematic system more coherently, had she taken these functional issues into consideration.

Citing two more cases may help to elucidate the issue. Two authors have recently tried to make a mysterious case out of such a typologically completely
commonplace pictorial system as that of Giotto’s frescoes in the Arena Chapel at Padua (Anne Derbes and Mark Sandona, *Barren metal and fruitful womb*.) The entire system, they claim, *bespeaks a consistency and symmetry comparable to Dante's Divine Comedy*; why not compare with the system's true basis, the liturgy, partly the basis also of Dante's work? Commenting on the pictorial program on the arch over the entrance to the altar niche or chevet, they write: *... the most provokative of these formal [?] arrangements is the following combination of subjects: the Annunciation topping the triumphal arch... [and The pact of Judas] Why juxtapose the Pact of Judas and the Visitation in such a prominent position on either side of the chancel arch?*. The combination is hard to explain, they claim, because it is rare in late Medieval art; and since a comparable artistic case cannot be found, they go into an exercise of literary acrobatics in order to find an explanation. Why not look at the functions as a source (both texts being used in the liturgy)? The Visitation story (Luke 1:39–54) is a crucial event in the lives of the Virgin and Elizabeth and, of course, in the coming and incarnation of Christ, while the pact of the traitor Judas initiates the passion and death of Christ (Luke 22:1–3). Thus the two scenes are well-chosen parallel starting points for the narratives on the walls with Christ’s life and passion. This type of arrangement is commonplace and the specific choice of scenes not especially notable. The setup is simple and logical when seen in the context of the Catholic system. To call up similar artistic cases, if they exist, does not explain anything. It may seem tempting to disregard this system and focus on some of its more simple-looking verbal expressions, while believing one may do without further conversance with the complex notions behind them. Panofsky's dictionary-conceived Christian iconography has contributed to a tendency in our discipline to adopt the Do-it-yourself tack in such a highly specialized field as this and accept simplifications that are often functionally inadequate. Thus we may come across what I would label a "one-to-one" iconography, of which I shall cite one striking example. This is when the theological "processus" of the three persons of the Trinity (1. Father, 2. Son, 3. Holy Spirit) is understood exclusively in the literal sense and expected to be directly mirrored in a pictorial order – 1. 2. 3. Pictorial
Changes in that order will then look as a symptom of unorthodox theology. One might just as well have claimed that the *Gnadenstuhl* image does not represent the Trinity because the order of the Persons is “wrong”: God, the Holy Spirit and Christ (or vice versa). Unfortunately Trinity theology is much too complex to warrant argumentation of this kind – which on the other hand means that the notion leaves room for a great variety of visual expressions, variable in terms of the actual level that is being focused on. Catholic theology was not devised as a customized product for art historians and neither should they pretend to turn it into one.

The fact of the matter is that in the liturgy, the main points of theology and ecclesiology are expressed and lived through in a unified process of actions, readings, recitals and songs. When Sixtus V stated that the liturgy was the proof and confirmation of theology, he summarized a traditional knowledge within the Roman Church, one that explains the juxtaposition of pure philosophy and Eucharistic liturgy with the Trinity etc. in Raphael’s *School of Athens* and *Disputa del SS. Sacramento*. Thus we find classical, secular and Christian philosophy (theology) on two facing walls, the theology expressed through the practicing or acting-out of it in accordace with Tradition. Clergy and other people may have read their Bible, and other books such as a Hymnary (Beryl Smalley, *The study of the Bible*), but being a member of the Church meant being active within it, that is, participating in the liturgy. Here the Bible and the other text collections were no reading matter but the source of energy behind the crucial action, that of the participation in the Sacrament of the Mass, with the other sacraments focusing on it directly (baptism, confirmation, eucharist [Mass], penance, ordination) or recursively (marriage, last rites).

The liturgy in the strict canonical sense interacts with society in a number of ways, also across political authority through their participation in it. Thus further ritualization of this participation, often extended into very spectacular public ceremonies, reinforces the liturgical field at its outer margins. Patricia Fortini Brown, in her otherwise excellent *Venetian narrative painting,*
makes these distinctions, partly with reference to Edward Muir's likewise excellent account, in which he, however, sets apart what he labels "civic ritual", a term culled from his own Venice-focused and substantive narrative (E. Muir, *Civic ritual in Renaissance Venice*, pp. 5f. and Index). The significance of "civic ritual" is borne out by his narrative account, for what it is, but this concentrates on the big public shows while offering too little attention to the rites of the San Marco and other churches in this pattern (he also seems unaware of the Wednesday procession). On p. 59 he claims that in the Middle Ages the liturgical rites were local and provincial and that "The Roman Church offered merely a skeletal structure around which localities arranged a calendar of feasts". Thus it may look when focus is primarily on "feasts" for the Ascension, for patron saints etc. But the central core of Roman liturgy, common and essentially uniform all over the Roman world (at least after the early Middle Ages), consisted in the Mass, and the year, day and hour rhythm of rites that was certainly something much more than "skeletal". **And** these rituals brought society at large actively in both in terms of appeal and usage, to say nothing of the theology behind the system. One shouldn't let spectacularity of forms mislead one into setting "civic" off from liturgy as something "outside".

The liturgical participation of State or Commune is ubiquitous in the Roman world; a liturgical participation more or less embroidered with political symbolization, which, however, is basically religious. Here, as is evident also in relevant political theory, there is no clear boundary between the sacred and the profane. The religion, the Church and its liturgical action covers all society and is hence completely "civic". "Civic" aspects are activized from the moment when authority participates in the liturgy, which they always did. When the Venetian government are accompanied into San Marco "with Christ" on every Wednesday, this is for participation in the liturgy. All States in the Roman world were religious in theory and in liturgical practice, had religious duties and purposes and various forms and degrees of the same kind of participation. And they pretended to divine protection. The same applies to
"pseudo-Roman" cases like the English court, when, for example, the traditional *Te Deum* used at Matins was turned into a celebration of the 1743 victory at Dettingen (with music by the court composer, Händel; or, for that matter, his *Utrecht Te Deum*). The question is how far into society liturgy-based rites are manifesting themselves, not of any passage across distinctions from liturgical ceremony to public ritual (Which is the title of a recent article that seems to try set Venice apart from other States (such as the Norman): Rankin, *From liturgical ceremony to public ritual*. That the phenomenon, to be attested in all States, was "conscious" is a matter-of-course, since all States were very consciously religious in theory and liturgical practice). So there is no question of "integration", for you cannot integrate the elements of something that forms an indivisible whole.

It doesn't do analytically to try to define rituals by distinguishing between "ceremony" and "ritual" and settle for what is "religious" and "secular", or "civic" and religious, in such processes - at least not in the traditional Roman world (See Sinding-Larsen, *Christ in the council hall*, passim, on Venice; and *Plura ordinantur ad unum*, on Roger II's kingdom, and Dale, *Relics, prayer and politics in medieval Venetia*, passim, with further bibliography on the richly documented subject.). Insisting on these definitions, as well as on "civic" ritual as a particular genre, one loses track of important system characteristics and creates a distorted picture on the basis of a distinction that the contemporary authorities and public would not have recognized.

This case is one in which it is relevant to speak of interacting levels to substitute tentative definitions of boundaries or sharp delimitations between categories. As Grayling has noted in a different context, the fact that one cannot draw boundaries between two things, does not entail that there is no distinguishing between them: at each end of a stepless scale there are Church and State ( "From the fact that no boundary has been drawn between analytic and synthetic statements, Quine takes it to follow that no distinction has been drawn, ... [Grice and Strawson's contrary] arguments is twofold: it is, first, that difficul-
ties over drawing boundaries do not entail that there is no genuine distinction in the case; and secondly..." (Grayling, *An introduction to philosophical logic*, p. 53).

But the liturgy has something that is absent from the everyday rituals and their short or long reaching effects. It is that there is a sacramental action that brings about a result, a true effect. It will, provided it is performed under the canonical conditions, bring about the real presence of Christ and other correlated effects. This occurrence is not magically achieved but has been instituted by God to assist in the achievement of salvation. It is liturgy's purpose not only to effect this, but also to convey information about it, and to set before mankind the hope of salvation; slightly different from when I raise my hat to Mrs Grimani and as result or effect ensure a friendly attitude from her and, under certain preconditions, even from her husband. Rites like raising my hat are not sacramental and are, in fact, noticed only when we do not do what is expected of us.

In a provisional "laundry list" the action and process program may be outlined in the following manner (8 points). This system corresponds to the centre, RITUAL, on Model 3 (see Chapter 3). The "lateral" connection to the networks and "upwards" to conceptualization and focus object, will be discussed later, after an introduction on information perspectives.

Now to the 8 points: yyy

1) There is a repeatedly performed, structured and prescribed process involving people and eventually authority, and if liturgical, it is also public; this point can be further specified (a to h).

a) There is a process, a sequence of actions and interactions between participants (A good introduction to interaction rituals, also in everyday conditions, in Collins, *Theoretical sociology*, Chapter 6. The "formal model" of interaction ritual on p. 194 is cruder even than my models) with time-limits set by mandate, convention or interest:

b) The set of actions is goal/purpose-oriented: in addition to any specific goal(s), the performance of the action or process itself is defined in terms of value and is itself a goal:
c) The set of actions is rule-determined, by convention and/or instruc-
tions (constitutive and regulative rules):

d) The set of actions is formalized, hence creating, to some extent, an
artificial reality - hence, again, a model of an objective reality:

e) The set of actions is repetitive and hence predictable:

f) The set of actions determines time- and place-limited situation(s):

g) The set of actions involves obligation, by authority mandate or con-
vention, or motivation by interest (or two or all of these), for individual(s)/
groups/categories of people to comply with the rules, participate directly
or indirectly (watching) and to take an attitude of respect for the process itself:

h) The set of actions has symbolization as an implied or declared goal;
symbolization may also come as a byproduct of features in the actions that
are primarily evaluated for other characteristics.

2) the structure generally applicable on some specific level: it is public or
operative at some place in an official or public hierarchy.

3) the proceedings are authority-devised, managed and controlled, partly by
constitutive and regulative rules;

4) authority rests in a formally constituted organization; or in social conven-
tions felt as mandatory (society or part of it being the "organization").

5) the process is goal-directed and purpose-defined by the authority;

6) Selected actions and objects are defined as expressive of specific themes
and notions relevant to goals; authority goals in official ritual may be clear but
goal attributions on the part of various categories of participants will hardly be
amenable to specific descriptions.

7) the main themes or notions are conceptually of large scope, embracing
physical reality and "transcendental" issues;

8) and there are extensive space perspectives in the sense that local physical
and space-conceptual barriers are being penetrated.

However, there are enough potential ambiguities inherent in understand-
ing and acting upon its canonical nucleus, too. The issue about "how it works",
i. e., our picture of its function or functions, is far from simple and readily
understandable, either in the conceptual or in the technical sense. Localizing
functions is always a tricky affair (Cf. Gregory, *Mind in science*, pp. 83f.).
Verbal description of a process is equally liable to instability and uncertainty of choice. Conceptually, for the users or protagonists themselves, the overall effect of a complex ritual, such as the liturgy (its "emergent properties", for which see...), may overpower the specific intended messages of a liturgy and drive them off stage. Significances as they are accepted by the protagonists may override or transcend intended meaning. However clear the mandatory system (as set out, for liturgy, in the rubrics and other instructions), a liturgical rite involving a set of actions is a theatrical performance liable to be perceived in the light of its setting-up and of the precise character and behavior of its actors. People may note style more than content.

What is "formal" and what is less so or not at all, can be partly unclear to many, ourselves included. Information stored in the liturgical system is rich, complex and open to varied nuances in attention and interpretation that may run counter to or disregard official intentions. These factors have to be borne in mind while proceeding with the analysis-oriented simplified account which follows in the next sections.

In the situations typically facing the Ceremony Master - and ourselves - there are two distinct levels with regard, alternatively, to common and to individual goals. What the "goal" or "goals" may be, depends on the characteristics of the situation. Rituals, including liturgy, can be considered on the canonical level, on which the authorities' intentions and planning are executed in compliance with definite rules, in a system aiming at specific goals with numerous subgoals. At the same time, single individuals and groups will have their particular goals, too; and these may occasionally show up at cross purposes with the canonical goals, or the two goal-sets may simply be independent of each others. These goals may be to identify oneself as a member of the Church or of the community and hence increase one's standing within them, and also to identify (or contribute to identifying) the situation in which one is involved. In some cases, for symbolic purposes, some specific objects may be involved, such as, for instance, a cross or a candle; as well as particular items like vestments with appropriately chosen colors, and so on. This picture covers most of the current definitions of a system, for clearly situations of protagonists han-
dling their various assignments, adjustments and so forth make up a pattern of interlocking networks and processes, among these some that are often not in phase with each other, to cite from Webster. These physical and mental activities and their physical setting (the "tangible assets") are examined at some distance by the analyst (myself). Process models would seem to capture some aspects of this pattern:

A process model may be thought of as comprising a number of sequential phases, each marked by the achievement of an objective such that the objectives seem to be the goal of the processes represented by the model. The process model thus describes a system, or perhaps a meta-system, for producing a system - the goal ... The end-system, the goal of the process - may be a product, a set of procedures, a new organization, or almost anything, and is hence best considered as a system (Hitchins, *Putting systems to work*, pp. 119f.).

Let us say that, in general terms, a sequence of ritual actions involves some or all of a conventionally or authoritatively established set or pattern of the actions or processes and qualifications of these actions or processes. I can identify a core within them that has specific characteristics: the "social" everyday rites and the formal liturgy are both predictable under given circumstances, at the recurrence of which they tend to be repeated (entering church, seeing an acquaintance). Both acts follow a certain pattern: crossing myself starting from left if Roman, from right if Greek; saluting by raising or waving a hand, not a leg. At the same time a ritual process, because it is communal and predictable, always following the same pattern, will help people, to cite the British poet Stephen Spender paraphrasing T. S. Eliot, to "escape from the subjective self into a world of objective values" (Cited in Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 131f.).

. There is a system of written or unwritten rules behind each pattern. Even if I am not seriously engaged in what I am doing, what I actually do is the same as if I really were sincere about it. This becomes glaringly evident once I try to
raise a leg when saying hello to someone. Thus the act is still following a pattern that ensures some effectiveness in its message to other people, even when my mental attitude does not truly warrant this. The role of rituals in covering up insincerity is notorious.

As noted, the patterned actions have some specific goal or purpose; such as paying respect to a sacramental site (the church) or to somebody, and thereby identifying oneself as a member of the Church or of the community and hence maintaining one's standing within them, and also identifying (or contributing to identifying) the situation in which one is involved. Both kinds of action are also limited in time: they are used on specific time-limited occasions; normally I do not wave my hand to myself when shaving. The actions presuppose a respect for the acts themselves both in the performers and in people receiving their messages: the actions are taken as signs of serious intent (whether true or not). This means that the end product of such an action is that of conveying a symbolic message, communicating information.

1.2. An information perspective.
Ritualization at the level of communication and information may be outlined as compounding preestablished and repeated sequences of rule-regulated and formalized actions of
1) transformations of real-life features and things;
2) handling of messages conveying notions and concepts and calling forth mental models of some kind;
3) communication and interchange of these items; and
4) participation in these actions and information interchange. It occurs to me, as I mentioned earlier, that the "machinery" that starts the ritual and keeps it going can be described on the lines of a production process model generating the storing, handling and interchanging of information (No confusion here with "Production theory" in computer science, based on an "if-then" mechanism).

Later on I shall look at a ritual object, the cross we saw used in the Epiphany rite (see...), in terms of the exchange and interaction patterns in which
it functions. I take it that it is with a similar idea in mind that Roger Penrose can call physical objects patterns of information (Penrose, *Shadows of the mind*, p. 13.), while the evolutionary biologist George C. Williams, however, views the gene as a package of information, not an object (According to Brockman, *The third culture*, p. 34).

On the level of ideological and conceptual contents, ritualization can be considered as an information system that is sustained by human actions and which produces, in turn, other human actions. Actions on (at least) two levels emerge from the list: a rule-regulated, formalized and predictable layer of processes with which another (or several others) is running parallel, which consists of partly unpredictable human and social inputs affecting also to some extent, and with individual and groupwise variations, the way the formal process is accessed mentally and behaviorally.

The processes that the Ceremony Master was handling, and that we are trying to survey, have some affinities to processes expressed through information models. Now information clearly is all there is about the social-conventional everyday rituals: my manner of salutation conveys an information about my attitude towards someone. The same principle also applies to the liturgy. But the liturgy, we noted, has something that is absent from the everyday rituals, namely a result, a true effect. It is liturgy's purpose not only to effect this, but also to convey information about it. In the liturgy there is a pattern of pre-established actions; there is a communication of information among the participants (clergy and congregation) from sources like the liturgical texts and rubrics; these people act upon the acquired information; their acting consists in managing information: actions such as movement, gestures, reciting, etc., ultimately mean conveying messages to other participants, even if this consists in no more than a confirmation of a common agreed-upon pattern. Information in the ritual context is, however, not unidirectional, making it hard to say what are inputs and what are outputs. The same applies to the passing of information through the system and to its being made manifest and visible, audible and olfactory (incense!), edible and tactile.

Goals, purposes, means of attaining them, the significance of the pro-
cess itself, its criteria for validity (canonical form, etc.) are all on storage. Books are the primary storage medium in liturgy, and some of them are also used as communication tools during the rites (Missal on the altar, Gospel carried in procession and read from, etc.). The storage is in books, yes, but also in brains recording customs and controlling attitudes, behaviour and actions, both for the individual and for the group, in fact, in interaction patterns within a culture.

These actions, too, in their basic features, are prescribed in the sources from storage. But all such attitudes and actions are performed in some way or other and assume some specific style of interpretation, much like a theatrical piece or a piece of music, in which the text and the score remain the same but performances vary. Because of the repetitive character of the liturgy, and the habits of usage resulting from this, people will, as we noted, easily note style more than content, since it is here that variations can occur within any specific type of representation. These variations do not derive from any storage nor from the preestablished processing of the data, which consist in the carrying out of the rubric instructions and the reading or chanting of preestablished texts and melodies. The variations originate in a kind of machinery which information theory cannot accommodate: humans in interaction with one another and with the environment. As noted earlier, information in the ritual context is not unidirectional, making it hard to say what are inputs and what are outputs.

Semantic models, therefore, are instructive up to a point, but insufficient. Its deficiency for contexts of ritualization of any other kind of human intercourse becomes evident once we learn what has been observed concerning the less formal sides of human information exchange.

Information is not data but interpreted data, facts processed into meaningful entities whose significance depends on the context. This is rather obvious but must nevertheless be stressed: the "data" of liturgy (bits of texts, gestures and so on) will always encompass a double set of values: one, the authoritatively prescribed ones and the contextually and, two, the socially constituted and perceived ones. In information discourse we typically consider an input of data from somewhere (external inputs), and when the data is being
processed in some specific context and thus takes on significance, it is being sent out into the world, or output, as information. The simple model below has been borrowed and adapted from an excellent field of research called business information management. The diagram illustrates the process as just referred to (from Davis and Olson, but supplemented with Storage algorithm and feedbacks; see Part V, Chapter 4.2; it is further developed in SL, Patterns).

DATA STORAGE

| INPUTS (DATA) ---------> PROCESSING  -------> OUTPUTS (INFO)

Some of the data also will come from some special storage as when for example a permanent data base is available for the case (storage inputs: such as, for example, liturgical books, memory, conventions, etc.). Furthermore, data once they have been processed into information will often be stored for later retrieval (of which copies may be output). Looking at this simple four-parts information model, we will note that in the case of formal rituals like liturgy, almost all the essential data, including the rules, originate from storage (Church documents and elements from Tradition). Under liturgical conditions, external inputs seem to consist mostly of rather unpredictable reactions of social character among the congregation, such as sheer inattention and chatter among them, and pure accidents in the proceedings. Such contingencies do occasionally show up as in the general trend of popular disaffection with the long Latin rites in the Middle Ages. We have to operate on a scale at whose extremities are strict canonical rule-regulated actions at one end and near-chaos at the other. Most everyday actions and attitudes respond to some set of rules (conventions, etc.), but these are much less predictable and far more easily subjected to changes than rules in formal liturgy.

The liturgical texts (text base and rubrics) may be viewed as such a data/information storage as Davis speaks of. But liturgy and related rituals of the kind we are concerned with, do not require decision making on essential subjects, which figures largely in the information literature; a ritual contains pre-defined decisions in storage about what to do. Information in this kind of
context is about what to do, how to do it, and what the meaning is of doing it in the prescribed way.

A formally prescribed ritual does not have any great intake of new data; it mostly draws on resources (information, instructions) already stored (in liturgical books, customs, conventions). Even when there are variations in the time rhythm depending on dates, Sundays, moveable feasts etc., the inputs come from the storage; since these variations, as we have seen in the Ceremony Master's account, are stored with the rest. Real inputs "from the left" on the model are environmental and social: unforeseen reactions among the people, personnel problems among the clergy, etc. A crucial characteristic of a ritual could be that of a process in which the input of information is all from storage. But this may look so, as we have noted, only if we disregard the human element. How about sermons or any other section of the liturgy that allows on-the-spot interpretation? By participating in the rites, people have a share in the data and information exchange and their own memories will also act as storage. Unlike information models handling contentless, quantitative data, the contents in this storage are highly complex and evasive and open to optional interpretations. This consideration takes us directly into the hottest area of cognitive science.

This is all I want to say concerning the subject of information in this chapter. The issue is far more complex, involving as it does the human factor, defying once more interpretation and leaving space only for discussion of frameworks. This does reduce the scope and range of simple formalized models like the one just presented. I shall discuss the matter more in detail in Part V.

Let it be enough for now to say that no single model can accommodate the relevant items; we need a structure consisting of several models at different levels, and the ones I have developed (Models 3 to 5) represent a minimal proposition.

With this general introduction of the liturgical system behind us, we shall discuss various features regarding the analysis of liturgical processes in general and, especially, those concerning visual media that I have described in the preceding chapters. Starting out from considering configurations and sce-
2. CONFIGURING

Until I came across a Norwegian publication on poetry with such a title, I intended to call the present book *Configurations*. I know this is a recent buzzword, but I also am aware that buzzwords often appear when the language is in need of focusing more markedly than before on some specific idea or insight. The cited term, together with a new use of the word *architecture*, came along with an increased concern for systems and visual representation (graphic models), largely connected with the development of data technology. Anyway, the term as I am using it in the context of my analytical frameworks, is intended to capture an idea that rejects, on any level but the trivial one, "explanation" by cause and effect. I prefer a systems analysis that sees things as much too complex and intertwined to be conceived of in any terms but that of verbally commented images, such as graphic models. Like almost everyone else today, I adopted the obvious notion that objects do not exist independently of our conceptual schemes (to summarize from Hilary Putnam, anticipating a later section), and that we create our conceptual schemes or *objects* out of material from our personal setup, experience, competences, actual situations and frameworks developed from these contingencies. This also applies generally to *scenarios* and *configurations*.

Our historical protagonists as well as we ourselves as analysts, create configurations by focusing processes guided by criteria and goals laid down in specific scenarios, with cues for focusing goals and directed attention. Whatever claims to tentative approaching objectivity we may make, the fact remains that analytical models are products of a creative act on the analyst's part (For various fields and domains of creativity, such as problem solving, see Gardner, *The creator's patterns*) This seemingly simple idea of a creative act as pure output will turn out to look considerably less unidirectional if Gerd Gigerenzer is right in claiming that justification influences discovery; this seems to reflect the old wisdom that in creating a reality we look ahead also taking into account the consequences (Gigerenzer, *Where do new ideas come from*, p. 54: *My thesis is that*...
scientists’ tools for justification provide new metaphors and concepts for their theories). Configurations in this sense are conceptual units conceived as such and as relevant under the rules inherent in a person's or group's specific scenario. The idea in its general outline is not new; it is familiar in the field of Environment Cognition. The notion that people configure, in a creative venture, their reality out of material from the world that is surrounding them or which they expect to encounter, is relatively old and today a central tenet in a discipline called Environment cognition and other psychological paradigms. Thinking in pictures seems to be essential in humans (and Einstein said he couldn't understand a thing unless he could see it: For an introduction, see Moore and Golledge, Environmental knowing; and Canter, The psychology of place):

The task, therefore, is just to describe such patterns - or rather simplifications of them, as I am trying to do in this book; in short: configurations within given frameworks. I am making Wittgenstein's words my own: We must do away with all explanation, and descriptions alone must take its place (Philosophical investigations, I, § 109; quoted by Anthony Kenny, Wittgenstein, p. 9). He also had the intuitive insight that description must be couched in general terms. I take this in support of the idea of operative frameworks as an alternative to specification of identities. Then, causal explanation, too, goes by the board.

As a consequence of what I have just been claiming, I see visual media in the shape of pictures and inscriptions, too, as features in configurations on which people operate mentally, having in mind not only the internal or compositional buildup and content but equally the visualizable structures of physical, cognitive, conceptual and emotional features in interaction in patterns of focusing processes. We shall see an example concerning the cross from the Epiphany rite). Our analytical models are simplifications of some of our configurations; it is a scientific goal that we might be able to redirect our configurations to match, to some extent, those of our historical protagonists.

A graphic model has the advantage of enabling us to see crucial factors here and their interrelations, at the cost of simplification, of course. It is possi-
ble that our model, or rather, parts of it, then may correspond to mental images our historical protagonists reacted upon and handled in the given context.

It would be precarious, however, to be confident about having made a direct hit here. The so-called dual-coding theory (developed by A. Paivio) postulates the existence of verbal and non-verbal systems that are [people's] alternative ways of representing events, and while it is so that when people imagine a scene, the experience is a bit like looking at a pictures, nevertheless several different pictures can be derived from the same underlying information (Benjafield, referring also to Johnson-Laird; BeEnjafield, Cognition, pp. 148f., 163f.).

Analysis of observables thus takes two main creative steps with no definite order in time: my conception and conceptualizing of the object and my way of expressing this in model form amenable to analysis or inspection, forming some kind of image of things, always shuttling between the two maneuvers. To some extent these steps are valid also for our historical protagonists in their handling and coping with whatever situation facing them.

Let me imagine an occasion when I am a protagonist in a liturgical process. My \textit{scenario} in this context has a specific structure of features and relations between them. This emerges from my interaction with the process and the surroundings, in which interaction my general framework of beliefs, interests, values, norms, patterns of behavior etc. is one determinant factor. Now I am thinking of God. I have a concept of him. One of its components is a sign or signs attached to some notions of divinity that I have connected with the name \textit{God}. The sign itself apart from its use is not, Putnam tells us, the concept. My ability to handle the sign is the second element of the concept.

My \textit{use}, let us assume, is that I connect the notion and the name to a set of operations by which I link them to, for example, an approach process: mentally I am trying to approach divinity and am using my participation in the liturgy for this purpose, mentally activizing parts of the factors displayed in
models of the system. The process is guided by the liturgy through its stages towards something perfect and eternal. In this manner the name and the notion of God is connected with a certain set of actions operating on them; and this is my concept of God. My concept can evoke some mental image, or it may remain unvisualizable, as with Allah, of whom I have never seen and will never see a pictorial representation (in the conventional sense of the word); but I do see the image of him in the shape of his written name: A-l-l-a-h. The Christian God I can illustrate mentally: I see an old man with flowing beard and a rather critical look to his eyes, because I have seen paintings of him (after Daniel's vision). If the physical image hooks up with my concept, then it functions.

In this way, adopting a mechanism of thought corresponding to Rosch's (and Lakoff's) prototype theory of categorization (to be discussed in Part V, Chapter 4), I see my concept in relation to a network of other concepts. Among them I have, for example, the concept of a linkage between a non-visible God in his heaven and his local presence during the rites; and I may even, but not necessarily, "see" this as Christ standing at the altar where the priest is celebrating Mass. This group of two visual or visualizable concepts (or several of them) make up a structure which I have extracted from my scenario, and this is one building-block in my conceptual and emotional process when working my way "up" through the system illustrated in Model 4.1: such a cluster is a configuration: a structured cluster of concepts which is valuable for me within some action that is also valuable for me. Now the celebrant priest at the altar does represent Christ and so also God in a strictly liturgical, not human, sense, and I apply my concept of the linkage between God in heaven and God present to him, whom I thus convert into a private symbol; private, but with canonical justification and backing.

In Chapter 7, I shall introduce the idea of configurations in a conceptual space constructed - in terms of knowledge, vision, conception and perception - out of patterns of focusing acts directed at special "targets", usually one after the other chained together or branching off tree-like in different directions. We saw examples of such processes in, respectively, Model 1 concerning the
Epiphany ritual (see ...) and the face-to-face and approach cases in Models 4.1 and 4.2. Preparatory to turning to this issue, let me address the issue of visualization, a mental faculty connected with so-called mental images. This subject can be treated only in a very summary manner here, and in some respects my comments are not even on target. The subject is among those referred to in the present book that requires a careful evaluation in the context of the enormous relevant literature (e.g., Arthur I. Miller's books, and Blake and Troscianko, AI and the eye). The reader should feel out of touch when in the following paragraphs I speak now of the analyst, now of her or his protagonists. There are or, at least, should be for a successful analysis, many points of symmetry between them.

In the context of mathematics, Kolman has noted that we can calculate in quite a normal way not only with two and three dimensions, but also with, say, four or five or n dimensions. We can write $x^2$, $x^3$, and also $x^4$ and $x^n$, but we cannot visualize dimensions above the three of height, width and depth (often called 3D): we cannot draw pictures of $\mathbb{R}^n$ if $n$ is greater than 3 (Kolman, *Linear algebra*, pp. 111, 114).

Referring to Skemp we might say: We can visualize any word: man (directly), to walk, being cold (by substitution), etc. But we cannot visualize a letter except in its own format - except when it is used as a declared/conventional symbol (x, y, z, for example, for a 3D space). We can visualize many kinds of mathematical expressions, also $X = x, y, z$, for a vector - but, as we noted, not an n-dimensional (above 3D) vector or space. This list seems to imply that visualization is the name for placing something conceptually (or really, if it comes to that) in some real or imagined space - i.e., some feature space in the sense of features as dimensions (exact or approximate or even sketchy; For pattern recognition and "feature space", see Beale and Jackson, *Neural computing*, pp. 17f. Visualized also as "possible/relevant for being measured" in case of mental images (of a triangle, for instance). Seeing a square or rectangular field partitioned by some system of intersecting straight lines - in many modern paintings - we can visualize separate geometrical figures from it.
so to say by extraction, and mentally place before us some mathematical formula (e.g., that of the golden section). Seeing a shape and then mentally seeing a formula; e.g., seeing a circle and getting an "interior" vision of $2\pi r$; this is the reversal of the above process. On the other hand, we can think about the binomial theorem or Pythagoras' formula, and then "see" them. Such processes may be understood as creating a conceptual space into which to project, respectively, the formulas and the shape (Skemp, *The psychology*, pp. 94ff. on visual and verbal symbols).

When such conceptualization processes as just mentioned occur between and involving several persons, we can consider the entire mechanism as a complex of communicative processes conveying, exchanging, circulating and receiving information. This itself can be considered as an exploitation and activation of the potentials inherent in the conceptual space, physical as well as mentally construed space. This will encompass features and relationships delivered by the environment, how it is prepared by the Church authorities, and so on: a continually changing system of interaction supported by the ingredients of the conceptual space, between human beings amongst themselves and between them and environmental factors. Here also physically passive features like imagery are made to play an active role.

*We may consider the possibility that the ordinary media of thought and conception are in themselves systemic, tending to arrange things in some order. This apparently was Wittgenstein's opinion concerning language; while to Lakoff and Johnson, our metaphorical talk is remarkably systematic... it is so systematic that <the term> 'metaphor' should refer, in the first instance, not to individual expressions or utterances, but to the organizing, structuring 'concepts' which underlie our talk* (Cooper, *Mertaphor*, 130).

It should be noted here, though, that Lakoff and Johnson's account has been challenged on the ground that it is not really a theory of metaphorical interpretation. They are more concerned with demonstrating the prevalence of metaphor in our language and conceptual schemes than with questions of how
we interpret a metaphorical utterance when we encounter one. Kittay, Meta-
phor, p. 186. The following statements from Kittay's introductory comments give
an idea of what she is driving at: "While many contemporary theories have in-
voked the semantic-pragmatic divide ["content" and "use"], insisting that meta-
phor falls squarely within one division, my account refuses to stay within the
putatively well-drawn boundaries. Metaphors, I argue, have meaning and they
therefore require a semantic account. But I also hold that a semantic account does
not give us a full comprehension of the ways in which we understand metaphor
and must be supplemented by pragmatic considerations. It is arguable that meta-
phor does not differ in this regard from at least some literal language... It is further
arguable that all language is understood contextually and that the semantic-prag-
matic divide is therefore ill drawn" (p. 10).

Things may look clear enough in the context of formal networks, less so in
our empirical (historical and social) venture. The very idea of configuring, as
set out above, hinges on our stand on the difficult issue of concept and represen-
tation and how we can make it work on our protagonists. These items, how-
ever, concern categorization and this procedure in turn depends on the
framework system in which it is meant to operate, with the net result that the
entire picture becomes so extended and leaning on so many debatable supports,
that it seems to carry the entire issue to the limit or even beyond our analytical
grip. Systems, we learn, can never be entirely accounted for. It can also be
doubted, in my view, whether several concepts (in Putnam's sense) intuitively
attributed to one and the same cluster, can be categorized meaningfully in relation to each other. Even the formerly obvious-looking notion of analyticity
("bachelor" = "unmarried man") now goes by the board.

Configurations will usually embrace chunks of knowledge and also con-
cepts that will generally be acted upon as if they did represent knowledge. Pro-
fessional treatment of knowledge, mostly in computer science, can give clues
to our handling of empirical evidence. According to Elaine Rich (Artificial Intelligence, pp. 201f.), a good system for the representation of complex structured knowledge in a particular domain should possess the following four properties (partly related to my idea of analytical efficiency):

1. Representational adequacy - the ability to represent all of the kinds of knowledge that are needed in that domain;
2. Inferential adequacy - the ability to manipulate the representational structures in such a way as to derive new structures corresponding to new knowledge inferred from old;
3. Inferential efficiency - the ability to incorporate into the knowledge structure additional information that can be used to focus the attention of the inference mechanisms in the most promising directions.
4. Acquisitional efficiency - the ability to acquire new information easily. The simplest case involves direct insertion, by a person, of new knowledge into the database. Ideally, the program itself would be able to control knowledge acquisition.

Transferring these points to our protagonists, we note that there is a large and complex spectrum of relationships to apply to them in wholes or in chunks, making attribution challenging and rich in perspectives but correspondingly hazardous.

As a corollary to this list, there are declarative and procedural methods for acquiring and handling such knowledge. Declarative methods are exemplified by predicate logic; in which most of the knowledge is represented as a static collection of facts accompanied by a small set of general procedures for manipulating them. The advantages here are: each fact need only be stored once, regardless of the number of the different ways in which it can be used; it is easy to add new facts to the system, without changing either the other facts or the smaller procedures. In procedural methods, on the other hand, the bulk of the knowledge is represented as procedures for using it. The advantages accruing from this are mainly: it is easy to represent knowledge of how to do things; it is easy to represent knowledge that does not fit well into many simple declarative
schemes. Examples of this are default and probabilistic reasoning; it is easy to represent heuristic knowledge of how to do things efficiently.

These perspectives on knowledge and knowledge representation, hence communication, at the very least show us that, in attributing specific configurations of knowledge to our protagonists, we find ourselves in a precarious position. The image or visual-model approach has a venerable history way back. The "medieval" history of this use of images and figures is relevant to my analytical program since it shows that we, using the "modern" illustrative-analytical device do not operate in a manner totally different from the way earlier generations coped with things.

"Medieval" people of course knew that images of some kind play a role in conceptualization and knowledge handling; imaginatio, imaginari are Classical Latin terms. With good luck, our modern models may even to some extent possibly mirror conceptual figures in the minds of our historical protagonists. Graphic models, in our sense of the term, were in use since Antiquity. Both trees and box diagrams and combinations of these were in use in the schools (Wirth, Von mittelalterlichen Bildern und Lehrfiguren).

In the Aristotelian tradition, strong at the University of Padua, the Tree of Porphyry was used to illustrate the interrelations (and distinctions) between matter and spirit, living and non-living, etc.: a graphic picture of a true mental image: Porphyry arranged Aristoteles' categories in the world's first semantic net, and Sowa shows it as it was usually drawn by the Scholastic logicians in the middle ages (Sowa, Relating diagrams to logic, pp. 1f.). This "tree" shows a procession of central terms right through its middle axis, with lateral branches along the axis containing terminological extensions (See the interesting discussion of the tree in Wirth, L'image médiévale, pp. 64ff.; also Gisolfi and Sinding-Larsen, The Rule, Chapter VII on other repeated medieval images, especially Fig. 77, concerning wisdom and virtues). Cardinal Roberto Bellarmino (The following two paragraphs
are an approximate quotation from Gisolfi and Sinding-Larsen, *The rule*); writing in the 1580-90s, said nothing new when he stated that everything we know, either with our senses or with our spirit, is known through images. He distinguished two kinds of images: perpetual images, like a cross in wood or metal; and transient images, like making the sign of the cross (For relations between images and texts, the literature is today almost unsurveyable; some observations in Sinding-Larsen, *Categorization of images* and *Créer des images*). Bellarmino offers a synopsis of the traditional paradox:

*It is usual to depict those who are absent, because one doesn't see them; God, however, is present, but we don't see him, and therefore we depict him, as if he were absent, and these images do not represent God but are there in order to lead mankind into some understanding of God through analogical comparison (...pingi solent absentia, quia non videntur: Deus autem licet sit praesens, tamen non videtur, ideo pingi potest, ac si abesset...At imago Dei, et Trinitatis, ut a nobis pingitur... neque habetur pro Deo a nobis...sed ad perducendum homines in ali-quam Dei notitiam per analogicas similitudines (De controversiis, II, Cols. 703 E - 704 A). To St. Ambrose, for example, Christ is the *image* of God: "solus enim Christus est plena imago dei propter expressam in se paternae claretudinis unitatem" (Francesconi, *Storia e simbolo*. This monographh dedicates a chapter to each of the following terms: *mysterium, sacramentum, imago, similitudo, species, umbra, typus*, and *figura*. For this and what follows, see Gisolfi and Sinding-Larsen, *The Rule*, with further bibliography on medieval use of images for cognitive purposes).

Richard C. Trexler makes the following comments on Peter the Chanter's treatise on prayer, in which he taught how to pray using drawings: *Yet that essence that Peter thought could be preserved in images entailed more than lines or mere body comportment. Mood and moralities could also be figured. Thus a picture could teach that supplicants should incline before any image or cross of Christ or figure of a saint ... A picture could also teach spiritual duties ...* (Wittgenstein would love that; Trexler, *The Christian at prayer*, p. 51).
Most modern branches of research, including physics, depend very extensively on graphic models and other media for visual thinking (For physics, see Miller, *Imagery*). The advantages of using visual diagrams and models are well-known today, and the relative literature is enormous (Simon and Larkin, *Why a diagram is (sometimes) worth ten thousand words*).

In the light of these considerations, I shall go on with a simplified analytical picture. Before doing so, let us look at the analytical process from evaluation of a situation to the establishment, however provisionary, of a scenario to work with.

2.1. From situation to scenario
Perhaps the most important aspect of any discussion of methodology, whatever its merits and failures, is to insist on attention to the course of the analytical process itself in spite of the difficulties of being fully aware of it: what do we do at which stage in the proceedings? If a research process is completely smooth without definite stages, how can we know where we are at any time and how, then, could we monitor and control it?

The terms situation and scenario have been frequently used in the foregoing chapters and sections. I have said that a scenario is a set or system of significant features that people react and act upon as an identifiable unit. These "people" may also be ourselves facing an analytical assignment. We work our way towards some scenario. Let us see how.

I have said earlier that my main focus is on processes rather than on states, events and situations. However, during the research work, especially at the beginning, we need an initial overview of the subject at hand. Here things will be noted for their attributes and relations without initial attention to the next phase, when things start moving. This initial picture we call, in conformity with literature to be cited presently, an (analytical) situation. This is a first description of our subject, but in a wide frame of reference. My Model 3 is one possible expression of this for my specific material.

How to go from this over to the analytically critical phase, in which we feel we are getting down to brass tacks and start our analysis of the picture of
things that we take to be the important and relevant one; the position at which we might conclude the specific part of our work? Such a picture is what the literature (at least, some of it) calls a scenario. My Models 1, 4.1. and 4.2., in the shape of trees, express such pictures. The series of models, from No. 3 to 4.2., are terminals in the picture of a ritual process: from analytical situation to scenario. At the end of this section, I shall suggest how this comes about on the models.

This analytical passage from our first, survey-dimensioned picture of a real-world situation, like the utterly complex one perceivable behind the Ceremony Master's description of his duties, to an analytically workable model, presents a methodological problem. How to determine stages here, seeing that there will have to be stages in order to ensure control of the process? - a control especially urgent since no research work is ever linear but involves shuttling back and forth between the "stages".

This problem has been tackled in a general and systematic manner in Business Information Theory. I have been structuring the general path of my research on a model used in a relatively recent publication edited by T. William Olle (Information systems methodologies), and I shall now offer a brief and simplified account of it.

To cite the authors: The response to be associated with that situational description states what methodological approach is taken. Response here means deciding how to tackle the situation that has been so far analyzed: we build an analytical picture of a particular problem area made up by our selection from among the contributing factors: a scenario (or several of them). Part IV in principle covers the progress from response decisions, which are methodological, to the building of scenarios; actually, however, these two phases are being dealt with by way of shuttling back and forth, which is what will usually happen in practice.

I will illustrate the procedure with an example from the history of music. Let us say we want to find out something about the origin of the string quartet as developed by Joseph Haydn (and Luigi Boccherini) and let us assume (as a thought experiment) that we have an idea that it is somehow con-
nected with the older form called the concerto grosso (It is well known that the concerto grosso is an expansion of the trio sonata. For the string quartet as a development from the trio sonata, see Geiringer, *Joseph Haydn*, pp. 254f.). Thus we are faced with a complex analytical situation, illustrated, say, by Arcangelo Corelli's *Concerto grosso*, Op. 6, No. 7, and we make out a sum of numerous instruments or better: several sequences of various sums of varying numbers of instruments - a highly complex picture. Next we note that the concerto grosso consists of a certain number of individual strings and wind instruments and also of a small and a larger group of them playing against each other. Thus we have sorted out contributing factors of the overall situation. What to do now? We have several alternatives or response options: shall we look out for each individual instrument, each string or each wind, or rather for one of the groups; or for the interaction between the two groups? Our decision here is a methodological one with further consequences for what to do and how to do it.

This analysis, let us assume, brings out the picture of Corelli's *Concerto grosso* as consisting of a nucleus of three instruments (two violins and a basso continuo), called concertino, and a larger group of instruments called tutti or ripieno. Because we were interested in the quartet, we pick out the smaller group from the Concerto grosso for focus of analysis: it is now our scenario. This is the picture we settle for as the place for our assumed conclusive drive towards completed analysis, the picture we make of our reality to deal with.

Studying this further we discover affinity with the trio sonata, usually two violins and a cello or voila da gamba with the effect of a contrabasso (often also with a lute or a harpsichord in between) (e.g. Corelli's opus 3, to stay with him), making a jump over to a presumably more adequate scenario. Next we discover that we may give greater autonomy to the contrabasso, which originally just played a "background" basso continuo, and elevate it into a fourth solo player, eliminating the basso continuo function: and we have the string quartet. All this may sound like an excellent way of making simple things complicated; the usefulness shows up whenever we face a highly complex subject.

Let the cited authors explain some matters more closely. The task is to
decide on a framework within which information systems methodologies may be viewed ... A feature of a framework is that it supports a variety of different concepts, often combined in a number of different ways. Prior to using any information systems methodology, therefore, it is generally necessary to consider how, and within which context, it will be used (Olle, as above).

The quoted authors explain the model in the following terms: ... the framework to be described should always be used selectively and that it provides the rationale for these selections.... They say we have to consider what sort of conditions are encountered (to be referred to as situations) and what elements contribute to these (called contributing factors). Given one's view of the situation, a decision is to be made about how to deal with it. Often, more than one option offers itself [called response options]. The final response will then be that one option (or set of options) is selected. Such a choice will be named a scenario.

To specify further:

A 'situation' is a very complex concept. It is established by many different factors. Of these, only those that could influence or would be influenced by the choice of a specific methodology (in the broadest sense of the word) are of interest here. The term 'situation' in the sense used <here>... describes the result of an analysis. When combined with a certain chosen methodological approach, that is to say, together with the prescribed response, it will be called the 'scenario'.

There is an affinity to Putnam's notion of a concept: a set of features or attributes in focus pluss resources by which to handle them as a unity. The cited authors present the final phase of the procedure as follows:

Having highlighted the important aspects of a potential situation and having decided on the factor values to be attributed, the scheme must be completed with the choice of solutions to describe fully all scenarios of interest ... The virtue of this approach is that one's modus operandi is determined beforehand, making it easier to be systematic in one's procedure. The 'given' element in scenario selection consists of the contributing factors (and factor values) one recognizes.

Of course, there may be too much of a virtue if this means deciding too
much beforehand and falling into some hermeneutic trap of *Verstehen*.

The approach is, however, not "hermeneutic", but one of deciding on methodology and general levels for frameworks and taking the consequences of the choice. In my specific case concerning San Marco, I have decided at the very outset that processes and situations are primary factors and images secondary, and that rituals and procedure management seen in the light of information processing are basic issues.

Picking up where we left off and focusing on analytical scenarios as objects of analysis, again, it should by now be easier to cope with the circumstance that we are unable to define boundaries in complex situations under a "totality" vantage point, relieving us of obligations to state what our objects "really are". For the systems-framed terms and concepts we have just taken account of provide us with tools with which we can handle the assignment of modelling our historical situations systemically, which does not necessarily mean definitely. We can look at them operationally, distinguishing between factual, conceptual and emotional framing operations going on among the protagonists internally, the emergent properties (total sum of properties) of this system, and, finally, the analytical operations we (or I) perform on these levels.

Analytically speaking, and looking at my own argumentation also from outside, since I am after methodology rather than historical substance, we obtain three levels: the internalized, "inside" involvement by the protagonists, whether acting and reacting on the scenario consciously or more or less mechanically (on account of training, or expertise, etc.); their reactions to or handling conceptually and emotionally the emergent properties of this; and the analyst's (mine) configuration of these two levels (*Expertise*, here in the famous (or notorious to some) definition developed by Hubert L. Dreyfus, author of the book, *What computers can't do*. There are five stages in performance development: 1) the stage of being a "novice"; 2. of being an advanced beginner; 3) of having obtained competence; 4. proficiency; and 5. expertise. *The expert performer knows how to proceed without any detached deliberation about his situation or actions, without any conscious contemplation of alternatives. While deeply involved in coping with his environment, he does not see problems in a
detached way, does not work at solving them, and does not worry about the future or devise plans. The expert's skill has become so much part of him that he need be no more aware of it than he is of his own body in ordinary motor activity...", etc. (Dreyfus, *Misrepresenting human intelligence*).

Of course, to postulate the relationship between this configuration and those levels is highly uncomfortable, seeing that I have no other way of construing the two "levels" except by configuring them in my own terms. Configuring is what the protagonists in our situations were doing, too; their actions counted only - except on trivial levels - when construed as significance or meaning, and the most we can achieve is to come up with hypotheses that match to some extent their configurations, or, more likely, the frameworks for them. It is ancient and well-established wisdom that visual, designed models and diagrams often are the best means for displaying and discussing such configurations (See above, and Gisolfi and Sinding-Larsen, *The rule*).

3. OPTIONS FOR GENERAL MODELS
At this point, having set out the main precepts for analysis and presented the empirical material, we should be ready to do two things: set up a general model for analysing rituals, and applying this to the specific liturgy. There will be some shuttling back and forth between the two perspectives. The question to be faced before anything else, however, is whether a general model in the terms available in the present context can really present a generally valid picture of the types of scenarios and configurations involved and their interrelation and interaction patterns.

3.1. Building models
For our purposes we construct models, a subject that requires some general considerations before facing our models more specifically. All models, either verbal or graphic, must capture somehow processes and systems in interaction and have to be continually readjusted and modified in response to new evidence, analytical or empirical, inside the analytical picture or from the outside. Some of the analytical requirement for a model were noted above (I, 4).
In this book I am using verbal as well as graphic models and a terminology concentrating mainly on situations in process terms, scenarios and configurations. The purpose is to try to reconstruct some of the systems properties characterizing the actions and values that are inherent in the processes and situations the Ceremony Master was expected to manage. The more evasive parts of the Also the conceptual patterns here labelled configurations and stipulated for the protagonists in ritual contexts might be considered under the heading of models, in terms of so-called mental models. But I have not found it necessary to do any deep digging in this field. I shall not delve into that unruly subject, but note Boden's criticism of one of the major contributions: Johnson-Laird's *Mental models*: according to her, he claims that the structure of mental models corresponds directly to the structure of the state of affairs they represent. A psychology of mental models which satisfy this criterion would be a theory not only of the mind, but of the world (and all possible worlds) too. For to be able to identify the structure of the state of affairs in general, one would need answers to the fundamental questions of philosophical semantics, ontology, and metaphysics. If Johnson-Laird's typology of mental models (described briefly below [= p. 185 in *BODEN]*) is both sketchy and controversial, this is due not least to the difficulty of these highly abstract questions (Boden, *Computer models of mind*, p. 183).

Models are simplified minisystems devised to reduce larger ones to a format that is surveyable and tractable. Therefore it would not make sense to try to develop any general theory for them. They are, as a concept, general themselves and can be shaped in any form and used for anything. The special name Model theory, on the other hand, is reserved for current "objectivist" and formal-logical applications (Lakoff, *Women, fire, Index: Model theory*).

A crucial distinction between image theory models and sociological or social-anthropological models is that, while the latter address bi- or multilateral interchange (are "interactive", to use a current buzzword), the former address merely unilateral attribution (walls do not talk, we know). Image theory models consider only the parameters assigned or imposed by society or parts of society upon the perception and conceptualization of things like images and people: an
interaction between two distinct sides across some ill-defined space. This limitation is inherent in models dealing separately with visual media like images and things. The present contribution makes an attempt to break through this barrier by studying the media as features interacting with other features inside total processes and situations, rather than using the processes and situations as a reference base and a background.

We try to build reconstructive models of processes and situations and people's scenarios in them. My argumentation so far shows, I believe, that such models cannot be tied up in formal paradigms based more or less directly on the rules of logic, mathematics or computer science. Even though this is certainly possible for limited chunks of the empirical world, these models would fail to cover some highly relevant features in the overall pattern. Not all people argue; some *argufy* (in Empson's formulation). and everybody occasionally just "feels" intuitively or connect concepts by sheer habit. The American physicist Richard Feynman warned against using physics theories to "prove" everyday conditions; on the other hand, we may share some of the unpredictability of physics:

It is usually thought that this indeterminacy [i.e. Heisenberg's principle], that we cannot predict the future, is a quantum-mechanical thing, and this is said to explain the behavior of the mind, feelings of free will, etc. But if the world were classical - if the laws of mechanics were classical [i.e., Newtonian] - it is not quite obvious that the mind would not feel more or less the same (Gleick, *Genius*, pp. 429f.).

On the other hand, it is a well-known fact that even scientists themselves have not always followed logically deductive courses in their pursuit of whatever problem solution they were after. Descartes used God's intentions as an argument (Cf. his argumentum ad Dominum in his Méditations métaphysiques, fourth paragraph of *Méditation quatrième*: *Et après j'expérimente en moi-même une certaine puissance de juger, laquelle sans doute l'ai reçue de Dieu. de même que tout le reste des choses que je possède; et comme il ne voudrait pas m'abuser, il est certain qu'il ne me l'a pas donné telle que je puisse jamais faillir, lorsque l'en userai comme il faut* etc.); and Kepler
brought in God's creation as an important factor in his search for a model of the planetary system.

While the exact models cannot be used operatively in our empirical field, fetching out concepts and concept-relations from them may at least yield a provisional consistency and clarity that can serve as focal points for debates in looser empirical contexts. One important advantage is, simply, that they usually have standard fixed abstract structures which make different contents logged into them systematic and comparable; which cannot be said of free, arbitrary models. One can do anything with freely constructed box-models fitting a particular problem or data collection but without an underlying abstract structure setting out generally types of levels and types of processes. The so-called *World model* created in the context of the Club of Rome covers two pages with 77 (seventy-seven) boxes, most of them linked up with most of the others with connection lines. If everything is connected with everything, there is no analysis and we don't know where we are.

This means that formal models might aid on account of their structural characteristics. These are intuitively chosen, provided the formal pattern has sufficient affinity to our way of simplifying the situation at hand so as to validate it as a provisional tool for keeping track of our thoughts. Let there be no illusion as to the straightforwardness of this issue; the following aspects (at least) have to be investigated (listed none too systematically and without comments): natural language (and natural formats generally) versus formalization; concrete versus abstract; continuous versus discrete; content versus contentlessness; functions, functionality; reference modalities; basic questions of 'meaning'; constraints on interfacing; foreground-background problem; generalization-over-equivalence; classification, systematization issue; defining ad hoc models: planning, production, functionality.

It is not so much a question of fitting "reality" to the models (always a relevant contingency, since we largely create our realities), as selecting models that can accommodate features and relations between them that we consider essential or analytically viable in such a way, as I insisted above, as to ensure some degree of systems cohesion (*The conceptual graph formalism in essence*...
just specifies the form of representation. No real claim is made about the content of representation,... the conceptual graph of a sentence need not be similar to its syntactic structure (Willems, *A conceptual semantics ontology for conceptual graphs*, p. 312).

Thus, the graphic models employed in this book can be integrated into a coherent picture – but, of course, a picture is the outcome. The “moral” of this book is that pictures is all we have; but perhaps this should not make us feel too impoverished.

Let me quote a statement by Ludwig Boltzmann as cited by Arthur I. Miller (in his translation):

*Thus the memory images of pure sense impression can also be used as element in combination of ideas, where it is not necessary or even possible to describe those impressions in words and thus to grasp them conceptually ... Indeed, the idea of a three-dimensional figure has no content other than the ideas of the series of visual images which can be obtained from it, including those which can be produced by cross-sectional cuts. In this sense, we may rightly claim that the idea of stereometric form of a material object plays the role of a concept formed on the basis of the combination of an extended series of sensuous intuition images. It is a concept, however, which, unlike a geometrical construct, is not necessarily expressible in a verbal definition. It is held together or united only by the clear idea of the laws in accordance with which its perspective images follow one another* (Miller, *Imagery in scientific thought*, p. 49).

Graphic models and formulas from logic and mathematics have some noticeable features in common. Many of Richard R. Skemp's reflections are relevant to the issue of formulas as illustrations and recall symbols, whether recall or retrieval of data (which Skemp calls "recovering", now obsolete; Skemp, *The psychology*, pp. 89ff.).

Mathematical and logical symbols, like graphic models, show structure. Asking what shape a reflector must have to give parallel beams, the answers may be to produce a full formula of a parabola, or a drawing of it, or just saying "a
parabola”, and thus calling forth a mental image of one:

The difference between a mnemonic and a formula is that the latter embodies the structure of what is to be recalled. From a formula, therefore, understanding can be reconstructed, even if it does not immediately follow the recall of the symbol

Now to the question, if a general model in the terms available in the present context can really present a generally valid picture of the types of scenarios and configurations involved and their interrelation and interaction patterns. Can a real-world material expressed in natural language (as distinct from formalisms and quantification) ever be treated in a general model?

Apparantly, there are (at least) two stumbling blocks in our way. One concerns what we are dealing with and the other how to do this – fairly fundamental constraints, as it would seem.

First, generalization requires unambiguous categorization: what goes with what and what does not go there? In due course, it will become evident, as I hope, that this is a requirement that cannot be met (see IV, 11.1). Secondly, graphic models can be established at various levels, but even an articulate verbal elaboration of them does not seem to be sufficient to turn them into a seamless unity of general analytic validity that covers the actual field of research, unless this is severely constrained. The models appear to be destined to remain fragmentary and stepwise.

The choice of models in this book reflects, as far as I understand the issue, this situation. Of course, the choice might have been different in many respects, but I cannot see any alternatives that would change the situation illustrated by the above two points.

The graphic models, as total pictures or at different levels, represent or include the key analytical concepts employed in this book, such as frameworks, scenarios and configurations. These building-blocks are subjected to the same limitations as are unavoidable for categorization in general (V,4). It is the model structure that settles, however hypothetically, the issue of which of them belong together or not. The structure reflects methodological choice with regard to levels and embedment; an example: The church-goer in Venice will, if San Marco is the place, have her or his scenario for formal and emotional participation in
the rites within the framework set up in liturgical or other ecclesiastical terms, while for the Church authorities the liturgy forms part of their scenario within their larger framework of the Roman Church. In this way, a framework can support a variety of scenarios and configurations (and other concepts), while a framework is itself a concept and a scenario may serve as a framework. Here are two levels, that of authority and that of the congregation or groups within it. Other levels are the management of the liturgy and the management of San Marco or the Church of Rome. Among these concepts some can be integrated into others, thus be embedded, while some can encase other concepts. So that the system rules for model structure concern levels and embedment/encasement.

The models employed in this book may be briefly described in the following terms.

1. The model used for describing the Epiphany rite (Model 1: III, 2.3) was described as an epical model, because it followed or monitored a process over time. It is useful as a basis for construing structural models and features in it and it may even be integrated in such models. All the following models belong to the latter type.

2. An interactive system is represented in Model 2 (IV, 1) for the Programmatic System in the Roman Church; in terms of a closed system with data feeding in all indicated directions. Functionally, this model controls processes outlined the models under 3. and 4., below.

3. An interactive system is again represented in the general ritual model (Model 3, in the present Chapter); this time a semantic production model with a main course toward a product: general process features seen from the vantage point of the process, with media aspects integrated. Models under 1., 2., 4. and 5. are functionally integrated here.

4. Of a somewhat similar character are the tree models, except that “products” are brought forth on the way up the tree (Models 4.1 and 4.2: the “Roman” and “Islamic” trees; IV, 8.1 and 8.2): media processing, seen from the vantage point of the media, with selection of relevant (supposedly) ritual processes called forth.

5. The PROLOG-inspired model (Model 5, IV, 9), too, is process-
focused, indicating likely access and barrier patterns in approach of users (Roman and Islamic) to the media: a complement to Models 4.1 and 4.2.

All these models are basically ad-hoc, since they cannot be generalized above the level of literary description and they do not present generalized pictures because their interrelations are not entirely clear, this in the sense that purely formal and syntactical models can be. Strictly speaking they are arbitrary, since they are chosen among numerous options by estimate, with no other criterion than the stated systems cohesion (see…), which in itself will never attain absolute validity and could be achieved by other models than the chosen ones. The processes “up” or “down” or through the models do not follow logics or mathematics (as the science models of which they are reflections), but may be hypotheically determined by empirically-based mmetaphors.

3.2. Model resources

We cannot use formal models to prove anything within the empirical world when it comes to non-quantifiable items. And we cannot start out from the models typical of the social sciences, since they suffer from the ailments accompanying any model couched in terms of natural language. As already affirmed, we need a starting-point in models with a well-defined syntactical structure, for by projecting from them into our context, we have the best security we can have (which is not very much anyway) for structuring our models in describable and potentially controllable manner. Here, the models from Science, Management, Information and Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science in general, are obvious candidates.

We can use them for two sets of purposes: as an idea bank and to help to set ourselves constraints that are at least describable by translations from formal to verbal statements. Formal models can be made to operate negatively, less reliably in a positive format. It is in computer programs and Artificial Intelligence (AI), in addition, naturally, to logic and mathematics, that we find the clearest accounts of classification issues. This is partly due to the circumstance that the context is always operational, so that definable procedure steps are required, and to the fact that entities have to be discrete for logistic
as well as technical reasons (See Born, *The case against*, p. 46).

Many of the different definitions and goal perspectives, claims and experiments from the cognitive sciences, among them AI, are useful in an analytic sense because they have provoked and do provoke systematical investigations into the workings of the human mind; which is not to claim that the machines or programs work in ways that are "similar" or "analogous" to the human mind or even to parts of it (See Dreyfus, *Misrepresenting human intelligence*, p. 46; and Penrose, *The emperor's new mind*, passim).

Adopting models from the relatively precise and at the same time generally adaptable models from the cognitive sciences and artificial intelligence (AI) also gives us the advantage of establishing working contact with central issues in modern scholarship. Arthur I. Miller cites Allen Newell who was moved to declare that we are on the verge of a unified theory of cognition. Although such optimism has not yet come to fruition, some spinoffs of AI are of great value. On of them is that the mind is an information-processing system whose formal structure is referred to as the 'cognitive functional architecture'... Exploring the cognitive functional architecture of the human mind is a major research effort of cognitive science and AI (Miller, *Insights*, p. 270).

Retrieving structural characteristics and argumentation types from AI models and using this on empirical material may turn out to have the following advantages as a perspective storage and an idea bank.

1. Models of this kind represent some protection against illogical thinking. Since *meanings aren't in the head* (Putnam) and even though no AI program so far seems to be able to imitate the functioning of the human brain, the brain's working with some kind of strings and networks makes computer strings and networks the closest model of what we do when using our brain for planned, stepwise argumentation. At least, if an argument is incompatible with the program logics, then it should be handled with suspicion; this, it seems, is as far as we can go in taking AI as a model of the mind.

2. Models from AI define and explore ways of developing and monitoring processes from empirica to various modalities and degrees of abstraction. Hierarchies and levels are defined in formalized terms.

- These models guide us in decomposing a problem or a topic into managable
sub-problems or sub-topics.

- These models may provide some protection against a too blatantly ad-hoc reasoning (this of course applies to all abstract models).

- Many of these models' distinction between user and implementation issues help us to distinguish between user operations and object operations (this particularly for the object-oriented perspective).

3. Since computer languages express data and concepts as contentless strings of letters or other signs and in contentless networks, everything is brought down to the lowest common multiple.

- Data contentlessness makes it possible to evaluate the analytical and argumentation principles as distinct from the substantive issues of the case at hand. This makes for possible generalizations of the insights arrived at.

- Many parameters in our conceptualization processes can be expressed as knowledge representation, and this is AI's forte.

4. AI may picture (rather than really provide) the best testing ground for connections between formalisms and empirical observations.

- AI is the field in which there is an ongoing structured international and interdisciplinary debate on the relations between empirical observations and rigorous argumentation; hence the field has taken over a big chunk of philosophical investigation.

5. AI models articulate problem structures, which, when applied to iconographical or design material, will force one to see the importance of there being several parallel (and not only alternatively exclusive) ways to look at an issue (Rich, *Artificial intelligence*, p. 30). Working with these models, because of the way networks are construed, forces us to see/discuss not only relations between our concepts but also levels and hierarchies (among other things, because of 'inheritance'-inferences from one level to another).

6. Crucial issues in the interface between objects and the "mind" (perception, knowledge representation)(Sowa, *Relating diagrams*; Gaines, *Representation*. The latter speaks of "major qualitative changes in applications of the technology, from information processing to knowledge processing" - knowledge being defined (in simplified form) as information data plus com-
petence in handling them (creativity, planning, etc.) are discussed in coherent model systems).

7. Most terms relevant to image production, communication and processing in conceptual terms are treated in AI or else in other contexts whose key terms are processed in AI.

Outside of the pale of formal argumentation (logic, mathematics and computer science), argumentation systems are illustrations of concepts or configurations in the sense used in this book. But even when staying within the bounds of the semi-formalized field of modal logic, we notice that the "competition" between systems cannot be decided in principle. Facing the choice of different modal systems (of modal logic, concerning possibility and necessity, not absolute truth or falsity), Hughes and Cresswell write: Which system is the correct one? Now the assumption behind this question seems to be that we have in mind some single sense of 'necessity' and 'possibility', and that systems weaker than the correct one will give us less than the whole truth, while the stronger systems will contain theses which even if plausible are really false. But perhaps the systems are not rivals in this way. It is at least possible that a number of systems may each give us the truth about necessity and possibility, though each in a somewhat different sense of those terms (Hughes and Cresswell, An introduction to modal logic, p. 79).

3.3. A ritual model

We have noted the essentials of a process from situation to scenario. This represents my analytical path, which of course does not mean that in practice one works one's way unidirectionally from the one to the other. The purpose of it is to come up with a scenario image that is as close as possible to the scenario or scenarios of the historical protagonists we are studying, from the Ceremony Master, to other members of the clergy, to servants like the Dog-Chaser, to members of the public. Let us see how the models fit this passage. Among the tree Models (4.1. and 4.2.), I shall limit myself to the Roman case (4.1.), as this should be sufficient to discuss the idea behind the procedure.

This assignment means that we want to see if Model 3. (see below) is amenable to being transformed into Model 4.1. in such a way that the perspective shifts in the predicted direction, from a general situation picture of a ritual
over to one of internal operations within the ritual, actions and conceptualizations that are focusing in specific directions. We can subdivide Model 3 in three vertical zones expressing the relational formalism aRb. Zone No. 1. covers the entire vertical Environmental process. The input (or impacts) from this enters the tree-like system on Model 4.2. from below, being at the basis of the entire focusing process. Zone No. 2., then, comprises the Situation process up to but not including the Conceptual space. Data from this zone are activated inside the liturgy itself, "feeding" level 1 in this model. The 3rd zone, the Symbolization process plus the Conceptual space and the FOCUS OBJECT, contains the values that inform levels 2 and 3, with the ALTAR with IMAGE SETUP and the SACRAMENTAL SPACE in the CHURCH or CHAPEL. As with all simplified models of these types, any claim about connections like the ones I have just made, is open to revision and improvement. But such an overall picture of two or more models and their interrelation provides a ground for going further. A prose description of the same coupling would hardly have made the total process from situation to scenario visually clear enough to trigger reactions bent on improvement. This tripartite subdivision in a central-axis relational operation between two lateral factors corresponds to a relation: aRb.

With the subject of configurations we are in the midst of my analytical enquiry. I believe that the general picture, which is, in part at least, expressed in a basic model like Model 3, is the most demanding and crucial part of an argumentation. Therefore, the reader should be familiar with the empirical material and with the outlines of its theoretical elaboration (as in my previous models), in preparation for taking a critical stand on the central model. The structure of the model will be discussed below.

The passage from the existence of an organization, like the Church, having goals, to the ritual process has to be captured with a maximum coverage of its most important interrelated features. For a start we need a picture of what we might call the total process or process-molded situation in which we locate our ritual and to which we can relate other more specific models, as I have just indicated.

In our case a basic model, and I have in mind the graphic Model 3, should set out essential features in the workings of a particular organization in such
abstracting terms that it may take on a general character and be used for other comparable cases. The organization in the present context, is the Roman Church and the Venetian State and State Church. These institutions entertain certain goals, such as carrying through a ritual in order to transfer potentially salvational effects (contributing to salvation in the case of the Church), to illustrate the position and role of the Venetian Republic, and conveying messages to the same ends. The carrying through of this depends on and is informed by specific resources (such as liturgical texts and traditions) and by specific values, attitudes and general demands (local and universal). The functioning of this fluid structure (or system on the move) depends on the environment, including specific factors such as social and other local networks and norms and goals cherished in them. How to capture all this in a manner that can account for changes or fluctuations in the systems and can be used for other specific cases, too, as a basis for comparison? How to generalize in such a way that we seem to acquire some understanding beyond mere ad hoc registration? The problem arises about where to put the relevant factors, for they have to appear somewhere. This "somewhere" can hardly be defined as anything else than as - to repeat - a level. Analyzing on distinct levels, the possibility is secured for simultaneous operation, in that features on one level remain active when we go n to the next one. Here there is perhaps a possibility of approaching the parallel versus serial issue in cognitive science (This is a standard theme in recent literature and presented in a number of relevant connections in Baumgartner and Payr, Speaking minds. The brain itself is a parallel machine). To give an example with regard to Model 3, of course the values show up in a number of places. Another example is this: while representation/reference is located at production level, where the feature may be said to come into full view, still it is obviously attached to the "thing" at management level, since it is dependent not only of the actual conceptualizing of the "thing" (which is necessary for the thing to have any relevant existence at all), but also on the way it is managed. In this manner I may set up a system of kinds of factors on their respective levels, organizational, actional and so forth, but on pain of losing direct view of the time-flow. Selecting this way out of the
impasse, we must decide right at the outset which kind of feature or factor we will consider important. A necessary criterion of relevance would then have to be that the features or factors have a sufficient general and generic value - for instance: "action" generally rather than "handling the Cross" - so that other specific cases can be judged by the same scale.

3.4. Levels of interrelation

Model 3 is structured after a so-called semantic network (For which see Teskey, Representation and reasoning), and represents my first survey of important features and relations between them in the situation I want to investigate. Situation here means the initial picture of our real-world case, either a state or a process or event, that we select for our topic or subject of analysis. This is already at the initial stage a picture built up by features I have found striking or interesting; if it is not an analytically argued choice, at least it is a selection grounded in my general framework, attitude and, let us hope, competences. A further development from this should end up in some scenario.

Now to the structure of Model 3. The RITUAL in the central vertical axis of the model is part of a process involving also the chief protagonists, for example the Ceremony Master of San Marco. This process interacts with an environmental process and - in our cases, where we focus on symbolical messages in visual objects - also a symbolization process. is the operation space of analyst or protagonist, in which factors from the processes are brought together to produce a scenario (or scenarios) at CONCEPT SPACE.

Let us examine the model a little more closely. Model 3 is an adaptation of semantic models used in Artificial Intelligence and presented, e. g., by
Teskey (Teskey, in Winstanley, *Artificial intelligence*, pp. 39ff). It "works" from bottom and upwards, along three parallel processes of analysis and through six levels. These processes and levels have a generic and non-ad-hoc character.

MODEL 3. General ritual process.

The three processes – representing the relation aRb and thus derived from a fundamental formalism – are:

a) a situational process, which concerns the time/space/events in focus in which the "protagonist", for example the Ceremony Master participates operating relevant comparisons between the lateral processes after the relational model aRb.

b) a symbolization process elaborating the "thing" (some object, like a picture or other people) through its role and involvement in a significant context (network) and its interpretation in terms of representation and reference; and, finally,

c) an environmental process, starting from the environment determining in part the specific situation and working its way through community networks and interaction (communication).

Following the central path, that of the situation process on Model 3, we have as starting premises the organization system (Church, State), its resources (liturgy etc.), data (liturgical texts etc.), and planning characteristics); then, upwards in the model, specification of the resulting values, goals etc., all of it to be taken care of, more or less completely and consciously, by the situation protagonist, in our case especially the Ceremony Master, but other clergy, too. This position is marked off as RITUAL, the node for the ritual performance. The performance is the system of various actions and is itself a formalization. Through his management mandate he directs the actions etc. of the ritual itself, which in its turn defines a conceptual space: a space characterized by the concepts and messages issuing from the ritual and participation in it: and producing relevant configurations at FOCUS OBJECT.

Two more things should be noted concerning the model. First, it presents
a picture of a system of interrelated actions and their resources (ideological and otherwise), objects and products in a de-technified version of a semantic network, and as such draws on another much more complex system, namely the triple-cluster system of Catholic theology, ecclesiology and liturgy. The second point arises from this systems connection, and it is that there is a wide range of overlapping between the "nodes" and possible or even likely alternative positions in the network for many of the entries. This flexibility attests to the richness of life but is a severe limitation to any static (not kinematic) graphic model of real-life conditions. Therefore, the model has to be seen as representing just one among many possible states of matters. However, in Model 3, items have been graphically collocated on the level at which one seems to get the clearest view of the item's interaction with other items. So that items function in interaction when they have similar operative characteristics. For example, on level 3, physically attestable items are interacting: objects, people, environment; while on level 4 a conceptualization from level 3 takes place; a ritual performance being, at certain levels, a formalization, an expression of a rule-system applied to a system of message display.

The levels in the model are:

1. an organizational level, on which, in the case of San Marco, the ecclesiastical authorities, and partly also the government, plan, evaluate and make decisions on the basis of imposed and selected sources and resources (such as canon law, liturgical texts and rubrics, ritual traditions, pastoral and church-political considerations, etc.);
2. a goal level, on which values, goal and demands are defined and attitudes assumed under the impact of the outcome of processing on level 1.;
3. a management level, on which the "thing" in focus is being handled and otherwise dealt with by whoever is our analytical candidate for manager, within the given environmenal setup.
4. The next level is where actions directed or at least influenced from "below" on the model, are being performed, with local participation and information exchange.
5. On the production level the relevant meaning-producing processes are issuing as a final output to determine the
end product. The latter may be visualized in terms of the resultant analysis of a media case, for example a liturgical image in a church or a Quranic inscription in a mosque.

We have just drawn a general picture of the "total" process in which our rituals are involved, tentatively surveying the prominent kinds of factors, their interrelations and the levels on which they interact with other commensurable items. A verbal statement of what may be meant by ritualization generally may be termed as follows, in connection with Model 3.

We have two main levels, one with the action and process program including general resources and goals; and the other focusing on the information mechanism arising from this.

3.5. Model structure in the liturgy

No organization has just one structure. Even charts showing how a business firm is organized in terms of presidents, vice-presidents, directors and so on down an hieratic scale, tell only one set of stories, leaving out the criss-crossing of informations, influences and decisions and the clientèle patterns extending into the surroundings. Nevertheless we cannot cope with the issue by any means than setting up general models, hoping to be able to make them work together (the models, not the firm!), at least at levels considered particularly important. Such models, however, are "pictures" themselves requiring analysis for which there are not any general rules.

I have just presented "a general picture" of a ritual in a model (Model 3) that tries to take care of the different levels in the ritual process - or better: the parallel processes in a more complex ritual. I shall use it presently in order to structure some comments on the relation of the Roman liturgy to the concepts spelled out above.

Starting from "below" in the model (Model 3), with level No. 2: the goal level, concerning values, goals, etc., we note the following things in comparing Roman liturgy, partly with reference to Wittgenstein's remarks. The ritual does not depend on magic or myth but rests on divine decree (this according the Church dogmas). At management level, concerning the basic function(s), we note the following four points:
1) The central rite, that of the Sacrifice in the Canon, does not display a metaphor but a reality by divine institution: a memorial with specific (even though not easily defined) reality and effects, some of which occurs with certainty (the transsubstitution, the Presence). Furthermore that

2) The power of the ritual words in the liturgy do depend on divine decree and is ensured by this - not by magic or myth.

3) The decisive events and their objects through which they occur (transsubstitution, host, bread and wine etc.) and their significance, the connection between rites and ritual objects (bread and wine) and ritual focus (God, Christ, the saints), are not implied by some traditional popular beliefs and ideology-loaded customs but manifestly spelled out (even though semantically difficult) in words. Thus, the expectation-fulfilment semantics (as in Wittgenstein) has before it a defined set of terms less vague than the cases he discusses and, within the dogmatics of the Church, real in specific theological senses (Of course even "mythical" rites may be felt as providing some kind of reality by their adherents. Without entering into this complex issue, I may just say that there are at least two crucial differences: in the Roman case the "reality" is set out systematically and spelled out in texts kept alive through the centuries through exegesis; and the "reality" here is articulated in various mutually supportive modalities connecting earthly things with heavenly conditions).

4) These points are made clear through a high degree of linguistic precision in the liturgical rubrics and texts and by centuries of authoritative writing on the subject.

At action level, concerning the actual ritual performance in its factual (state-of-affairs aspect; Adopting Pears and McGuinness' translation of Sachverhalten; see Ayer, Wittgenstein, p. 17.), we note the following three points:

1) contrary to the "anthropological" rites contemplated by Wittgenstein, the liturgy does not focus on specimens that remain the same (one goat for each sacrifice, a child) but on specimens that attain functionality only upon their transformation into something distinctly different (bread -> body; wine ->
blood) and on named individual entities: God, Christ, Mary, whose individualities comprise a number of correlated aspects and who play varying roles according to the specific situation or part of the liturgy. Furthermore,

2) the Roman liturgy as defined canonically, consists in a real event. In traditional rituals, a true event, like sending out the scapegoat, is hoped to give certain effects. In the liturgy, a true event (the ritual handling of the bread and wine, etc.) produces a real event (presence of Christ's body and blood, etc.). At the action level, but now in the context of the local network, we must take into account that

3) on most of the points listed here, there will have been wide differences in understanding and access, in accordance with educational standards and scope of life among the faithful, from the top clergy to lower clergy to various categories among the lay people, including the dog-chaser (the expulsor canum). This means that we cannot describe the liturgy as one process but in terms of a set of parallel processes.

Now to the production level, where

1), in the conceptual space, first of all there is an articulation in the fulfilment that is not characteristic of Wittgenstein's rites. The fulfilment is by two steps that are interlocked: one is ensured by divine decree (transubstantiation, Presence), the other one is wished-for, hoped-for: that God will accept the sacrifice, that the salvational effects will occur in due time, etc.

2) To turn to the representation context: Reverting to Wittgenstein's question about our knowledge concerning the outcome and nature of our expectations, our case does not present the same kind of problem; for one kind of fulfilment is ensured while about the other one we are not allowed to be sure. But in the liturgy, Wittgenstein's comparison between the expression of my expectation with the event that has occurred gets much more complex, for there are, canonically speaking, a number of alternative outcomes and also a number of possible levels of understanding the written and stated expressions and one's own conception of what one expects: in short a whole network of expressions. For example, in the Canon of the Mass, the prayer that these gifts [the bread and wine] be carried by the hands of your holy angel up to your altar on high, before the face of your divine majesty, may be subjected to conceptualizations quite
different from the authority-defined ones; for example by having appeal to physical imagery.

3) Staying within the representation context: Contrary to Wittgenstein's description (the adoption rite does not describe a birth, he claims), the liturgy does provide information, on two levels, in fact. First there is "historical" information - even in the short formulas of the Canon: the *Qui pridie*, which relates the crucial Last Supper event. Secondly and importantly, the liturgy, as Sixtus IV had stated, gives information about dogma, really confirms it. Within the context of the representation issue, there is still a point to be made.

4) I shall adopt Hilary Putnam's ideas, in part derived from Wittgenstein, concerning mental images or representations as conformities to feature patterns and concepts as idea units that are attended by abilities to handle them appropriately, for example in terms of normal language. In the liturgy, the terms and notions refer to entities of different categories, namely: ideal entities for which there may or may not be accompaniment of mental images translatable into pictorial images (God, Holy Spirit, heavenly altar etc.); historical entities once existing in terms of human experience, for which mental and real images come readily (Jesus the Man, Mary the Virgin, crucifixion, and so on); notions that can be illustrated in terms of images but that are also linked up with physical presence: sacrifice, body and blood connected with the Eucharistic bread and wine. At the action level, in the context of network role, these items are processed in a network interaction and brought out as representations in the next level in terms of words, gestures, actions and display of objects, sometimes enhanced by music and incense. In the model's environment process, this entire complex will be evaluated differently by different categories of people, leaving only our fictitious "situation protagonist" with a complete view. An example: to some, the accompanying physical image of Christ will not be an image at all but simply "Christ", rendering further intellectual conceptualization utterly superfluous. To the highly educated, the bread and wine will be "accidents" in the Aristotelian sense, while for others they will remain bread and wine and so vicariously consecrate their daily life; and they may, as in the old-time Tuscan countryside, offer a newly baked little bread with a cross on it to the first passing beggar. The cross "baptized" at the Epiphany rite for the upper echelons may not be in focus
while the ideas attributed to it are so; for other people this situation may be reversed.

Concluding at the product level, it should be adequate to say of the focus object that

1) God, Christ, the Holy Spirit, the saints are "produced" by the ritual process (2. and 3. to follow). This may sound irreverent but the sense of it is merely that the liturgy produces the configurations imagery of divine things, fixes them and displays them in action and word. I do not think that saying this is any different from the relevant Church's teachings which may be summed-up as stating that the liturgy displays as much of the incomprehensible divine things that God has allowed mankind to see. Thus it is fair to call the ritual a production process and treat it like one.

Now, to stay with the focus object, it is noteworthy also that

2) this consists in part of named entities (God, Christ, etc.) and in part of events, which I prefer to treat as processes (divinity being celebrated at the heavenly altar; divinity being celebrated in heaven by angels and saints; divinity being present, etc.).

At this point, let us revert to Wittgenstein's ideas concerning the distinction between the protagonist (I expect my brother) of an event and the event itself (I expect that my brother will arrive) and his claim that description is always couched in general terms, which I understand as drawing the distinction between language in general concerning events and the function of names specifically. The liturgical focus, as we saw specifically in the rites discussed in the foregoing section, is on names and events. This is important for configuration purposes: for most of the persons named (God, Christ - to say nothing of the Holy Spirit, Mary, "the saints", the angels) the only medium for mental visualization is pictorial imagery; there are no descriptions.

For events, there seem to be degrees of conceptualization scopes but in general they are open to description and mental (often pictorial) representation. There are those that are plainly biblical or legendary, in which someone does something and which are open to being described and depicted in terms of normal human actions. This even goes for Christ being enthroned, since
we know about kings having been seated on thrones (at least from fairy tales and pictures). Medieval pictorial arts avoided taking the notion of Christ "seated on his Father's right" literally on account of the pre-thirteenth-century reluctance to portray God (An ecclesiastically unauthorized tradition in the Subiaco (Rome) area of representing the Trinity as three identical-looking men seated next to each other (13th-century wall-painting in the Trinità grotto). nd the idea was represented in art simply as Christ enthroned, requiring the viewer to perform a transcending scanning: adding an invisible feature to the one you are seeing (one might visualize mentally two persons seated next to other); the process laying claims to instruction and competence on the part of the people involved (See Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 64f., 67f., about the *sessio a dextris*). No one, as far as I am aware, ever depicted Christ at the heavenly altar, a theme explicitly brought out in the Canon of the Mass (and elsewhere), but of course the idea of the bishop enthroned behind the altar can be visualized mentally without great effort. For the named persons as such, the distinction is between those who have a human nature and can be portrayed (Christ, the saints) and those who cannot (the First Person in the Trinity, the Holy Spirit (Hence the use of portraits of Christ to represent God visually, until reference to Daniel's vision came into use (he saw the ancient of days - *antiquus dierum*, and you may depict a vision).

It accords with theology and liturgical exegesis when Wittgenstein in the context of language philosophy claims that a proper name "is used without a fixed meaning" in the sense that, theologically, there is for any of them a great range of relevance patterns allowing one to shift emphasis according to need or occasion.

We now come back to point 3) concerning the focus object in Model 3. In the authority, top-information (high-clerical) understanding, description of events but especially conceptualization of the named persons rest on a system of notions spelled out in theology and liturgical exegesis and expressed in the liturgy which is itself eminently systemic. The present development of an analytical framework should have been followed up by a careful analysis of relations to
real historical exegesis for one or more periods or schools of thought; this would, however, take us too far afield for the present scope of general methodology, so I have to rest content if I can come up with a framework that can be developed further.

Looking now at such models as Model 3, there are two serious problems attached to such models in general. Later on, I shall argue that the weaknesses displayed here also affect many, if not all, of the models employed in the social sciences, too.

Firstly, when fitting my parameters partly derived from my empirical observations into the model, the question arises at almost every point as to where in the model structure to locate each item. For many of my parameters may seem (at least to myself) especially meaningful in the respective positions where I have located them. Thus the model is, so to speak, customized. But there are evident alternatives to the way I have arranged this. The case may be described by invoking the functional and semantic cohesion among the chief features in the underlying theological-liturgical system (the programmatic system illustrated in Model 2).

But certainly the basic idea behind the notion of Divinity has its logical place especially at the level of values, goals, attitudes. At the same time, since in the Roman Church performance of the liturgy is an expression of the passage, so to speak, from the value level to the final manifestation, the idea also would fit functionally in at the action level, where there is talk of the actual liturgical performance. For a graphic model to account for these variously motivated dispositions, it would have become too complex to provide us with a survey; and it should really have been a flexible, mobile model (such as a computer can operate). We have to "fill in" such a model with natural-language comments, as I have just indicated with one example.

At any rate, the process is overly complex and no real living person at any time, not even the pope himself, would be able to grasp it in its entirety in one coherent picture. The model, which purports to some extent to do exactly this, emerges as a customized simplification. A customized simplification is the best simplification we have.

So also - and this is the second point to make - is the situation pro-
tagonist, an artificial model. How is the entire machine depicted by the model and the comments on it set in motion and kept going? We know of course that the Church organization takes care of that, but it does so through various persons at different levels, including someone like our Ceremony Master. We need, for model completeness' sake, a place for any specific case of efforts on the part of such notional situation protagonists. This kind of personality, which may represent one individual, a group of them or the entire outfit active in conducting the liturgical rite under evolvement (somewhat corresponding to a juridical person), effects the connection between 

a) the value level (behind which we find the entire theological-liturgical system: the programmatic system (p. 134) – levels 1 and 2 on the model.

b) the resource level – levels 1 and 2 on the model.

c) the management level and 

d) the action level.

This applies to another kind of personality, too, namely ourselves as analysts.

4. LITURGY AND ORGANIZATION

In my list model, accompanying Model 3 for ritualization, I stressed the organizational factors in the setup, performance and control of the liturgy

Once an organizational model is applied to this systems interaction, it becomes easy to see that we are faced with situations of great complexity; and, again, that there can be no question of any interpretation or Verstehen. According to Thomas W. Malone (Malone, Organizing information, pp. 58f.).

One dictionary definition of organize is 'to arrange systematically for harmonious or united action'. Thus a group of agents is an organization if (1) they are connected in some way ('arranged systematically'), and (2) their combined activities result in something better (more 'harmonious') than if they were not connected. In other words, an organization consists of: 1. a group of agents, 2. a set of activities performed by the agents, 3. a set of connections among the agents, and 4. a set of goals or evaluation criteria by which the combined activities of the agents are evaluated. To organize, then,
is to: 1. Establish (either explicitly or implicitly) the goals of the organization, 2. Segment the goals into separate activities to be performed by different agents, and 3. Connect the different agents and activities so <that> the overall goals are achieved.

To which I should add 5. Resources, including material and personnel resources, competences and know-how, plus management capacities and traditions.

This account should give a fairly adequate picture of the pattern behind the activities making up our Ceremony Master's burden. The organization, once functioning, enters into action and its actions are mainly ritually focused. Let us look at a few selected sequences more closely.

In the Church as an institution - and in the church as a building - a special human agent in the person of the celebrating priest (or priests and other participating clergy) is presupposed for Roman liturgy. Christ acts through him (or them), and the priest (or priests) represent the entire Christianity (the People of God), so that any congregation member who might happen to find herself or himself alone in front of the altar during Mass, would be alone in a trivially social but not in a religious sense. This means that the ritual is a community concern in a strictly formal sense - the "formal" side being secured by the sacramental principle: a true, because heaven-sanctioned, sanctification of the liturgical action itself. The organizational nature of the Church means systemic character and since the liturgy isn itself systemic, we have to do with two interacting systems.

An elucidation of the systemic character of the liturgy may take two courses. Either we may follow the usage in most books on Roman liturgy and proceed up or down (as you prefer) the main levels: through the Mass, through the hours and through the ecclesiastical year as the rites evolve on these three levels. This is the model familiar to the Ceremony Master and the only adequate one if one is to be sure to do the right things at the right time or moment.

Yet most ecclesiastics and also well-educated members of the congregation would be perfectly aware of another kind of systemic image, fragments of which were communicated to people generally though the catechism and ordinary instruction as well as by pictorial means.
This is the message core which is spelled out repeatedly on different occasions and on numerous levels throughout the rites, year in year out. It sets out the mechanism of salvation through qualified participation in the action of the Church, centrally the celebration of the Mass sacrifice. Model 2 above (Chapter 1) gives a very crude depiction of the principal operations in this system.

We cannot speak of participation in the action of the Church without an awareness of the nature of the Church itself. As a minimum requirement, we must have in mind that the Church is more than just an ecclesiastical hierarchical structure with specific ownership and jurisdiction, and with formally (canonically) mandatory obligations, prerogatives and certain canonically defined roles in human society in the widest understanding of this term. It is also the embodiment of an ideological and text-supported system consisting of Tradition, Theology, Liturgy and of a literally and traditionally supported self-awareness concept subsumed under the term Ecclesiology, the latter a factor rarely taken seriously in art-historical writing /These terms are explained, with bibliographies, in Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 16 - 20).

The Church, then, is an organization in the wide sense of the word. This is so as long as we consider the Roman Church as a whole. Complexities increase once we focus on the specific case of San Marco in Venice, with its government-controlled life and practice within the wider liturgical and theological framework of the universal Roman Church. For this means that a third system is brought into the interaction process, the State and its government. Thus, the organizational source of the entire set of rites in San Marco (as a State Church) consists in three direct inputs and one indirect:

1) the Roman Church, expressed through Tradition and liturgy;
2) the Roman Church as a political-secular factor of power and influence; and
3) the Republic of Venice, and its State Church, and, inherent in its functions;
4) its relation to other States, including the Papal State.

I have found it necessary, in the present methodological venture, to simplify the political issue, giving the State system only a rudimentary part in the overall picture I am providing. Two organizations, the Roman Church and the Venetian State with its own State Church, which are interacting,
often in terms of contrasts, on numerous levels in the political and social spheres, are interacting in formalized patterns across the liturgy, the paraliturgical rites and the State ceremonies in San Marco (For the latter, see Sindling-Larsen, Christ in the Council Hall, passim; and, concerning the more spectacular aspects, see Muir, Civic ritual).

Our Ceremony Master worked right in the midst between them, in their interface, so to speak.

We may read as follows in the Rituum cerimoniale (Appendix, Nos. 2v/2 etc.): For Christmas Vigils among other things (in a synopsis):

*For vesper everything is read as in our Orational and Antiphonaries; Compline is said reading [not chanting]. Usually our Vicarius [acting bishop] intones this Vesper and sings the two Masses, unless the Primicerio [State-elected clerical head of San Marco] wants someone else to do it. When he chants, two canons sing the Epistle and the Gospel and one or two canons are present if the Dominium [Doge/Government] so desires. Then we learn that after the Salve Regina and Compline, the Vicar begins Matins (and in Invitatorium is sung by two priests wearing plumvials). In former times three young clergymen sung one after the other the Second Nocturns and three subdeacons the first five Readings, the three Gospels of the third Nocturn, etc. In this night, the pope (himself) recites the ninth Reading, that is to say, from the Gospel of St. John: In principio erat verbum ... such as this is indicated in the Roman Ceremonial, and he gives his blessing at Mass, but not indulgences. But he imparts them at Mass on Christmas day. At the third Nocturn all candles are lit. Further on (3/1), we are told that the Papal Legate (who is always officially invited so as to make it clear that he had no rights to be there) in 1538 wanted the priest celebrating Mass to walk up to the Doge and hear his confession, etc. This was evidently accepted, but Doge Andrea Gritti could not move himself as required because of his ailments. Concerning Epiphany we learn (3/10) that the Mass for Vigils is very different from that practiced in the Papal Court, and therefore the celebrant (in San Marco) must keep to the local order of San Marco and not use the Roman rubrics. On the other hand (4v/2), whenever no Sunday comes between Epiphany and Septuagesima (third Sunday before Lent), then the Venetians do as they do at
the Papal Court.

These brief and quite sketchy synopses bring into evidence some of the organizational features inherent in the document. First, the level of the major categories of participants. Two regular participants are mentioned: the clergy of San Marco and the Government (usually represented by the Doge and a restricted choice of holders of office). The third element, the congregation or the people, is hardly referred to at all. This need not mean that we are back to earlier centuries when a ritual, but also a physical, barrier was erected between the Mass celebration and the congregation (Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 74f.).

For the integration of all participants into the rites by now, in the sixteenth century, was taken for granted. There is a fourth participant, and that is the representative of Rome: the Legate or the Bishop of Venice; who was regularly invited to participate.

Secondly, on the more intimate level of subordinated categories, we find detailed instructions for various classes among the clergy (and also the Ceremony Master himself, the Dog chaser, the Candle Administrator, my translation of the title of *gubernator cerae*, and other servants, as to what they are to do at any precise moment and what they are to wear at each point in the proceedings. In terms of Model 3, we can locate all these participants as Situation protagonists picking up values etc. and transferring these to the performance level (marked Ritual on the model), this process is in part conditioned by the Environment setup: architectural and spacial features, organizational features, command lines, modalities of public versus clerical participation, etc. But the participants through their actions and conceptualizations also contribute to shaping the Environmental setup, so there is an interaction here. This in addition applies to the "Thing" (not a good word but chosen for want of a better one), which in the cases just cited are the objects used at Mass, books for reading, candles etc.

This entire system produces a complex set of messages which can be outlined only in very rough contours, since there will be situation-conditioned nuances that escape us. The "coloring" of the Conceptual space and the Representational values, plus the confirmation of the values and norms invested in the
entire system, issue in a Focus object which is conceptual: an image of the traditional and orthodox action of the Church; the respect for every detail in the canonical rites; the optimal performance of rites (priests with good voices, etc.); the Church of San Marco sharing loyally in this and then also the Republic of Venice through its government; the autonomy of Venice in certain important matters on account of her rights and her history (olum, formerly, is often used when reference is made to how things were done is earlier times in San Marco); the ensuing relationship between San Marco and the Papal representatives and hence between the Church of Venice and the Church of Rome. All these features emerge constantly throughout the *Rituum cerimoniale*.

The congregation or people does not so appear in it. This may mean two things, alternatively or simultaneously. Their participation, as I hinted, is taken for granted and sufficiently regulated by such instructions as, for example, to "prepare the (procession) ways" (*expedire vias*) so that mentioning them in the document would be superfluous. On the other hand, the Government completely and satisfactorily does represent the entire Venetian people (this is clear from all texts concerning Venetian constitutional and political theory and legend), just as one celebrant at Mass does represent all Christendom.

On top of all this, or better, encompassing it, there are the emergent properties of the entire complex of systems. This term refers to overall values emerging from the totality of a rite (and not from single part of it), such as for instance the spectacular aspect of the whole, its role in prestige-heightening for the city-state, and most actively, emotional response (Gordon, *The structure of emotions*; Richard Mark, *Propositional attitudes*; Shweder, and Levine, *Culture theory*; Leary, *Introduction to behavioral research methods*; Howard and Callero, *The self-society dynamics*).

All these factors are joined together interactively in some kind of system on yet another level. Such systems are dynamic and process-like. They are aimed at specific goals that are in no way achieved in dependence on or in terms of the media themselves, which are adapted, physically or at least conceptually, to the rites. Any specific visual medium like images or inscriptions can be replaced by another one if conventions are changed. Physical, conceptual and emotionally
relevant space is thus occupied by a system with some kind of hard, formal, rule-regulated core that expands in any direction into hazy and descriptively fuzzy and evasive areas of relevance.

As one of the emergent properties in the case of the rites of San Marco, there is the value of a total ritual, combining ecclesiastical and political aspects and conveying images of unity between them in a successful State under divine protection and mandate, of great prestige and richness. The most generally valid among the emergent properties arising from rituals generally, would seem to consist, on one hand, in the total ritual's property of being the object of respect for the very procedure, on the other by creating, in Stephen Spender's words, a world of objective values. For the liturgy in particular, such an effect as the latter also enters the system from without, by divine decree ("without" here in a technical sense, since the liturgy is itself a manifestation of divinity): the liturgy is instituted as a ritual by God and is thus a unity and a whole which hedges around the participants, fusing them into a unity and protecting them from the outside. Some kind of rule-system is at the basis for this feeling of identity and security.

Ritualization depends on rules, but what kind of rules?

4.1. Liturgy, rules and behavior
The liturgy uses the ordinary two types of rules: constitutive and regulative, terms originating in game theory: the former create the game by defining its purposes, its legitimate moves and the powers of its pieces. Without such rules there is no game ... Regulative rules then govern choice among the legitimate moves...

The distinction is not always clear but the difference is roughly that, if one breaks regulative rules, one is not playing the game well or appropriately, whereas, if one breaks the constitutive rules, one is not playing at all. Ambiguity about borderlines is often useful to theorists and players alike and certainly does not imply that there is no vital difference (Hollis, *The philosophy of social science*, pp. 152f.).

Preset rules for actions and mental elaboration are a distinct and fundamental element in the liturgy, covering almost everything, from how to effect the transubstantiation of the Bread and the Wine, over to apparent minutiae like vestments. A college once dismissed the celebrant's bowing his head at certain stages as an "insignificant nod": the trouble is that the gesture is heavily loaded
with significance. This significance is formally defined by the Church, and it doesn’t do for a scholar to dismiss it.

However, more or less directly connected with such rule-determined actions there are actions and modes of behavior reflective of everyday uses, as referred to in Chapter 1, above.

How can a rule-bound formally defined ritual model be made to account analytically for such everyday processes? My core idea goes as follows. We have to try to develop a method that may be capable of capturing the regularities on general levels, and then try intuitively to position the chaotic features inside this relatively manageable framework: *Die Fläche, weit gedehnt, / Durchläuft der breite Strom / in mancher Krümm* (Die Schöpfung). We may observe a river running its course and may predict its general flow also in terms of seasonal changes, but at a more detailed level there will be a multitude of whirls, back-eddies and still backwaters that we cannot generalize about. But we may be able to locate them in the overall flow pattern, leaving the tiny whirlpools to semiotics and image theorists. In other words, I have suggested that formal ritualization can be used, and are, in fact, indispensable, for framing in the more irregular occurrences but not for describing them, not to mention interpreting them.

To repeat: can the liturgical framework, seen as a special form of the rule-sequence set forth above, be applied also outside of formally rule-bound and predictable ritual situations? Several problems arise from this query; they seem to turn on the following issues:

1) The irregular features in normal human processes and situations which will often accompany liturgical participation, too;

2) the everyday and less formal rituals; if a liturgical-grounded model cannot capture these, then it is not adequate for the development of general process and situations analysis;

3) liturgy (at least the Roman one) not only expresses hope of fulfilment, but, as mentioned already, it does always produce, automatically under divinely prescribed conditions, one result that is of primary importance: the local presence of Christ/God and the setting of the faithful into a specific and divinely determined state. In addition, hoped-for fulfilment expressed through liturgical
participation regards the larger salvation achievement as an outcome, partly, of
participation in the liturgy as a "good work"; but this of course is not warranted
by the action itself. An everyday rite is never certain to produce an "automatic"
fulfilment.

Now to point 1), the irregularities attending participation in the liturgy.
Formal liturgy does not operate in isolation. Even the most well-devised and
strictly controlled ritual will yield some room for behavioral extras that may sur-
face more or less openly but which, nevertheless, we must take into account as a
factor in the overall play. Occasionally serious irregularities arise, too. If we are
to take at face value the complaints voiced at various medieval Church Councils
(Lyons 1274, Vienne 1311), even cathedral High Mass did not go undisturbed
by disorderly chat among "alienated" people (Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and
ritual, p. 9.). This sociological issue is relevant because the "users"' attitudes are
part of the game played out by any ritual. The notional "floor sweeper" I referred
to above is, to my mind, at least as important as the expulsor canum, the dog-
chaser, whose job is recorded in the ceremony book for San Marco. So there are
hidden powers, ... a chaos of attractions and repulsions far beneath the ordered
surfaces of intercourse, as Edith Wharton reminded us (The Reef).

Conversely, with regard to point 2), everyday behavior and discourse
involves ritual, formalized features, so that the boundaries are not all settled
(An idea developed by, among others, Goffman; see Collins, Theoretical
sociology).

Social Anthropology, among other disciplines, has long been teaching us
that everyday life, too, is largely made up of ritualized actions (saying hello to
my neighbor, etc.), so that the formally ruled ritualization may be considered a
tightening and solidification of what we witness in everyday life.

Yet the question remains whether formalized situations may be used for
understanding also the less formal ones attestable in everyday situations. The
information perspective introduced in the foregoing section will make this ques-
tion still more urgent; for capturing and understanding a message presupposes
rules by which to do this. I am thinking here of cases such as mentioned above:
conversation between people, language games that are notoriously unpredictable
and often rather chaotic. Chaotic as they may be, they do occur within active processes operating within frameworks in whose terms situations can be coped with behaviorally and conceptually.

Furthermore, if *thrownness* (a neology for being thrown into some situation) is considered a basic and common status in human life, as Heidegger and Gadamer (and, in a comparable perspective Maturana, in Flores and Winograd's account), seem to claim, then the use of a ritual model to capture situations generally, would be rather meaningless. The two American authors illustrate the idea that, as a normal occurrence, we non-reflectively are thrown into situations whose factors we cannot predict and control, since reflective thought creates abstractions and hence "blindness" to essential features in the situation into which we have been "thrown" (Winograd and Flores, *Understanding computers and cognition*, Index *Thrownness*).

Well, but certainly our representations of the world around us help us to focus on relevancies, construing frameworks, and hence to direct our will accordingly and structure our understanding of almost any situation - even though our will doesn't have the ultimate say on all levels. Does it really happen - or would it be analytically sound to believe so - that there are situations in which we aren't "blind" to some features or factors? Moreover, how crucial are cases of *thrownness*? How does the idea of fit in with the by now firmly established insight that we plan ahead for most situations we are about to enter? (The subject of Moore and Golledge, *Environental knowing*, and Canter, *The psychology of place*, to cite two classics).

Ultimately, at least in an analytical context in which we can work only with what is graspable, it is the constituent elements of frameworks, such as ideas guiding conceptual actions (and physical ones), that are the subject-matter of communication and information in the ritual context. So I believe the issue of thrownness can be reduced to the question of what resources a person, in any such case, is able to call up in order to handle the situation she or he is being thrown into. People don't have rules for any specific situation or event but certainly they do so for any type of situation or event; and if they happen not to,
they use the rules they do have, rules derived from social regularities, to redefine to some extent the thing they are unwillingly involved in (Canter; Moore and Golledge).

Such rules contribute to forming frameworks for handling things on the part of the protagonists of our stories. So maybe we can answer to the above query: can the liturgical framework, seen as a special form of the rule-sequence set forth above, be applied also outside of formally rule-bound and predictable ritual situations? We may do this by proposing to describe the frameworks of rules derived from social regularities which will be applied to unpredictable or thrownness cases. This is as far as we can go: no rules at all, no analysis; then poetry is more honest (and more pleasant).

5. THE RITUAL PROCESS AND ITS DIMENSIONS

Ritualization processes such as outlined in the above paragraphs may furnish us with a model by which to understand the Epiphany case in the perspective of the ecclesiastical authorities. People's conceptions of what was going on, on the other hand, depended on a number of partly unpredictable factors. Basically, the authorities could control and predict the most important of them through the tenets of the liturgy and relevant theological and ecclesiological teaching. As for the "internal conceptions" in the various categories of the participants, they would in part reflect teachings but also entirely unpredictable social and psychological inclinations among distinct groups or individuals. We can only capture analytically such factors as are to some extent functions of the ritual rule system (Sinding-Larsen, *Categorization*).

With the above discussions behind us, we shall look into three special subjects that seem to be important in an account of the relations of specific liturgies to ritualization in general: first, their role in relation to expectation and fulfillment, in other words, long-term time dimensions that defy precise account on our part; second, space dimensions in terms of approaching: preparatory to taking up focusing processes in a later chapter; and, third, "definition" of ritual-involved objects.
5.1. Ritual expectations: Epiphania and Salve Regina again

Given the force, or perhaps noise, of Ludwig Wittgenstein's theories of language, it seems unavoidable at this point to take a closer look at his ideas to the extent that they touch on the subject of rituals.

Some of his ideas have been severely criticized, among others by Ayer (Ayer, *Wittgenstein*) and I report them here not for their philosophical bearing capacity but for the analytical articulation they bring to the issue of rituals. His ideas about rituals are useful in an indirect way, since they call forth features with which Roman liturgy may be contrasted; which is perhaps not very complimentary to his efforts.

I shall dedicate some space and give some comments to Rush Rhees' account of Wittgenstein's thoughts regarding the subject of ritual in a linguistic context; this is based on the latter's manuscripts as well as published writing (Rush Rhees, *Wittgenstein on language and ritual*, pp. 69 - 107. Wittgenstein himself wrote in a rhapsodic style making interpretation and systematic appreciation sometimes hard; so does Rhees. This is somewhat confusing, as when to play a drunk man you use an actor who is himself drunk. Occasionally Rhees' texts is hard to read: *... the picture set out in the scapegoat ritual is a form of symbolism of form of expression* [has he read too much Wittgenstein?]. See also Skorupski, *Symbol and theory*, pp. 13ff., a note on Wittgenstein's conception of rituals).

Wittgenstein (hereafter W) focuses on the somewhat exotic kind of rituals that anthropologists, starting with Frazer, formerly concentrated on. This limitation may bear some responsibility for W's almost exclusive interest in rites that presuppose an action with a definite result or outcome, as in many magical connections; a rain dance bringing rain; an adoption ceremony giving social status to the adoption; the scapegoat relieving wrongdoers of some of their burden. The rites generally express expectations and hope of fulfillment. So do also the Roman liturgical rites - but with some important differences.

W compares the ritual object, namely its acting/action and significance meaning to a movement in language; the ritual process with shifts in meaning or in "grammar" like a language; and the rites themselves with their gestures as a
system akin to the system of a language. At one point he states that The ritual of the ancient myths was a language. It is, among other things, the formal character that makes the sequence of words and gestures into a ritual: \textit{the repetition and keeping constantly to a strict form makes it plain that nobody is telling anybody anything or asking to be informed of anything in this use of language and of figures of speech} (Rhees, \textit{Wittgenstein}, pp. 72f.: Rhees' summary).

Here one might comment that any ritual, whether it is taken to guarantee a desired result (like some of Frazer's cases that W refers to) or just holding out hope for it, may be described as a system dedicated to conveying and circulating information about these two items in a process. W focuses on verbal expressions, but the desired outcome may very well be understood without verbal expression: even regarding formal liturgy, people may attribute effects to it on concerns that are not explicitly expressed in it.

In the rites described by W, the gestures, according to him, are not being used as when people talking together or addressing a public meeting, and it is as if they assumed words and gestures had some power in themselves: a performance by words and gestures. W cites the ceremony of adoption of a child (as described by Frazer), in which the woman draws the child through her clothes in illustration of a real birth. The purpose is not to tell a story of an actual birth, i.e., provide information about it. Ayer comments that The woman's imitation of the process of birth solemnizes her intention to treat the boy as if he actually were her son (Ayer, \textit{Wittgenstein}, p. 9).

As far as I can see, solemnization rites, too (like birth celebrations), do display informative material. We may also note that some rites do indeed tell stories (in compact form), as we have seen in the case of the baptism of the cross at Epiphany. The story here is intended as a model for real-life behavior or, at least, ideals, and anticipation of possible, even likely, reward in the hereafter (no promise of rain). Even everydays rites, which Wittgenstein does not contemplate (taking off one's hat to a lady), provides information: telling something about people's state of mind, in situations that vary attitude towards others etc. Perhaps the Austrian philosopher takes a too limited view of the notion of information.

W then goes over to a closer look at the role of language and linguistic
rules, noting that application of a rule presupposes other rules (an infinite regress?) and that we must distinguish between a) simply its application and b) the ways of applying the first rule. Rituals contain reference to persons, things etc., and W contemplates cases like meaning N (or meaning him, someone) and hitting someone (Rhees, Wittgenstein, pp. 77f.). The first case can consist in looking at a picture of N, imagining him or uttering his name.

Circumstances are different with the liturgy. For as long as we stay within the framework set up by the Roman Church, such connections and references from one thing to another are not a question of myth nor of our daily language games à la Wittgenstein. Everything is established by divine decree and canonical definitions. If one believes in the religious framework as a whole, then this is no myth; and this is what we, analytically, have to count on. For a simple-minded non-believer it may look like one. Corresponding frameworks may exist also for the "anthropological" rites.

Wittgenstein then (in Rhees' account) goes over to what I might label an Expectation-fulfillment semantics (Rhees, Wittgenstein, pp. 83ff.). I believe that Wittgenstein's thoughts on this topic are challenging - if I understand him rightly; but he is difficult to read at first, and invites wildly varying interpretations of what he really meant (McCulloch, The mind, pp. 79f.). But then many of W's notes are products of brainstorming not intended for publication.

Wittgenstein formalizes his fulfillment-expectation semantics in his Philosophische Grammatik: the passage from expectation to fulfillment corresponds to a step in a calculation, he claims: a multiplication operation (25 x 25) relates to its result (625) exactly as expectation to fulfillment; and to the extent, and only then, that this calculation is an image of the result, the expectation itself qualifies as an image of the fulfillment (Wittgenstein, Philosophische Grammatik, pp. 160f.). This seems rather to simplify the modalities of what a fulfillment may consist in, for in quantification, the expression is what the fulfillment consists in, since the number does not have any content. There is no change of state from 25 x 25 to 625, only two different expressions of exactly the same quantity. If fulfillment shall have any useful mean-
ing, then something should happen from expectation to fulfillment. Illustrating rain in a dance is not rain, as must have become sadly evident on occasions.

Wittgenstein warns against confusing what belongs to the symbolism with what is expressed in that symbolism, such as the wish for fulfillment (In Rhees' summary: *There is a tendency to confuse what belongs to the symbolism with what is expressed in the symbolism - especially in expression of a wish, or of an expectation or an intention*: Wittgenstein, p. 84).

What does it mean to belong to a symbolic expression? Let us stay within natural language (here, too, with W!), and assume that the expression of fulfillment \( F \) is identical with the expression of expectation \( E \), as W seems to imply. Then certainly no expression, symbolic or otherwise, on either side of the equation, is any longer evaluated in strictly consistent terms, for the affirmation of identity must be a contingent and even fluctuant matter.

The Canon of the Mass bears the promise that Christ will be present, and to the believers he will really be so in the bread and wine. But this is a reality, no symbolic expression (staying within the Roman framework). A symbolic expression of his presence is the celebrating priest himself, through whom Christ the High Priest is acting or, for example, a pictorial image representing his Presence. W would say, I believe, that the image is a symbol of the fulfillment which should not be confused with an expression of the event of a fulfillment. For W affirms that *The fulfillment consists ... not in the thing expected but in the fact that it has arrived*. Hardly a great discovery, since fulfillment must have a time dimension, which "the thing" does not have.

But the problem here is that we can put more things of our own concoction into an image than we can into a corresponding verbal expression. Language, by statements, has greater capacity for exclusion and negation than pictures, which are endowed with a much more open-ended faculty of showing. Seeing the picture of Christ, we can easily see Christ as present but also see the event of his appearing upon the scene. When the text says He is present, then he is; saying He will be present, means he is not. It is at this point that W, in Rhees' account (Ibid., pp. 85ff.) turns to a special issue concerning the modality of a ful-
fillment. All talk about the fulfillment of a proposition must be couched in general terms, for, as we have heard already. We can never describe anything except in general terms (my emphasis); and, if this covers his intention, only actions and events can be described in general terms; categories captured by specific names not being general in W's sense.

Matters are less simple with the liturgy, which is partly seamless as a process and part contains sections that overlap other. We have a continuous ritual process which is intensified at some points by real visible events, an extension from texts to visualization: the Real Presence, with the Host and wine Chalice; and real hidden events: Christ coming into presence at the Transubstantiation. These events are in part expressed pictorially not as such, but only in terms of their outcome, for instance in a picture of Christ in Glory. Here fulfillment is partial through a protracted event or chain of stages, or even the relevant emergent properties of the liturgy, occurring by divine decree and hence being real in an absolute sense, with the final fulfillment as a future prospect (contingent upon man's ultimate account before God). Thus the coming or presence of Christ or the salvational action of the Church can, at certain levels, be described as equivalent to the coming or presence of divinity in its general significance and the Church's action as a salvation process on the level of Divinity. Yet one cannot claim that the coming or presence of Christ or the salvational action of the Church are mere expressions of expectation: they are also cases of real fulfillment.

The *Salve Regina* rite, with chanting before the image (probably the Nicopeia Madonna, Fig. 4.), presupposes the Virgin's role as mother of the Church (or its embodiment) and as chief intercessor for mankind before Christ; otherwise the rite would have no point. Thus her roles are incorporated in the ritual structure. But the effects of them are not, so that scopes for expectations branch out in many directions, taking personal or groupwise coloring. She is reputed to be selective with her favors and the participants in the rite entertain expectation that she may bestow her favor on them and that this may have a better chance of ensuing if they practice repeated veneration of her, as in the specific rite. The fulfillment (in Wittgenstein's sense) would consist in her turning towards them with favor, an event (let us say, one event, to simplify). The likely
favors are briefly listed above, and can be summarized as follow: she is approachable through the rite; in fact, trascendentally present in terms of attention directly to the participants. This improves their spiritual condition; it is now expected that she may turn her benevolent attention to them, especially in terms of intercession; these expectations transform the ritual situation and site into something especially valuable. Now these favors consist in what, somewhat awkwardly, may be called a network of sub-expectations and fulfillments. The mechanism is telescoped further, in that another set of expectations is implied, namely the ultimate resulting favor of God. Liturgy, thus, implies stagewise events of fulfillment and thus hope of final fulfillment but does not include it, except, to repeat, on intermediate levels (the expectation of Christ's presence and his Real Presence).

While the Salve Regina rite appeals to the Virgin for intercession and protection, the Epiphany rite mainly tells a complex sequence of stories and celebrates them in honor of God and also celebrates the institution of Baptism, which provides membership in the Church, particularly focused on the Republic of Venice. A scanning of the simplified graphic account of the rite (Model 1, sections 1 - 4) will show an even tighter pattern of sub-processes than in the case of the Salve Regina rite. The expectation-fulfillment mechanism is repeated on numerous levels and understanding this dynamic system lays claims on the individual's preparation and intellectual capacities; there will be various degrees of conceptual access to them. For the less prepared members of the congregation, much of this will probably be blurred because of the complexities (and the Latin!). For them, again, visual representations of the manifestations of fulfillment will consist, for example, in the dipping of the cross in the holy water. This is an image of the prototype of their own baptism and acceptance into the Church, with a hope of salvation. Try to describe the state of salvation! When it is defined, it occurs mainly through verbs denoting actions and events leading up to and its ultimate state consists (at least since Benedict XII's bulla Benedictus Deus of 1336) in the direct sight of God (the Beatific vision), an act of seeing, again an action or protracted event (References in Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and ritual, p. 123;
A perusal of the council definitions reported in Denzinger, *Enchiridion*, bears me out, I believe; see also, for example, Ott, *Grundriss*, pp. 213f.: *Man unterscheidet die Erlösung im objektiven und subjektiven Sinn. Erstere ist das Werk des Erlösers, letztere (auch Rechtfertigung genannt) ist die Verwirklichung der Erlösung im einzelnen Menschen oder die Zuwendung der Erlösungsfrüchte an den einzelnen Menschen)*.

Thus it is what the *Epiphany rite* shows - the dipping of the cross, the cross itself and so on - that illustrates, but merely by implication, the general expectation: the state of salvation.

To conclude, the complexities of the liturgy do not seem to warrant a distinction between expectation and fulfilment, since these two factors interact continuously and are converted from the one to the other at many points in the process. No verbal models à la Wittgenstain are adequate here.

5.2. Consecutive approach processes

To recapitulate and draw some conclusions, speaking now of how it is analytically viable for us to figure out how our victims react and behave. First: leaving out of consideration whatever is known about retinal and mental vision on deep physiological and cognitive levels, we may say that various modalities of eye vision, mental vision and conceptualization are in constant and incontrollable interaction. We can to some extent tell what is being done with concepts, but hardly ever why and at which deep psychological level. Second: the essence of my exposé on configurations and also on expectation-fulfillment, above, may be set out like this: in terms of knowledge, vision, conceptualization and perception - the entire set of configurations, people involve themselves in consecutive approach processes. So does the analyst.

In almost any case it is the approach to any notion or concept (God in his heaven, at the heavenly altar, the altar in the church, a sacred image, and so on), that is crucial, and the more so the more content- and association-loaded the subject. This is not usually a rational process, which is probably what Pascal intended to say with his famous and often misquoted and curtailed statement about reason and "heart" (which I quote in full, for the importance of the sequel):
Le coeur a ses raisons, que la raison ne connoist point, on le scait en mille choses. Je dis che le coeur ayme l'estre universel naturellement, & soy mesme naturellement, selon qu'il s'y addonne, & il se durcit contre l'un ou l'autre à son choix. Vous avez rejetté l'un & conservé l'autre, est ce par raison que vous aymez? C'est le coeur qui sent Dieu & non la raison. Voilà ce que c'est que la foy, Dieu sensible au coeur, non à la raison (Pascal, Pensées, II, p. 140).

Then the approach is more important than capturing the concepts themselves conceived as either static or discrete ("rounded-off") entities. For most of these subjects lead on or branch off to others. What is the continuation? We can isolate some of these or some of the "stretches" from one to the next, for further scrutiny, but this does not allow us to forget about the process, be it more or less ritualized.

The way towards the target becomes more important than the target in terms of what humans can cope with and handle; the target position itself being taken care by supernatural forces. We can search towards something whose existence we seem to know about without being able to define its nature: this, of course, applies especially to things divine. We cannot know God's nature directly, Pascal notes, but we can know his existence and, within the notion of his glory, also his nature: par la foy nous connoissions son existence, par la gloire nous connoistrons sa nature. Or, j'ay déjà monstré qu'on peut bien connoistre l'existence d'une chose sans connoistre sa nature (Pascal, Pensées, p. 147).

Allah is certainly not "less" important than our way toward him in any absolute sense, but the way is more important among the things we can handle: the Quran is explicit on this point.

In the briefest possible form, we are facing directions of attention that may be expressed analytically as forming patterns of arrows (For modalities of attention, see Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and Ritual, pp. 101f.). Hence it would not make an analytically viable model to presuppose a conceptual space consisting of constellations of well-defined, fixedly positioned and clearly-delimited "lumps" of concepts and images. We are always on the move. So is the analyst, who will never reach a position at which to stay con-
tent, à la Faust. Our objects themselves are focused processes.

5.3. Object orientation: what is this cross?

Processes are at the basis of Model 3. The argumentation in this book focuses rather on how things work and are operated on rather than on "what they are". This to some degree suits the specific empirical material, because Roman liturgy and ecclesiastical display (and teaching of the people) aimed at doing more than being; this generally also applies to the Islamic prayer ritual. The stance that I have adopted finds some justification in the so-called object-oriented approach in Computer science. We shall see that this perspective comes to support analytically viable definitions of objects and subjects or themes.

First, let me discuss the identity of a ritual object, the cross used at Epiphany, and of a theme, the so-called "living beings" (viventes) in the liturgy; whereupon, secondly, I shall take up the general object issue.

Returning to the Epiphany ritual, the question arises: what is the central artifact object here?

Let us focus on the cross. What is this cross? Is it a work of art, an historical "period piece", a piece of craftsman's work, an economic item, a prestige item, a liturgical object, a visual medium or all of these?. How to define an artifact in order to capture in a coherent way some of these different roles? The coherence and internal integration of the various features of the Epiphany ritual offers an answer: in terms of meaning, the cross is the entire process outlined in the model, including the artifact itself. The latter is a place marker within the process acquiring significance from the whole. It marks the place we, at the moment, want to focus on; another time we might want to focus on something or someone else, on some text, the water basin, or, indeed, the Ceremony Master's handling of this process (as we have summarized above). It goes without saying that I have just referred to my object with my framework context. Other students or different people in the historical situation will form different processes for object significance.

So that the meaning of the Cross is the entire functioning network. This is not quite the same as Wittgenstein's idea, that ... die Bedeutung eines Steines (einer Figur) ist ihre Rolle im Spiel (Wittgenstein,
For what I just claimed was that, analytically, it is not just its role in the process but the process as such and its involving the cross.

There is a parallel - even though a somewhat oblique one - in the philosophy of meaning verification; one branch of which purports to specify the nature of meaning, while the other...sets out to furnish a criterion of meaningfulness for sentences and may be summed up in Schlick's slogan 'the meaning of a proposition is its method of verification', the latter is summed up in Ayer's dictum to the effect that 'a sentence is factually significant to a given person if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express'. In both cases 'verification' means checking by observation" (Grayling; *An introduction to philosophical logic*, pp. 200f.).

The issue of process-relation of an object or a depicted figure becomes urgent when the object or figure, within Art-Historical academe, have acquired the value of fixed identities, while they in fact originate and function in a context attributing sequentially or alternatively different values to them.

A typical case is provided by the standard pictorial symbols of the Evangelists, the man, lion, ox and eagle. In other contributions, I have shown that these viventes – created out of a liturgical conflation of texts from *Isaiah* 6 and *Revelation* 4 - play an important role in the Mass liturgy, in which they illustrate the celebration of the heavenly liturgy before God (Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 77f., with further references).

The twelfth-century reliefs on the ambulatory wall, directly behind the choir (originally grouped in the same way on the altar) in Saint-Sernin, Toulouse, provide an illustration: Christ enthroned among the four viventes is flanked by two angels carrying identical inscriptions referring to the viventes: ET CLAMANT S<ANCTU>S S<ANCTU>S S<ANCTUS>, exactly as in the Sanctus of the Mass and in liturgical exegesis. Their singing the threefold Holy in *Revelation* 4 (Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus) makes their liturgical role clear, since they, when inserted into the liturgical context of an altar decoration, will quite obviously be associated with the *Cantus angelicus* of the *Sanctus* following
immediately upon the Mass Preface: *Sanctus, sanctus, sanctus, Dominus Deus sabaoth. Pleni sunt caeli, et terra gloria tua.*

Nevertheless, the Evangelist identification sticks and is commonly considered the only one or, at least, the most important one. In a recent publication on the mosaics of Santa Prassede, Rome, we are being told, with abundant references to medieval texts stating the same, that they count as symbols of the four evangelists or their gospels (Wisskirchen, *Die Mosaiken der Kirche Santa Prassede*, p. 52: Noch heute gelten die vier Wesen als Sinnbilder der vier Evangelisten bzw. ihrer Evangelien, and *die exegetische Hauptquelle*, Ambrosius Autpertus, is quoted: *Nullum dubium, quin per haec quattuor animalia, sancti quattuor figurentur Evangelistae*. The idea, however, goes back to St. Irenaeus.). In fact, in the twelfth-century apse mosaic of Santa Maria in Trastevere, Rome, the figures are accompanied by inscriptions conveying the four names. As for Santa Maria in Trastevere, we might note that the great inscription held by the Virgin is also liturgical. So it is perfectly correct to make the claim just cited: the viventes do signify the evangelists or their gospels.

The question is, however, whether the medieval exegetes would be satisfied by this statement. Did they really mean this as a simple statement of symbolic identification: $A = a$ (majuscle), so that saying: here you see the four evangelists (or their books), would be all the issue turns on?

More than just a case of symbolic identification, we are faced with the symbolization of a process or action. This is crucial, for a process has more than one contextual anchorage place and it is thus open to a number of different conceptualizations that may be or not be in conflict with one another; a generally valid point missed by Panofsky and his followers. The early writers, stating merely the symbolic identification, must have taken this process for granted as the basic feature:

1) The "$S,s,s$" in the Mass *Sanctus* is performed in the heavenly liturgy, of which the earthly liturgy of the Church is a reflection but also an act of participation in it.

2) When *Revelation* tells us about the same performance on the part of the
viventes (the four "animals"), and the liturgy brings in the additional support of *Isaiah*, we know that they, too, participate with us in the liturgy.

3) Now we also know that reading from the Gospels (and, indeed the writing of them) is itself a glorification of God; and that the Gospel book itself during the rites is treated as representing Christ himself.

4) Hence we combine 2) and 3) and, conflating the sum with 1), we will easily find that the four *viventes* are Old Testament prefigurations - more than mere symbols - of the Evangelists or their books. Writing the gospels is a verbal glorification of God corresponding to the verbal and chanted glorification on the part of the viventes. Again, it what is being done that counts, less what is what.

Thus the identification is not one of putting one name for another but of elaborating a process and identifying a role within it. The process is the liturgy. The early exegetes hardly ever make the comparison between the glorifying Viventes and the Evangelists because they take it for granted as part of the permanent frame - the entire system of Ecclesiology operated by the liturgy - within which all arguments acquire their value (For the basic and all-important but often (in scholarship) neglected theme of Ecclesiology, see Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp.16 - 18.).

After these comments on the definition of objects and subjects or themes in the liturgical process, I shall go on to discuss object in general terms, basing my argumentation, as I said, on the object-oriented perspective in computer science. This should be preceded by a proviso.

My appeal to analytical patterns culled from computer science should not be taken as a sign of any belief in their mechanical utility: my empirical material and the models I have developed for handling it cannot be programmed to be run on a machine. So when adopting an idea from the so-called object-oriented paradigm, it is the moral and the methodological perspectives behind it I do find useful, considering the ideas behind the programs as a bank or store of ideas, not as software.

The gist of the perspective is to ask, not what a thing is, but for a list of some of its characteristic features or attributes, and then ask for the method adequate for handling them. I do not ask what is a ritual?, knowing only too well that attempts at definition would either be superficial or infinite. I am asking for
characteristic functions and active factors in a ritual process and how to handle
them analytically in way that highlights the apparently important features in their
functional interplay. I wouldn't "cover" anything but I might pick out essential
features in the dynamism. Thus,

An object consists of a set of attributes and methods. Methods are groups
of instructions with reference to the attributes or even: Object (Blair, Gal-
lagher, and Shepherd, Object-oriented languages. A corresponding distinc-
tion between a data base (accumulation of facts) and a knowledge base:
data base plus rules for how to handle them: Coyne, Rosemann, Radford,
Balachandrian and Gero, Knowledge-based design systems).

A variable comprising both routines and data that is treated as a discrete entity
(Microsoft Press Computer dictionary). Furthermore, ... what is an object at the
conceptual level (the user view) and how is an object realised in practical sys-
tems (the implementor's view). At the conceptual level, an object is any per-
ceived entity in the system being developed ... In more detail, an object is defined
as follows: - An object is an encapsulation [joined together in a packet or mod-
ule] of a set of operations or methods which can be invoked externally and of a
state which remembers the effect of the methods ... The methods are the set of
operations which we are allowed to perform within the context of the object
(Blair, et al., Object-oriented languages, p. 26).

Thus the San Marco jewel-studded cross with a piece of the True Cross is
operationally or processually defined, as we have seen. We cannot in any satis-
factory manner set strict boundaries for what it is, but we can operate distinctions
between it and other things in the light of the entire ritual process in which it is
involved. This, however, applies to anything involved in that process, and so we
have another argument in favor of treating all things, persons and concepts like
media on the same methodological level, without trying to distinguish art works
from the rest.

We should now be sufficiently prepared for attacking the question of how
people may frame their focusing processes. This presupposes at least a hint as to
what is meant by "people" in sociological terms. To whom is it that I am paying
the compliment of being able to handle the complexities I am conjuring up? The
reader has a right to know this. So we shall have a brief interludium on this before continuing our discussion of configurations.

6. HANDLING AND COPING: SHE AND HE - OR THEY?

In discussing the roles of the authorities and the congregation or groups within the latter, avoiding the issue of whether the individual or rather the group, or even a crossing between them, is the basic unit, I have evaded an intricate problem to which the social sciences offer many mutually excluding solutions. Before taking up this problem more carefully, I shall cite some characteristic attitudes toward the issue. This should equip us with a framework for attacking it. Obviously the term congregation is valid for some levels, such as comportment directed by the formalities of liturgy and probably also, at least to some extent, with regard to basic attitudes, such as veneration and respect, attending them. But clearly the congregation (in definite modality) consists of numerous social groups, social-psychological identities and so on, such as the formally defined Upper Class: the optimates with a seat at the Great Council, then the members of various confraternities, crafts, etc., all of them with specific traditions, attitudes and demands. The same apples to such a strng as "the authorities", among them "the Roman Church", "the Republic", "the Government", "the Venetian clergy", to say nothing of the canonical subdivisions in canonicus, subdiaconus etc. amongst the clergy in the church, and so on.

As long as I stick to formal liturgy, the above-mentioned categories may provide sufficient articulation; not so, however, once we try to look behind the canonical facade and assume that a priest, the Ceremony Master, a senator, a craftsman and the expulsor canum might bring in personal extras and, at least as an aside, evaluate things differentially. Systems analysis certainly teaches us that a system is more than the sum of a system's components, and any social group obviously is something more than the personal features of n individuals added up.

There are at least three different views on this - and a fourth one which seems to be a special version of one of the three.

The Norwegian sociologist Jon Elster declared that The elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social institutions and
social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals (Elster, *Nuts and bolts*, quoted by Hollis, *The philosophy of social science*, p. 109).

Having Elster as our "individualist", we can let Margaret Gilbert, forthcoming through an excellent study (*Gilbert, On social facts*) represent the opposite stand: the basic unit is the group and the key terms are: social groups, collective action, social convention, and shared belief, even, I am sorry to have to report, *shareability*.

The third position, which I introduced into Art History in my book of 1984 (Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 171f.) is represented by various authors such as Knorr-Cetina, Cicourel and Collins (Knorr-Cetina and Cicourel, *Advances in social theory*, pp. 139ff., 150 - 56, also with the quotation of Collins below): *there appears to be no theoretical justification for taking the individual for granted as a simple, elementary unit of social action ... ; rather we have to deal with a multiplicity of selves constituted in communicative interaction ... Today we are confronted with the notion of multiple identities which appear to be insulated rather than to be functionally integrated into just one person, or one individuality.* Thus the macro-micro problem - how to make the multitude and the individual work on the same analytical level? - is solved: Macro- phenomena are made up from aggregations and repetitions of many micro-episodes (Collins). According to Ritzer (Ibid., p. 493.), Knorr-Cetina (1981) accepts interactional domain, grants greater role to consciousness and macro-level phenomena, like Collins *makes the case for a radical reconstruction of macro theory on a micro-sociological base, she is also willing to consider the much less radical course of simply integrating micro-sociological results into macro-sociological theory ... I... believe in the seeming paradox that it is through micro-social approaches that we will learn most about the macro order... (K.-C.).

Smelser also comments on the macro/micro problem (Smelser, *Handbook of sociology*, pp. 87 - 93, 106ff., 119ff.). *Theorists have been led by this focus on transformation [linkage between macro and micro]: an analytic one sustained*
by invisible processes in the larger system. This analytical linkage is achieved by the application of 'transformation rules', like voting procedures, to individual action] to consider individual action not as objects for analysis in their own right but as initial conditions for the operation of structural mechanisms. In this way, structural explanations - about the rules of constitutions, ... the dynamics of organizations and intergroup relations ..., the system of prestige allocation ... - have begun to replace utility arguments within the rationalistic micro tradition (Smelser).

Still, we may want the group to exist by itself, too. In that case, with the fourth perspective, we are helped out by Hogg and Abrams; the self-individual is transformed into a group-individual: Social identification with groups is as psychologically real, and measurable, as interpersonal attraction, reactance, frustration, performance anxiety or any other psychological phenomenon. In focusing on this transformation - from individual to group member - the approach opens the way for a more integrated and complete analysis of the social psychological functioning of individuals in society. By avoiding reduction of groups to individuals, it allows us to conceptualize the relationship between individual and society, and to place theoretically the group within the individual (Hogg and Abram; Social identifications, pp. 217f.).

Whenever required, the group characteristics get absorbed by the individuals who will then act accordingly At least this outlook leaves group characteristics as something that can be treated as such, oblivious if necessary of individuals, whether "basic" à la Elster or burdened à la Knorr-Cetina and her colleagues. It is not necessary, as I see it, to take a definite stand with respect to these alternatives. But if we accept some or all of them, we certainly are obliged to try to be clear about when and under what circumstances this or that version is actualized.

Again, to adopt the object-oriented approach, I would say that there is no question about what is the basic element, individual, group or a mixture of them, but rather how any specific analytical assignment requires us to treat them.

So now the issue turns on what our actors really do and how what they are doing relates to whatever situation or organization in which they are involved.

Anthony Giddens introduces the term structuration (Ritzer, Sociological
theory, p. 487) relating action to structure... there is no sense in which structure 'determines' action or vice versa. The rigid macro / micro distinction is not useful. The theory of structuration runs somewhat on these lines: the basic domain of the social sciences is not the experiences of individual actor nor societal totality but social practices ordered across space and time. The ontological (basic-foundation) starting-point here is not consciousness nor social structure but rather the dialectic between activities and conditions occurring in time and space (Ritzer).

Whichever way we look at our manner of handling social entities in an analytical venture, we cannot forgo consideration of how people involved in the actual situation were identifying themselves. Did some specific group consider themselves primarily as that very group, secondly as Catholics and thirdly as Venetian citizens, and so on?

In the context of so-called social identifications, there are two aspects of relevance to the present discussion, the first one leading up to the second: stereotyping and attribution theory. Stereotypes here are somewhat similar to Putnam's. I am following Hogg and Abrams here (Hogg and Abrams, Social identifications, Chapter 4). 

Stereotypes are generalizations about people based on category membership. They are beliefs that all members of a particular group have the same qualities, which circumscribe the group and differentiate it from other groups. A specific group member is assumed to be, or is treated as, essentially identical to other members of the group, and the group as a whole is thus perceived and treated as being homogeneous... An important feature of stereotypes is that they are shared; that is, large sections of society will agree on what the stereotypes of particular groups are... Stereotyping is a fundamental and probably universal bias in perception which has important and far-reaching consequences for behavior...It is a central component of prejudice and inter-group relations... Furthermore: The analysis of social functions of stereotypes can perhaps be taken further if it is related to work on causal attribution and is located in the context of concepts such as social representation, ideology, and orthodoxy... The attribution approach goes a step further in maintaining that
there is a more fundamental underlying need to render the world predictable in order to be able to behave adaptively. Such predictability is cognitively represented by individuals as intuitive or naive theories of the world which are arrived at by spontaneous and largely automatic cause-effect analyses of events. People are intuitive scientists engaged in the business of employing science-like but informal causal analyses in order to satisfy a fundamental need to understand the causal relationships between event, and thus render experiences, actions, and so forth, predictable and ultimately controllable.

Connected with this is the perspective of social representations that are distinct for different groups in a society and originate in everyday social interaction and furnish individuals with a commonsense understanding of their experiences in the world. They are [citing Moscovici] 'a set of concepts, statements and explanations originating in daily life in the course of inter-individual communications...'...Social representations appear to possess many properties in common with social stereotypes - both are shared, socially acquired, rigidly impervious to disconfirmation, employed to prejudice, and so on...<But at the same time the theory of social representations> is extremely vague and imprecise.

Social sciences, like parts of psychology, feel a certain responsibility for deciding on categories because they are so much involved in contemporary society and the public management of it. An analytical venture has a freer hand to experimentation without having to take other consequences of it than intellectual miscarriage.

Let us look at an individual or a group, or some other among the more or less artificial units construed by the cited authors and for the present subsumed under the name of a "person". Such a person was, in the historic setting, living in a specific society (the Venetian) with a specific cluster of ideologies, ideals, criteria, norms, goals and competences. If we were, like the modern social sciences, bent on acting in our surroundings, we would have to be familiar with and relatively sure about categorizations within this social tissue. But our protagonists inside San Marco involved themselves directly or indirectly in the rites, carrying with them some or many of the effects on them from the same tissue and its impact in various ways. But they were not then operating within that tissue.
They were operating within within an artificially created, defined and goal-driven process, the ritual. There is no way of assessing what happens in the transition from the outer world into the artificial one. The only thing we can do, is to be thankful for the "moral" advocated by some of the cited authors, who are virtually saying that their social persons are artificial concepts construed from their interaction with one another and with the surroundings. We cannot monitor their conceptual passage from the world outside into the artificial one of the ritual. But we can meet them at the door and attempt to assess their processes inside the ritual.

One method for doing this is suggested in this book, and its principal operations are

1) evaluation of process systems;

2) of special focusing processes; and

3) of approach processes in the light of competences that are in part socially supported (For "at least seven separate computational or information-processing systems" in human beings, and a discussion of issues around this theme, see Gardner, *The development of competence*. I have problems with relating anything to "culture", which remains too comprehensive a concept covering both features and actions in the light of some more general historical view, preferring to forget about culture and concentrate on specific processes. Several other interesting essays in the same publication). For the latter task, the parameters of barrier breaking and penetration of layers in the media setup are essential. A corresponding graduation of competences would be possible with regard to the entire Epiphany process as expressed in Model 1.

7. FOCUSING ON CONFIGURATIONS
From the vantage point of the line of argument in the present book, there is an analytical distinction between the Christian and Islamic cases of facing the holy and the Epiphany ritual. In the former, more simple-looking cases, we were concerned not with a time-sequenced course picking up image references and various focal points on the way, but with shorter rituals that in terms of visual media, like an image or an object (as the cross), seemed to have just one obvious focus. We shall see, however, that in other respects there are not one but several foci in
In the Roman ritual, human behavior and occupation of space - physically as well as conceptually - is more complex than it might seem at a first glance. The process of the liturgy moves through various preestablished stages, during which images, such as an image of Christ, assumes varying relevance. Thus in official or canonical terms, provided the liturgy achieves sufficient communicative appeal, a complex system of notions is activated among the congregation. Any description like the one I have presented concerning the rites in San Marco, will always be subjective and situation-dependent: an expert in the sixteenth century would to some extent disagree with it and one from the twelfth century might disagree even more. And different groups and members among the congregation would, below (or above?) the formal and canonical level of conceptualization react differently to the offered actions, objects and notions.

It is here, especially, that interpretation on our part is clearly meaningless, leaving us with the alternative of developing frameworks with scenarios and configurations subsumed under them; so that postulation of protagonists' scenarios and configurations is our ultimate product, substituting "hermeneutical" interpretation. Let me repeat that scenarios and configurations are operations directed on the situation, not identifiable objects. It is also clear that a scenario can play the role of a framework within which things are evaluated and reacted upon.

Our situations and processes are ritual. Any ritual model implies, as I have argued above, a series or a network of situations involving levels characterized by a certain regularity and predictability, to the extent that canonical authority remains effective. Furthermore such a model concerns patterns of processes that involve, as essential elements, a focusing on goals or targets and accompanied by a display of symbols and other value markers, such as images or various ritual objects. The processes determine or, at least, influence, framing (setting up of frameworks) also of the physical and the conceptual space. Through interaction or feedback, conception of images and objects is, in turn, influenced by these factors. The latter proposition needs a comment before we can proceed.

The focusing processes clearly occupy space in both physical and conceptual senses. Space, apart from contentless mathematical expressions of it, like
xyz in the Cartesian coordinate system or n3, may be considered a momentum space of three modalities:
1. directions/vectorial movement;
2. goals/targets/focus; directed attention;
3. constraints/barriers (physical, emotional, ritual, etc.) . The term momentum space concerns the operative aspect of conceptual space.

Here events are happening that are situated (in the sanctuary, for instance), focused (on the altar, for instance), channelled (by passageways, for instance), and limited (barred, by walls, for instance). Thus physically and conceptually they are extending and, in an everyday sense of the word, occupying space. This is no great discovery, but sometimes trite observations are needed to lead on to something a little less trite.

Psychologically and sociologically, but also, in fact, philosophically, it is necessary to analyse visual bearers of meaning in a coherent system, where all kinds of visual factors are activated, whether they are paintings or "things" or other individuals or groups interacting in verbal or non-verbal communication. This means that the space - including physical as well as imagined or perceptive "felt" space - will be a basic scenario of analysis. Within it any participating individual or group, say, attending Mass in a church or prayer service in a mosque, will to some extent have shared patterns of focusing on relevant actions, actors, objects, space sections and even transcendent space "out there", beyond the architectural limits, such as towards the throne of Divinity in heaven or towards far-away Mecca with the Ka‘ba. Any visually relevant factor in this ritual, from artifacts such as a painting or a piece of liturgical vestment, to architectural features, to the presence and behavior of other participant individuals or groups, may, according to circumstances, act as cues contributing to changes in system states.

The space characterized by such actions, is what I refer to as a conceptual space, in which not only ritual but also extraliturgical, sociological, environmental and psychological factors interact (In the present context I shall refrain from giving specifications from the vast bibliography involved in this connection).
The conceptual space consists of the pattern of mental attention on the part of people involved in the specific situation or process. This in part regards the local physical space, such as the hall of the mosque or the nave and sanctuary of the church or, say, painted visions of heaven e.g. in an apse. But conceptual space also encompasses the extended space and this is integrated with the local one, and the extended space may be of physical as well as purely conceptual character: it may have to be sought beyond the local architectural barrier, and be retrieved through mental images (or, indeed, through "depicting" pictures), like far-away Mecca with the Ka'aba, the Golgotha outside Jerusalem; or the "space" may have to be conceptualized in more or less abstracting terms, like heaven where God is. Human behaviour - physical as well as mental and emotional - will then have to be described in terms of focusing processes, optical as well as conceptual. In my opinion, analysis of architectural functions, too, must take such parameters as these into account.

In the Christian as well as in the Islamic context, by liturgical action and ritual focusing within a liturgically appointed space as well as beyond it, characteristic and distinct patterns emerge that seem to reflect important properties in the two confessions' employment of visual media. The model, thus, envisages focusing processes, directed and sustained by liturgy and by correlated ideological, social and environmental involvement and also by varying competences and capabilities of individuals and groups, as well as, indeed, the impact of the participating community as such. These processes define what is urgent and relevant and what is not and also priorities and order with regard to targets or goals that are available for focusing within a specific context, be they objects like an image or inscription or some conceptual or notional entity.

Roman liturgy under specific conditions, by accepting cult imagery, not only permits but in fact encourages what may be labelled a diffracted focusing on the part of the worshipper or the congregation. This is so when their attention is drawn not only towards the sacrament handled by the celebrant, but also, if the emotional or artistic impact is strong enough, to the image. Conceptual attention would occur when someone seeing the altar so to speak bypasses mentally the physical altar table and the rite enacted there and thinks instead of Christ or God.
in his heaven. So here a visual action would have two foci, one optical and one mental.

In many, if not most, cases the pictures themselves contribute to an increase in complexity (For the following, see Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 67 - 70; 109ff.; 168 - 170; 174 - 177). A simple cross, loaded as it is with denotations, cannot be scanned and subdivided into separable events. But a picture with a literary or pluri-subject content can, and it often will, offer several alternative patterns of "weightages", as we may see in connection with the Titian's *Pesaro Madonna* the Frari church in Venice (Fig. 7): is St. Peter the most important figure in the view of those who ordered the painting - or the Virgin? Is the space depicted in the painting to be considered as a space separated from the space of the church itself or as an extension to it? Does the world depicted "inside" the painting seem directly accessible from the church itself or does it seem closed off? Under rather common medieval liturgical conditions, when the action of the Canon rite evolved unseen and unheard by the congregation, and images were installed as substitutes (Sinding-Larsen, *Some observations*), then the pictorial media could complicate the patterns even more. Apart from canonically imposed ritual practices, as prescribed by the rubrics, however, we are seriously lacking information on "popular" practices concerning attention to the various parts of the liturgy. Trexler's studies constitute a promising foundation; and in another context I have noted some striking factors (Trexler, *Florentine religious experience*; idem, *The Christian at prayer*; and idem, *Legitimating prayer gestures*; Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 101ff.)

*Inheren* t in Roman liturgical iconography there are furthermore two factors that considerably complicate - but also enrich - the functional relations to the spatial surroundings. An image, by virtue of its very content (accepting this term, now, in its trivial sense), is ritually made to contribute to the setting up of these relations in the time dimension as well as the space dimension. Let us see.

As I have noted in another connection (Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, p. 36), a subject (motif) serving a liturgical context lends itself to being
conceived of as subjected to process-regulated changes. Because most cult images are subjected to doctrinally interrelated interpretations on several levels, some which are specifically connected with definite sections of the Mass liturgy, or with the liturgy of the day or the night or the year, it may seem to the worshipper to change attributes of primary relevance in conformity with these changes in liturgical emphasis as the rites evolve over time, while remaining unchanged in design and literary content. Quite simply, in seeing an image of the enthroned majesty during the celebration of the Canon, one will be alerted by what is affirmed and prayed for in the liturgy itself and see the image as an expression of one's facing the divine countenance, whereas on another occasion, say, a death Mass, one may see the judge or savior. At one stage the aspect of sacrifice implied in the image of Christ is accentuated because this is the theme of the Mass text being recited at this moment, while in a next moment the recital evokes the theme of the transcendental presence, and so on. Thus the time-evolution of the liturgy so to speak lends a kinematic effect to the image. One and the same image will evoke different aspects of attributes of Christ as the rites are proceeding. The Glory image, for instance, will undergo conceptual transformations from one Presence modality to another. This mechanism will often be attributed to other images, too, only usually with less direct canonical support or none at all.

7.1. Arrows of attention

Such time-regulated factors must be thought of as influencing also the conception of the space itself, since they evoke varying perspectives for what is going on within the space and transcending it. Further cognitive articulation of conceptual space may be favored by different modes of accessibility inherent in the compositional arrangement of the depicted features in the image itself (Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 96 - 99). Accessibility by direction when, as a reflection of the notion of the rites evolving before the countenance of divinity or some saint, the holy person or persons are depicted as facing the worshipper from a central position; accessibility by space unification when the depicted space construction appears as a part of or continuation of the architec-
ture of the chapel or the church; and, finally, accessibility by penetration, in which case the figure or scene in focus is emphatically represented as being far off and accessible only if we cross conceptual barriers or huge distances (as when we behold Christ and some saints in a Paradise landscape in a Roman apse mosaic).

With regard to liturgical imagery I suggested, at a conference at Strasbourg University in January 1988, using a metaphor to illustrate the idea of focusing patterns (Fauconnier, _Mental spaces_, 1994. His account is clear and very articulate and I have no doubt that a careful testing of my ideas against his findings would prove advantageous to my argumentation. But it does not seem to me that my overall ideas would be seriously affected; in some cases my terms, presented at Strasbourg in January 1988, seem to correspond roughly to some of his).

The model was one of a conceptual space, comprising also the physical space of the actual scene, with the momentum features as the operative principle. The protagonist construes her or his situation-dependent environment by focusing on concepts represented in the local space itself in an image on the altar or a quranic inscription, but also, and transcendentally "out there", not only far-away Jerusalem or Mecca but also God or Allah in heaven or being enthroned. In this way, an image is involved in pluri-stage focusing process that defines conceptual space structures precisely by various focusing approaches. The idea came from my work with liturgical imagery, in which the importance of focusing first at one thing, then at another, telescoping, is rather obvious - and with support from Von Helmholtz's idea of internal visualization. Fauconnier's book _Mental spaces_ - with whose idea mine bears some resemblance but also crucial dissimilarities - was not then known to me. It is probably helpful to introduce Von Helmholtz' distinction between external and internal visualization of space as reported by Salmon (Salmon, _Space, time, and motion_, pp. 18f.). _There are no special difficulties in visualizing two-dimensional spaces, whether they be Euclidean or non-Euclidean. We can literally see the surfaces or we can call them up in our imagination... Let us call this external visualization. Otherwise in the case of_
internal visualization: ... we must formulate an appropriate conception of internal visualization in order to understand what is involved in the visualization of a three-dimensional space of any variety. If we visualize three-dimensional Euclidean space, we do so from the standpoint of being confined within that space ... It was Herrmann von Helmholtz ... who first saw this point and formulated a suitable concept of internal visualization. To visualize a space internally, he said, is simply to imagine the kinds of experiences one would have if we were living in such a space (Salmon).

Such a conceptual space will be criss-crossed by attention directions for which I know of no better picture than that of vectors. This term, of course, is borrowed from mathematics, where it refers to directed speed, that is, velocity (as distinct from undirected, scalar speed), and is usually represented graphically as arrows. In our cases, we might say that imagined arrows directed toward foci in the ritual space denote directions of various forms of attention, optical as well as conceptual. For vectors indicate both direction and speed, which latter parameter in our context can stand for intensity.

Needless to say, the employment of the mathematical term vector is merely metaphorical; but the length of a vector, which in itself indicates speed in some specific spatial direction, that is, velocity, may be visualized, in accordance with Von Helmholtz' notion of internal visualization, as an indication of the urgency and intensity of any focusing process. Later I have come across Steve Weinberg's book Dreams of a final theory, of 1988, in which he uses the arrow picture to illustrate complex systems of explanation in science: arrows of explanation, as he calls them (Think of the space of scientific principles as being filled with arrows, pointing towards each principle and away from the others by which it is explained... (Weinberg, Dreams of a final theory, p. 4.)

There is nothing new in this idea of turning a perception model into a research model: The status of perception may be very like that of scientific hypotheses. What we see is affected by what is likely; and we can be driven into error by following assumptions which are not appropriate for the available sen-
sory data, to quote the neurophysiologist Richard L. Gregory (Gregory, article on "perception").

So in my present discussion I use the vector metaphor to cover the notion of a visual or conceptual (or both) movement in a specific direction. The Catholic Christian will always have divine manifestation right before his eyes at the altar during the celebration of Mass, while for the Muslim, the manifestation, apart from the non-localizable notion of Allah's being present everywhere, the distances are unmeasurable and humanly insurmountable, so that conceptional and emotional direction acquires a more significant value. Even so, the Roman Mass opens up a number of focusing goals for the congregation. The vectorial idea is at the basis of some models to be presented in the following sections.

7.2. Integrating the models

Model 3 has been presented in a foregoing chapter. It describes three roughly parallel processes in general fashion. One of them concerns symbolization and fetches data from the processes outlined in Models 1, 2 and 4.1/4.2. The Epiphany process, as it is expressed in Model 1, can be looked at as a specification within the mechanism of Model 3. From the point of view of the protagonists of these processes, the "actors" such as the Ceremony Master, every action is a focusing process aimed at some imminently attainable goal, while the entire set of actions, that is the rite as a whole, involves them in a higher-level focusing process approaching some superior goal. Thus the "tree" models of focusing processes (Models 4.1. and 4.2) share mechanism with Model 1. I have proposed elsewhere how partial processes from Model 3 feed specific entries on specific levels in Model 4.2. Within this overall system, the PROLOG-based Model 5 represents micro-processes on individual (or individ-type) level aimed at penetrating layer after layer in the media composition (For PROLOG, see Bratko, PROLOG).

The integration of models like those presented here does not create a simple surveyable system that can be taken in at glance or in some image that can show the whole structure. Reading, writing ad talking about the integration will occur as a process during which we absorb things in succession. The models
must be flexible enough to be modified so as to capture at least crucial stages in this process. As I have emphasized often enough, my models are not quantitative, nor are they based on some fundamental kind of "reality" or "truth". As noted earlier, their consistency can only be assessed by the way they can be made to integrate with one another in a manner that seems to produce reasonable pictures of the cases at hand, with as much coherence and few inconsistencies and internal conflicts as possible.

8. LOOKING AT TREES
Reverting to our images with Christ enthroned (Fig.. 5) and the Quranic Throne verse (cf. Fig. 9), let us now see what kind of space the two visual representations would typically be made to occupy. By typical I mean nothing more than a first-approach record of conditions, characteristics and circumstances that may be taken, analytically can be taken, as a point of departure - not as a classification pretending definite validity or permanence. Also let us ask what demands the characteristics of each case would make on the competences of users participating in the two different liturgical situations, in which the Throne Verse and the image of the Enthroned Christ, respectively, serve as focus media. These questions are discussed in the present chapter and below, where the internal specificities in the two media, pictures and inscriptions, are explored.

Directly perceivable are, of course, the inscription with the writing in Arabic and reporting on Allah's Throne, and the mosaic picture of the human figure of Christ. From an "objective" point of view only the Quranic inscription is invested with something close to a participation entative (Schönborn, *L'icone*, p. 195) and is thus ready to be conceived of as an extension or manifestation of divine presence, while the picture merely refers to such a presence. In a general transcendental perspective, both media evoke the idea of enthroned divinity in heaven. The inscription is an item in the telescoped focusing process aiming in succession one after the other or, by way of diffraction and thus without linear succession, at the imâm, the qibla, at faraway Mecca with the *Ka'aba* and, ultimately, at some notion of Allah - in the last instance perhaps perceptually if not intellectually reinforced by anthropomorphic notions. The Christian picture is a
step in a focusing process including, more or less stepwise, the celebrating priest at the altar, local divine presence, and God's transcendental presence at the heavenly altar. In terms of sequential focusing, the two processes appear as in the following simplified flowcharts, an indicative model that will be expanded further on:

1. inscription ----> Quran ---> Allah enthroned;
2. picture ---> God enthroned ---> five aspects of divine presence locally and "directly above".

In terms of diffraction, the focusing is distributed to the imâm leading prayer and the qibla, while the Christian picture shares focusing with the altar ritual and, indeed, the different modalities of presence just noted. The diffractive model is more likely than the sequential one, for an orderly succession as pictured in the latter presupposes some list of priorities: what comes first, what second, third and so on. To assume this would probably be to demand too much from people's handling real-world conditions generally - and demand too much from ourselves.

Thus, on the diffractive model, focusing processes go all at once in different directions, spreading out like the branches of a tree. But in both cases recursion is conceivable. For in the Roman case, as we shall see when discussing the graphic models, several processes connect the notions of presence. Conceivably, a person may focus straight on to the heavenly, transcendental presence at the heavenly altar or in the throne and find support for the notion in the concretizing local situation involving the presence through the consecrated bread and wine, or the imagery. In the Islamic case, the authority-imposed and mandatory focusing in the qibla direction, towards the Ka'aba, will tend to link up with the notion of the presence of Allah. The notion may find further substantiation in Allah's manifestation in the Quranic inscription itself. Correspondingly to the Roman case, confirmation or support may be sought in the concretizing inscriptions. Addressing the Ka'ba also means encompassing mentally the rites centering around the Ka'ba and reinforcing the principle of Islamic unity, thus activizing the feeling of community values in the mosque. Thus focusing towards Mecca with the Ka'ba may be interpreted as addressing the Ka'ba as the House of Allah, which is a non-definitive, comprehensive and never unambiguous term, however, see-
ing that bayt Allah (Allah's house) is used frequently also for any mosque.

This recursive reference also reminds us that focusing includes conceptual comprising and encompassing as applied to local space, other participants, and so on.

It has (rightly?) been claimed that everything can be expressed by a tree (Bratko, Prolog, p. 34.), and some of the functional items of the above general model (Model 3), can be extracted and used for the illustration of focusing patterns as I have just suggested. This model depicts the analysis procedures on the part of the analyst (in this case, myself) and the apparently relevant interrelations among selected features.

The tree models to be presented now - Models 4.1. and 4.2. - aim at reconstructing or predicting the principal features in a conceptual space as experienced by a participant in the described situation: his or her focusing pattern arising from contemplation of the church image or the mosque inscription in the framework of specific scenarios and directed towards various configurations.

There are internal levels in the models in the sense that two "targets" may seem to be directly interacting with one another. There are several objects in focus, image or inscription, and an altar or a piece of architecture, etc. But in each case, the Christian and the Islamic, there is, as long as we stay with my analytical course, one cue object: the image or the inscription. This is because I am asking what happens when someone particularly addresses or directs attention to the image or inscription. We need a more restricted model for the build-up of the visual media themselves, the image and the inscription, and for this I shall be using a model - Model 5. which is adapted from the computer program PROLOG.

My strategy now is to be as follows. First, I shall propose an empirical content for Models 4.1., 4.2, and 5., culling documentary and hypothetical evidence from the relevant chapters and sections above concerning Christian images and Arabic inscriptions in Part III, Chapters 1, 3 and 4. Secondly, I shall test them by trying to see where they may represent barriers of access to various degrees of understanding among notional historical users: what kind of person is sufficiently equipped to grasp what is going on at various levels, where does an alphabetic person have to stop in the "upwards" focusing process, and so on. Con-
Sciousness about such barriers is healthy also because we, too, as analysts, will meet them more often than we are perhaps aware of.

8.1. The Roman tree

Models 4.1. and 4.2. look like trees with roots down and tops upwards. In 4.1., for the Roman liturgical situation, level 1. is for the storage of relevant sources; these consist mainly in liturgical texts (Missal, Breviary or corresponding earlier collections) and their rubrics (instructions), special literary and practical traditions within the Roman Church (such as the Ceremony Master's account, other reports of usage, and theological comments on the liturgy through the centuries).

**MODEL 4.1: The “Roman tree”**

In these sources, goals, too, are either stated or implicit so as to determine process directions. On principle all focusing from an authority or canonical point of view are determined at this level; but personal, social and situational and contextual factors of course will bring, as mentioned several times earlier, considerable noise into the system.

The model depicts a situation from the celebration of Mass, and hence we focus attention on the altar. A network is established in the sense that altar and church/chapel belong physically together while the Mass ritual at the altar (level 2) backed up by the relevant texts and traditions, in fact, the entire ecclesiological and theological system (level 1) accomplishes the real presence of Christ as expounded in the sources (level 1) and defines the architectural space as a sacramental one, which unifies the altar and the architecture also in this meaning.

To stay with Model 4.1. The parallelism indicated on the model between altar -> image setup and sacramental space -> church/chapel is significant in several directions, for example in the sense that the architecture also becomes an image, especially of Heaven with which the Church during Mass is "unified". (St. Gregory the Great and, following him, Guillaume Durand (died 1296): Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, p. 24).

Nevertheless, this designed parallelism on the graphic model provides an
example of a claim that has some truth but also some inherent problems: a suggestion for further research - which, however, I shall not undertake here.

The focusing from the sources (level 1) and from the altar (level 2) directly "upward" to the "real presence" (level 4) is twofold in a real sense. While the former is exegetical (giving explanation and explication), the latter concerns action: by doing as the sacramental rite demands, the presence occurs. This image of the presence also is simplified, seeing that several modalities of Presence are associated with the real one in the bread and wine: the Trinity's presence in the Church; Christ's presence at the altar not only as the victim of the sacrifice but also as the High Priest acting through the actual clergy (the celebrant etc.); and Divinity's presence from on high on the heavenly altar (Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and ritual, pp. 25f., 49, 65, 74). The local real presence of the altar ritual, supported by the sources and by the sacramentality of the space brings about a notion of God's "transcendental" ("other-worldly") presence. And the real presence in bread and wine at the altar (level 4) links up with presence in heaven (level 5), especially the notions of presence at the heavenly altar and communication with the holy Countenance or "Face". These paths of direction attention (vectors) have a recursive effect on the conceptualization of the altar and the surrounding architecture. To avoid too messy a model, this is indicated on the top of the graph, from which I might have more correctly drawn in arrows downward to altar and church/chapel. The architecture by virtue of this process is considered an image of the heavenly Church and the heavenly liturgy (often illustrated pictorially, as in Jan van Eyck's Ghent altar) is mirrored in the church liturgy.

So far, on Model 4.1., we have noted what may be taken as the network or pattern of the main focusing processes generated by the ritual system itself. The altar imagery (on levels 3 and 4) is embedded in this network and contributes to its efficiency in some particular respects. Our focusing on the altar during Mass may (or will often) refocus on an image and determine our conception of its internal or compositional setup: choice, arrangement and significance of figures, things, surroundings, states or events within it. This happens provided the
authorities have already determined, though their planning of it, a framework for the content and internal build-up of the image that can prove receptive to the processes involved in the entire network: a more circumspective way of saying what the model shows, that the picture must answer the relevant theological, ritual, historical and traditional requirements.

Attempts, for example on the part of an artist or a commissioner of an artwork, to bypass these requirements will raise doubts about the image's place in the network and will normally be rejected just for this reason. For example, the setup may, under specific circumstances, block further focusing from the image itself "up" to its figure significance. If, in an imaginary case, Rosso Fiorentino's drastic *Descent from the Cross* of 1521 at Volterra were to be placed above an altar in fifteenth-century Venice, how would people react to it? It might be considered a less valid, or indeed unsuitable, representation of Christ's or Divinity's local presence and also our notion of heavenly presence. Even though we may think that the Church authorities would generally hope for and try to effect as complete an understanding of pictures among the congregation as possible, an easier, safe and cheaper method is available: to have the artists stick to established pictorial traditions. Faced with well-known types of images, a greater portion of the congregation would probably take what they saw for granted and remain unaware that there might be things they did not understand. Sticking to conventions in art is not merely a question of "style" or "period"; it is an instrumental matter, a question of playing safe.

On the other hand, image setup is linked up with that of the church or chapel in which it is situated: the reciprocity or interaction between the two may be unclear, missing or it may be highly conceivable, as when a painting depicts the interior space as a continuation of that of the building itself. The twelfth-century apse mosaic of Santa Francesca Romana, Rome, and Giovanni Bellini's *San Zaccaria altarpiece* of 1505 and Vivarini-Basaiti's *St. Ambrose altar* in the Frari church, both in Venice, are examples of this liturgy-based method. The situational role and impact of the altar image and the conception of it of course also depend upon the specific characteristics of its design setup, "also" since there is in addition the specific scenario, We noted this in connection with the modalities of naturalism and abstraction (in the conventional sense).
An important issue in following up the "complete" focusing network rests in the leap from level 1 (liturgical texts and actions) up to the significance of the altar image, which depends on the dedications and interpretation of the altar itself (levels 3 and 4). It is when facing this specific network that the question of degrees and status of instruction in various parts of the congregation becomes decisive. Let us see how.

If the altar image is of the Show your face type examined in Part III, Chapter 1, then probably most people would have connected it conceptually with the altar because of some minimal instruction in the workings of the liturgy. But this focusing from altar to image takes two different alternative paths that for some people will be combined: the general consciousness of connection with the Holy Persons during Mass is one, while another pursues a more specific conception of the critical moments in the Mass. Then things are happening before the holy countenance, and people knowing this, would probably also know that if the picture represents a saint (not God or Christ or the Trinity), then the saint has a vicarious role, an intercessor for humanity with Divinity; this especially applies to the Virgin Mary. This second modus alternative in fact comprises the first one. Things are different if instead of Your face (in one rendering or other) we meet with an event, say, the Annunciation of the Virgin. Then focus is on the interaction between two protagonists, the Archangel Gabriel and the Virgin, and while the basic meaning is clear, since this is the moment of the Incarnation, the idea of facing the holy person may not be evident. For if the Virgin looks and seems to have her attention in the direction of Gabriel, then the linking up of Holy person and Your Countenance is less direct and may not play a significant role in the minds of less instructed people (this problem may have been at issue also concerning Titian's Pesaro Madonna: Fig. 7). By turning her face or even her whole figure more towards the congregation, this may be compensated for.

In this way there are numerous alternatives for approaching the issues and understanding them and hence for competences in following up the various focusing subprocesses. Here there are variations at level 4, between the interpretation of figure significance, the notion of real local presence, and the evaluation of and reaction to the artistic value. A distinctly negative reaction to the artistic value may create a barrier at the same level.
There are, as we noted, also distinctions in the interplay of different layers of interpretation in one and the same image setup. A Christ facing us will recall Divine presence and the circumstance that Mass is being celebrated before your holy countenance. But the show your face and advent or coming texts cited above also call forth a substratum of meaning focusing on the Last Judgement. How people are to perceive this double-layered meaning, depends on their education and outlook. It also hinges upon any individual's mental state and psychological condition at the actual moment - a situational variable hardly possible to account for theoretically in anything except in terms that will become so abstract that they will turn out as mere speculation. Nevertheless, these personal oscillations are a fact of life.

Finally, but fundamentally, the quoted liturgical texts concerning Christ all focus on his glory. In Western, especially Italian art, there is a large pictorial repertoire of types of pictorial response to the notion. The notion itself is complex both theologically and liturgically and may be described as an intersection between five main aspects:

a) the incarnate God's (i.e., Christ's) glorification through the Ascension;
b) Christ/God as an object in focus of liturgical glorification in Heaven (celestial liturgy) and on earth;
c) various aspects of his presence (as above...);
d) his coming back at the Last Judgement; and

his particular appearance to a saint finding herself or himself in critical circumstances, through such an appearance, his appearance also to portrayed persons (Sinding-Larsen, Christ in the Council Hall, 1974, apparently gave the first systematic account of the generally rather vaguely presented iconographical type Cristo in Gloria or Christ in Glory: see Index Christ, glory, for the numerous occurrences; further in S.-L., Titian's Triumph, and Iconography and ritual, Index Christ; Christ's appearing to saints and persons is special topic treated at length in S-L, Christ, pp. 85ff., 88ff., 93ff., 166).

Of course the precise specifics of the image setup as well as characteristics in its situational setting will lend different emphasis to these various aspects. A systematic account of this require us to engage in considerations of situational networks, so let us specify the issue.
We have seen that the rites at the high altar of San Marco took place under an apse mosaic with the enthroned Christ and that the same subject occupied the centre of the "everyday" altarpiece as well as the *Pala d'oro* (Fig. 5), which was opened to full view on special feasts. The question of what such an image does represent is twofold. The first aspect concerns the repertoire of text notions from liturgy, and through it also from theology, that the image so to speak picks up by virtue of its content. This issue is usually tackled with sufficient acumen in art-historical research; the second issue hardly ever. That issue turns on the consequences or repercussions of the text references just mentioned. For the texts referred to from the image we have in our focus, in this case the enthroned Christ, in their turn are illustrated also by a number of other kinds of pictorial representation, images that also pick up some or all of the cited texts by the technique of association. Thus any image supported by liturgical and theological concepts will unavoidably be embedded, in terms of associations, in a complex network of other interrelated images. This is illustrated on Model 4.1. A.

This model again is a tree (upside down, this time) starting atop, with the Ascension of Christ - but with a little side-growth to the sending of the Holy Spirit. Just a few explanatory comments should be needed. The numbers indicate the types of image (in the list on the right) that are relevant under each liturgical/theological concept. No. 3. indicates the very common medallion or clipeus with a bust of Christ holding one hand up to a blessing or speech gesture and holding the book in the other (as on the triumphal arch of San Clemente, Rome; Fig. 11). No. 4., for "freemoving" glory, refers to the very large repertoire of levitated and "flying" rather naturalistic figures of Christ in Italian art from the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries and later. Fig. 11. Rome, San Clemente, mosaic on triumphal arch, Christ.

No. 6. concerns a great number of different Eucharistic representations: the Man of Sorrows, in many cases standing in the chalice, is a common one among them. The appearing Christ in No. 8. has been explained above. Some of the image types listed show Christ strictly frontally, a factor enhancing the sense of a direct contact from the point of view - and the physical position - of clergy and congregation.

What the model especially serves to show is how the above-cited back-
and-forth-reference networks operates in practice, psychologically including everything from top-down and bottom-up to mere shilly-shallying on the part of protagonists. If, for instance, we focus on No.3., the enthroned Christ, we see what notions the item refers to liturgically and theologically and also the conceptions which it serves to illustrate visually (along with a number of other representations that do the same job). It is this theology- and liturgy-grounded system in the Roman Church that offered such a rich repertoire of motifs choices for artists to chose from - and which has led many a scholar astray in vastly exaggerating the role of the arist in planning content programs in church art. If the choice of an alternative within an accepted group of representations was occasionally left to the artist, it does not follow that he decided on the basic idea systems and messages that were to be illustrated in one or the other fashion. Church authorities had consistently insisted on the importance of images for a correct understanding of the liturgical themes and subjects. On the other hand, other people, such as individuals or groups commissioning a work, might have a say, and influences here could be unpredictable in the cases of protracted enterprises, as has been aptly noted by Jean Wirth: *Lorsque'un étranger fait un don en argent pour l'oeuvre de la cathédrale, on peut supposer qu'il n'a aucune influence sur le programme. Mais lorsqu'un individu ou un corporation offre un vitrail à son saint patron, les représentants du chapitre contrôlent tout au plus la correction de l'iconographie, à supposer qu'ils aient des raisons et la possibilité de le faire.* De plus, la construction d'une cathédrale se poursuivait sur plusieurs décennies et comptait presque toujours d'importants changements en cours de route. Il était donc à peu près impossible de prévoir d'un seul coup un programme cohérent, ce qui favorisait les inititiatives d'où qu'elles vinssent (Wirth, *L'image*, p. 222).

It is, however, necessary to distinguish between levels here: there are basic norms not to be interfered with, at the level of fundamental liturgical and theological issues, and there are areas open to more liberal initiatives (See Sindring-Larsen, *A walk*). To propose, just to take a notional case, that Michelangelo’s Last Judgement in the Sistine Chapel does not represent the Last Judgement but some ideas of the artist's, would mean to disregard the regular iconographic features (figures in hell, Passion instruments, etc.) and, even more perilously, to
imagine that the Pope let the artist a free hand in the particular papal chapel. The interesting issue concerning this case, is that the pope placed his Last Judgement on the altar wall instead of, as was normal in centuries of tradition, on the entrance wall (either on the exterior or interior). If the explanation is, for example, that the chapel was used for the election of popes, one might refer to cases of French cathedrals with Last Judgements on the west facade, in front of which jurisdictional rites were performed. In this, admittedly notional, case, the fundamentals were preserved but put to specific situational use without impairing the canonical values.

MODEL 4.1.A: Semantics of “The enthroned Christ”.

If we now revert to Model 4.1. and insert an enthroned Christ in the box for Image setup (level 3), and set in the semantic network in Model 4.1.A., then we see how simplified Model 4.1. is. The two Presence boxes or nodes in this model compound too many features. Developing it further would require us to zoom in on the central part of the model: altar-image, setup-figure, significance-local, real presence-transcendental presence, and expand the model to contain such a network as is represented in Model 4.1.A. Then the survey limitations even of graphic models would become obvious. In a next stage of analysis it would have to be split up in more detailed and articulate patterns, thus becoming more precise but this on pain on losing survey capacity. So in the last instance there is no other way to go that to shuttle back and forth between models of different formats. Using models dynamically in this way, uncovers some facts about specific parts of the situation and they becomes tools for us in acquiring expanded understanding.

Different understandings of the image set-up and its connection - or partly missing connections - with the rest of network also can influence the conception of the architecture: if conditions such as those just exemplified are more accessible at one altar than another, this may increase the popularity of the former and its chapel.

For the commission or approval of a new image for San Marco, the ecclesiastical and governamental authorities, even though the juridic obligations of the
clergy were less strict before the Council of Trent, would try to ensure that the novel image would suit the predicted overall situation, including probable reactions among the congregation. They would have to take into consideration two aspects of the issue. They must ensure that the new work conformed to stated goals and purposes (in the authorities' normative prevision), after first having tried to evaluate the situation that the planned changes (installing a new picture, etc.) might realistically generate (in their explorative prevision, Normative and explorative prevision: Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 109, 113). This means that it is insufficient for us to limit our view to the relation artist-commissioner, for the latter is a member of a society, an organization, a group etc. and will predict and control effects on these surroundings.

Ecclesiastical authorities when faced with some task of decoration a church pictorially or otherwise furnishing it, probably did not work out graphic models of their conceptions of the kind of networks we are discussing at present (even though for other purposes such models were in use all through the "Middle ages"). But they will have had more or less precise ideas and insights about the existence of important and relevant factors and their interdependence and interaction, in short: networks of principally the same kind. We should not underrate scholastic training and its use, through out the Middle Ages, of many sorts of graphical diagrams for philosophical, theological and moral terms. Topping a chart of virtues and vices, we may find the enthroned Christ, and the same applies to examples of the Tree of wisdom (Wirth, *Von mittelalterlichen Bildern und Lehrfiguren*, passim and, e. g., Figs. 8 and 28).

To summarize: it is a trivial fact that the understanding of images differ among people. The important point is to try to see exactly where in the system the different barriers to understanding occurs and are located with respect to different groups of people. It is hardly possible to chart this unless we see the picture in its (hypothetical) total functional situation. Graph models are a help to chart such situations. I shall return to the question of barriers, after having discussed Model 4.2. concerning the Islamic context.

8.2. The Islamic tree
We shall now turn to Model 4.2. in order to collect enough evidence concerning
the "Islamic case" for identification of possible correlations and contrasts between this and the Roman case. The most salient difference is the presence of a sacramental system and an altar in the latter and the absence of these properties in the former. The next item is the distinction we might draw between the Roman picture "depicting something" by showing it and the Quranic inscription stating or saying something; between visual image and visual word. This distinction, as we shall soon see, is much harder to be clear about, because the Quranic inscription also does show: it shows a Quranic text, regardless of it being red or just looked at, and hence a manifestation of Allah.

The entire picture in Model 4.2. is much simpler than in the Roman case (Model 4.1.), because there are no notions of divine sacramental presence (only in "everywhere" terms), of a consecrated ritual space, or of a "counterpuntal" correspondence between the liturgy on earth and a liturgy in heaven; and there are no counterintuitive ideas about divinity: there is no Trinity in Unity or vice versa; and no saints, at least not in official terms: one doesn't pray to Abraham, Muhammad or to Saida Ruqayya. Finally, Islamic prayer ritual does not even approach the complexity of Roman liturgy. The Islamic (traditional Sunni) liturgy is a relatively plain choreographed prayer ritual including quranic recitations, with a strong community makeup.

So prayer and quranic recitation, with the additional impact from individual or groupwise and other specific contextual factors, conceptually produce the mosque room. Directing attention towards the qibla the congregation marks their approach to divinity as a community concern (a concern accentuated in the Roman ritual, too, but here it is sacramentally established) and intensifies their feeling of a real approach.

The theologically correct recognition of Allah's local presence, based on the doctrine that he is present "everywhere" (Allah mawjûd fî kulli makân), is intensified because of the local (in terms of physical space) intensification in the feeling of approaching God/Allah. Correlated focusing on the quranic inscriptions can only reinforce this emotional and cognitive drive, since, as we have seen, Allah manifests himself in these texts.

MODEL 4.2: “The Islamic tree”.
Moreover, the quotations themselves will also reinforce the drive, especially since they constantly evoke the image of the transcendental presence of Allah and offer concretizations of his creative power and guidance. We have also seen that many Quranic texts can lead to theologically unacceptable images or imprecise notions of a physically addressable God. So there is a highly productive interplay between the intimately interconnected notions of focusing on the qibla with Allah's house (bayt Allah), and of manifesting and witnessing inscriptions, with their special artistic and hence religious value, and the local presence of Allah in the "everywhere" terms. Ninety-nine "beautiful names" are attributed to Allah, but it is noteworthy that this series of names is not susceptible to being set up so as to form a system like the terminological-conceptual systems in the teachings of the Roman Church and to some extent reflected in the thematics illustrated in Model 4.1.A of the Roman case.

Most importantly, on Model 4.2., no relations are indicated between local divine manifestation presence (level 4) and transcendental presence (level 5). This is so because in Islam there is no theological system setting out any terms and modes of relations here; nothing to compare with the Roman system of a regulated, sacramentally supported and therefore to some extent describable progress from real local presence to heavenly presence (or vice versa). In the Islamic case, there is no articulation among terms for modalities of presence such as we find in the Roman context. Hence the Mosque room cannot really, except in emotional fashion, be identified as the proper place were God is particularly close to humans, as God is closer in a church than anywhere else. For it is prayer and not a place that brings man nearer to God in Islam.

8.3. Comparisons
Comparing the two "trees" in Models 4.1 and 4.2. and the comments on them, will produce, as far as I can see, the following pattern; a problem, indeed, for further enquiry!

First of all, the media are integrated in different ritual processes. In the Roman case, participation is a an act of free will; and if one does participate, one shares in the goal achievement. And participation occurs through the clergy. In
Islam, participation is (theologically, at least) contingent upon being selected for guidance by Allah and it is direct from the point of view of any praying individual without any mediation. For Roman liturgy is instrumental in an operative sense. In the Islamic case, participation is subject to a divine order; when one does participate, one shares in the promise for the future. Islamic ritual is operative in a contingent sense.

Secondly, there are notable differences between the media's relations to the respective ritual situations. In the Roman case, the image is embedded in, and understood in terms of, a sacramental situation, the implied notions and their messages having absolutely predominant value. In the Islamic case, the medium predominates locally in an absolute sense in terms of value (as Quranic quotations), the ritual being subordinated to its reality and its messages. Here, the visual medium is encompassing.

Connected with the characteristics just mentioned but also with differences in the liturgical setup, there are differences in the focusing mechanisms operating on the two kinds of media. In the Roman case, the altar is the very point of focusing, the place where the determinant act is being performed and where an immediate result is achieved and a necessary goal on the way is reached: the transubstantiation of bread and wine and the Real Presence of God. So that from a canonical point of view - not necessarily being fully grasped by the ordinary congregation member and her or his personalized views - imagery will at best remain supplementary focusing objects. In the Islamic case, nothing results directly from the rite, which bears promise for the future but does not change the actual state. And officially there is only a distant and physically unseen focusing object, the Ka'aba at Mecca; while the mihrâb with inscriptions is in the virtual focus without being canonically defined as such. From the point of view of formal ritual, the inscriptions are supplementary focusing objects.

In both cases the visual media are, of course, man-made in their physical constitution and message presentation or style. But while the Roman image is a comment and visual focus facilitating approach to the partly locally present divine realities, the Quranic inscription is a rendering of absolute and divine reality, Allah's spoken word as well as his inner speech, as we saw.

The Roman image is a supplement and a commentary on the rites and
their purport, contributes to enhancing the notion of the holiness of the site in church or chapel, which is realized by the sacramental state. The Quranic inscription does more than this. The holiness of the site consists in the act of prayer as imposed on men by Allah, and the inscription, which is certainly not a necessary feature, completes that definition in a visually manifest manner. Sometimes inscriptions make statements about the holiness of the cite, as with the Mihrâb or Nourishment inscription. This difference certainly is not due to media distinctions but to theological principles.

In the Roman case, the notion of a face-to-face relationship to divinity is central and supported by the real presence at the altar. This notion can be expressed through images, as we have seen. But this is for focusing and for didactic purposes, not out of any kind of divine ordinance. Images are not divinely chosen and determined media. The paramount medium of communication with mankind is the sacramental system, which is explained and backed up by verbal reports from the patriarchs and prophets and quotations from Christ. The Word (Logos, Verbum) is a theological entity, one with God, while his stated words (through patriarchs, prophets and Christ) are expressions of it but is not it.

For Islam, the Quranic words and hence texts are indeed divinely ordained, and the whole of them bears the mark of perfection and in-imitability. This is more than anyone can claim with regard to a Roman image. But the differences are not due to media distinctions but, again, to theological principles. Manifestation of Allah occurs in all nature and in the universe, but it does so in a more break-through manner in the Quran, whose text does not only originate in God but also is his only medium of communication with humans. The written word in the Quran is Allah's Word (kalâm = Quran and Allah's quality, called sifa, of which one property is speech). The medium is thus divinely appointed. This comes closer to Greek conceptions than to Roman ones.

Muslims are advised not to gaze toward heaven but concentrate on the prayer at the given site, for gazing at heaven may distract, since Allah is not thus localizable there. Such gazing is encouraged in the Roman context, probably and ultimately because God made Man ascended to heaven where he may be reached ritually and conceptually in a manner not envisaged for Allah in Islam.
On the other hand, the Roman image carries emotional load in terms not only of its message, but also by its pictorial features invested with human significance. The figure must necessarily show some expression and attitude, and these features are subjected to interpretations that are often wide open to attributions on the personalized level and usually will defy description except in terms of wide-masked reconstructions of frameworks, scenarios and configurations. Here, our historical protagonists and we ourselves, as analysts, go each our way. The former will interpret, which we will not (preferably, according to the strategy adopted in this book).

The Quranic inscription's emotional appeal will be mostly limited to its message on one hand, and to its formal calligraphic features which are not expressive of human-like attitudes: pure form. In this way, the Roman picture involves people emotionally, by the figures in the pictures being directly associated with them as bearing some feature similarity to them. Occasionally it does so also in terms of messages, as when human figures are included as prayers in the picture. The Quranic inscriptions very often refer to types of people classified in accordance with their faith, behavior etc., and occasionally contain a direct address to the congregation (the Cleansing verse), but for human appeal they remain detached without direct association to people themselves; that is, in the sense that they are not accompanied by synoptical (poetical) inscriptions in some popular idiom, in the way we see it in the churches (Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 76ff. on synoptical inscriptions). On the other hand we have noted that the Islamic world, like the Christian one, knows mystical ways of approach, which will attribute extra strength and reality to image and inscription.

In the Roman context, the centrally focused image (on altar, in apse vault, etc.) has simple enough central features to lend itself to an all-at-once visual appreciation. This would render the Roman image rather especially efficient because of the humanity of its features and the feeling of direct contact, even identification, that it can convey or contribute to. Whereas in the mosques some standardized texts can be absorbed in one glance, while others require sentence scanning, often enough even demanding unravelling of calligraphic complexi-
ties. Whenever the medium can be taken in at one glance, it would seem that the emotional impact of it is invigorated. On the other hand, the knowledge that here is a Quranic quote may be sufficient to permit one to bypass the specific linguistic content.

From a totally unorthodox but rather wide-spread popular point of view, a Roman image "contains" divinity or saint, while in Islam divine manifestation is a canonical reality, at least for highly informed people: so here the social conditions for assessing the two media are working in opposite ways. We have noted that the Light Verse with the light in the niche seems to have been consistently avoided in inscriptions in the mihrāb niche and that the motivation for this must have been fear of a too physical interpretation of Allah's light.

The Throne Verse we do find there, however, with the mimbar "throne" next to it. But nobody would probably confuse the Quranic image with a high-rise chair with their local Imām sitting on it while preaching. The exegetical tafsīr literature, we noted, consistently explains the Quranic throne in metaphorical terms. The Roman Church, on the other hand, had no problems allowing images of Christ being seated on a nice piece of furniture shaped like the throne of some earthly potentate. For God became man through him and thus the pictorial device need not become offensive. This more physically close relation between congregation and divinity is an outcome of the sacramental reality which was alien to Islam.

As for the approach toward divinity in both contexts, the Roman and the Islamic, there is of course the entire storage of religious texts and traditions not recorded on the actual ritual site. Both religions share some features that act as leading and focusing devices. Light is one of them, as we have seen, another is the idea of lordship which is made graspable in human terms: the Throne verse and images of the Enthroned Christ. In both cases there is an oscillation, or so it seems, between appreciation of the concrete term of vision and the notion of divinity.

Lastly, the issue of meaning and goal-direction of signals. In reference to the distinctions between communicated, intended meaning, received meaning and conventional meaning, we might say that these precise parameters are set out explicitly in the Roman case, namely in the liturgical texts themselves. The
lack of a universally fixed structure of liturgical texts in Islam makes the issue less definite. The same applies to goal-setting. All texts in the Roman liturgy, and the pictures through their follow-up, are directed toward the concrete event taking place at the altar in preparation for reaching the final goal. Corresponding readings - and inscriptions - in Islam are selected widely differently from a large store, the Quran, and set no immediate goal within the rite itself; the goal is so to speak a long-distance one. This means that the Roman imagery is more actively focused on the local rite, while the Quranic inscription is less precisely directed - more focused along the right path or the way of the rightly led, on which the Quran insists incessantly.

As for signals that are perceived of as being goal-directed, two things may be noted. In the Roman liturgy, authority, in the embodiment of the canonically consecrated local clergy, is much more markedly present than in the Islamic prayer ritual. The imâm is a community member like everyone else but attributed with particular but completely human qualifications and competences. In the Islamic ritual, the signals, in words or visual media, are all goal-directed but the goal is common among all individuals, and there are no privileged groups among them (in the same way, Islamic urban tradition - and the shârica law - does not allow of privileges granting local laws to one city as distinct from other cities); speaking now of the canonical conditions, leaving aside the fact that of course in reality Islamic society is just as split up in portions as all other societies. The Roman Church has always (until recently, at least) presupposed a level-divided society of men, based partly on the Biblical story of Noah's drunkenness (Sinding-Larsen, *Christ in the Council hall*, Index Noah). And inside the Church society is also subdivided; there is the clergy and there is the congregation and the former is formalized as a hierarchy. Situations will easily arise here, in which people will note or presume a divide in goal-setting between these various groups. Also terms of involvement will often vary among these groups, and this will affect the appreciation of imagery: to some the pictures will seem to belong to "their" world, to others it may look alien or not highly relevant or even interesting; and so on. Also response can vary much more in this group-divided society.
Finally, we note that the Roman liturgy is a typical gestured one, with the clergy moving about doing things and making gestures all the time. Choreographically, the Islamic prayer ritual is not only much simpler, but the entire motional pattern is shared by all, following the imâm, if there is one present. This probably makes for a much more psychologically loaded atmosphere in a church than in a mosque, with impact also on the appreciation of the imagery, both as its contents are ideally conceived and as the figures inside the picture are themselves serving as models.

9. ACCESSING THE MEDIA

The foregoing comparisons between Roman and Islamic cases should have prepared the grounds for a closer look at the relations between a text (verbal) and a picture (visual) with the same contents. I use the word "contents" in the pragmatic and not very articulate sense of real-world reference, such as to a lamp, a throne, somebody seated on a chair, or corresponding conceptions (Christ on the heavenly throne). Contents in a more analytic sense have not been discussed carefully in this book, because it doesn't seem possible to endow the term with a managable analytic sense (See, e. g., the discussion in Fodor, *A theory of contents*, based on Quine's claim that there is no principled distinction between matters of meaning and matters of fact. *Quine was right; you can't have an analytic/synthetic distinction* (p. 3). Har- rison, *Form and content*, by a different procedure, color comparison in particular, makes a corresponding claim, namely that current distinctions between form and content are incoherent).

It seems useless and, in fact, not tenable, to distinguish between object and content, so that both would be treated as the same thing. We have an example in my "definition" of the Epiphany cross as consisting of the entire process involving it including the cross itself, as an artifact describable in lowlevel physical-technical terms.

We have on one hand an image (The following remarks were made in Sinding-Larsen, *Medieval images*, pp. 335f.) - the Christian image of Christ/God (Figs. 8, 20) - constructed by a combination of visually directly accessi-
ble features with which real-life concepts such as a human face are being associated; in addition, this human face shows a God who is conceivable in human terms through Christ. On the other hand we have inscriptions: a word string scanned as A-L-L-A-H (Figs. 13, 14), which spells out the name of God without making that referent of the name in any way visible or even visualizable. Then we have a Quranic inscription with ALLAH and including the word KURSI (throne, chair). In the inscription cases we have a shuttling between "saying" (throne, light, etc.) and "showing" (Allah letter combination, or YHWY in a Jewish case), occurrences in which there is no other way of "showing", so that the string of letters becomes an image. The Islamic inscription both says and shows, as we noted above, but its showing is abstracted in the sense of being expressed through a conventional letter-code, whereas in the Roman case, there is a real-world resemblance referring to Christ’s human nature. So far the distinction between the two media seems clear and readily definable. But this is so only in terms of the theological basis, hardly in terms of effects.

The difference seems definite only as long as we isolate the two media from their functional contexts and consider them as if they should not be seen and perceived by anybody at all in any real-life situation. Seen and used, however, they certainly are, and accompanied by texts to which all these media would refer or be understood as referring, more or less precisely according to people's competences.

9.1. Access modes

It seems analytically necessary to distinguish between at least two levels of conceptual access to the media on the part of our notional protagonists.

First, as will be normal when facing long texts and complex figure compositions and such ones that we are not familiar with, we scan the medium feature by feature or word by word collecting evidence for a final summing-up at the end of the process, or, indeed, stepwise during the process. Then various solutions may come to mind, eventually to be supplanted by the final one. I call this the subject access, because it consists in analysis of the constituent parts of
some represented subject (or topic). The same applies to "narrative" rituals combining actions, texts, images and objects, such as in the Epiphany rite. The Epiphany rite shows a sequence of features that amount to a manifestation of the general expectation, the state of salvation: the dipping of the cross and the participation of the people, first through baptism, then through participation in the Mass, a sequence confirmed on the political and social levels through the doge's drinking off the water.

Then, as the second alternative, there is the head-on approach and I shall refer to this as the system access, since such an approach takes in something that is felt as being whole and entire (regardless of how limited the outlook may seem). One can capture something apparently essential in an image (a depiction) or in a relatively brief or standardized and oft-repeated text (inscription) by looking straight at it. A simple pattern of features, a conventional and well-known one, or of letters of some alphabet (or a mathematical or logical formula) can be perceived without scanning part by part as a whole and significant items attributed with meaning. A classical example is the letter combination for ALLAH, which even analphabets would recognize and see as a whole. This access mode is facilitated by so-called expertise, in the sense Hubert Dreyfus has given it. Under certain conditions and with adequate abilities or training, one may even take in a situation or a complex image by almost instantly construing over them some relatively simple model or schema with the salient (relevant, more important, etc.) features in some sort of system (Sowa, *Conceptual structures*, pp. 127ff.; Benjafield, *Cognition*, pp. 35ff., 52ff., 82ff.; Johnson-Laird, *Mental models*, pp. 189ff., 202ff.).

This manner of access, the systems one, can be facilitated and its drive intensified by the awareness that the image or inscription belongs to a situation that is felt as being in some sense particularly cogent or incisive: a relevance situation; such as in a sacramental or a ritual context, or represents something holy and very particular or important, as in the Islamic case, when the text is considered a divine manifestation, or, in the Roman case, where the image can give a
concentrated visual translation of an important notion or concept that defies verbal description.

This modality of access may mean that it is not so much the features and words themselves that are being conceptualized as the ideological system, or even the emergent properties, behind the visual pattern: a direct access to some more abstracting configuration (in the sense proposed in ...) or a summing-up of the emergent properties.

9.2. Media constitution

The constitution of the media also seems to offer various alternative openings or barriers to these modalities of access, in part subjected to sociological and sociopsychological variations. Considering the unsurveyable multiplicity of image variation, it is clearly not possible to chart the landscape in any generally valid sense. But I shall try to propose some possible guidelines for further research, connecting the features in a graphic model for distinguishing between access competences in people (Model 5).

The modalities by which, or conditions under which the media are scanned, will first be discussed in a very crude verbal flowchart with hypothetically valid headings or items, taking into account the two access modalities of subject and system access. What is at issue here are the modalities of access and constraint that images and texts may bring to bear separately or in combination. The simple flowchart list quite clearly should not have looked, as it does here, unidirectional; to simplify, however, feedback loops have been taken into account only in the comments.

The list has the following headings indicative of a systematic view of the issue: (1) Identifying the object; (2) Priorities in scanning operations; (3) Media dynamics; (4) Use of rules. It will contain more open questions than answers.

(1) Identifying the object.

The operation of describing definiteness - leaving out of the picture the question about what thing are - can probably best be conceived of as searching for the set of characteristics of the concepts we use when handling a thing: concepts as abilities. In most cases declaring something to be definite will involve stating that it
is similar to something else, whether another thing or a concept or idea, whatever. A traditional view is this: When we recognize something, we categorize it as something we have experienced before. But the current wisdom is that the operation is less once-and-for-all and more dynamic than has commonly been thought, for memory is often a very active process, in which our recollection of previous experiences is continuously being reviewed and revised (Benjafield,, *Cognition*, p. 4). Indeed, categorizing itself today emerges as a dynamic, context-dependent venture, as we will note when we look at Rosch's prototype theory (see Part V, Chapter 4): a matter of preferential choice of the best example within a cultural context. The issue of recognition leads on to that of analogizing, for which today theories are available that also point in the direction of multiple processes.

A picture can be conceived as aiming directly at a notion or concept, with the immediate result that the viewer "sees" the abstractions without much noticing the picture in between. God cannot be verbally described except in terms of his attitudes and actions, but he can be shown pictorially - at least in a vicarious format, in the figure of Christ or, from the late Middle Ages, after Daniel's vision of the Old of Days; in the Islamic case, only in the string of letters A-L-L-A-H. Verbal retrieval will then call up experience with imagery of this kind.

Names as written also identify - but how? Wittgenstein applies his holistic perspective to proper names - which is relevant to my subject because of liturgy's constant appeal to proper names: God, Christ, Mary, St. Augustine and other Fathers of the Church, Santa Rosa or San Gennaro. Starting out from the experimental proposition Moses did not exist, Wittgenstein claims that such a statement has various meanings. Ayer comments (Ibid., 68f.). In short, he accepts Russell's view that a name like 'Moses' can be defined by means of various descriptions, so that a sentence containing the name acquires a different sense according to an adoption of one such description or another....

It follows, as Wittgenstein remarks, that a proper name is used without a fixed meaning (Ayer, *Wittgenstein*, p. 69). This rather obvious claim again is a
healthy reminder for us in our attempt at pinning down the specificities inherent in our rituals: look at use and context! In the context of Roman liturgy, look mainly at the rubrics and liturgical exegesis or hagiographical narratives (basic to the liturgical readings) like St. Gregory the Great's *Dialogues II* about St. Benedict's life and miracles. These sources will provide a wide range of conceptions around a name.

But pictures and words do not only represent alternatives; they may also be correlated in an access process, either because there is a text accompanying and commenting on a picture or because seeing a picture may call up a text or the other way around; or, indeed, they may be combined with actions as in the Epiphany rite (or similar theatrical performances).

How can message similarities between a picture and a text be established? Does the picture or the text offer the framework? Is one of them foreground and the other background? This question calls to my mind the treatment of a relevant (as I see it) issue concerning the analogical reasoning techniques proposed for accessing the bilingual lexicon (Smith, *Accessing the bilingual lexicon*, pp. 109f.). If I understand the argument right, it goes like this: meaning and information have other formats beside the linguistic and visualizable ones. So one particular item is represented as a cluster of various attributes, including but not exclusively, also linguistic and visual patterns. Thus, it may be a question of a language-free characterization of bilingual representation... information [by this theory] is stored as a complex of features or attributes in a single memory store, with language representing one of these attributes, or, alternatively, the lexical representations of associated words are connected directly between as well as within languages, or the only connections between the two languages as well as within a given language are via an underlying language-free conceptual system; in the latter case, it is being postulated that it is possible separately to activate information about meaning (via a conceptual node [in a network]) and information about more physical aspects of the word (via a surface mode).

Let me note that the drive today is away from Chomskyian deep structure to non-linguistic cognitive base (See for example the interview with neuro-
scientist Patricia Smith Churchland, in Baumgartner and Payr, Speaking minds, pp. 25 and 29: "Davidson is wrong, Fodor is wrong, Putnam is wrong. Most people are looking at the problem of representation in the wrong way because they are looking at it as tied to language, as languagelike. Language is probably not necessary for representing the world, and probably lots of what we call reasoning does not involve anything languagelike either"; "My hunch is that quite a lot might come of sneaking up on language via nonlinguistic forms of representation").

These new perspectives, today only at a preliminary stage, probably will present a major challenge for which, in an adjournment operation, we have to prepare ourselves, as I said in the Introduction.

The cited research is still at the stage midways between experimental evidence and creative theorizing and can serve in the present context merely to point up the complexity of the matter. But the theory does render Wittgensteinian speculations somewhat less enticing. It also renders our analytical assignment still more intractable by blurring the tentative distinctions between image and language in the access operation.

Wittgenstein seems to distinguish between direct registration of a thing or image and interpretation of it. Panofsky's idea about iconology versus iconography looks similar. But modern cognitive theory, however one may judge the "positive" insights it is claiming, effectively discards such a clearcut, stepwise accession and identification of subjects, and so does, in fact, in the case of certain images of Christ and God, liturgical theory and doctrine (Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and ritual, pp.34ff., 45, 48f., 53, 164ff. .

In the humanitities, speculation about abstraction often occurs on very shaky premises, and Wittgenstein's ideas are no exception. He compares a series of simpole line-drawn human figures (stick figures) with a story told in normal verbal terms, claiming that the former is more like (ähnlicher) a verbal story than a realistic pictorial sequence would have been. He asserts - in a vague argumentation springing probably from brainstorming not intended for publication -
that a sentence in our verbal language comes closer than suspected to a picture in such a pictorial language (Und ein Satz unserer Wortsprache kommt so einem Bild dieser Bildsprache viel näher als man meint).

It is usually taken for granted that abstraction works one way, from the complex to the simple, taking literally the Latin abstrahere. But the term is useless unless we concede that we are abstracting also from other kinds of pictures (such as black-and-white photos) and, in fact, from all realistic pictures (indeed, necessarily so), and that we are abstracting toward some real prototype. Seeing a word, we do exactly the same; we do not see the outline of some figure but the words do the same job for us as an outline: we abstract from that to the prototype: a sentence from a story works as satisfactorily for us as a picture (Ein Satz einer Erzählung gibt uns dieselbe Befriedigung, wie ein Bild) - provided, I would add, that the word calls forth some familiar prototype of image or object. I think it is futile to try, as W does, to come up with general statements concerning such processes.

Abstraction to me looks as generic as movement. I cannot explain movement as something specific, only measure it for its scalar and vectorial qualities. Reading a number of recent research reports dealing with abstraction, I remain with the same view, that what we usually have in mind when speaking of "abstraction" is only a change in some system, be it cognitive, physical or whatever. There are no "abstract pictures" for they are all abstract, transferring concepts or display from one state to the other, in any direction. To try to say that a thing is "more" abstract than the other is really only to say that something has happened to the original system, and the meaningful operation would then consist in describing this shift in the system. I think this fits in with what Benjafield has to say about the issue. He focuses on abstraction as etymologically taking away and his definition covers a special kind of case:

The process of including recurring attributes, and excluding nonrecurring ones, is the process of abstraction ... When you abstract the recurrent attributes from the set of positive instances you take them away from all the others. The recurrent attributes form a set that defines the concept. He asks, Do people abstract the meaning of what they experience, and remember only
the gist, rather than the particulars?. Recent experimental studies imply that, although abstraction can take place, memory for individual units is also real (Benjafield, *Cognition*, pp. 63f. and 94f.).

What all this seems to entail is that we cannot set up any generally valid theory for how abstraction happens, for any system shift is strictly speaking an abstraction, and I can see no reason to distinguish between removal of some features and changing them or their position within the system. For a system has no boundaries except in terms of what we want to focus on. So our question now concerns how people may operate on a verbal or pictorial system and change it.

(2) Priorities in scanning operations.

Initially I claimed that "content" is not a question of what but of how: thus also with object: different scannings will bring out different contents from the same picture, and, when texts or pictures are being scanned in the subject access mode, the question of value, order of procedure and priorities arise. Certain features may stand out in so-called salience: a color or a subject, either by visual or mental operations (Blake and Troscianko, *AI and the eye*, p. 92, on the visual (retinal) aspect of this).

Salience may facilitate access and in fact lead effectively on to a systems access even in a complex picture. Under conditions of ritual repetitiveness, people may note form rather than content.

Some inscriptions have to be scanned linearly, from left to right in "Western" languages and from right to left in Amharic, Arabic, Hebrew, Persian, Ottoman and Karakhanidic Turkish, Urdu etc., while others, because of visually simple or striking shapes, invite focusing in a similar way as relatively simple visual images may do. Complex pictures offer a variety of scanning alternatives: facing Titian's *Pesaro Madonna* (Fig. 7), do I start out from the Virgin or the kneeling Jacopo Pesaro? Depending on their complexity and structure, we have a subject access or a systems access.

From this follows a comparison problem: we may have an inscription without a definite focused feature. But most images, especially in a liturgical context, will have a focused object already installed in the setup of the picture,
usually by way of being placed centrally in a symmetrical pattern (the face-to-face images of Christ and the Virgin) or by facing one another across an action field (Annunciation, Visitation, Betrothal of the Virgin). How do we handle these issues in verbal analysis? The modalities are position and action of the figures, at the very least that of "appearing" somehow.

The two words Christ, St. Peter in juxtaposition to one another will, when seen in isolation, reveal non-relatedness in terms of a lacking other syntactical connexion than the comma; space relations between the two words on a wall or a piece of paper yield no meaning beyond grammar and syntax or lack of these. It is their historical, religious, liturgical etc., relationship that may effect a set of interrelations. The two visual (depicted) human figures placed side by side have no common structural requirements like grammar and syntax for their combination in space, but they are fixed in their positions in relation to one another and they must necessarily appear in some form and thus they do invite consideration of their spatial relations, as we noted concerning Giorgione's Castelfranco altarpiece.

Scanning priorities depend on what "story" is being told or attributed to the image, whether it is a story or merely potential action in the represented subjects. Not "merely", in fact, because a depicted human figure cannot avoid being attributed with at least a potential action.

(3) Media dynamics.
Depicted representations seem to invite the notion of fixing the state of things (an idea of Wittgenstein's). The word sequence St. Peter standing doesn't say anything about how he is standing, what is his attitude and "expression", whereas an image of him standing fixes this - and an onlooker may attribute definite values to the way he is standing.

Fixing, binding applies to a visual narrative: in a picture of St. George killing the dragon and liberating the princess, each feature is embedded with all the rest, whereas the sentence just cited is open-ended in a number of respects and on several levels: we have to supply the interrelations between the protagonists (corresponding to compositional arrangements) of various stages in the action, as well as the psychological or "expressive" configuration of each of
them, and their appearance: colors and so on; furthermore the surroundings of the scene or its background. This should imply that the picture is more readily accessed in the system mode than the text, which requires us to consider various alternative ways by which to combine the cited features mentally or in our imagination.

Fixedness also must be seen in relation to the medium's intended function. Speaking merely of what happened in images and inscriptions, one risks losing the chance to integrate this perspective with their unavoidable functional relations to the entire context and the processes that are involved. The question is: what is their function? The general idea we can pick up from previous chapters is that both image and inscription have been installed where we have found them in order to a) explain or elucidate important things happening on the actual scene, preparatory to repeated use; b) visualize and hence improve the storage in memory of these things; and c) thereby intensify the corresponding experience emotionally and perhaps even rationally. The fixedness of images will favor points b) and c).

It is possible to say St. Peter without imposing any specific relation, whereas we cannot depict St. Peter without bestowing upon his appearance some degree of "naturalism" or "abstractedness", which will trigger widely different reactions in onlookers (reactions that cannot be mapped over onto professionally established terms of style). A play on ambiguity is possible: again, to achieve comparable effect by verbal description, the effect easily gets lost on the way because of over-accentuation of the terms involved in the play. Language is bound to rules that account for this effect.

The word term St. Peter is implies no affirmation or proposition, but so does St. Peter standing. The word term indicates no direction for interpretation; this is left to any grammatical and syntactical context in which it occurs. A visual set of features showing St. Peter, as we have indicated above, does display notions that will seek expression in sentences or sentence-like structures. Or unavoidably the figure must do something or not do something, and it must be located somewhere, on a blank wall or a sheet of paper or in an iconographical programme. The bust of Christ/God cited above performs no unambiguous action such as standing or being seated: but it unavoidably seems to appear in a
spatial sense and with some kind of expression (hierarchically posing, looking severe and so on). Thus an element of action will be called forth, but with no definite time dimension to it in the design itself. It is the liturgical process, corresponding to the story cited above, that it is meant to accompany that provides the action and the time dimension.

The corresponding word term - Bust figure of Christ - is not active. On the other hand, such a visual appearance is expressible in some word sentence; so that it could seem to be just a question of going up another level, from word to sentence, from Bust figure of Christ to Christ appearing (or Before the Countenance of your holy majesty).

Indeed, but the effects of the visual appearance and the appearance stated in a word string can be rather different. The appearance of a depicted figure is attributed with more or less importance from its context and environment. A verbal description of the iconographical context including the figure must mention the figure with the rest, and this might mean over-accentuating it, an effect that would not necessarily follow from a visual scanning of the same context with the specific figure.

A distinction between a visual figure and an inscription/verbal statement can be attempted by considering a picture showing a "set of features representing a standing, white-haired and bearded, haloed, elderly man wearing some sort of 'biblical' costume and holding two keys, one golden and one silver white". Related concepts are, of course, St. Peter, but also apostle, saint, martyr, the first pope, the papal office (Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 151ff.).

By set terminology, {St. Peter} intersects with all the other sets, except that of {the first pope}, which must be considered an identity. The primary motivation for depicting this specific set of features and for "reading" it one way or the other, creates, in an interest-driven and competence-regulated action, some specific order of importance in these sense-structures according to individual variables in, let us say, the clergy and some particular patron. Beyond the levels of compositional focusing in terms, e.g., of symmetry, or narrative focusing (St. Peter receiving his keys), the visual features position each feature and present
several connotations simultaneously and without internal priorities. It is for the onlooker to retrieve, as from a data base, what is felt as interesting and relevant. The word St. Peter, on the other hand, by being the selected and stated one (instead of, e.g., apostle and martyr), emphasizes itself over against all the other sets. And the above full sentence "set of features..." etc. spells out priorities without indicating position. If priorities are more decisive in a relevance or quality evaluation than positions in themselves, then it should follow that descriptive or evocative sentences have a more determining effect upon environmentally and socially influenced interpretation than iconography, which is more susceptible to fixation and determination by situation involvement, such as in the liturgy.

Furthermore, and this seems even more important, any visual image depicting some live subject (let me call them live entities: humans, including human-like divinity, saints, angels, etc., animals, plants etc.) will always be embedded. This is my term for the circumstance that a visual shape of this kind cannot escape being evaluated for its active or passive relations to its close surroundings; that is, with the medium it is a part of, such as a sheet of paper of a piece of wall, or other figures next to it and belonging to the technical medium, such as oil paint, gesso covering, paper, etc., so that we will tend to see a visual unity here. Usually, however, a drawing on a white surface will immediately be understood as something obvious and the relation between figure and sheet passed over as unproblematic.

Usually, too, I have noted, an inscription will not call for our attributing to the live objects mentioned in it any other relationship to the wall as such, other than that of physical presence of the string of letters. Of course, if entities are mentioned in the inscription that do have special functional relevance to the space where the inscription is situated, such as God or Allah in a church or a mosque, then the names or corresponding terms will easily be seen as related to the functional situation of the place, but again in terms of the prototypes rather than graphically designed words. A systems access will probably be effective here, grasping an overall picture or emergent properties of situational characteristics. The problem with "depicting" images is that there does not seem to be anby way available by which to distinguish, either conceptually or philosophi-
cally, between form and content, other than by quantification of the former.

Two juxtapposed visual figures must unavoidably display some kind of attitude or behavior, some sort of self-presentation, "hieratic" or emotional, etc. You cannot draw a figure without making it look like something and not two figures next to each other without provoking one to get ideas about their interrelations. A good writer can give an adequate verbal rendering of this (up to a point, at least), but again description may emphasize the particular state of affairs too heavily and to the detriment of some central message. Attitude in a depicted figure may not be in the focus of interest but may act as a basso continuo run off beside the main theme because the two themes in iconography appear simultaneously.

In an image it is the graphic design that seems to bear potentials of motion and activities relating to the neighbors or surroundings. What we can "see" mentally is not dependent on whether the object exists or not, but whether we have seen it or a picture of it or can draw from other sources of imagination. If I have seen the *Unicorn tapestry* in the Musée de Cluny, then pictorially the unicorn exists for me (Curiously enough, Nelson Goodman, *Pictures in the mind*, seems to make a distinction between "real" things and non-existent things such as unicorns).

And I have seen the Christian God in pictures, whereas I have never seen and will never see a picture of Allah, nor for that matter the grex porcorum: so concerning him I am helpless with regard to visualizing, whereas I have seen pigs and am prepared for visualization. To the intellectually active, lack of pictorial reference may entail a challenge to thinking over the notion. To the less active or less prepared, it may be something taken as given, including some of Allah's attributes, and therefore less difficult to cope with than a picture.

These factors also affect the discussion in the below account of barriers. To sum up my observations so far: there are cases of attribution with potential motions or interactions with the surroundings or neighbors on several levels: media-specific (we attribute to the graphic design potentials of activity) and prototype-specific in visual images and inscriptions.

All the perspectives discussed in the previous sections have to do with the
production or retrieval of concepts. This term is understood in the light Putnam's notion of concepts not as things but as abilities to construe meaning-bearing structures and the total conceptualizing operation on them. My handling of the main issues is intended for debate. But I do believe it demonstrates the futility of treating media (pictures, objects attributed with significance, words, sentences) as something distinct from the processes in which they are involved and the other "objects" that are also involved in them. The idea of media specificity is not a very good guide. For almost any feature in the given situation (itself only analytically delimited) may be subjected to similar cognitive operations, via schemata, on the part of the notional "users". An empty chair in a strategic position, say, behind the high altar, may call forth the image of the bishop. The presence of other features, some of them perhaps pictorial or inscriptions, as well as actions by participants, will activize such a mechanism.

Perhaps an observation of Immanuel Kant's may come in handy, as translated by Johnson-Laird (Mental models, pp. 189f.). In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our purer sensous conception. No (design) image could ever be adequate to our conception of triangles in general. For it never could attain to the generality of the conception, as this includes under itself all triangles, whether right-angled, acute-angled, etc., whilst the image would always be limited to a single part of this sphere, i.e., either isosceles, equilateral etc. The schema of the triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought, and it indicates a rule of the synthesis of the imagination in regard to the pure figures in space – : the rule for constructing any triangle.

Wittgenstein's contention that images bind while concepts of their subjects are freer and more flexible, seems to amount to the same. A picture of a cube does "bind", at least so because it has to be shown from specific point of view; not so the expression \( a^3 \), which is a general instruction for an operation: make \( a \times a \times a \) and the outcome of such an operation.

(4) Use of rules.

Are there rules behind all this? In language, sense-bearing units are fed into a pre-channelled structure of grammar and syntax. A visual system of iconography includes no operative rules specific to the system itself in terms of pre-set categories like verbs, connectives, etc. In operative terms, iconography is category-
less. It is environmentally imposed logic that makes it implausible to show St. Peter standing on his head or makes depicted narratives translatable into symbols of terms like subject, predicate and object. It is liturgy that imposes certain structural properties on an image or an iconographical programme. Because the visual medium is not pre-channelled, the alternative terms of perception increase exponentially with the increase of features (Sinding-Larsen, *Iconography and ritual*, pp. 151ff.).

Wittgenstein discusses an idea of Frege's to the effect that we may often disregard the impression made by a sentence and just look at how the sentence operates. The former insists that there is no such thing as a separate sentence: what people call a sentence is a position in a language game (*Denn was ich 'Satz' nenne, ist eine Spielstellung in einer Sprache*), and the common misuse of the term obscures the fact that a sentence is dynamic (has no "position") (Cf. "Die matematischen Sätze sind nur Spielstellungen in einem Spiel - which does not justify the cited claim that understanding is irrelevant" (Wittgenstein, *Bemerkungen*, p. 299). For his language games, however, there are rules, whereas we cannot come up with anything similar for pictures: iconography is, as I said, category-less.

9.3. Barriers to access

Now, as already suggested, the constitution of the media seem to offer various alternative openings and barriers to these modalities of access, and I shall try to set these characteristics out in a systematic manner, connecting them ultimately with a graphic model for distinguishing between access competences in people (Model 5). All through there will be social and social-psychological variables to the access concerning the above points.

We turn now to a closer look at interior operations within Models 4.1. and 4.2. The question is how people may be thought to access the mosque inscriptions and the pictures.

The focusing processes stipulated in Models 4.1. and 4.2., in fact, depict, as we saw, conceptual access processes, breaking through competence and conceptual barriers in the two liturgical situations of church and mosque. Going about it in this manner, we would also seem to have defined categories of users,
counting from below, from the lowest range of learning and intellectual preparation. The assumption is that an object should be defined operationally, that its buildup and setup depend on what we (or the users) are doing with it. Let us access, with the users, the inscription and the image from the lowest level and proceed upwards through the various levels.

Model 5. Media access model (after PROLOG)

However, to formulate how far people can reach in their conceptualizing processes will be too vague to serve an analytical purpose. Positive statements tend to have ranges hard to define. The assessment can best be achieved by putting the issue in the negative: what hindrances could there be at the various levels of accessing the media? We postulate access barriers effective for specific categories of people when they look at an image in a church or an inscription in a mosque. In order to do so, I shall extract the features directly connected with the two media of picture and inscription and postulate levels for the access to them and corresponding barriers. This is the purpose of Model 5.

Model 5. is a reflection or mirror-image of a computer-run PROLOG model (See Bratko, *PROLOG*), whose nature and workings will be explained below. In a later chapter (Part V, Chapter 5) the question will be raised: what does it mean for a model of empirical material to reflect or mirror a formal computer model?

The main idea is that the program offers a logical system through which the validity of object-related attributes can be verified so that a definition of the object will result, for example of nuts and bolts. Starting at the "bottom" with elementary units one moves upwards through various specifications to end up with a final definition at the top level. Intuitively, the model can be looked at both ways: we move "upwards" through the various categories of concepts or data that make up the resultant object (topping the graphic model) to see how this is constituted. Alternately, we can start with the object and work our way down to take a closer look at its anatomy and physiology. Computer-run PROLOG starts in the latter position; we tentatively feed it the object definition and the program checks to see if reality matches our prediction. The computer model
has nodes like atoms, values, and so on, and lines of relations between them (a "relational" model with features in boxes or nodes and arrows or lines relating them). These features and relations have been adopted without alteration in Model 5. The specific entries in this model are structured on a general pattern developed in the context of the PROLOG application. Of course the motivation and rationale for keeping them is debatable; which is one useful aspect to such a model: it forces us to being conscious about systems. So let us try.

The trick now to be used is to articulate the various features of an Arabic Quranic inscription and a Roman-liturgical image and postulate people's access to them from the elementary level and upwards. We postulate various access alternatives for each box, for example how far an analphabet may reach into the system (in the following section, I put key terms in boldface).

Starting from below on the model, we should be able to evaluate approximately terms of access to the various levels as represented in the different nodes or boxes. I shall do this respectively for quranic inscriptions and Roman images. I postulate barriers at the levels. Needless to say, the following is an attempt aiming at suggesting an analytical principle more than presenting a convincing case representation.

1) There is barrier to access at ATOM (access level):
   **Inscription:** 1.1). An analphabet will not understand the words, but may access VALUES (without reading) and CONSTANTS. 1.2) Someone may be having problems with understanding the specific calligraphic style for reading. In both cases, things may be understood as images of something divine further up to DATA OBJECT.

   **Picture:** 1.1) No special competence is required beyond being told that the male face with cross-halo and a beard is Christ (or being familiar with the motif from other cases). Pointing and naming will be sufficient as a minimal help to access, also with regard to narratives that are not especially complex and which are familiar (if they are not so, the barrier is literary not pictorial).

2) There is a barrier at VALUE:
   **Inscription:** 2.1): two alternatives here: if 1.1): seeing contentless shapes (that may become images of something divine further up in the model); if 1.2) seeing shapes with unidentified (until informed) content. Things may become images of
something divine further up in the model (DATA OBJECT).

**Picture**: 2.1) Any pictorial style can be subject to evaluation and hence involve barriers: a style felt as out of place or not acceptable.

3) **CONSTANT** (applying fixed rules).

**Inscription**: Access to 1) ATOM and 2) VALUE normally means access to CONSTANT, which within the Arabic language domain is a mere sum of the two lower-level data.

**Picture**: If one "passes" 1) and 2), one has access to 3).

3. 1) A barrier at CONSTANT

**Inscription**: Linguistically, "constants" here mean the capacity generally of making some sense of Arabic sentences, for example in terms of sounds, regardless of the degree of understanding of the meaning of any particular statement. A barrier here may mean there is a problem concerning language but not alphabetic capacity (for example: a Turkish person from the days before Kemal Atatürk's alphabet reform, when the Arabic alphabet was still in use, so that she or he could scan the text letter for letter without understanding Arabic: something that happens with Turkish Imams).

**Picture**: A visual pattern here will be seen automatically as soon as the lower level has been penetrated: the pattern is a combination of figures and features and figure attitudes and the style in which they are rendered. A possible barrier here might arise whenever someone finds the visual pattern confusing, but this will not bar seeing the pattern, as such, which become effective only at Simple object level (where there is a question of understanding, possibly misunderstanding, relating to something).

4) Barrier at VARIABLE (alternative inputs to someone):

**Inscription and Picture**: A person may not be equipped with the necessary or expected store of concepts. For both modalities: A person reading about or seeing the scene of St. George slaying the dragon, may make out the event described or depicted without having the necessary information to understand that it carries some specific symbolism, e.g. a political one (like Bernt Notke's sculpture of St. George in the Riddarholm Church in Stockholm). This can mean that the person goes straight on from Constants (3) to Simple objects (5), bypassing Variables (4).
5) Barrier at SIMPLE OBJECT (plain story):

**Inscription**: 5.1) the reading relates to specific text locus (chapter, verse, etc.) but does not relate to conceptual state or event (story, parable etc.) or to canonical interpretations of text (religious "meaning"). Therefore, while the elementary sense is accessed, some contextual or the traditional meaning is not. The person reads the text but does not grasp the concepts set forth in the sentence(s); The person reads and locates Q text but does not perceive/know significance beyond literal meaning. 5.2) this may be due to a barrier at Variable (4); one still may access general religious value of text; 53) if the person has partial access up through Variable, she/he may still access the canonical value of the text. 5.4.) The person reads and localizes text in Q. but feels alienated because of difficulty of calligraphy (on own and/or community's account) in case of barriers at ATOM or VALUE hold (or both together), it may be still possible to perceive the divine character of the inscription, either on account of site or of knowing what kind of inscription it is (or both); hence the enormous flexibility of Arabic inscriptions.

**Picture**: 5.1) A comparable occurrence as 5.4) above, would hardly be possible with "pictures": if a person does not recognize a Madonna as such, the existence of a painted form in itself will not have a corresponding effect. 5.2) If there is no barrier at the lowest level (1 and 2) and normally nor in Constants (3) either, then there should be no hindrance at Simple object in terms of basic (feature by feature) understanding; but if 5.3) there are barriers at Variables (4), then so also at several possible levels of interpretation at Simple object.

6) Barrier at STRUCTURES (physical and concept space):

**Inscription**: 6.1) A person reads the text but cannot evaluate its textual or traditional source (Quran). 6.2) Reading relates to source but unrelates to specific locus in text (Quran) and hence context: barrier therefore may be partially effective (understands sentence but misses contextual meaning). 6.3. The person reads and localizes Quranic text but does not perceive physical position (mosque wall) as important, for example because of person's cultural or religious setup which makes her or him disregard physical items such as architecture and inscriptions (and "decorations"); 6.4) The person reads and localizes Q. text but does not perceive/know significance of connection place of prayer and text; 6.5.
The person reads and localizes the text but does not recognize connection between inscription and community (ritual) aspect. 6.6) Some of the different interpretations, mainly generally ritual and social, as set out below (6.2) may also be active with regard to inscriptions.

**Picture:** 6.1) Again circumstances are more complex with pictures. On a liturgical level, a connection image-site is imposed and acknowledged; so far there is no barrier. But 6.2) further conceptual elaboration of the linkage between the religious image and the local site presents a number of possible barriers that different people will stop at or break through depending on the kind of connection they see between local site-impact (Structures) and image: is this consciously connected with the sacramental character of the site, and if so, how is sacramental understood? Or is a more vague and general ritual concept active here, or rather a social one: the church or chapel primarily as a community site, with authority backing from the doctrine of the Church and the People of God?

Of course the example of an isolated drawing does not apply to a church or chapel or any other liturgical context. In the latter, images will always be architecturally fixed; but they can be so in widely varying manners:

a) directly on a blank wall in some specially marked-out position;
b) as above, but together with others (votive paintings spread out over a wall, a very common occurrence);
c) in special frame, above an altar;
d) as c), but with the frame carried by angels;
e) as c) and with frame imitating the real architecture (as in Vivarini-Basaiti's St. Ambrose altar-piece in the Frari, Venice);
f) as c) or e), but with the interior pictorial perspective breaking away from the main focusing line of the altar space (Titian's *Pesaro Madonna* in the Frari and many others).

7) At the level of DATA OBJECT, barriers are functions of combinations of those in Structures (5) and Simple objects (6). Things are now getting complicated, so we need a matrix of the possibilities arising from these combinations and in relation to them we need to evaluate the above list of comparisons between the two types of media.

So far, the discussion of the barrier-model has proceeded stepwise, as if
all processes went "up" the model by clearly separable stages. This is not always so. Competences in associating a rigid and motionless human figure (like the Virgin image in Figs. 4, and 6) with liturgically generated narrative features may vary by numerous different criteria and show their impact at almost any level in the model. The same holds for ways of coping with abstractions, as this term was considered in Part III, Chapter 1. Finally, but fundamentally, the parameter of access as used in my above discussion needs theoretical elaboration. It has been made synonymous with ability to grasp, but of course things may be accepted emotionally even if they are not understood in a way that the person in question might back up with a verbal explanation. Again, my account remains skeletal and focused on rough principles of approach methodology.

10. AD OPUS INVENTUM: THE CEREMONY MASTER'S JOB
We have scanned some aspects of the rites in San Marco and tried to penetrate their complexities. I took the burden of the Ceremony Master as my point of departure; can I also take it as a conclusion? In one sense not, since I have not even attempted a serious study of his working situation and assignments under the perspective of modern management theory. For such a venture I have no competence and do hope that others thus endowed might take over. But I think I have made two points relatively clear: the complex systemic characteristics and the operative paradigm ruling the entire system at all levels, including the Ceremony Master's job assignment.

The burden of the Ceremony Master concerned an exceedingly complex process that cannot indeed be taken generally to represent most “normal” processes. But it is so rich in aspects and interacting factors that it can be considered as covering most processes that involve visual media and thus it should be analytically useful for experimenting with theoretical models. On the other hand we cannot pretend to say that it covers most types of such processes, since categorization of them would rest on shaky ground (see Part V, Chapter 4).
The famous, even though possibly not authographic, letter that Dante Alighieri allegedly sent to Cangrande della Scala, Signore of Verona, announced that the Commedia (not yet qualified as divina) was conceived not as a speculative enterprise (theologically or otherwise) but one directed at action, at doing things: the poem was *non ad speculandum, sed ad opus inventum* (Dante Alighieri, *Inferno*, Sapegno's introduction, p. VII.). Authentic or not, this expression of attitude represents Catholic tradition.

The opus (work) in question concerned religious and moral revival; much needed in Italy, as is attested all through the Commedia. So the poem, though appearing to most of us as a string of symbolic and metaphorical images, did not focus on display for theologic and academic learning but was meant to incite to action in those who read it. This point, the superiority of action or work(s) - opus - to knowledge and opinions - is fundamental to Roman tradition but is often disregarded by modern non-Catholics. Good works is a crucial and central demand on all aspects of life. Performance and participation in the liturgy is a good work, and celebration of the sacrifice of Mass is the supreme opus bonum at the centre of everything (Evidence collected in Sinding-Larsen, *Paolo Veronese*, and in Gisolfi and S.-L., *The rule*, Index: Work(s)). It can be taken for granted that this was the conceptual background also for the Ceremony Master's and his colleagues' and superiors' activities.

*The liturgy is a system (also) in the sense that it consists of more than the sum of its elements, and this is partly on account of the good works perspective just mentioned: performing it and participating in it, we do something that God ordained us to do and which prepares us for the supreme good work, participation in the celebration of Mass. But not only this. There are, as already mentioned, also the socalled emergent properties, to appeal once more to this term from machine technology: phenomena emerging from a complex structure or process that have no counterpart at any of the lower levels. The liturgy taken as a whole offers a complete picture of the Church, of the role and place of the people and, by extension, of the State, in it, an image of the rotation of the year in its cosmic order as ordained by God. It is as a process of actions, not as a col*
lection of truths, that it produces this effect. The two specific rites I have select-
ed for more direct focusing, the Salve Regina performance and the Epiphany
baptism of the Cross, like many others also reported in the Ceremony Master's
account (and indeed in the liturgical books), were perceived by people of vari-
ous competences, ranks and conditions. To different extent and with variable
emphasis they all of them shared parts of the whole system of participation and
display. While this overall proposition cannot be doubted, we are, I seem to
have to conclude, not equipped for descending into a more detailed and precise
account. I noted that respect for the ritual as a whole is an important, not to say
fundamental, requirement of ritual attitudes. But again, there will be different
understandings about what this "whole" means. Apparently our most capital
questions cannot be answered except by pointing out possible directions.

When I tend to stress the operational aspects, the actions, in the material
provided by the Rituum cerimoniale, it is in agreement with religious and hu-
man attitudes behind it. But my stance also may be due to the circumstance that
I, far from pretending to any "good work" myself, feel very much in line with
Wesley C. Salmon's general attitude to analysis and models: ... I do maintain
that scientific explanation is designed to provide understanding, and
such understanding results from knowing how things work (Salmon, Scientific
explanation, pp. 240f.). This is a question of frameworks not of interpretations.
You have tentatively to predefine the "things", thereby limiting the scope of
your own action. Very many misunderstandings of iconographic types, espe-
cially common among non-Catholic art historians, could be avoided if one
asked how two pictorially different pictures functioned, then frequently to dis-
cover that they functionally amount to the same, instead of taking for granted
that different morphologies mean different functions.

The framework within which the Ceremony Master worked provides a
good illustration of the type of framework in which we are involved in our ven-
ture of analytical management. In his situation, on some levels strictly regulated
and on others fluctuating or even evasive, he had a number of factors under his hand, most of them linked up with other factors that he could not handle or didn’t even know about. In his actions, however – and we in the decisions we have to make – had to focus on some of them, generally the obvious and critical factors, hoping the rest would follow suit, take care of itself or turn out not to be very important.

11. CONCLUSION

Since my book is an excercise in methodology, let me conclude with some general remarks on some crucial issues - with support from an additional look into the toolbag (Part V), being aware, obviously, that a project like the present one can never have a real conclusion.

I shall start my Conclusion – which is no conclusion at all, but just a break in the proceedings – with a summary of the main tenets of the above text.

1. **Basic operative level**

The analyst’s research consists of approach process(es) towards description of chosen subject in specific framework(s) structured in interrelated levels and embeddedness/framing of concepts and terms. These processes have no definite terminations, only ”breaks”.

2. **Object level**

The protagonists (historical or typically reconstructed individuals or groups) are calling forth and processing of canonically and/or personalized scenarios and configurations in conceptual spaces with patterns of focusing and directed attention.

3. **Model operative level**

3.1 This type (2) of intellectual, mental (and physical) action is described by verbal and graphic models in terms of the analyst’s configurations acquired in processes under (1) focused on (2).
3.2. The models are intuitive and fundamentally (inevitably) *ad-hoc*, but under some guidance and control by means of formalized models from various branches of science. The chief criterium of validity is, ideally, a) no obvious conflicts between the models, b) internal cohesion inside and between them in a system ruled by the principles set out under (1).

4. **Subject and object**

There is no absolute distinction between an active subject (*analyst*) and a passive object (*protagonist*), because the analyst’s processes and the protagonist’s processes in most respects are parallel or comparable on most levels. Ideally, the former tries to match her or his analytical processes to the latter’s. The protagonists’ characteristics and processes are reconstructively accessible but only in terms of the relative validity of the analyst’s processing of them. There are no general terms for definitely defining the analyst’s procedure.

5. **Key terms**

The key terms – *categories (and "types"), framework, situation, state, event, process, scenario, configuration, emergent properties, model* – are all relative to an inexactly defined total structure and several of them may substitute one another or merge into one another at various levels.

**Visual media**

Distinction between the different visual media is analytically inadequate on most levels.

**Description versus interpretation**

Interpretation understood as searching for and opting for one or a definite set of explanations does not work analytically. ”Conclusions” will be limited to description in terms of simplified models that pick out sections of our material within given frameworks.
11.1. Talking of what?

At any rate the material and the perspectives I have presented would seem to allow the following conclusion: if a material and its perspectives are rich and articulated, and the analysis is not dominated by one discipline’s isolated paradigms but by intake from whatever field may seem relevant, then we are no longer in the position of saying with some certainty (above trivial levels) what we are talking about, to affirm what goes with what and what does not – in the traditional sense of categorization.

Let me specify with reference to the preceding chapters. What makes the problem especially intractable is the circumstance that we cannot be exclusive about view-points. There is the officially defined view of the subject or the process or situation, the canonical expression of this, the different, usually officially recognized, levels of interpretation of it; then the various modes of attribution and reception, on the part of the protagonists and users, regarding all these factors and formally extraneous situational impacts on interpretation and attitudes. We have somehow to take care of this entire cluster.

On the specific level of media, there are some clear rules for how images and inscriptions should be used and how they should refer in the Roman and Islamic liturgical contexts, and it is possible to distinguish between some functions proper to each one of the two media. But both on the authoritative and the “user” levels, they shear roles in many connections and levels and these “connections” and levels are often more important than those in which the media can be defined separately.

Text or picture contents defy general definition and are categorizable only at source level (Bible, liturgy, Qur’an), at those of formally defined functions (specific image/text used at specified occasion with specified purpose) and at trivial-level story/attribution level (Nativity, San Gennaro).
What does not at all seem to be categorizable are cross-references among the media, for which the systems seem to be subject to variations more or less similar to those just cited. This is so both with regard to media-specific issues (to the extent these can be isolated) and to reception/attribution by people involved. Relations word-image cannot be categorized in any absolute terms for the above reasons.

In order to tackle an issue in a meaningful (or not meaningless) manner, we have to develop a different conception of categorization itself. For this purpose some recent views on the subject are presented below (Part 5, Chapter 4). Eleanor Rosch, as cited there, argues against the classical view that the properties defining a category are shared by all members (a view that rules out differences between more or less typical cases and also dependence on human factors in the categorizing process). She presented what are called prototype effects: Prototypes are subcategories or category members that gave a special cognitive status - that of being a 'best example'; while prototype effects indicate the resulting asymmetries. The most representative members of a category are called prototypical members. These views are constructive and lends meaning to what we are trying to do but at the same time make it even more evident that the dynamic, process-like and non-definitory stance adopted in this book has something to be said for it.

11.2. Just a display.

Whichever way we phrase our problems and describe our object, we are bound to stay with artificial simplifications, and whichever way we describe them, what we do consider, is what we can do with them and how we may be able to do it. What all this amounts to, can be set out as follows. Abstractions are simplifications up or down one or more levels, not objective or true, but researcher-framed in the sense of being chosen as tools of analysis by somebody. Hence
our object is nothing but a set of features we pick out and bring together in some pattern; that is, the object "is" our analysis process, as I noted concerning the Epiphany cross: what we are doing with some features we consider as identifying it. So the object, in this specific case "complex situations involving people, things and images, physically and conceptually", cannot be bounded by some lexical definition. My entire process of description and analysis constitutes the object. It is and remains my picture of it. Truth and objectivity, as opposed to subjectivity, are irrelevant parameters. There cannot be any talk of "truth" except, either in a trivial manner (this is a book made of paper; but I hope it consists of more than that) or in a sense formalized within some previously set-up language system (a metre is 100 centimeters).

Veriﬁcation can only consist in partly intuitive systems inspection. Here I have in mind the procedure admirably sketched out by Herbert A. Simon. Speaking of his personal style in doing science, he comments:

My predictions will face backward, for backward predictions are really the only ones we can wholly trust in this realm. After all, forward predictions may be influenced by the very theories we are trying to test (SIMON, Models of my life, pp. 368f.).

But the research process itself does not usually present a clearcut picture of "before and after". I would hardly be frank if I were to affirm that I developed all of my theory and my models after I had done with all of my treatment of the empirical material; there has to be a constant shuttling back and forth between observation and theorizing.
than trying to base the theory on a selection of empirical material, a choice of specific cases of imagery and other representational entities. Such a selection process is a creative act based on decisions intuition concerning characteristics that our intuition tells us may prove analytically challenging - characteristics that we may call resources, adopting a term of Giddens' "... capabilities of making things happen", Giddens, *Agency, institution*, p. 170).

The only workable test of the analytical relevance of such a choice consists in investigating whether the scenario thus constructed lends itself to being reduced to analytical models and abstraction of some consistency and which proves to be analytically productive, and, finally, which is relatable to apparently relevant models, including, eventually, those employed in neighboring research activities. *Anything goes if it will work* (amending Feyerabend).

Since even the most trivial facts of human and social interest are a matter of conception interpretation, we have to recognize that all analysis is meaningless unless it is based, ultimately at least, on abstraction or can be reduced to it, processing, not defining, within frameworks and some form of scenarios: sheer model production, operation and analysis.

I am aware of the danger of relying on Wittgenstein: it is not always clear to me when I fall into the trap of using his scattered aphorisms for more than they are worth or simply misunderstanding them. The British editors have taken the high road and published absolutely everything, a bit hard on a man who was used to thinking with the pen on the sheet before him and who often had to start out from sheer banalities in order to arrive, step by step, where he wanted. It is a contingent glory to have one's brainstorms made public (I am sensitive to this, for what else is my entire book?). The analytical importance of his notes consists in the circumstance that, with a how? rather than a what? as a prompting, he shows a number of things usually taken for granted that cannot be so accepted. His entire account really is a negative one, saying that there is no way of basing anything on objectivist, truth-conditioned rule-sets; a negative account but a liberating one (except for the numerous philosophers who take issue with him on the crucial points). Negative statements provide more solid ground that positive ones; the latter tend to flutter about like playing-cards.
Von Wright writes concerning Wittgenstein's use or practice philosophy that it was his philosophical conviction that the life of the human individual and therefore also all individual manifestations of culture are deeply entrenched in basic structures of a social nature. The structures in question are what Wittgenstein calls 'Lebensformen', forms of life, and their embodiment in what he calls 'Sprachspiele', language-games; they are das 'Hinzunehmende, Gegebene', that which we accept in all our judging and thinking ... This basis, to be sure, is not eternal and immutable. It is a product of human history and changes with history. It is something man made and he changes. But how this happens is, according to Wittgenstein, not to be accounted for by a theory, or foreseen (Von Wright, Wittgenstein in relation to his times, p. 111).

To me, this affirmation, if correctly representing Wittgenstein (which I have no reason to doubt), seems to identify him as an advocate of what I would call an ad hoc approach - which I have confessed to falling back on in certain respects.

Now to the factor of using pictures, an issue basic for the functioning of models like Model 3. To repeat, the model does not prove anything but provides a display of supposedly important factors in a hypothetical and simplified process (or parallel processes) in one among several likely states of matters, one specific analytical situation. In all this, it comes out no worse than models used in the social sciences and even in the cognitive, computer-related sciences; but this is rather an extra reason for looking at it carefully.

Wittgenstein's machine image is of particular interest because a machine implies intertwined and to a certain extent hierarchically systematized processes and could to a certain extent be used as a model for liturgy. I believe the following synopsis gives an adequate account of it. But who can tell, seeing the difficulties attending W's writings: he is difficult to read at first, and invites wildly varying interpretations of what he really meant: McCulloch, The mind, pp. 79f.). He probably did not know that himself. We learn (no novelty!) that an image tends to produce further images in us. Each of these images fix the states of motion of the machine, whereas the real machine is subject to unpredictable
motions (because of accidents, mostly). This might look rather trivial: images remove conditions of reality! But the crucial observation concerns the role of images for our understanding - and we see that their use is contrasted with cases in which they do not apply:

1. The picture of a machine is used as a symbol for some specific functions of it;
2. the machine or a picture of it sets off, triggers, a further series of pictures;
3. the machine itself might work - or malfunction! - in other ways (partly unpredictable), while the pictures fix the types of functioning (Wir gebrauchen[!] eine Maschine, oder das Bild einer Maschine, als Symbol für eine bestimmte Wirkungsweise. Wir teilen z. B. Einem dieser Bild mit und setzen voraus, daß er die Erscheinungen der Bewegungen der Teile aus ihm ableitet. (So wie wir jemand ein Zahl mitteilen können, indem wir sagen, sie sei die fünfundzwanzigste der Reihe, 1, 4, 9, 16...)... Nun, wir können sagen, die Maschine, oder ihr Bild, stehe als Anfang einer Bilderreihe, die wir aus diesem Bild abzuleiten gelernt haben. Wenn wir aber bedenken, daß sich die Maschine auch anders hätte bewegen können [above: ... die Möglichkeit, daß sie sich biegen, abbrechen, schmelzen können], so erscheint es uns leicht, als müßte in der Maschine als Symbol ihre Bewegungsart noch viel bestimmter enthalten sein, als in der wirklichen Maschine. Es genüge da nicht, daß dies die erfahrungsmässig voraus bestimmten Bewegungen seien, sondern sie müßten eigentlich - in einem mysteriösen Sinne - bereits gegenwärtig sein. Und es ist ja wahr: die Bewegung des Maschinensymbols ist in anderer Weise vorausbestimmt, als die einer gegebenen wirklichen Maschine, W, Bemerkungen, 85). 

It may sound counter-intuitive that pictures bind or fix things, since we are used to taking exactly the opposite view of them. But for him pictures fix states while they do not fix understanding of the same states. His distinction seems to describe exactly what graphic models do not do (fix understanding) and what they purport to do (fix states).

Wittgenstein's reservations against traditional philosophy are well-known; it is as if he had taken to heart Pascal's dictum: Se moquer de la Philosophie,
c'est vrayement philosopher (Pensées). The difficulty consists in the circumstance that we, or rather, the philosophers, tend to try to dig into the "ground", instead of recognizing the ground which we have right before our eyes as the real ground - by which Wittgenstein obviously intends cultural practice, as before.

My unaided reading of W may have misled me, but at least it seems safe to say that my pragmatic account of models and their knowledge foundations as images and so also the few rules I have stipulated for them in terms of levels, all tie up with his views. Models do fix states but leave it to our assessment of the circumstances in which these states are embedded to understand alternative purports in them. But describing the form of the picture does not explain this [what understanding consists in]. Wittgenstein goes on that no sign or image can in itself compel a particular way of taking it ... (McCulloch, The mind, p. 82).

My discussion so far does not seem to be invalidated by Ayer's analysis of Wittgenstein's Bemerkungen. Noting that the text is difficult but its outlook, however, uniform, he makes the following points:

a) Wittgenstein attempts to undermine the status accorded to logic as the foundation of mathematics, as set out in the work of Russell-Whitehead and in his own, earlier, Tractatus;

b) he abandons the search for "ultimacy"; we don't need ultimate or conclusive truths but analysis;

c) whatever truth there may be to a mathematical proposition, it does not exist "out there" but is relevant only whenever a specific calculation is needed (so the "truth" rests on this applicability; Ayer, Wittgenstein, pp. 60 - 66.). Ayer also cites Saul Kripke to the effect that something is owed to Hume, and refers to the latter's interpretation of the necessary connexion which is supposed to obtain
between cause and effect as consisting in nothing more than the habit of mind by which we associate types of events which we have found to be inconstant conjunction, and his [Hume's] reliance on custom as the ground of our beliefs in default of any logical warrant that those conjunctions will continue to be constant ... (Ayer's synopsis, p. 72.).

So now where do I stand in the light of all these scriptural quotations? Where I stood before I read them, but now with a more articulate support. Facing reality, whether historical or contemporary, and not believing in any countable number of "truths", we can only build models and stipulate rules for them that display aspects of how we reconstruct specific situations and processes.

11.3. A house of cards

Even the display will remain precarious like a house of cards. The present book is not a substantive study, trying to find out what really happened, but a discussion of methodology involving frameworks-based models as the ultimate achievement. Therefore, I have had to consider simplification as a necessary operative condition. In spite of Feyerabend's claim, that simplicity, elegance or consistency are never necessary conditions of <scientific> practice, I shall at least try to be consistent. This, in order to keep track of one's operations and reasonably predict their consequences, requires some degree of paring down. So I shall stick to Herbert A. Simon's advice to simplify the picture (Feyerabend, Against method, p. 24; Simon, Models of thought, p. 103). Unfortunately, it is only the transformation of simple theories into complex systems of interrelated hypotheses on a "lower" substantive, "reality", level, that can to some measure show us whether the simple theories are consistent and to the point, and so we are caught in our own stew whichever way we argue. So much the worse for the Humanities. They are even more dependent on theory than is science, in which
at least something lends itself to measurement and quantification. But even within physics, we meet with scepticism with regard to the issue of "truth" and "reality". This is what Feynman had to say concerning his epochmaking discovery of the so-called partons: *We have built a very tall house of cards making so many weakly based conjectures one upon the other... Even if our house of cards survives and proves to be right we have not thereby proved the existence of partons ....* (Gleick, *Genius. Richard Feynman*, p. 395).

The following statement by Derek K. Hitchins seems almost scarily to the point: *Soft methods are often procedural, frequently interactive, encouraging commitment through participation, developing consensus rather than solving problems ... Soft and hard systems methods alike lack a theoretical base, so that the undoubted reasonableness of their several approaches is more in the nature of a theology than a science. This is particularly so of systems engineering* (Hitchins, *Putting systems to work*, p. 48).

How could it be otherwise when there can be no preset rules for defining time and space extensions for the building elements in the entire domain of empirical observation, situations, states, events and processes? As I have said already, the basic theoretical structure is one in which the "primitives" are constituted by the conceptualization frameworks attributable reconstructively to the protagonists in the specific situations/ contexts we are studying.

### 11.4. Prospects for a general image theory

I said in the introduction (*Part I, Ch. 6*) that *whenever these distinctions in media construction have functionally distinguishable effects, this is due to the functional context, the nature of the ritual and behavioral patterns associated with it, and not to the inherent properties of the two media* [images and inscriptions] *themselves*, and I noted that I would have to articulate my claim. By starting out from a rather massive statement, an argumentation will run into difficulties in a
more obvious manner than if one had started out with a highly articulate and refined initial assumption. Let us see, then, how the initial assumption or hypothesis will fare when confronted with relevant observations in Parts II, III, IV and V.

What would the requirements be for a general image theory? That it can make not only lexical but also functional sense of some of our loosely defined types of visual media, such as pictures and inscriptions. Since Wittgenstein is proved right by recent and more scientific achievements to the effect that anything can be an image of something, a theory would be meaningless if it did not bring out some distinctions below this level. So, again, the first issue must be one of analytical levels at which various manifestations of visual media, such as pictures illustrating something, may be evaluated. Developing general analytical levels has been the purpose of the present book, so the question will be if we on that basis can make sense of distinctions between such loosely defined categories as images (in the everyday sense of "pictures representing something") and texts referring to similar "somethings".

Skeletal as it is, my account at least should amply prove the impossibility of interpretation, i.e., settling for some gradually improved statement fixing one definite meaning or significance, or a set of them. This leaves us with construals of hypothetical scenarios and configurations within selected frameworks, the entire construal in terms of dynamic structures of interaction and focusing which involves media, institutions and people integratedly, with no notion of foreground and background.

Interpretation must mean a decision in favor of one among several possible descriptions of what is characteristic, relevant and most important in the medium at hand. Such decisions, consciously or otherwise, can, and usually will, be taken by the participants in the situation. But we ourselves cannot, above the plain iconographic (lexical) levels, opt for one in preference to the others.
For the decision means activizing frameworks, some parts more than others, and filling them with contents, and frameworks are flexible and unstable on several levels according to a number of human and situational factors; so that a number of specific possibilities arise from them. We have heard that *A feature of a framework is that it supports a variety of different concepts.*

Thus there is no "whole" picture or "true object" in any real-world sense; only relevant features in an abstracted analytical perspective; in the present context constituted by frameworks, scenarios and configurations. The physical delimitation or boundary for instance in terms of a picture frame, is irrelevant. An altarpiece is not interesting because it is installed upon an altar but because it functions in the context and according to the rules of the liturgy. Functionally the consecrated Host help up to view, a simple cross on the altar, a complex altarpiece and an apse mosaic behind it, or even the open Missal on the altar, may count as the same, at certain levels.

And how do *media* "function"? They do not do anything, the humans function because they do things physically and mentally (and animals sometimes, like the bug on the neck of the celebrant), and the humans *operate*, by handling physically and mentally, the *media* - which is what the meaning must be when we, by an ingrained convention (also respected in this book), speak of the functioning of architecture and media. Everything is literally in the hands of humans. For these humans, there are shifting patterns of relevances, importance and priorities. They make their more or less conscious selections and decisions facing the *media*. But we cannot opt for one decision here, we have to try to acquire a total picture of the operative format. Thus we cannot decide among the *media*.

All media, therefore - except at trivial levels - are, analytically speaking, from the viewpoint of what we can do, equally relevant: visual, auditive, cognitive, memory, even physical and social ones: someone's neighbors or co-con-
gregationists, the space they are acting in, its furniture the moment they use it. This makes it mandatory to take the morphology of imagery as just one set of aspects within a larger pattern of interplay and interaction with the surroundings (For morphology as a basic consideration, see VAN OS, *Some thoughts*, pp. 31f. This is of course correct when imagery and its position in architectural surrounding are seen in a *Gegenstandswissenschaft* perspective). The passage from things, such as *pictorial narratives or literary narrative, in which distinct parts of contents may be identified, over to those that may seem contentless on the surface, is seamless and usually too vague to admit monitoring and control.

*All media* are equally relevant, I claimed, but are they equal, too? Let us now see what a summing-up of the relevant argumentation entails, supplied with insights presented in *Part V*.

The outcome of my approach is the disappearance of *artifact images* as a distinct class of objects, except in an artistic, technical, marketing and mass-media (technical communication) sense. The integration of the features and connotations, which may be attributed to them, into complex situations in which the structure emerges from goal-driven actions on the part of people involved, conceived in the terms of the object orientation. Theories of meaning should be developed from people's operations on things, not from classifications of what they are. So the central concern is human cognition, consciousness and socio-environmental linkages, dependences, commitments, feelings of relevance, interests and goal-focusing. Quite obviously, this “catalog” gives an unsurveyable total that cannot therefore be generalized. Hence, the operative mechanism behind media characteristics and functions cannot be described in general terms. How, then, can we pretend to generalize about *media*?

*Visual media*, thus, do not call for any definition: whatever is in focus of an operation is a structural part of a larger structure which can only be described in terms of processes and systems. As a consequence, our real *objects* are interdisciplinary models that capture somehow the physical structure and the oper-
ations on it. I claimed that the *Epiphany cross* was to be identified with the entire process in which it was involved.

Summing up from the foregoing chapters and sections, and referring to *Part V*, I end up by killing the myth of a **general image theory in empirical contexts**, meaning by this term the issue of how "pictures" in the "Fine Arts" category (however unprecise) function in complex situations that involve such features of human, social and environmental characteristics as we subsume under the term of "real life".

On the basis of my above observations, with added material in *Part V*, - and also on the basis of numerous recent attempts to come to terms with "image" issues - I might think I should be able to set up some matrices with similarities and differences between the visual media of image and inscription (or text), between showing and saying or depicting and writing. Some such matrix would represent the minimum requirement for analytically distinguishing between these media.

There are two or three problems, however, attached to this optimistic prospect. **First**, almost every point in the matrix would show, on closer inspection, to be fuzzy. **Secondly**, to whatever degree humans may be shillyshallying between them: picture foreground, text background, or vice versa, modern studies on conceptualizing and categorization, places the operational psychology on levels at which "pictures", "inscriptions", "iconography" etc. are accidental and serve as cues rather than basic meaning-bearing entities.

Many factors militate against any notion of a general theory of images or visual media: the dependence of any statement beyond the trivial on elaborate, articulated and differentiated frameworks; in turn their dependence on highly relative and partly *ad-hoc* categories of concepts and information contents, as well as on analytically unavoidable recourse to artificial constructs; the unclear
relationships between what is formal and what is not; the ambiguity of functions and where to locate them; the fuzziness in the concepts of objects, situations and processes; above all: the shaky nature of the types of models at our disposal; the variable and diversified potentials of almost any larger framework. Finally, there is the almost total lack, except in the canonical nucleus of ritual contexts, of rules for what we do and what we handle. Linguistic rules have for a long time represented the hope of many, but even this is fast becoming obsolete in view of recent developments in the cognitive sciences. A general image theory would require a general framework for anything that might function as an image, but to ask for this would be absurd, for it would amount to ask for a framework for everything. All we can do, is to develop different specific image theories within specific frameworks. We need analytical frameworks of the types discussed in this book and in the literature on which its argumentation is based; of the type, not necessarily the specific models I have been trying to propose. It is the type of action not the specific pattern that is essential. In this we are in line with attitudes traditionally characteristic also of the Ceremony Master's world.

In fact, the current debate in the organs dedicated to such issues illustrates the state of affairs by its scattered collectioning of "examples". Here we have contributions like Hans Belting's recent Bild und Kult, a book immensely rich in empirical information and insights, but deficient on theory, canonical principles of functions and rituals. The title is a little misleading; Bilder und Kult-Gebräuche would better have covered the text.

In conclusion: whatever low-level specificities we may find to differentiate among writing and images, such as the faculty of excluding in the former and the necessity of being situated somewhere of the latter, the functional proc-
esses in operation do not allow for the development of any general theory of visual media.

A general theory may, however, be possible on the level of the information-processing cognitive functional architecture of the human mind studied in computer-based programs in cognitive science (Barlow, Blakemore, and Weston-Smith, *Images and understanding*; Blake and Troscianko, *AI* [artificial intelligence] *and the Eye*; Gregory, *The image and the eye*; Miller, *Imagery* and *Insights*, give all of them good surveys and historical background). It is the further outcome of these studies we have to stand by for, preparing ourselves in the meantime, instead of hiding ourselves behind outlived paradigms.

The cited group of research efforts concentrates on the operational aspects: how does the brain handle visual and other information; is the thing we call our "mind" a mechanism of brain-functions whose operations can be described in terms of methodologies at our disposal today? It seems hardly possible to speak of the creation, perception and conceptualization of "empirical" images without relating these perspectives to available (while by no means "definitive") theories of mind "imagery" (Chapter 11, "Mental imagery: a figment of the imagination?", pp. 323 -339, in Gardner, *The mind's new science*, gives an instructive account, including "a Wittgensteinian criticism", in which Gardner notes that W. *introduced a sophisticated view of how the community provides ways of conceptualizing the world* (p. 338). See also the critical comments in Baumgartner and Payr, *Speaking minds*, passim).

Cognitive scientists like Boden, Gardner, Hofstadter and Miller are all interested in artistic phenomena (and music), Miller’s, *Insights*, devoting an entire chapter to Cézanne, Picasso and Cubism. Nearly all the models on creativity operate on principles of analogy, the operative mode also of our brain. One might expect this to present a challenge to the discipline of Art His-
To sum up. The operative stance considered the only viable one, has a venerable history behind it. *Feynman’s reinvention of quantum mechanics did not so much explain how the world was, or why it was that way, as to tell how to confront the world. It was not knowledge of or knowledge about. It was knowledge how* (James Gleick). A car can be analyzed at three levels: a) a *Toyota* versus a *Lancia*; b) a car with engine, gear system, transmission, wheels etc.; c) functionally and in principle beyond just “cars”, and more general: human-controlled directed motion and speed under energy dissipation. Dealing with functions, we are thus on a deeper level than the two for empirical “facts”, on which understanding is not achieved unless the functional level is taken into account. This principle also applies to visual media and rules out traditional Art History as a serious scientific venture. A typical case: my suggestion that the ignudi in the Sistine Ceiling are angels was met by a No! The colleague was hardly aware that he appealed to Art Historical tradition and not to functional criteria.

PART V. A LOOK INTO THE TOOLBAG

In the discussion up to this point, some terms and notions have been used that have been explained to the extent I have thought it necessary in the argumentation contexts. Some of them have a recent important literature behind them that should be taken into account more specifically than I have done in the previous chapters. Other terms, such as *model*, that have been used require further analysis. This *Part V* is dedicated to these issues, as a Postscript, not as a conclusion.

1. FINDING A FRAMEWORK

A framework, we have seen, is a selection of terms, models and methods tailored for the specific material or type of material, such as, say, ritual processes and sit-
uations. One expression for the present framework would be to say that it is represented by the graphic Models 1, 3, 4.1. and 4.2. taken together and supplemented with the respective comments on them, and by the key terms applied in these comments, especially situation, event - these two considered under the heading of processes; furthermore, ritual, liturgy, scenario, system and organization.

A framework is not something that can be set up initially as a "platform" on which to remain standing in a fixed position throughout the research process. A framework turns into an encircling fence if it does not allow dynamic handling of crucial issues and problems. It should be regarded as a tool and not as an occurrence. This is on a line with Putnam's idea of concepts; in fact, it is not unusual to talk about frameworks in terms of large concepts. All this means that a framework can indicate directions for interpretation (in the hermeneutic sense) but not interpretation as an end result (however tentative).

1.1. A triangle of queries
All of the examined separate items are related to a system of problematic issues that interact and interfere with each other across lines of interrelations that may be thought of as making up a triangle, with one main issue at each angle. This "triangular" model represents one of the most critical features in the entire book. The issues all have to do with the handling of fundamental analytical concepts.

First, how can I operate with frameworks, scenarios, processes, rituals, situations, events and other analytical terms as if they represented something with reliable character and use-value while at the same time adopting the object-oriented paradigm, which should make such things into quite fluctuating affairs?

Secondly, how can I talk of systems when I frankly confess to using the terms scenarios, processes, rituals, situations and events in a research paradigm I have described as being, deliberately on my part, specifically situation-de-
dependent and of a situation-specific character with no formalized or abstract constitution other than what can be abstracted from real-world conditions and displayed in graphic models? Is the "system" attestable and relevant only at the level of graphic models?

Third, these situation-specific displays are couched in terms of what I may label feature models, which show structure without implying any causal or logically formalizable passage or relation from one item in the model to another. Then how can I pretend that somewhere in the admittedly hazy background of such models there are hovering, and effectively supporting them, the much more reliable (if not always more telling) formalized models from computer science? I believe that my models have much in common with models used in the social sciences and if my models collapse under the pressure of evidence or better theory, then they too will look more shaky.

The first query can be tackled with relative ease, for it has been noted already that all terms and models are governed by the laws of processes. Their stereotypes (in Putnam's sense: assortment of typical features) remain the same, with their determinant attributes and methodology applications intact (the two parameters from the Object-oriented paradigm).

The second question has no definite answer, except that systemic features can be abstracted from or imposed on almost anything and that, without systemic features, there is no analysis. There is no good solution other than the one we have - and one with which the social sciences have had so far to content themselves. The procedure is frankly circular.

1.1.1. Formalism
The third question is the most embarrassing of the three. There is a little consolation to be found in the circumstance that this is what people normally do: behave and think as if everything they do and think is an expression of good if not for-
mal logic; probably what Descartes referred to with the famous opening of his *Discours de la méthode*; that common sense is what everybody is equally equipped with since they all believe they have it to a sufficient degree. But consolation is not an explanation nor is it a method. The passage I presuppose from the formalized models to the feature models is merely one of structure transfer; namely graphic structure, not syntactical structure, for there are no general rules, as in a syntax, that govern the interrelations in my models. That is to say, I note these kinds of structural characteristics in some formal model and I fetch them out, or rather the conceptual system they seem to be devised for capturing. I leave behind the logic that originally informed its functioning, substituting one picture of an acceptable procedure for another, hoping for the best.

The entire issue may be turned upside-down by asking for the validity of backing up formal models with real-world circumstances - but it comes down to the same: fuzzy relations between the two paradigms. Philip Clayton writes: The introduction of pragmatics into the theory of explanation has, I believe, devastating implications for exclusively formalist approaches (Clayton, *Explanation from physics to theology*, pp. 46f.), and he quotes John Passmore (1962) to this point: *There can be no purely formal definition of an explanation ... How <the formal> schema is used will depend on what we know and what we want to know; and these are not formal considerations ... Explaining, in short, is a particular way of using a form of argument; it has no logical form particular to it.*

Explaining (having abolished causal explanation) something can only mean to relate it to some system, and a system will then be affected by, if not encompassed in, our specific framework within which the issue of explanation is raised.

Even mathematics has to rely to some extent on verbal and hence non-formal methods, as in the case of laws of correspondence concerning sequences, for here, *In a number of cases such a law can be formulated only by words* (e.g., as regards the sequence of prime numbers; the sequence of _ approximations) (Tarasov, *Calculus*, p. 14). In fact, Maxwell in 1868 stated the equations of his famous theory of electromagnetism originally in
words, not in mathematical notation (Nye, Before big science, p. 78).

Generally, mathematical formalization may turn out to be less “fundamental” than it may look. Ganter and Wille, in their Formal Concept Analysis, claim that they have given the “Mathematical foundations” of concept analysis, and they present graphical lattice models that set out interrelations between objects and attributes of concepts. The latter, however, are expressed in words (names, categories etc.) and should logically be subjected to the same kind of analysis – and thus ad infinitum. So the formulas seem less fundamental, being formalizations at specific levels, more like a sorting out of relations between features that are otherwise left unaccounted for – as the authors perhaps mean when stating that the formulas only reflect some aspects of the meaning of ‘context’ and ‘concept’ in standard language (Ganter and Wille, Formal Concept Analysis, p. 17).

1.2. Frameworks in a philosophical light.

In order to provide further backing for the concept of frameworks, I shall appeal to a statement by Nelson Goodman and a comment on this by A. J. Ayer in connection with Wittgenstein's relativism (Both of them in Ayer, Wittgenstein, pp. 144f.; Goodman cited from his Ways of worldmaking).

Referring to two apparently conflicting statements (The Sun always moves and The Sun never moves, assigning them to different frames of reference, Goodman holds that (as quoted by Ayer): Frames of reference ... seem to belong less to what is described than to systems of description: and each of the two statements relates what is described to such a system. If I ask about the world, you can offer to tell me how it is under one or more frames of reference, but if I insist that you tell me how it is apart from all frames, what can you say? We are confined to ways of describing whatever is described. Our universe, so to speak, consists of these ways, rather than of a world of worlds.

Ayer comments:

World-versions may be right or wrong, though it is not made clear; to me at least, how this is determined, but when two such versions are internally right, even though they may appear incompatible, there is no deciding
between them. Perception is not the final arbiter since it has been experimentally proved that what we might suppose to be given in perception is very much the outcome of our own construction.

It is consistent with the argumentation all through the present book (or so it seems to me) that frameworks concern the ways we analyze (not the subject), but also that Ayer's misgivings are to the point as regards the basis being not clear, but not with regard to perception. For the frameworks under discussion are hardly products of perception in the normal understanding of this term, but of argumentation, at least one step removed from psychology, as I optimistically hope. Frameworks, like any system, cannot be fashioned from inside themselves; they come about by some external initiative and must build on conceptualization of the actual data. Hence a framework is nothing but just another concept expressable in model form, subject to the same relativism, context-dependence and constraints as the rest, but only rather bigger and more comprehensive. Formal decisions on truth-values (T for truth and F for false!) are irrelevant or, at least, uninteresting.

A real-world situation is not analytically accessible without elaboration; it can be approached from any number of vantage-points and along any path of focusing. The final analytical object, the scenario we end up with taking seriously as something to argue and conclude about (however tentatively), can be nothing but an artificial product of our making that may to a greater or lesser degree correspond to chunks of real-world states and conditions, for example as experienced by our historical protagonists. From sociology we learn that

*The objects for classification are not organizations or parts or attributes of organisations but analytical concepts and frames of reference within which methodological procedures can be designed and comparative studies usefully made* (Tom Burns, quoted by Silverman, *The theory of organizations*, p. 15).

Theology quite obviously is not a science of God but of human conceptions of God. These analytical concepts and frames, however, have to be made into something analytically viable. These conditions also apply to frameworks which, like all the other models, will only cover relevant parts of some notional overall picture.
In a larger context of history and philosophy of science, the cited perspective has affinities to ideas developed by Duhem, Wittgenstein and Ryle; let us see how - for we seem to be in touch, here, with a major development in modern scholarship: the accent is more upon how than upon what. (Perhaps it is not so modern, since Galileo defended, against Descartes, the view that science should measure what happened in order to predict it, without bothering about what happened essentially and why it did so). Let Gilbert Ryle introduce the issue. In 1949 he claimed it was more important to ask how than to ask what (Ryle, *The concept of mind*).

In Bechtel and Abrahamsen's summary (Bechtel and Abrahamsen, *Connectionism*, pp. 151f.): The distinction that Ryle develops between knowing how and knowing that is manifest in our use of language ... In general, the expression knowing that requires completion by a proposition whereas the expression knowing how is completed by an infinitive (e.g., to ride) specifying an activity. This linguistic distinction does not, however, settle the matter as to whether there are different psychological representations involved. What we need to do is consider what is needed for an agent to possess each kind of knowledge ... The radical character of Ryle's views... is based on the claim that propositionally expressed theoretical knowledge (knowing that) is not primary, but rests on knowing how to perform certain activities...

The point of departure was a criticism of Positivism, against which Pierre Duhem, too, reacted by promoting a thesis that today goes under the name of the *Duhem-Quine Thesis*, since the American logicist has developed it further. Quine, like Duhem, disagrees with the Positivist teaching: ... scientific experiments are so much theory-laden that it is impossible, even in principle, to isolate which part in them belongs to theoretical construction and which to empirical findings (Vuillemin, *On Duhem's and Quine's thesis*).

The gist is this: one cannot decide about any specific hypothesis in isolation because it belongs to a larger framework of theory and hypotheses. This certainly has some consequences also for art history - as the present book tries to show. Vuillemin comments: *Duhem expounds the thesis as follows: 'In sum, the physicist can never subject an isolated hypothesis to experimental test, but only*
a whole group of hypotheses; when the experiment is in disagreement with his predictions, what he learns is that at least one of the hypotheses constituting this group is unacceptable and ought to be modified; but the experiment does not designate which one should be changed'.

Holton records Einstein's reaction to some mathematical arguments by two colleagues: Einstein refuses to let the 'facts' decide the matter [a quotation from E. follows]: 'In my opinion both <their = the colleagues'> theories have a rather small probability, because their fundamental assumptions concerning the mass of moving electrons are not explainable in terms of theoretical systems which embrace a greater complex of phenomena' (Holton, *Thematic Origins of Scientific Thought*, p. 253).

We are right in the center of holism (from Greek, *holos*, whole, entire, complete): Let us say that the holistic thesis applies to a particular hypothesis if that hypothesis cannot be refuted by observation and experiment when taken in isolation, but only when it forms part of a theoretical group (Gillies, *Philosophy of Science*, p. 112). This quite obviously takes us into systems thinking. It also is easy to see why Duhem insisted on observation being theory-laden.

Fundamentally akin to the view just recorded is one that sees the meaning of statements as consisting in the way they are used: again, we ask not what does this word really mean; instead we ask, how is it being employed by people under real-world conditions? There are numerous accounts of Wittgenstein's discourse over this subject, and a balanced one is due to McCulloch (McCulloch, *The mind*, pp.. 27ff.), who cites a key formulation of Wittgenstein's (in McC.'s translation): *For a large class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word 'meaning', it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. But this paradigm can have validity only under a systems perspective.*

2. THE SYSTEMS IDEA

I have been using, of course, a version of the so-called systems approach. There are mathematical systems and a number of other kinds that we might subsume under the name of *real-life systems*. The entire liturgy for *Epiphany*, to refer to a
case treated above, is a system; at least, it is best treated like one. This contains, to use the normal terminology, various subsystems, which have their own operations, such as the interaction between the celebrant and his assistants before the altar, their interaction with the congregation, and so on. We may direct our attention particularly towards one of them, say, the interaction between the clergy, and this will then be the system in focus. The liturgy for Epiphany is then the containing system (Hitchins, *Putting systems to work*, pp. 53f. For the following, H., p. 104f.).

Now to a closer look at the systems issue. In another context I noted that the discipline of art history is always dealing with systems, that one cannot claim something to be Byzantine or an outcome of a patronage or another cultural context, without making claims about systems (Sinding-Larsen, *A walk with Otto Demus*, pp. 199f.). C. West Churchman provides an overview of the systems approach (Churchman, *The systems approach*, pp. 29f. A classical account: Von Bertalanffy, *General system theory*): *all definers will agree that a system is a set of parts coordinated to accomplish a set of goals*. He postulates five basic factors that have to be taken into account:

1. The total system objectives and, more specifically, the performance measures of the whole system [the goals of the system and its efficiency in achieving them];
2. The system's environment: the fixed constraints [what constraints are there to systems efficiency?];
3. The resources of the system;
4. The components of the system, their activities, goals and measures of performance;
5. The management of the system. Such a list is used in many management science texts (Davis and Olson, *Management*, p. 291).

Speaking of relations within the system, we should bear in mind that this often means more than just a conceptual linkage; it may be functional, with one factor acting upon another according to its "weightage", as in a computer connectionist network (For which see Bechtel and Abrahamsen, *Con-
Systems also take the form of a list of forms plus linkages between them: matrices, flowcharts, LISP lists, rules in propositional logic and propositional logic as a whole, are examples of systems. Linkages here are not just relations, but functional relations: one element does something to another one to which it is connected; this is as far as I want to go with the term "function" (But see e. g., Gregory, *Mind in science*, pp. 83ff.: localizing and explaining function even in an apparently simple machine is highly problematic: *It is particularly difficult to say where functions are located. This is a most serious problem for brain research*).

A model offers an *internalized* view of a system whenever it *highlights features and activities within the system for it to exist and have purpose*. The containing system ... [like the one just mentioned here] *looks inward upon itself, with a view to emergent properties of the system-in-focus* (Weinberg, *Dreams of a final theory*, pp. 29ff. ).

As for the *emergent properties*, a term I have been using all through my discussion, this is an important concept in systems analysis. Hitchins gives the following examples of how a "containing" system is related to the emergent properties of some subsystem; aircraft or ship relations to engine; company related to division: *For example, an aircraft or ship 'sees' the thrust, weight, fuel consumption, heat dissipation, noise, etc. of its engine - these are engine systems [a subsystem's] emergent properties. A Company or organization 'sees' divisional profitability, operational costs, work-in-progress, enthusiasm, resilience, etc. - these are divisional emergent properties.*

Steve Weinberg gives another similarly construed definition of the buzzword 'emergence'. As we look at nature at levels of greater and greater complexity, we see phenomena emerging that have no counterpart at the simpler levels, least of all at the level of the elementary particles [in physics]. *For instance, there is nothing like the intelligence on the level of individual living cells, nothing like life on the level of atoms and molecules... The emergence of new phenomena at high levels of complexity is most obvious in biology and the behavioral sciences...* <but> it also happens within physics itself ....
I have noted several cases of emergent properties in the liturgical system; one concerning the overall objective value.

Hitchins spells out the relationship between the system-in-focus and its emergent properties; there are two perspectives here: the mission, viability and resources management, or internalized, view; and the performance, availability and survivability, or externalized, emergent property view (Hitchins, *Putting systems to work*, pp. 104f.). These aspects are all relevant to rituals and have in fact been referred to generically.

The systems approach has not led an entirely easy life. Criticism has been levelled against it from representatives of the social sciences, especially Robert Lilienfeld (1978), because the approach supported some highly disruptive public interventions in society and environmen (Lilienfeld criticized the scientific pretensions of sociological systems theorists. He maintained that they tended to pick up details from the sciences that supported their view and to disregard those that did not. Lilienfeld also assailed the systems theorists' love of analogies (or 'isomorphisms') between one field and another. Although these may be esthetically appealing, they are not necessarily accurate: Ritzer, *Sociological theory*, p. 454; for a dramatic story of systems planning, see Robert A. Caro, *The power broker: Robert Moses and the fall of New York*, New York 1974, reprints 1975 and later).

This criticism against systems planning does not affect the value of systems analysis as a research tool. John Friedmann is probably right in claiming: *If policy analysts have a language in common, it is... the language of systems... This language has changed the very ways we think about the world ...*(Friedmann, *Planning in the public domain*, p. 143. Also Mintzberg, *The rise and fall of strategic planning*).

The sociologist Anthony Giddens discussed the relation of structure to system: *I want to propose that what most sociologists have thought of as 'structure', the 'patterning' of relationships between individuals or collectives, can be best dealt with by the notion of system. Social systems (and overall societies, as encompassing types of social system) consist of reproduced relationships*
between individuals and (or) collectivities. As such, social systems have always to be treated as situated in time-space. If we understand 'system' in this way, we can free the concept of structure to perform other conceptual tasks ("Structure' then refers to rules and resources instantiated in social systems, but having only a 'virtual existence'. The 'rules' involved here are social conventions. And knowledge of them includes knowledge of the contexts of their application. By 'resources' I mean 'capabilities of making things happen', of bringing about particular states of affairs (Giddens, Agency, institution, and time-space analysis. See also Niklas Luhman's article in the same publication, No. 8, pp. 234ff.).

A great advantage with the systems approach is that it opens possibilities for integrated interdisciplinarity. Any fullblown system accommodating empirical material will exhibit a number of points which must call for insights from various academic disciplines. One cluster of issues here is situations and processes.

3. SITUATIONAL MODELS
Situations, scenarios and configurations and related processes must, for consistency, be accommodated in some systems perspective. Systems are not necessarily static. Analytical or model systems would seem absurd if they were thought of as rigid.

On the previous pages I have been looking at situations and scenarios and their protagonists from the outside, while trying to account for the protagonists' roles and possible types of self-construals within the rituals. Jon Barwise has made an important point about this, regarding protagonists that are moving around inside situations: We must be careful not to think of the constituents of a situation as necessarily located in some spatio-temporal location associated with the situation, should there be one. For example, the fact that I am referring to Bach is supported by my current situation, but Bach is not present there in any spatio-temporal sense. All we mean by <something> being a constituent of a situation is its being a constituent of a fact supported by the situation ... What do we mean when we talk of individuating a situation s? There are two things we might mean. One is saying what facts obtain in s; what objects stand or don't stand in what relations in it. The other thing we might mean is treating the situa-
tion s itself as an object ... (Barwise, The situation in logic, pp. 266f. Barwise and Perry, Situations and attitudes, also has a number of interesting ideas. But Chapter One, "Meaningful situations", contains a number of claims that beg the question; for instance: If expressions were not systematically linked with kinds of events, on the one hand, and states of mind, on the other, their utterance would convey no information; they would just be noises or scribbles, without any meaning at all (p. 3).

Are physical events necessary? What about "events" that are purely conceptual but no less important to the persons involved? What about the situation in which an individual conceives of her/his own mental state as the only relevant "event" in a given context?.

Situations, then, are a very relative thing, and yet Barwise and Perry, and also Barwise separately, have set out to formalize the concept in attempts very strongly repudiated by Lakoff (Barwise, Perry, cited above; and Lakoff, Women, fire, pp. 125ff., 249ff.).

The centerpiece of Lakoff's criticism is that their attempts depend on objectivist and totally abstract and formalized so-called model theory (a formalized quantification type of model): ... the models still do no more than characterize structure; they are still meaningless... In short, defining meaning in terms of situations makes no difference, as long as situations are defined in terms of model theory, that is, in terms of models consisting only of entities and sets [that is, devoid of content or meaning]... The problem is that structure is not enough to confer meaning (Lakoff, Women, fire, pp. 250ff).

The models have no meaning themselves without some understanding being imposed on them: Meaningless structures cannot give meaning to meaningless symbols (Lakoff, p. 252).

Disregarding now the model-theoretical perspective criticized by Lakoff, let me confine my attention to the situational model as such, for it may turn out to be useful, as we shall see, because it implies a state (a situation is settled!), while it may be broken down into a process. This is just what I need, provided that it is supplied with some meaningful contents (and any model whatsoever can be subjected to such an injection). A situation on this interpretation can be a
narrow or a very extensive entity, from a moment's duration to the world situation of today - an expression implying (always incorrectly) that there is a stasis.

When a situation changes it passes from one state into another. Is this passage an event? Galton urges us to look linguistically at the distinction that can be drawn between state and event: The distinction between states and events is not a distinction inherent in what goes on, but rather a distinction between two different ways we have of describing it. Thus the same objective situation may be reported either by the sentence 'Jane was swimming' or by the sentence 'Jane had a swim' (Galton, The logic, p. 24).

I do suspect, however, that there may be some "inherent" difference between something that doesn't move (not meaning Jane, who did move, but the state!) and something that does (the event), and that Galton has merely shown language's ability to express this difference in a simple and efficient manner. But the distinction may be illustrated mathematically (very simply) with perhaps more analytical pull. One formula that may be understood as representing both a state and an event depending on the way we interpret it, is the following simple fraction: $y/x$:

\[
\begin{array}{cc}
\text{state} & \text{event} \\
\text{numerator} & \text{dividend} \\
\frac{y}{x} & \text{denominator} \\
\end{array}
\]

Focusing on $Y$, left side: the number of parts taken after the unit ($X$) has divided; division has been completed; numbering presupposes this. Right side: the number which is being divided; the operation is indicated, and completed only after the dividend has been divided as stated: thus on completed operation we do not have the dividend any longer, but the number $n = y/x$. Thus the same formula represents an operation - right side, and a resulting state: left side; this is verbally implied in the above terms. The fraction solution itself would, by convention and use, rather refer to a state (a fractional relationship between two numbers), whereas $y/x$ would emphasise the divisional operation or process. Substituting 2 for $x$, we might preferably stress the formula as an instruction either to see halved objects or to cut something at its middle. Still, if the result is what
appears, the cause is just around the corner. But conceptualization of the above fraction may change character to some extent if \( x \) and \( y \) are specified in some intuitively referable, real-life terms, e. g., as 2 and 4. Since "the half" (or a third, etc.) is an everyday experience, this term may readily bring up empirical notions and its "state"-character become enhanced at the expense of its process-character. In addition, the "halving" of things is an easily visualizable operation, so that, instead of noticing the numerical operation producing the fraction, one may rather stress the formula as an instruction either to see halved objects or to cut something at its middle. The described process looks to me as something different from alternative linguistic descriptions of the same event. Rather, it is concerned with two different aspects of it, its being produced and its end product. Jane's action of swimming had as result that she swam.

It may be consistent with this exercise to say that if a state is static (my regrets!), then it must be so in relation to something, at least the time-flow, from some \( t^0 \) to some \( t^n \). Then the preceding and ensuing steps are just around the corner. States and events presuppose one another and cannot be clearly distinguished from each other. So much more the reason for seeing ritual processes as systems in motion rather than causal chains of some sort. But then the time dimension appears to loose weight as a variable, the issue becomes one about selective focusing on a number of variables that do carry weight: in such cases the existence of ‘a moment’ means that a variable which characterizes the process takes on a certain value (Myshkis, Introductory mathematics for engineers, p. 110).

Now it would seem useful to say that a process is a series of interconnected events (Wittgenstein claims that perception cannot be anything but processlike: Die Aufmerksamkeit ist dynamisch, nicht statisch - möchte man sagen... Ich finde man k"onne nicht statisch aufmerken": "Über Gewißheit, 432f.").

But difficulties loom in the qualification "interconnected", for we have to ask How? and For what purpose, With what goal? and For whom? and In what context? and, finally, With what resources and methods? And it is obvious that answers to all these queries can be of many kinds and also interdependent. Let
me start by cutting the messy issue down to the bone (if a bone there is) and for a
moment adopt Wesley C. Salmon's definition of a process (Salmon, Scientific
explanation, pp. 139 - 147).

Eschewing rigorous definition, he notes as the main difference between
events and processes that processes have a much greater temporal duration and usually much greater spatial extent. His conception of a process is similar to
what Russell meant when speaking of a causal line, even though he does not hold that all processes have a causal character. A casual line, to Russell, was
regarded as the persistence of something - a person, a table, a photon, or what
not. Throughout a given causal line, there may be constancy of quality, constancy of structure, or a gradual change of either, but not sudden changes of any
considerable magnitude (Russell as quoted by Salmon).

Salmon specifies that: Among the physically important processes are
waves and material objects that persist through time. As I shall use these terms,
even a material object at rest will qualify as a process (and he goes on with a comparison of Newtonian mechanics and Special relativity). Continuity is essen-
tial; but continuity of what?

To sum up, I would say that a process is a sequence or a cluster of actions,
in part physical and in part conceptual and mental, over shorter or longer time
whose selection and modes of interaction are managed, goaldriven and produc-
tive (not just physically causal like the examples brought forth by Salmon). But
management may not only be part of some plan, it can consist also in coping
with challenges. Most processes accept inputs in the course of running. The leading criterion, again, as with any model, is that we, the analysts, consider the
sequence as constituting a sequence with internal coherence, regardless of
whether the historical protagonists did so consciously. It is implicit in the propo-
sition just presented that any event can be analysed into components and be pre-
sented as a process, if it qualifies as required by the above account, so that an
event doesn't qualify as a distinctive item.

Where do we locate situations in this network? Situations taste rather
strongly of trying to make lumps out of things, but this of course is occasionally
needed, at least for communicative purposes. For it may prove useful to create an
artificial unit by doing with time as Joshua did with the sun, stopping it, and pre-
tending that we can set a limit to both time-duration, as cited by Salmon, and space-extent and call the lump a "situation". In fact, it is normally useful, for we cannot capture continuity in our languages (Cf. Salmon, \textit{Space, time}, pp. 208f.), since they operate with discrete units (words, etc.); and we have to bid the process to stop awhile in order to examine it. It seems more convenient to "delump" the issue and consider situations as \textit{processes} (I cannot see how relative length of duration can have any analytical relevance). And all processes are, necessarily, \textit{located}, so even this aspect doesn't set situations apart.

4. CATEGORIZATION

\textit{Concepts} and \textit{conceptualization} are two terms used almost everywhere in \textit{Parts} I to IV and taken more or less for granted. This was unavoidable unless the text should become unsurveyable, for the terms take us into a highly complex field in which controversy is raging in several disciplines.

The things we see and use are elaborated intellectually and mentally, and this process and its outcome are labelled by the two terms just cited. Involved in the processes discussed in the foregoing chapters are artifacts like the \textit{Virgin Image} and the Cross. I claimed that their identity consisted in the active process of handling them, including the artifacts themselves (see...). This also touches on the issue of categorization (or classification): how to delimit a thing if it cannot be conceptually isolated?

Saying that the cross "is" the entire process handling it, should amount to saying that it is a product of our - the congregation member's or the analyst's - actions and conceptualizations, for of course the entire process is also our creation. It is a creation grounded in at least two areas of basic but highly debatable areas of cognition: the issue of classification or categorization; and the interdependent issues of \textit{conception, reference and meaning}. The latter cluster of items will now be approached - to an extent I consider minimal as a back-up for the foregoing chapters. Some general issues concerning categorization are presented in the next section, 4.1. I shall rely heavily on Hilary Putnam, and, in the background, on Wittgenstein, even if some recent research in the cognitive sciences, especially due to Lakoff, reject both of them on several issues.

The key terms in this book, such as \textit{framework}, \textit{scenario} and \textit{configuration}...
tion, also represent categories. The main moral of the views reported in this chapter is that definition of concepts, or categories, cannot be absolute, but is a function of structured decisions and actions on our part. The structure, let me repeat (IV, 3), reflects methodological choice with regard to levels and embedding (what level for which subject, what is embedded in what). In this way, a framework can support a variety of scenarios and configurations (and other concepts), while a framework is itself a concept and a scenario may serve as a framework.

4.1. Talking about a perceived world: categorization

First a preamble to Putnam's "theorem", as Lakoff calls it. This purports to be concerned with a theory of meaning; in Lakoff's report: Meaning cannot be characterized by the way symbols are associated with things in the world (Lakoff, Women, fire, pp. 252f.). After this assessment against the socalled symbolic theory of meaning, which art historians will know from reading Panofsky's dictionary-like interpretations, the comment runs like this: The theme is the traditional symbolic theory of meaning, which holds exactly the view denied in the quoted formula, and postulates a direct mapping from symbol to thing "in the world" (by convention, the Virgin on the moon sicle "means" the Immaculate Conception) (Which is simply not correct, for the figure was in use also in places where the idea was not accepted and referred to theologically by writers who did not endorse the idea, e.g. Bernard of Clairvaux; see Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and Ritual, pp. 45, 58). This theory is objectivist in nature, since it does not depend in any way on the nature or experience of any thinking being. All that is relevant is the pairing of symbols with things (Lakoff, ibid.).

Here a difficulty shows up: In order to qualify as a theory of meaning, the symbolic theory must sanction the pairing of symbols not only with individual things, but also with categories of things. But what is an objectively existing category? Symbolic theories all take for granted that classical categories are the only kind of objectively existing category. This is based on the assumption that things in the world have objectively existing properties and that categories of things sharing those properties are also things in the world with which symbols
can be associated ... Since a symbolic theory of meaning concerns only the associa-
tion between symbols and things, any characteristics of any beings using the
symbols must be irrelevant to the relationship between the meaning of the parts
and the meaning of the wholes (Lakoff's analysis).

Putnam, referring to Wittgenstein and to Nelson Goodman, summarizes:
... it is futile to try to have a notion of what the perceptual facts 'really are' inde-
pendently of how we conceptualize them, of the descriptions that we give them
and that seem right to us (Putnam, Reason, truth and history, p. 68).

This takes us over to an alternative to the symbolic theory of meaning in
the shape of Hilary Putnam's important conceptual truth (Putnam, Reason, truth
and history, pp. 1 and 5.) concerning representation and reference. Both of these
terms he applies exclusively in cases of a relation between a word (or some
other sort of sign, symbol or representation) and something that actually exists
[i.e. not just an 'object of thought'] ... even a large and complex
system of representations, both verbal and visual [this applies to the liturgy], ...
does not have an intrinsic, built-in, magical connection with what it represents -
a connection independent of how it was caused and what the dispositions of the
speaker or thinker are (Elsewhere I blamed semiotics for focusing on the crea-
tion rather than the use of signs, symbols etc. Putnam's reference to people's
dispositions seems to me crucial: even the creation of the media is evaluated in
terms of people's dispositions rather than in terms of the pseudotechnological
accounts of semiotics). And this is true whether the system of representations
(words and images ...) is physically realized - the words are written or spoken,
and the pictures are physical pictures - or only realized in the mind. Thought,
words and mental pictures do not intrinsically represent what they are about.

I believe Ayer is saying something similar when, in his criticism of Wit-
tgenstein's use of pictorial metaphors, he notes that ... physical likeness acquires
a symbolic function only when it is chosen as a method or representation. In par-
ticular, since it is only one out of many possible methods of representation, it
does not serve to explain in what representation consists.

Ayer also observes that images are subject to the will in a way in which
sense-impressions, including kinaesthetic sensations, are not. These cannot be
conjured up, in the way that images can. Nevertheless it is not true that they are always subject to the will. Day-dreams afford an exception and so do unpleasant images that sometimes force themselves upon us ...(Putnam, *Reason, truth and history*, p. 5; Ayer, *Wittgenstein*, pp. 25, 105).

Real reference depends on connection with language rules, the now somewhat unfashionable Putnam insists, taking his cue from Wittgenstein's *entry rules*. These bring us from seeing an apple to our saying something about it, and exit rules leading us from statement about apples to doing something with real apples. Otherwise the apparent occurrence of a reference remains a mere syntactic play that resembles intelligent discourse: coupling statements that are similar without real reference (Putnam, *Reason, truth and history*, pp. 10 f.). In fact, *one cannot refer to certain kinds of things, e. g., trees, if one has no causal interaction with them or with things in terms of which they can be described*; and he goes on to give theoretical support to what he has just endeavoured to demonstrate by use of thought experiments (Putnam, pp. 17 - 21).

Here Putnam develops his idea concerning *concepts versus (mental) images and representations*, and as I see his distinctions as useful, I shall briefly recapitulate his main points.

Putnam's strategy, as already indicated, is to *separate concept and representation* as resulting from two distinctly different intellectual or mental operations. After another round of thought experimenting on a Twin Earth, he goes on to affirm (with my emphasises) that *Concepts are not mental presentations that intrinsically refer to external objects for the very reason that they are not mental presentations at all. Concepts are signs used in a certain way... the sign itself apart from its use is not the concept*. Whether accepting this or not, the reader will see, on the background of the foregoing chapters, why this attitude attracts me.

Confessing to not being clear about the difference between an elm tree and a beech tree, Putnam goes on to ask: *Is it really credible that the difference between what 'elm' refers to and what 'beech' refers to is brought about by a difference in our concepts* [his emphasis]? *My concept of an elm tree is exactly the*
same as my concept of a beech tree ... This shows that the determination of reference is social and not individual... Contrary to a doctrine that has been with us since the seventeenth century, meanings just aren't in the head (Putnam, pp. 16f.).

Putnam continues in what he calls an abbreviated version of an argument in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*, an argument that strongly supports - or is supported by! - the attitudes of the Roman Church concerning central concepts. Thus, possessing a concept is not a matter of possessing images... since one could possess any system of images you please and not possess the ability to use the sentences in situationally appropriate ways ... A man may have all the images you please, and still be completely at a loss when one says to him 'point to a tree'... For the image, if not accompanied by the ability to act in a certain way, is just a picture, and acting in accordance with a picture is itself an ability that one may or may not have ... He would still not know that he was supposed to point to a tree, and he would still not understand 'point to a tree'.

So the ability to use certain sentences... *is* the criterion for possessing a full-blown concept; and in conclusion: ... no matter what sort of inner phenomena we allow as possible expressions of thought, arguments exactly similar to the foregoing will show that it is not the phenomena themselves that constitute understanding, but rather the ability of the thinker to employ these phenomena, to produce the right phenomena in the right circumstances.

I think this operational aspect of concepts is crucial, and would hold even if it is no longer common wisdom that language is the basic vehicle, and this regardless of the corollary concerning the issue whether meanings are inside or outside our head (writing this book I have often wondered).

Against the believers in phenomenology Putnam asserts that what they fail to see is that what they are describing is the inner expression of thought, but that the understanding of the expression... is not an occurrence but an ability; and:

What follows from all this is that (a) no set of mental events - images or more 'abstract' mental happenings and qualities - constitutes understanding; and (b) no set of mental events is necessary for understanding. In particular, concepts cannot be identical with mental objects of any kind. For, assuming that by a mental object we mean something introspectible, we have just seen that what-
ever it is, it may be absent in a man who does understand the appropriate word (and hence has the full blown concept), and present in a man who does not have the concept at all ... concepts are (at least in part) abilities and not occurrences. The doctrine that there are mental representations which necessarily refer to external things is not only bad natural science; it is also bad phenomenology and conceptual confusion (Putnam, *Reason, truth and history*, pp. 20f.).

In a section entitled *Wittgenstein on 'following a rule'* , Putnam further develops some points concerning concepts (Putnam, *Reason, truth and history*, pp. 66 - 69). Whatever introspectible signs or 'presentations' I may be able to call up in connection with a concept cannot specify or constitute the content of the concept ... Even if two species in two possible worlds... have the same mental signs in connection with verbal formula 'add one' [in a representation of the natural numbers], it is still possible that their practice might diverge; and it is the practice that fixes the interpretation: signs do not interpret themselves.

He refers to an argument by Nelson Goodman to the effect that it is futile to try to have a notion of what the perceptual facts 'really are' independently of how we conceptualize them, of the descriptions that we give of them and that seem right to us.

We have to look at realities of usage and practice: Traditional philosophy of language, like much traditional philosophy, leaves out other people and the world; a better philosophy and a better science of language must encompass both (From the cited article, Putnam, *The meaning of 'meaning*', p. 271. See also N. U. Salmon, *Reference and essence*, section 2.4 about Contextual factors in reference, 31f., and Chapter Four, *Putnam's theory of natural kind terms*, pp. 93 -157; a technical account and criticism).

Usage and ability, let me say, the operational aspect, seems to be absent from Smith and Medin's big monographical account of theories concerning concepts and categorization (Smith and Medin, *Categories and Concepts*). They principally focus on representation of knowledge in concepts, which is probably why 'image' is absent from their terminology, seeing that
this is what 'representation' really means to the authors (Smith and Medin, *Categories and concepts*, pp. 84 - 86; 113 - 115; 157 -158). Listing and criticizing three different sets of theories: the classical, the probabilistic and the exemplar view, they conclude in favor of the latter two. *This means that we cannot go directly from the findings [about how people categorize] to claims about how concepts are represented; instead, we must interpret these findings in terms of both representations and processes - in short, in terms of models* (Smith and Medin, p. 33).

As far as I can see, the cited authors see concepts as the kind of *categorizations* that people make when they refer to things: "sing" and "fly" are characteristic of birds, "flying rats" is not a current reference to pigeons (though the term has been aptly applied to those in Piazza San Marco). They do not seem to see concepts as tools for knowledge as well as understanding and reasoning the way Putnam does.

I should put on record that Johnson-Laird very strongly takes issue with Putnam about the latter's claim that *meanings are not in the head* (And so does Katz, *Cogitations*, pp. 32ff.). J.- L. wants to *qualify Putnam's conclusion and to restore the study of meaning to psychology* (Johnson-Laird, *Mental models*, pp. 191ff.).

Whatever the outcome of such a debate, Putnam's *operational* notion of concepts - as abilities concerning things that *can* but will not always be represented in some kind of images - is analytically very useful. So it is precisely because it distinguishes between abilities to refer and (pictorial) occurrences that may or may not match the reference.

At the same time both authors seem to take their point of departure in what Ayer calls the *pragmatic tenor of Wittgenstein's thinking*: *We are advised ... to substitute for the question 'What is the meaning of a word?', the question 'What is an explanation of the meaning of a word?' or 'What does the explanation of a word look like?'* (Ayer, *Wittgenstein*, p. 42).

In this way, *Objects* do not exist independently of [our] conceptual schemes. *We cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description. Since objects and the signs [referring to them, or, in an*
oldfashioned term: denoting them] are alike internal to the scheme of description, it is possible to say what matches what (Putnam Reason, truth and history, p. 52).

George Lakoff, quoting this passage and some preceding ones, comments: The problem is the external perspective - the God's eye view. We are not outside of reality. We are part of it, in it. ... an internalist perspective ... is a perspective that acknowledges that we are organisms functioning as parts of reality and that it is impossible for us to ever stand outside it and take the stance of an observer with a perfect knowledge, an observer with a God's eye view:... By taking an internalist perspective [My emphasis; the externalist perspective or the God's eye view, Putnam's terms, that one can stand outside reality and find a unique correct way to understand reality (Lakoff)]. Putnam avoids the problems with reference that plague the objectivist. Our way of understanding the world in terms of objects, properties and relations is an imposition of our conceptual schemes upon external reality; reality as we understand it is structured by our conceptual schemes ... [citing the example of a chair:] Thus, whether the chair is a particular object - a single bounded entity - or a bunch of molecules or a wave form is not a question that has a unique correct answer. All the answers can be correct, but correct within different conceptual schemes (Lakoff, Women, fire, p. 261) - we might say, frameworks.

Putnam, then, sees concepts as mechanisms for achieving something that may or may not be expressed in representations or mental images. He consequently does not go further in classifying various types or clusters of them: animal -> dog -> retriever. This, as we shall see, is exactly what Lakoff does try in his Women, fire and dangerous things, which to a great extent is based on Putnam's philosophy, partly in opposition to it. Are concepts susceptible to categorization?

I cannot fathom how, under Putnam's account of concepts as set out in his Reason, truth and history, and acceptingly summarized by Lakoff, the latter can categorize within such a multipurpose and environment-dependent cluster of entities like this. I believe any attempt at construing some general and systematic division of labor among the members of this cluster would have to resort to
some kind of formalism that, again in consideration of Putnam, would seem to belie the very functions and roles of concepts.

On the other hand, the members of this cluster seem to perform the jobs assigned to them not only according to traditional accounts on concepts, like those reported by Smith and Medin, but also and noticeably, those developed by Putnam and Lakoff. But then I will go further than Lakoff in exploiting Putnam and say that these concepts defy categorization within their cluster; that, for example, it does not always make sense to operate, as recommended by Lakoff, with a basic level (dog, with animal as superordinate and retriever as subordinate levels), as I argued above, in my discussion of consecutive approach processes.

Now let us hear Lakoff himself concerning categories of concepts (Lakoff, Women, fire, Chapter 17 (pp. 269 - 303). His Chapter 17 deals with Cognitive semantics and we are presented with three general issues: - Foundations: What makes concepts meaningful. - Cognitive model theory (In contradistinction to plain "model theory", which is an "objectivist" formal model theory, for which see below, ...): What is known about the nature of cognitive models. - Philosophical issues: General approaches to meaning, understanding, truth, reason, knowledge, and objectivity - all in all a tall order. There are dual foundations: 1) basic-level categorization, which suggest that our experience is preconceptually structured at that level (my emphasis); and 2) kinesthetic image schemas [or schemata, as distinct from schemes], which provide the structuring factor: We have general capacities for dealing with part-whole structure in real world objects via gestalt perception, motor movement, and the formation of rich mental images. These impose a preconceptual structure on our experience [my emphasis again]. Our basic-level concepts correspond to that preconceptual structure and are understood directly in terms of them. Basic-level concepts are much more richly structured than kinesthetic image schemas, which have only the grossest outline of structure.

Lakoff continues One of Mark Johnsen's basic [again!] insights <which> is that experience is structured in a significant way prior to, and independent of, any concepts. Existing concepts may impose further structuring on what we
experience, but basic experiential structures are present regardless of any such imposition of concepts (my emphasis).

The idea is that we are all of us acting and hence also conceptualizing on a rather limited set of basic (!) - perhaps the most basic things - schemas (I wonder about the insistence on "basic" all through the argumentation; the notion seems to imply a systematicity alien at least to the philosophy of Putnam, which Lakoff adopts with much admiration and, indeed, very helpful understanding.. Is basic axiomatic?). We have a series of such schemas: the CONTAINER schema for in and out, whose structural elements are interior, boundary, exterior; the PART-WHOLE schema with structural elements: whole, parts and a configuration; the LINK schema: A, B and a link connecting them; the CENTER-PERIPHERY schema: entity, center, periphery; the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL schema: a source (starting point), a destination (endpoint), a path (a sequence of contiguous locations connecting the source and the destination), and a direction (toward the destination). There are others, too, such as an UP-DOWN schema, a FRONT-BACK schema, a LINEAR ORDER schema, etc. (summarizing Lakoff's survey, Women, fire, pp. 273ff.).

According to Lakoff, Johnson's argument has four parts: - Image schemas structure our experience preconceptually [my emphasis]. - Corresponding image-schematic concepts exist. - There are metaphors mapping image schemas into abstract domains, preserving their basic logic. - The metaphors are not arbitrary but are themselves motivated by structures inhering in everyday bodily experience (my emphasis) (Naturally metaphors in the numerous acceptances of this term are appealed to in language philosophy and cognitive studies; besides Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors we live by, there are Cooper, Metaphor; Ortony, Metaphor and thought; Johnson, Philosophical perspectives on metaphor; Kit-tay, Metaphor).

Lakoff commenting further makes the following crucial points: The point is this: Schemas that structure our bodily experience preconceptually have a basic logic. Preconceptual structural correlations in experience motivate meta-
phors that map that logic onto abstract domains. Thus, what has been called abstract reason has a bodily basis in our everyday physical functioning (This largely seems to have been Bollnow's idea, too. See Bollnow, Mensch und Raum, passim). It is this that allows us to base a theory of meaning and rationality on aspects of bodily functioning.

In short, bodily based schemas with a certain order cooperate in the creation of ideas in which some of this order of things is preserved. If I may contribute an example, I will say that I consider it illogical to have things standing on their head because I don't do that myself. Furthermore: We have argued that our conceptual system has a dual foundation - that both basic-level and image-schematic concepts are directly meaningful; and What gives human beings the power of abstract reason? Our answer is that human beings have what we will call a conceptualizing capacity. That capacity consists in: - The ability to form symbolic structures that correlate with preconceptual structures in our everyday experience. Such symbolic structures are basic-level and image-schematic concepts. - The ability to project metaphorically from structures in the physical domain to structures in abstract domains... - The ability to form complex concepts and general categories using image-schemas as structuring devices. This allows us to construct complex event structures and taxonomies with superordinate and subordinate categories.

I have no quarrel with any of this, except the idea of preconceptuality - but the argumentation as a whole looks to me like an attempt to salvage logic where logic, if applying at all, works rather untidily. Concerning the notion that the schemas have preconceptual effects, that - as I understand it - they impose structure on our ideas, notions etc. before these themselves are being formed, I will note that there is a crucial difference between a case when they merely exist preconceptually (and this is what Lakoff seems to say) and a case in which they operate preconceptually. For in the latter case they would (or might) impose their logic on our concepts, whereas in the former case, if there is any clear connection between schemes and concepts at all, it would be our concept formation that selects existing schemes from storage, making specific combinations of them (for they hardly ever occur in singles, do they?).

How could they operate preconceptually, even if they existed precon-
ceptually? In the snake in lethargy there is, as Wodehouse would say, not much bounce to the ounce. But once the sun gets warmer and the call comes, then the snake and probably also Johnson's *kinesthetic image schemas* get alive and start functioning. And who makes the call (forgetting about the sun)? We ourselves, when we come up with a concept and *need* some of those schemas for its formation, when we pick them up from storage and activize them. The "schema" of up/above versus down/below is crucial to Dante Alighieri as he, going through Hell with his guide Virgil, stops on an *alta ripa* (a high ground) to gaze down into the *profondo abisso* (the deep abyss), on the luckless Pope Anastasius II (whose sin it was to have been accused of espousing heretical ideas; Inferno, XI, 1ff.) (I am using the most recent scholarly commented edition of the Divina Commedia, ed. Natalino Sapegno, rev. ed., Florence 1985 which is based on the latest "vulgate" version of the original text). For we do not expect to look upwards for Hell, nor do we like the idea of seeing it straight in front of us and on the same level, as this might give the impression that we were present there ourselves as registered members. We would be less inclined to call up the "schema" of outside/inside (CONTAINER schema for *in* and *out*), since we want to remain outside (and so evidently did Dante, even though he clearly recognized the unpleasant possibility of finding himself a permanent inhabitant there), while having to be in some sense inside in order to communicate with all the *perduta gente* (the crowd of the hopeless). But the "schema" of above/below is crucial to Dante's story not because it imposes anything on him - or on us, the readers of the *Commedia* - all by itself, but because his visit to that part of Hell is focused on a concept that requires the notion of above/below. It is his visit that imposes the logic in the choice of schemas and their use, not the schema itself.

The outcome of my considerations so far is that I shall have to fall back upon a somewhat less sophisticated option than the one offered by Lakoff-Johnson, postulating *typical cases* and adequate models for them at the cost of letting the pretense of semi-logical constructions go by the board. On principle I
can see no way of getting round the philosophically distasteful recourse of arguing *ad hoc*. But if there is available a large number of each specific type of ad hoc-case, then don't they seem to converge into quasi-principles?

The perspectives just outlined accord with that of *object-oriented* description, or rather, with its "moral" if not with its technique. Here we asked for lists of attributes and methods for handling them. Does this also apply to categorization generally?

4.1.1. Prototype theory: away with objects

At the basis of any conceptualization of real or "transcendent" things, of any cognition, and of configurations and systems involving these items, there is the factor of categorization: put simply and in traditional but now obsolete terms: *things are categorized together on the basis of what they have in common* (Lakoff) (For this and the following notes, see Lakoff, *Women, fire*, pp. 8ff.).

Lakoff presents a more recent alternative called *prototype theory* concerning categorization and initiated by Eleanor Rosch. This suggests that *human categorization is essentially a matter of both human experience and imagination - of perception, motor activity, and culture on the one hand, and of metaphor, metonymy, and mental imagery on the other*. As a consequence, human reason crucially depends on the same factors, and therefore cannot be characterized merely in terms of the manipulation of abstract symbols ... One consequence of this [Lakoff's] study will be that certain common views of science will seem too narrow.

Rosch argues against the classical view that the properties defining a category are shared by all members; a view that rules out differences between more or less typical cases and also dependence on human factors in the categorizing process. She presented what are called *prototype effects*, also against Whorf's hypothesis, that language determines one's conceptual system. Prototypes are subcateories or category members that gave a special cognitive status - that of being a 'best example', while prototype effects indicate the resulting asymmetryes. Subjects judged certain members of the cateories as being more represen-
tative of the category than other members. For example, robins are judged to be more representative of the category BIRD than are chicken, penguins, and ostriches ... The most representative members of a category are called 'prototypical' members (Lakoff) - somewhat like Putnam's stereotypes: the stereotype of "tiger" has it striped while there are individuals devoid of such decoration (Rosch's contribution is presented in a separate section, Lakoff, pp. 39 - 57. Some remarks of hers on prototypes are quoted on p. 44). Lakoff, noting that prototype effects are superficial (because nothing is said about their structural place within the actual category), observes that a category must have additional internal structure [in addition to its member listing] of some sort that produces these goodness-of-example ratings [experimental rating of people's categorizations]. Moreover, that internal structure must be part of our concept of what a bird is, since it results in asymmetric inferences... , these mean that New information about a representative category member is more likely to be generalized to nonrepresentative members than the reverse: disease was considered more likely to spread from robins to ducks than from ducks to robins. Lakoff therefore takes upon himself to outline a general approach to the theory of categorization and to sketch the range of sources for superficial prototype effects ... Our basic claim will be that prototype effects result from the nature of cognitive models, which can be viewed as 'theories' of some subject matter (my emphasis).

Lakoff's idealized cognitive models (ICMs) are fundamentally close to the models in so-called ordinary language philosophy, in that context and use play a greater role than logics and "objectivism". In the following I shall try to summarize some of his more important points, to the extent that they may support my particular analytical task.

Lakoff cites Rosch and others concerning the crucial notion of basic-level effects. Consider three "taxonomic" (classification) levels: Animal (superordinate level) - dog (basic level) - retriever (subordinate level) (or, correspondingly: furniture, chair, rocker). There is some particular importance attached to the middle level, which is why it is dubbed the "basic" one.

The fundamental observation is that the basic level is distinguished from other levels on the basis of the type of attributes people associate with a category at that level, in particular, attributes concerned with parts. Our knowledge at the
basic level is mainly organized around part-whole divisions. The reason is that
the way an object is divided into parts determines many things. First, parts are
usually correlated with functions, and hence our knowledge about functions is
usually associated with knowledge about parts. Second, parts determine shape,
and hence the way an object will be perceived and imagined. Third, we usually
interact with things via their parts, and hence part-whole divisions play a major
role in determining what motor program we can use to interact with an object...

The assumption that we also impose part-whole structures to events, is of
particular interest for our present task. What determines basic-level structure is a
matter of correlation with our general perceptual and conceptional set-up, so that
the basic-level categories are human-sized ... They depend not on objects them-
selves, independent of people, but on the way people interact with objects: the
way they perceive them, imagine them, organize information about them, and
behave toward them with their bodies. The relevant properties clustering
together [called clusters of interactional properties] to define such categories
are not inherent to the objects, but are interactional properties, having to do
with the way people interact with objects, writes Lakoff, who cites Rosch, who
in her turn insists that we are talking about a perceived world and not a meta-
physical world without a knower (my emphasis) (Lakoff, Women, fire, pp. 50f.).
Categories occur in systems, and such systems include contrasting categories.
Categorization depends to a large extent on the nature of the system in which a
category is embedded. It seems reasonable to conclude that basic-level catego-
ries are, in fact, most differentiated in people's minds; but they are most differenti-
tiated because of their other properties, especially because most knowledge is
organized at that level (Lakoff, Women, fire, pp. 52ff. For causation categories,
see pp. 54ff.).

Not even the notion of analyticity is accepted in its traditional sense by
Lakoff (in this he seems to have a precedent in Wittgenstein). Analyticity has
been the touchstone of all logist and objectivist approaches, for what can be
more certain than saying that "bachelor" means "unmarried man" - a tautol-
ogy in which one term doesn't add anything to the other. Not so, according to
Lakoff (Lakoff, Women, fire, pp. 130ff.). Since 'bachelor' and 'unmarried
man' do not evoke the same ICMs [Lakoff's cognitive models], they do not
have the same meaning (In addition to Quine's own extensive writings, one may refer, for discussions of analytical statements, to Grayling, *An introduction to philosophical logic*, passim, and to Hookway, *Quine*, passim. See also Hahn and Schilpp, *The philosophy of W. V. Quine*, index ref.s to various contributions).

If entity definitions and categorization of them are as complex and relative as it has been claimed by the cited authors (and it would be hard to disclaim their argumentation), then the information issue, to, will be affected.

4.2. Handling information.

In Part III, Ch. 6.1., I discussed an information perspective applicable to liturgy. Now I shall revert to the subject and assess some points more closely.

Data are stored somewhere. But data do not qualify for the name of information: *Data refer to facts. When data are filtered through one or more processes so that they take on both meaning and value to a person, they become information. Information, rather than data, is what people use to make decisions ... both the computer and the human mind act as processors that select the data and transform them into meaningful information. As information is generated from data, it, too, eventually becomes part of the store of data* (Parker, *Management information systems*, p. 12); and: *Information is data that has been processed into a form that is meaningful to the recipient and is of real or perceived value in current or prospective actions or decisions* (Davis and Olson, *Management information systems*, p. 200).

We cannot speak of a ritual as a means of displaying and exchanging messages without looking at it as an information system. The simplest information system consists of three "boxes": inputs (of data and instructions) - processing (of data according to the instructions) - output (results, information). These inputs are external inputs. But here as elsewhere (Davis and Olson, *Management*, pp. 288f.), *The information processing function frequently needs data collected and stored previously* [and data and acquired information, too, may be stored here, as we just noted]. *When data storage is added, the information processing function includes not only the transforma*
tion of data into information but also the storing of data for subsequent use (Davis and Olson).

Thus a fourth "box" is added to the system, one for "storage". Here data and data processed into information are stored (internal input). This is usually (also in Davis and Olson) illustrated with a simple model, which I showed above (IV, 1.2). Here (Model 6) I have enhanced it with additional features: processing methods added to storage and feedbacks from environment interface (extreme right) back to Storage and Data. For convenience; omitting feedbacks and that methods also will be in storage.

Model 6. Information system.

4.2.1. Construing information

As I noted in connection with the liturgy as an information mechanism, the contents here are not quantifications but concept open to various interpretations on the part of the protagonists. This takes us into cognitive science.

People construct and build within the information pattern. From numerous psychology-based research fields we today know that people to a great extent fashion their own surroundings by mentally elaborating conceptions of them. They arrange, often by expectation and before being confronted with a situation, the scenery in front of them, their picture of "reality", to suit their own competences, goals, interest and propensities. The Thomas Theorem is classical: If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences. So-called Personal construct theory postulates (to cite some of its key formulations) as follows: A person's processes are psychologically channelized by the ways in which he anticipates events - A person anticipates events by construing their replication ... Each person characteristically evolves, for his convenience in anticipating events, a construction system embracing ordinal relationships between construct (Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and ritual, p. 157, with ref. to Downs, Personal constructions esp. p. 77. The entire volume is dedicated to this perspective; so are in part contributions in Downs and Stea, Image and environment; and Canter, The psychology of place).

Mackay distinguishes between signals perceived... as communicatively
goal-directed, and those not so perceived and comes up with four basically different categories of situation cross-referenced in relation to each other: signals that are

1) goal-directed,
2) perceived as goal-directed;
3) non-goal-directed and
4) perceived as non-goal-directed; this seems to cover about everything (Mackay, Formal analysis, p 24).

Clearly, alternatives 2) and 3) make a great difference between people being conscious of authority-based or ecclesiastical, even political goals, and looking those who look on the liturgy as an absolute value system with the possibility of salvation not as a goal but as a prospect promise (two factors that would usually overlap).

The non-goal-directed parameter is explained as follows: Organisms in interaction can hardly fail to receive information about one another; and it has often been emphasized that such information can be conveyed by inaction as much as by action. All behaviour is potentially informative - even non-behaviour (Mackay, p. 4).

On top of what authority directive wants liturgy to tell people, they will look around, absorb collect information that has not been directly addressed to them, information that will color their attitudes. The figures of the all-male and publicly dressed (in Venetian State garments) adult members of the Pesaro family in Titian's Pesaro Madonna in the Frari, Venice (Fig. 7), or their participation in real ceremonies, may be perceived either as a message from one's own social equals or else a message about social distance from the common people assembled before the altar (Sinding-Larsen, Iconography and ritual, Index, with further references).

Mackay's focus is on the signals, that is, the information modality. From models purporting to help us think of communication between organisms in terms of its internal effects on the information system of each. MacKay derives three distinctive functions labelled, for short, a) facta, b) skills and c) priorities. From this, it is obvious that the available communication system is selective.
with regard to the information content. The target of a communication may be any or all of these aspects of the recipient's information system... one organism can be thought of as wielding a tool (verbal or otherwise) in order to mould the representation of 'facta', 'skills' or 'priorities' in another... thus focusing on alternative goals. Mackay notes furthermore that The action of the initiator to this end is generally called 'communicating', 'sending a message' or 'generating a signal'; but of course it is open to us to regard the whole causal sequence thus set in motion by the initiator, up to its point of impact on the recipient, as the operation of one and the same tool. What matters is that we distinguish between (i) the originator's goal in wielding the tool and (ii) the actual effect on the recipient (Mackay, pp. 16ff.).

Clearly, the "goal" issue concerns the nature and purpose of the information. Mackay cites Lyon's distinction here (Mackay, p. 17, with reference to J. Lyons, Human language, pp. 49 - 85 in the same publication).

(i) the intended meaning of a message signal - (ii) the meaning as understood by the recipient, and (iii) the conventionally understood meaning.

4.2.2. Signals and messages
The cited observations on the sending and receiving of information are relevant to the subject of liturgy in the sense that they provoke us to distinguish between levels in the mechanism. For on the authority-determined level, people are told how to interpret signals. But this information can regard only specific levels, some among many possible ones. On the level of action and performance, interpretative factors may enter the stage; an old priest with a drowsy voice and tired bearing will be perceived differently from one who performs with an attitude of engagement and energy. On other levels, social as well as cognitive, the reception of signals can vary widely.

The array of words meaning of a message signal (Mackay) may seem tricky and so it is. Bypassing a penetrating discussion of this little system as it is discussed in an enormously rich recent literature, let us just say that the signal is the format a message is given in: a visual image, a sound, a gesture etc. (i.e., a quantifiable or measurable dimension); while the message is what is understood
as the elementarily perceived content: nodding meaning "yes", etc.; and the meaning is the operative system elaborating these factors plus the references to context and to goal or purpose as understood by the initiator and the recipient, all these elements joined together, the entire process. Assembling data concerning birds, W. H. Thorpe concludes that a given utterance contains much potential information, *but that only part of it is used in a given set of circumstances* (Thorpe, *Vocal communication in birds*, pp. 153ff.). The author points up the importance of *distinguishing between message and meaning in every instance, and how dangerous* <it>to assume that all potential information in a message is perceived or understood by the hearers and affects their behaviour appropriately</it> (Thorpe, p. 154). What a consolation! For otherwise we should have to assume that every member of a liturgical congregation would take in everything there is.

Hinde comments editorially on the contributions just referred to (and others not cited here (Hinde, *Non-verbal communication*, pp. 86ff.), concerning the alleged main topic, *goal-directed* communication - and his remarks bear directly on issues relevant to our topic in this book: *In the commonest form of goal-directed signalling the effect of the sender's behaviour on the receiver is monitored by the sender in such a way as to promote corrective action by the sender if the message appears to be ineffective*. This is true also for messages not issued by the sender himself, as when our Ceremony Master applies "corrective action" to a subdeacon who fails to take his cue from the liturgy, as sender, and act as prescribed by the ritual. But not even the Doge or the Pope can direct or "correct" people's further elaboration of the messages on all levels at which they are accessed.

We may select words that are supposed to be especially likely to produce the desired effect on the recipient or hearer, but informative statements will change the state within the recipient: *our criteria of reaching a goal depend on assessing a change in the 'internal organization' of the recipient*. Take the case when *prego*, in Italian, is a response to *grazie*: (A) if saying the response is considered necessary in the context (of polite society), then no communication
occurs, the response being taken for granted. If, on the other hand, (B) the possibility of the recipient remaining silent is contemplated, then we may envisage a communicative effect which may affect the relationship between the two; for a disruption of what is expected does communicate something (this is my summary of what Hinde has to say; I hope it does him justice). Point A of course points up a common occurrence in frequently repeated rituals like the liturgy. The words and actions become so regularly repeated that they are no longer noticed as such, only in terms of the sum total of ritual they contribute to making up, the emergent properties.

 Argumentation in this field depends largely upon the way things are classified. I shall cite Lyon's classification first and then the one in Hinde's commentary, and this in order to indicate the richness of the repertoire rather than to embark upon a another detailed discussion of the categorization methods. Lyons distinguishes between non-vocal and verbal communication, and under the latter heading of categories such as prosodic and paralinguistic features or components (Lyons, Human language, pp. 52f.). Prosodic features concern intonation and stress; while paralinguistic is a troublesome term, but roughly it covers combinations of physiologically grounded parameters with pitch, loudness, duration and silence, etc. (Lyons citing Crystal). This restricts the term to features of vocal signals. However, a case can be made for applying it... to those gestures, facial expressions, eye-movements, etc. which play a 'supporting' role in normal communication by means of spoken language (Lyons). Michael Argyle, on his part (Argyle, Non-verbal communication in human social interaction, esp. pp. 246ff.) gives the following list: bodily contact, proximity, orientation, appearance, posture, head-nods, facial expression, gestures, looking, and some non-verbal aspects of speech (as in the Crystal reference above). And he postulates a rather complicated system of couplets like friendly - hostile; stable – unstable, etc. Edmund Leach, in the same publication, develops some category in what he calls a ritual context (The influence of cultural context in man, pp. 313 - 345). But his categories, such as the one between Private Arena and Public Arena, are not clear. I do not believe in the employment of adjectives for classification purposes. Friendly need not be the same as acting in a friendly manner, which noto-
riously can occur in a hostile atmosphere. People will react differentially to this register of modalities. Some are more sensitive to visual media, others to words or to music, or to the totality of the scenery.

Thus these authors end up by speaking not so much of communication as of communicative content, that is, information. This type of categorization reminds one of semiotics (and Sebeok, who is often referred to here, used the term zoo-semiotics). To repeat, they are useful in alerting us to a number of possibilities. On the other hand, what people really involved in interaction care about, is hardly which category anything they say or do does systematically belongs to, but what its significance is for each participant in the interaction: again, the information. Hinde's editorial comment seems to touch upon this crucial issue when he notes that the distinction between those aspects of human communication which do and do not depend on language is not easy to make ... Furthermore, the distinction between anthroposemiotic and zoosemiotic would not be useful to those contributors who are seeking for relationships between animal communication and certain aspects of human communication (Hinde, Non-verbal communication, pp. 91f.).

Semiotics deal in distinctions in the creative process of signs. This creative process is goal-directed, aiming a producing specific effects in the receiver(s). An equilateral red triangular frame, with one angle pointing downwards, and set against a white triangle, is intended to tell drivers to yield to crossing traffic. Is this a sign, a token, index or what? Who cares when driving? Who cares when setting up the sign? The same might be effected in words, saying yield (correspondingly to signs on US Interstates saying Wrong way instead of showing us the red disk with a white field across). One is verbal, the other non-verbal. Again, who cares when driving? A Turk may close his eyes and slowly raise his face to show assent; while a European doing the same would be interpreted (in Europe) as showing resignation. The sign, token, index or what-not is the same, but the information is certainly different. How to classify usefully a smile which, depending on context, may mean either acceptance or ironical rejection? Classification is effected in the way it works: here, positively or negatively.

When we come to this, we have already entered linguistics. John B.
Thompson has a relevant comment when speaking of the extension of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning [by reference to usage and language-games] to the sphere of human action <which> provides the basis for <Peter> Winch's analysis of understanding (Thompson, Critical hermeneutics, pp. 151f.). And: Since an action is meaningful only if it is performed in accordance with some rule, so it seems to follow that one understands an action only insofar as one comprehends the conventions which govern its performance. Here I would note that we have a case of looking at the "how" rather than the "what", in support of my argumentation in this book. But Thompson doesn't agree: I shall argue, however, that Winch's analysis cannot be sustained, since the elucidation of conventions which govern action is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding the action concerned. It is not necessary insofar as there are many actions, such as waiting, walking, smiling and frowning, which may be understood without uncovering some rule in accordance with which they are performed. These actions are understood through the attribution of appropriate descriptions; and in many cases, the only conventions which are relevant are those which regulate, not the performance of the action, but rather the use of the phrases whereby that action is described. On the other hand, there are situations in which action is clearly part of a ritual or routine. Yet even then, the comprehension of the conventions which constitute a ritual may not be sufficient for understanding the action. For an action may have a significance which transcends the meaning, endowed by the conventions of everyday life, and the elucidation of this significance may require a theoretical reconstruction of institutional and structural features which are initially inaccessible to the consciousness of lay actors (for the latter point, Thompson refers to Ricoeur and Habermas).

I believe Thompson's exposé sets the boundary for how far into everyday exchange and interaction ritual models have analytical value: first, the device can distinguish competent from lay actors; secondly, a large chunk of exchange and interaction will remain uncovered and outside of the pale of ritual functions. At this point we would have to enter the linguistic-cognitive debate properly spoken, but this is out of reach for the present venture.
Arabic names and titles are given in a typographical form different from the norm because of transliteration problems in the software.


ARGYLE, MICHAEL, “Non-verbal communication in human social interaction” (= HINDE, *Non-verbal communication*, pp. 244ff.).


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Rule, see also Pricoco.


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RITCERIM.MC1
Followed by RITCERIM.MC2 and *.MC3.

VENICE, BIBL. MARCIANA.
Cod.lat.III,172 - Coll. 2276 = Rituum ceremoniale.
Transcription of the Latin part of the document up to and including the Dominical, by Staale Sinding-Larsen,.

Minor points marked # still to be checked. Some references to antiphones, responsories, prayers, etc. are not clear in the abbreviated spellings and have to be checked, particularly referring to the San Marco Orationale of which I have a complete photographic copy (this probably is the Orationale referred to in the present document; more about this later).

The volume starts with later (seventeenth-century) additions (pre-paginated 1-23). The pagination is given as fol. n, fol. n verso. The manuscript's internal references to other place in the mas itself, with k3, for carta, occasionally just c, have been given as k. in the transcription, to distinguish from other abbreviations.

I have accentuated typographically some headings etc., in order to facilitate use of the texts. Indentations for paragraphs are mainly mine, and these are provided with folio number plus the relevant paragraph number (3/5: fol. 3, paragraph 5, 3v/5: fol. 3 verso, paragraph 5) in order to facilitate reference. Punctuation in the ms is often uncertain; I have chosen comma or period as it seemed natural. In some cases this may cause interpretation ambiguities, so the reader should always be ready to substitute one for the other if she or he feels my markings are not correct.

Unambiguous abbreviations have been spelled out (see list below). The original spelling has been maintained, also the (numerous) ortographical and grammatical errors.

Conventions used in the transcription.
Text status
/.../ word(s) cancelled in the ms.
/// illegible word(s) One set of /// sometimes means that a string of several words is illegible.
ab?de doubtful identification of single letter.
{} doubtful reading of word or part of word, except single letter.
<...> insertion in the ms, by the original author or others.
</ /////> illegible insertion
</jn mane hora... /> cancelled insertion
((() )) original text brackets.
(...) editor's addition to word.
[ ] editor's note or comment.

Common word abbreviations

Graphically raised desinences: ser\textsuperscript{mus} for serenissimus, thus: ser.mus. & for all abbreviated addition markers except full et (= and). See examples below.

- Abbreviations with period or without special sign: q = qui etc., quondam - de = Deo etc. (cases like this must be understood in their context: "de gràs", since the latter obviously means "gratias" (from the context), "de" must mean Deo) - x.o = Christo - Xri = Christi - pr. nr. = Pater noster.

- l', p', q' for abbreviation of l, p and q with a bar across the letter in the ms., since the crossbar cannot be rendered in the computer language. d' = de - i = in - p'uís = parvis - p'p' = propter, proprius - pr'= per - qr'e = quere - u'l = vel - al'l'a = alleluya - Ap'lice = Apostolicae - ap'lor3 as apostolorum - p'p'h'is = prophetiae - pp'le = prophetae - V'and R' = rubrical verse resp. responsory.

- ñ, ñ, ú, etc. for abbreviation marks placed above the letter in the ms., not reproducible in the computer language; thus (common words:) bré = breve - cú = cum - dñr = dicuntur - dr = dicitur - dút = dicunt(ur) - héc = hæc or haec.

- nœ = nomine - nro = nostro - nr'o = nostro - oia = omnia - p' = prima - pærde (Italian) = parendo - p'nti = praeenti - qñ = quando - q's = qu(a)esumus - rege = regentem - spáli = speciali - sup' = supra - tátùm = tantum - út = aut


- a3, b3, etc. for all kinds of abbreviation marks appended to words or
letters. Thus: dicam3 = dicamus - Et3, et3, &3 = et caetera - nru3 = nostrum - oib3 = omnibus - q3 = quem, quam, quum, etc. - s3 = scilicet - usq3 = usque - v3 = videlicet or versus or vesper - cóplet3/complet3 = completorium - Dñicar3 = Dominicalum - epl'ariu3 = epistolarium - hym3 = hymnus - oct3 = octava/ae - off3. = officium - R3.a = responsoria - scüt3 = sanctus - sr3 = sanctor. -

- Numbers: xL = quadragesima, LXX.ma = septuagesima - 4. or. tp3. = quatuor tempora (Quatember) - 4. or3 tp'r = quattuor temporum tempora.

EXEMPLES OF FORMULAS:
- po d'c3 = primo decembre - oês gètes, or'o, pr'a qs' = omnes gentes, oratio, praesta quesumus - et dr' psal. laudate d. o. g. = et dicitur psalmus Laudate Dominum omnes gentes - et cœpit de spu scto = et concepit de spiritu sancto - v3. laus honor vr gl'ria = versus laus honor versus gloria - sed in missa noctis no detur bndictione3 p' R. m. D. legatû. in missa dicta det bndicœe3 & Indulgên = sed in missa noctis non detur benedictionem [sic] per Reverendum Dominum legatum. in missa dicta det benedictionem & Indulgentiam - Respice qs. dnc. = Respice quaesumus domine - no à catorib3 = non à [sic] cantoribus - R' Deo gratias all'a all'a. postea fidelium anime. pr. nr. Regina çeli et c3. oro de more = Responsorium Deo gratias alleluya alleluya. postea fidelium anime. pater noster. Regina caeli etcetera. oratio de more - Et fer. a 6. & sabblo fit d' s. occurrêtib3 = Et feria sexta & sabbato fit de sabbatis occurrentibus - cetera gia ut i rubrica = caetera omnia ut in rubrica - duas missas, p. d' sct, o. 2a d vigilia, ui i oib3 uigilijs = duas missas, prima de sancto, secunda de vigilia, ut in omnibus uigilijs.

TEXT EXAMPLE:
The following example shows a typical case of text with abbreviations:
"Et fer. a 6. & sabblo fit d' s. occurrêtib3., sine aliq' commemoratione ferie. cú off3. bré & Et si nó eget festú, fit d' fer.a, ut in rubrica ordinatur. cú off3. bré &, sed ad mágt dr' aña <beate má. v. & in aña, bt'a dei genetrix> regina celi, aut all'a cetera oía ut i rubrica" (fol. 14).

TEXT (fol. 23 verso of the codex; pagination re-started below):
Anno-1564:/// [cancelled from A) to B): A) /Liber/Cerimoniale.
Rituum Ecclesiasticarum, siue sacrarum cerimonialarum, Ducalis Eccle-
siae Sancti Marcj Euangelistae, in praeclarissima ciuitate Venetiarum, per Reuerendum pr<orsum> Dominum Bartholomeum/ Bonifacium, eiusdem insignis Ecclesiae /Magister <chori et> cerimonialarum, et chorodidascaleum/ noviter /diligentissime/ reuisum, et pluribus ex libris, exactissime compilatum. secundum ueram ipsius Ecclesiae, antiquamque ordinationem, <Anno domini MccccLxuij pio uij. pontifici maximo Roma petri sedem regente [sic], Hieronymo priolo <inclito> Libri tres, duo ordinarij. <principe venetij principante. Tercius extraordinarius.> B)


Capita libri primi - Ritumm Ecclesiasticorum [sic] siue sacrarum cerimonialiarum Ducalis Ecclesiae sanctj Marcj Euangelistae in preclarissima ciuitate venetiarum.

Tabula.


De Euangelio dominicalj dicendo in festis dupplicibus, que ueniunt in dominica, loco euangelij, versus in principio erat uerbum, in fine missae - k. 21.

Explicit liber primus.

LIBER SECUNDUS - CAPITA SECUNDI LIBRI. JNCIPIT SANCTUARIUM TOCIUS ANNI.

December. De vigilia Sancti Andreae Apostoli - k. 21. De sancto Andrea
festo sanctorum Martyrum joannis et pauli - k. 28. De sancto Leone papa et confessore - k. 28. De festo Apostolorum petri et paulij - k. 28. De commemo-
ratione sanctij pauli Apostolij - k. 28.

_**julius** De octaua sanctij joannis Baptistar - k. 28. De sancto Marciale Apostolo k. 28. De festo visitationis virginis Mariae - k. 29. jntra octauam vis-
itationis virginis Mariae - k. 29. De octaua Apostolorum petri et paulij - k. 29. De sanctis Hermacora et fortunato Martyribus - k. 29. De sancta Marina vir-
gine - k. 29. <De sancta simphorosa. - De s. praxe de - k. 29.> De sancta Maria Magdalena - k. 29. De sancto Apollinare Episcopo et Martyre - k. 29. De sancto jacobij Apostolo - k. 29. De sancta Anna nec uirgo nec Martyr - k. 29. De sanctis Martyribus faelicis simplicij faustini et Beatricis [sic: four geni-
tives!] - k. 29. <De sancta martha - k. 29.>

_**Augustus** De sancto petro in vincula - k. 29. <De sanctis machabeis - k.
29.> De jnventione corporis sanctij stephani - k. 29. jn sanctae Mariae de niuis [sic] - k. 29. jn transfiguratione domini - k. 30. De sanctis ciriaco Largo et

**September** <De sanctis. xij fratribus - k. 30.> De sanctarum virginum et
Martyrum. heuphemiae. Dorotheae. teclae. et herasmae.- k. 30. De Natiuitate
Martyre - k. 30. <De sanctis Eustachio et socijs - k. 30> De sancto Matheo
Apostolo et Euangelista - k. 30. De sanctis cosma et Damiano Martyribus - k.
31. De dedicatione sanctij Michaelis Archangeli - k. 31. De sancto hieronymo
presbitero et confessore Doctore - k. 31.

**October.** De sancto Remigio Episcopo et confessore - k. 31. De sancto
francisco confessore - k. 31. De sancto Magno Episcopo et confessore - k. 31 -
De sanctis Sergio et Bacho Martyribus - k. 31. De dedicatione Ecclesiae sanctij
Marej - k. 31. De sancto calixto papa et Martyre - k. 31. </De sancta vsrula et
sodalium - k. 31/> De sancto Luca Euangelista - k. 31. <De sancta vsrula et
sodalium - k. 3.> De festo Apostolorum Symonis et judae - k. 31.

**Nouember.** De festo omnium sanctorum - k. 31. De commemoracione
omnium fidelium defunctorum - k. 31. De sancto Leonardo confessore - k. 31. De sancto Theodoro Martyre - k. 32. De sancto Martino Episcopo et confessore - k. 32. De sancto Bricio Episcopo et confessore - k. 32. De Dedicacione Apostolorum petri et pauli - k. 32. De festo presentationis sanctae Mariae virginis - k. 32. De sancto Mauro Martyre - k. 32. De sancta cecilia virgine et Martyre - k. 32. De sancto clemente papa et Martyre - k. 32. De sancta Katharina virgin et Martyre - k. 32.

Tabula de diuersitate coloribus quibus sancta Romana Ecclesia utitur in paramentis Ecclesiasticis k. 81 - 81.

finis sanctuarij.

De ferijs Aduentus Domini. Tabula parisina - prima tabula - k. 32. Secunda tabula - k. 32. Tercia tabula - k. 32. Quarta tabula - k. 33. Quinta tabula - k. 33. Sexta tabula - k. 34. Septima tabula - k. 34. Rubrica de festo sancti Thomae Apostoli - k. 34. Rubrica quando Natiuitas Domini venerit die Lunae - k. 34. Rubrica de Dominica infra octauam Natiuitatis Domini - k. 35.

De sanctis qui habent orationes proprias in nostro orationali in mense januarij - k. 35. De sanctis qui habent orationes proprias in nostro orationali in mense februarij - k. 35. De sanctis qui habent orationes proprias in nostro orationali in mense Marcij - k. 35. De sanctis qui habent orationes proprias in nostro orationali in mense Aprilis - k. 35. De sanctis qui habent orationes proprias in nostro orationali in mense Maij - k. 36. De sanctis qui habent orationes proprias in nostro orationali in mense Augusti - k. 36. De sanctis qui habent orationes proprias in nostro orationali in mense junij - k. 36. De sanctis qui habent orationes proprias in nostro orationali in mense julij - k. 36. De sanctis qui habent orationes proprias in nostro orationali in mense octobris - k. 37. De sanctis qui habent orationes proprias in nostro orationali in mense nouembris - k. 37. De sanctis qui habent orationes proprias in nostro orationali in mense Decembris - k. 37.

<Del nouo ordine hauuto dal serenissimo duce erizo per tenir la chiesa aperta nelle festiuità maggiori etc; à carte 3. indietro.>

104. Decreto {?? arctenus/oretinus} della Serenissima Signoria che fa visita della chiesa della salute per il Riceuimento alla riu - carte 117 verso fattol'anno 1707.>


51. Capitolo XXVI. De capitolo paruo. - k. 51.

Rubricae hystiorum suis temporibus ponendarum singulorum mensium, secundum litteram Dominicalem, anni currentis. - k. 51 - 52. Cerimonie serenissimi principis per totum annum quando uenit in ecclesia sanctij Marcij. k. 91. 92. /Capita libri tercj/ Li ordeni con li quali jl serenissimo principe ua con li stendardi et segni triomphali. - 52. Quello che si osserua nel giorno della resurrettion del signor per andar à san Zacharia k. 52. Quello che si osserua in la ottaua della resurrettione à sancto geminiano. - k.52. Quello che nella vigilia de san Marco si debbia fare. - k. 53. Quello che nel zorno de san Marco si debbia fare - k. 53. Quello che nella vigilia della ascesione [sic] del nostro signor si osserua.- 53. Quello si die far nel giorno della ditta ascensione - k. 53. Quello si osserua jìl giorno de san vido - k. 53. Quello si die [deve] fare el giorno de santa Marina - k. 53. Quello si die far el giorno della natiueta del nostro signor. - k.53. Quello si fa el giorno di san stephano. - k. 53. Quello si die ossuerar nella vigilia della purificacione. - k. 53. Quando jl serenissimo non puol andar, et li uanno li conseglieri. - k.54. Li giorni che el serenissimo ua in giesia [chiesa] di san Marco - et in altri luogi [sic]. - k. 54. [illegible note in the margin] Le solemnitade instituide per lo illustriissimo dominio. - k. 54.91. à tergo /cerimonie serenissimi principis per totum annum quò uenit in ecclesiam s. marci - k. 91. 92./ l'ordine delle nuoue congregation dellì pretti de Venetia - k. 55. l'ordine delle sej schole grande [sic] de venetia. - k. 55. l4 ordine delle religion dellì frattij de venetia et fuera - k. 55. Modo del inuidar alle procession. - k. 55. Le procession ordinarie. 55. / qua finisce el secundo libro - seguita el terzo. ///./ Psalmi ad matutinum tenebrarum. feria quinta. sexta. et sabbato.- k.56. <Modus canendi passionem in capella dominij papae romae - k.3 56.> pollizza della vigilia de nadal, vespero, compieta, et matutin. et messa. /k.2./ - k. 56. pollizza della vigilia della epiphania al battizar la croce /k.3/-k. 56. del zorno della zuobia grassa. et de carneual. /k. 4./ - k. 57. pollizza della domenica delle palme mattina et sera. - k. 57. pollizza del marti [martedì] sancto, mercore sancto, zuobbia sancto. - k. 58. Delli versiculi et lectioni delli mattutini, zuobbia, venere, et sabbo [sic] sancto. - k. 59. <Quando capita in Venetia legato nouo uedi à carte 85.> Modus percutiendi his tribus diebus ad matutinum - k. 59. pollizza del venere sancto de matina alla Messa - k. 59. pollizza del venere sancto à metter el corpo de Christo in sepulchro - k.60. pollizza del zuobba sancto de note al monstrar del sangue - k. 61. pollizza del sabbatto sancto alla benediction della fonte et Messa - k.61. pollizza del di de pascua damatina alla Messa - k. 62. pollizza della uigilia delle [sic] penthecoste alla Messa et vespero. - k.63. pollizza della
procession del corpus domini et circumstantie - k.63. l'ordine della ditta procession. etc. - k. 64. pollizza della Messa solenne Episcopal - k. 65. pollizza delli apparati per la ditta procession. - k. 66.

<Explicit liber secundus. Capita libri tercij extraordinarij. - liber tercius.> pollizza della procession con la madona ad pluia vel serenitatem - k.66. pollizza del dar el stendardo al general. ouer baston al capitanio. - k. 67. 90. <56/6/. 8.mazo. 1560. 21. april. k. 93.> pollizza del funeral del serenissimo principe, et sonno capitoli 27. k. 67. 68. 69. 70. pollizza della creation del serenissimo principe. et sonno capitoli 7. k. 70. pollizza del officio di morti. 2. nouembrio vespere matin et Messa etc. - k; 71. pollizza del funeral <49. 9. decemb 3> del primicerio nostro. et sua creation et possesso. - k. 71. pollizza del funeral del cancellier grando <59. ii April.> et altri orattori - k. 71. Ordine circha el dar del capello à qualche Reverendissimo cardinal. - k. 72. pollizza del exequio del Reverendissimo cardinal cornelio in san Marco.-k. 72. <46. 17. mazo.> jn exequijs Reverendissimorum cardinalium. - k. 72. pollizza della Messa episcopal pro defunctis - k. 73. pollizza del anniersario del Reverendissimo cardinal Zeno. - k.73. <21. 27. mazo.> pollizza del exequio del Reverendissimo patriarca contarinj - k. 74 <1504. ij. nouemb3. - 1554. 3. sett. querini.> Ordene che se die seruar alla morte et sepoltura dellj patriarchi k 74. <54. 19 auosto piero franco contarini> Ordene quando se fa el patriarcha. - k. 75. funeral del Reverendissimo Cardinal cornelio. - k. 75. 6.7. <24. 26.lujo - 25. 26. luio.> Quello che si osserua nella morte, et creation del pontefice. - k.77. 78.<55. 30. april. marcello 20. zorni 2j.> pollizza della procession con la madona [probably the Nicopeia] per peste et mortalitate.- k. 78. 85.<processio pro gratia habita, cessata peste, & mortalitate - k. 85> pollizza del dar delle candelle per choro le schuole grande al di de s. Marco alli 25. april. da poi la Messa granda.- k.78. pollizza del exequio del Reverendissimo cardinal zen fo fato del 55. adi. 9. mazo. per farlo ogni anno in questo zorno. & à questo modo. - k. 79. Circha el sonar delle campane per diuerse occasion, et morte de tutti quellj per li qualj se solita de sonar. - k. 79. Que seruantur cum mittitur galerus extra curiam romanam alicuj Reverendissimo Domino cardinalj.- k. 80. /Tabule de diuersitate colorum ch'sancta romana ecclesia utitur in para mentis ecclesiasticis. k. 81./ / / / / / / / / / / <Quando il serenissimo Principe non può andar alla Chiesa, et altra solenità per qualche impedimento uedi a carta 54.>

[fol. 1] 1/1 Quello si osserua quando el muore uno canonico de san marco dellj residenti. Ouer uno cantore. Ouer uno sottocanonico. Ouer el maistro del
choro. Ouer Diacono, o subdiacono, o altri. - k. 80. Circa el sepelir dellj corpi nelle arche sotto li portegalli [the front and lateral narthex] de san Marco. k.80. pollizza del funeral <49. 7. zener> del imembassador d'inghilterra. - k.82. Ordine quando uien alcun Reverendissimo cardinal sollemnemente in venetia - k. 82. <55. 16. zener> funeral del clarissimo jmbassador de mantua in s. hieremia - k. 83. <55.17. zener> funeral del Reverendissimo Arciuescouo de cipro in s. Marco. - k.83. <55. 28. zener> Della uenuta della Regina de polonia. <56. 26. aprile> con jl cardinal de Augusta & il cardinal de fiorenza in venetia. & à messa in s. marco. - k. 83. Lordinne della creation del serenissimo principe, con tutti li dosi che sonno stati dal primo che fu messer paulo anazato del 709. in driedo - k. 84. Quello si osserva quando uien el Reverendissimo legato etc. - k. 85 - Wuando jl uien à messa uno procurator fatto di nuouo. - k. 85. <56. i9. ottobre> /processio pro gratia habita, cessata peste, & mortalitate - k. 85./ Quello fu osservato quando uien el Reverendissimo cardinal caraffa in venetia & à messa - k. 85. <56. 21. dicembre> funeral del messer domenego da cômesso del re ferandin in s. sophia - k. 85. <56. 28. dicembre> parte ouer constitution del serenissimo gritt in diuerse materie della chiesa de san marco. <22. 25. zener. - 30. 26. marzo. - 60. 2. noviembre. 94. 59. 2j. auosto. - k. 95.> - k. 86. pollizza della inuestition & dar della bachetta al maistro del choro per el serenissimo principe da poi el sara elletto per li serenissimi procuratori. - k. 86. <De obedientia praestanda magistro cerimoniarum - k. 86.> Cerimonia quando la Dogaressa fa la intrata, & uien col bucintoro al pallazzo, etc. - k. 86. </57. 19. settembre - 57. 6. zener./>< 57. po de'3 [= primo dicembre]> pollizza del exequio del imembassador de mantoa messer Alisandro cathanij - k. 88. capitolo della uigilia della sensa del 1558. quello che intrauene. 18. mazo.- k. 88. <58. 16. Zugno> Circha el consecrar laltar de san lurnardo in chiesia de san marco. - k. 88. <58. 6. luio> Circha el reconcilelari la chiesia de san marco per uno che fu ferito in quella - k. 88. <la colonna seguente 4. riga> notta quando fu porta ["portà" = portata] la Colona fu batudo Christo de hierusalem - k. 88. <59. 30. mazo>. Quando fu porta li euangelij de san marco da aquileia in venetia - k. 90. pollizza del funeral del cancelier grando messer lorenzo rocha - k. 88. <59. ij. april> pollizza della procession della pace fatta del 1559. p.o [primo] mazo - k. 89. pollizza della inuention del corpo de san marco. - k. 89. <1085. 25. Zugno>. Littera scritta a roma del fuo go che fu nel sanctuario, 1265. 30. mazo - k. 89. pollizza del dar el stendardo & baston al gouernator de terra ferma videlicet delle gente darme - k. 90. <1546. 2. luio. - 1508. 13. luio. k. 93>. /cerimonie serenissimi principi per totum annum quando uenit in Ecclesia sancti marci - k. 91./ Li zorni che el serenissimo principe ua fuora, &
uien in chiesia de san marco - k. 92. 93. Del modo & ordine che se die osseruar uolendo andar in contra & receuer el Reverendissimo patriarcha quando el uien nella chiesia de san marco per cantar la messa del corpus domini uel per altre sollennita, cerimonia che si fa, cercha a k. 94. procession del jubileo per el consilio tridentino <fu fatta 60. 8.decembre, 61. 2j decembre> - k. 95. <[posterior addition:] Procession del iubileo con la serenissima signoria a carte ii5>

1/2 funeral del cardinal francese in san marco &3 - k. 95. <60. 9. decembre> procession per la resa d'ugonoti heretic da francesi in franca - k. 95. <63. io. zener> /// del collegio della procession col sacramento - k. 95 <63. 19. decembre> pollizza della bolla della indulgentia data da papa pio 4. del 1562. adi 20. febrer per la colona fu batudo Christo cerca nelle pollicè [pol-lizze]

1/3 El libro de tutte le littere, scripture, & uersi, che sonno nella chiesia de san marco, nelle mie scripture trouate & ponite [poste] nel ditto libro per sauer jl tutto, per reficer, quando le uenisseno à manco, & cascasseno [record of all inscriptions for use if the originals are damaged], ibi. Capitulo del capitular del serenissimo principe pertinente alla chiesa di San Marco, el libreto nelle scripture, trouato - et altre cose, nelle scripture>. A <1563 /// die io /februarij/ ianvaris jn missa & processione pro eresum estirpacione c 103 El giorno che el principe uien in gesia, et il giorno del suo anuario sempre se canta la messa della Trinita con la oration de quel santo, et della domenica se però uenisse in tal zorno, & del principe con gloria et credo. solenissima messa; 1590. 18. Agosto. L'anual del serenissimo principe cicogna fu per breuita ditto una messa piccola cum alcuni concerti in organo. fu tuto fatto tute le cerimonie come se fu quando se cantò la messa. 1591. /// [11 lines generally unreadable] 1630. 6. Agosto fu terminato dall'eccelso senato, che ogn'Anno li 2. Agosto fosse fatto un'Annivesario in san Marco per l'Anima del q.[ = quon-dam] Illustrissimo signor Marc Antonio Moresin sopradetto con l'interuento del serenissimo Principe, et serenissima Signoria et cosi si douerà fare ogn'Anno in perpetuo, il detto giorno cioe alli 2 do ///> [Furher 17th-century notes in this column]

[fol. 1 verso]

1v/1 In nomine dominij & hyesu Christi. Amen. Expedit filius Helisej jllius scilicet decaluati, qui in loco caluariae corona spinea coronoatus, crucem ascendit. flagellatus, consputus, et lanceatus. ministris uidelicet ecclesiae, et altaris, quos labor officiorum exagitat inuestigare quod sit officium, et vnde


1v/3 Cum igitur in diuininis officijs exercendis secundum diuersitatem locorum consuetudines, mores et ritus, in Ecclesia Dei longe lateque dispersa sunt diuersi, quamvis secundum apostolum simus unum corpus in christo, singuli autem alter alterius membra, à capite non est aliquatenus discrepandus. Nam sacrosancta romana Ecclesia, caput et mater est - omnium Ecclesiarium et magistra. Dicente domino ad petrum. Tu es petrus et super hanc petram hedificabo Ecclesiam meam. super hanc petram hedificare debeamus - et ab ea exemplum doctrine et magisterium sumere - et sicut à fonte riuuli imbuuntur et deriuantur. sic eius doctrina et magistero imbuti, hauriamus aquam cum gaudio de fontibus salvatoris. Cum itaque totum Ecclesiasticum officium in lectione et cantu, ac circa predictum diuinum officium exercendum in Ecclesia sancti Marcj venetiarum maxima duplicitas, siue diuersitas sit hactenus obseruata. in diuinis officijs et horis officijs celebrandis inducebat scandalum et pariebat materiam iurgiorum. et idcirco nos Simeon Mauro primicerius et capitulum sancti Marcj <idcirco nos franciscus quirino primicerius Ecclesie Sancti Marcj et nicolaus morauio plebanus sancti panthaleonis eius vicarius, et canonicus praedictae Ecclesiae - ad amputandam iurgiorum///> ad
amputandum omnem materiam jurgiorum et scandalum euitandum, Statuimus, et ordinamus, [San Marco conforming to Trent!] quod de cetero in predicta Ecclesia diuinum officium, et hore canonice, secundum infrascriptum ordinem celebrentur, non obstantibus aliqubus consuetudinibus actenus obseruatis, que dicende sunt pocius corruptelle, et secundum quod in præsenti opusculo est dante domino ordinatum, quod ex maxima parte de libro officiorum romani ordinis fecimus compilari, saluis quibusdam moribus, et consuetudinibus Ecclesie nostre sanctj Marcj venetiarum. Et quoniam ea quae in ordinario vet- eri continetur, nulli dubium olim fuerunt mistice à nostris sanctis patribus instituta. jndigni vene ra fore arbitror, ex eis aliquid detruncare, aut de suo loco mutare.

1v/4 Presertim cum ipsi tanquam alij caeli enarauerunt gloriam Dej, & man- uum suarum opera extruxere, nobis inuiolabile fundamentum. jlla nempe quae apud eundem ordinarium uidebantur confuse loqui, seu ordinem iam deficere, uel carere, prius per longos usus, uel consuetudines approbatas apparere curauj. deinde uero per nouas rubricas romanae curiae, ut fuit expediens, studuj ampliare, ex ea uidelicet que aliarum Ecclesiarum caput est et magistra, hauriens aqua in gaudio tanquam de fonte saluatoris, ut uniuersus clerus digne ualeat confiteri domino, et nomen eius per omnia inuocare. Amen.

1v/5 </...///.../ch. qua fa comenzar el primo libro. poi seguita li altri duj libri.>

1v/6 Officium iuxta consuetudinem Ducalis Basilicae sancti Marcj Euange- listae in preclarissma ciuitate venetiarum, per Reuerendum præsbyterum [sic] Dominum Bartholomeum Bonifacium eiusdem insignis Ecclesiae <magis- trum> cerimoniarum et chorodidascalum, nouiter diligentissime reuisam, et pluribus ex libris exactissime compilatum, secundum ueram ipsius Ecclesiae antiquamque ordinationem.

[fol. 2]

2/1 Liber cerimoniarum Ecclesiae Sancti Marcj venetiarum.

Cuum cerimoniarum Ecclesiasticarum in diuersis Ecclesiis varij ac diversi ritus, ac consuetudines habeantur, jn his enim quae ad sollemnitatem pertinent, Diuersa tenere non /est/ <sit> peccatum, ut inquit glo: [ ? ] in c. capellanus de ferijs. Et /ut/ ait Hieronymus ad lucianum unaqueque abundant in suo sensu. c. utinam Lxxvj dist; quare diligens lector, siquid inuerit in descriptione hac rituum et cerimoniarum Ecclesiae sancte diuj Marej Euangelistae ciuitatis jllustris venetiarum diuersum à ritibus aliarum Ecclesiarum non debet mirari. Presertim cum nostra haec Ecclesia in precibus orarij, non omnino /sequatur/ Eccsiam <sequatur> /romana(m)/ <id> quod et multae aliae faciunt: non
solum presbiterorum secularium uerum etiam Monacorum ac diuersorum ordi-
num regularium. Deuiant enim in celebrandis officijis diuinis ab Ecclesia
romana. Eiusdem permissione, uel etiam concessione. Nam etiam ætate /hac/
nstra nouus orandi modus Ecclesiasticis uiris inuentus est. ac dispositus et
promulgatus. cui etiam summi pontificis accessit auctoritas. multique hodie
modum hunc presertim sacerdotes seculares et in primis curiales libentius
amplectuntur. /quod et/ <ut> breuior, /sit/ et expeditior. [is this a contemporary
reference to the thirteenth-century abbreviated Breviary? ¹] quare modo per-
stemus in unitate fidei, et agnitionis filij Dei: /non ea quae prohibet/ sancta
ecclesia romana amplementes. <non prohibit> omnis spiritus laudat dominum.
Et licet ritus hujus nostrae Ecclesiae in nostris ordinarijs descripti sint, quia
tamen in multis deficiunt: nec qui eos descripserunt, omnia praevidere et dis-
ponere potuerunt: cum etiam desuetudine /quedam/ <nonnulla> immutata sint,
uel etiam longa consuetudine addita: ideo cerimoniarum Magister qui quotidia
in ipsis uersatur, melius, ac diligentius potuit, ea quae patrum nostri ac ueteres
<et> praelatio omiserunt: adderet observanda posteris diligenter praestare
<curauit>. Qui uero aliter senserit, charitati non temeritati Magistrum, hunc lab-
orem asseribant, qui non sua praestiterint, sed quae partim à maioribus tradita,
partim longa, et laudabili consuetudine seruata sunt, sedule recensuerit.

2/2  <Non est mediocre onus Magistri cerimoniarum qui pro omnibus
vigilat in choro et aequo omnium defectus ascribitur.>

2/3  De prima Dominica Adventus. in prima Dominica Adventus
omnia fiunt ut in orationali et nostris Antiphonarijs et fit commemoratio de
sancta Maria in vesperis <antiphona au t [ = aurem tuam? ≥ ] prima &c /// spir-
itus sanctus &c.³ > et in laudibus quotidie, quando non sit de festo Duplici
<usque dum ponitur antiphona O. [see below] ⁴ >. et fit quotidie commemora-

1. For the breviary reform and the "brevitas moderna", see S. J. P. Van Dijk and J. H. Walker, The origins of the
modern Roman liturgy. The liturgy of the Papal court and
the Franciscan Order in the thirteenth century, London
1960. A series of thirteenth-century and later Franciscan
liturgical books were adapted for use at San Marco; such
as the following:
2. Aurem tuam quaesumus Domine precibus nostris accomoda
et mentis nostrae tenebras gratia tuae visitationis
illustra.
3. Spiritus sanctus in te descendet, Maria: ne timeas,
habebis in utero Filium Dei, alleluia.
tio de Adventu, etiam in festis Duplicibus, et similiter in quadragesima, et nullo alio tempore <et dicuntur Responsoria in j.bis [?] sabbati, {et?}> missae 2.<a. ecce Dominus ueniet 1 et qui venturus est 2 ; 4.0 non auferetur 3 >, et quando sit de feria, commemorationis sit etiam de sanctis. <laudes 9x & xij antiphona ecce dominus ueniet &c. quere in laudibus pro dominicas adventus. & ecce apparebit 4. Responsorium et cum eo sanctorum millia. 5 oratio cons [? Cicon- gna 2066, 1 verso: Comm. de sanctis: conscienti ? 60 ] vide in libro orationali nostro, et hoc usque ad diem in quo ponuntur Antiphone maiores <versus o. sapientia &c.71 >.

2/4 In die quo ponitur Tabula. <///> fit de feria, et deinceps quotidie usque ad Nativitatem domini, exceptis diebus sanctae Luciae et sancti Thomae apostoli, iuxta ordinem Tabularum Adventus, quas uide <loco suo> /in fine orationalis/ /<et in /// libro ///>/, et diligenter obserua. <sed si feria 6a, erit vigilia sancti Thome apostoli ut fuit in anno 1560, prima missa dicitur feria jdest d///, 2a missa dicitur d'ugilia /// in feria prophetia ante epistolam dicitur in tono prophetie. sed Epistola dicitur in tono Epistole ///>/ Ad com- memorationem uero Maiorum Antiphonarum versus O sapientia etc3. [see above] Dicitur uersus prope est ut ueniat tempus eius zzz . Responsum Et Dies eius non ellongabuntur. oratio Festina quesumus ne tardaueris domine, que est in orationali <post antiphonas excepto festo s. ///>/ folio Lxxxvj./ Jn Diebus ferialibus Adventus Domini, et similiter in alijs temporibus totius Anni quando fit de feria, non Dicuntur preces ad vesperas matutinum et omnes alias horas canonicas, sed dicitur tantum, pater noster, psalmus Miserere, uel ad laudes, De profundis, cum illis <ut in orationali a carte q. [= quattro?] tribus uersiculis sequentibus. et Dominus uobiscum cum oratione ordinaria, modo et ordine

4. . For O-antiphons, see Pascher, Das liturgische Jahr, pp.366f.
2. . Qui venturus est in mundum. Miserere nobis.
3. . Non auferetur sceptrum de Juda, nec dux de femore eius; donec veniat, qui mittendus est; et ipse erit expectatio gentium (Gen. 49 : 10).
5. . Et cum eo sanctorum millia: et habebit in vestimento, et in femore suo scriptum: Rex regum, et Dominus dominantium (...).
quo in orationali feria secunda post Dominam primam post octauam Epiphaniae. à prima uero Die quadragesimae, usque ad Dominam de passione Domini omnes preces quando fit de feria, uide ubi supra, et aduerte quod nos in quadragesima non consueuimus facere officium de feria, nisi in prima Die quadragesimae, et nullo alio die; sed à dominica de passione quotidie faciamus de feria usque ad pasca, nisi festum duplex ocurrat. quamuis per nostros libros appareat sepius in quadragesima de feria fieri deberet <sed à dominica de passione ///>.  

2/5  

Jn his etiam temporibus Adventus domini videlicet feria quarta et sexta non cantantur duae missae sicut in alijs quatuor temporibus Anni, sed una tantum missa de feria. <occurrence, cum com. [= commemoratio] de domina & ecclesia & dicuntur Kyrie ut in ferialibus diebus, & non dicitur missa de /// dominicae> in sabbato uero due misse cantantur, prima de domina [Virgin Mary]. <cum unica oratione> secunda de feria <cum nomine ecclesiae & pro duce> <sed si uigilia natiuatatis domini uenerit in sabbatis missa dicitur sola d'uiigilia ///> feria quarta et sexta missa cantatur hora solita, scilicet, mediarum terciarum et canores ueniant ad missam feriae quartae <Et ad missam de domina in die sabbatij. prophetia in quarta feria prophetia ante epistolam dicitur in toto prophetic. sed Epistola dicitur in tono Epistole ///.> 1559 feria 4. 4or temporum, uigilia /// due misse ///. Et nota quod à primo sabbato de aduentu usque ad natitivatem domini post salve regina, <in fine orationalis> dicitur versus angelus domini nuntiatui marie, & et concepit de spiritu sancto. oratio Deus qui de beatae marie. Et /{finito}/ in processione primae dominicae <decembris> aduentus in /medio/ ecclesie /// versus laus honor versus gloria, loco gloria tibi domine, quod dicitur eundo in choro post processionem, jn tony hymni conditor alme syderum. </el primo sabbato del aduento el uespero
se mette el panno/ roan [?] ferial alalta r & in lectoria, se sona agnolo uespero &c. R. canta el magnificat ferial {largo} & psalmi del uespero le domeniche del aduento & la messa /// > [fol. 2 verso]

2v/1 De vigilia Natiuitatis Domini <carta 57> jn vigilia Natiuitatis Domini cantatur sola missa de uigilia et habet unam prophetiam ante Epistolam. pulsata media tercia de more - et cantores non intersunt - nisi haec vigilia uenerit in Dominica. et subcanonicus cantat missam <et dicitur cum paramentis albis, sine in principio, Kyrie & gloria & semiduplex, epistola & et /// de magnificat ut in diebus sim [similibus ?]>. Quando vigilia Natiuitatis Domini uenerit in Dominica, Missa dicitur de vigilia, cum commemoratione Dominicae quartae adventus et Deus qui de beate Marie, sine gloria in excelsis, cum prophetia ante Epistolam. Epistola et euangelium - cantantur ut in Dominicis Adventus, et dicitur alleluya de Dominica quarta Adventus ut in graduali loco suo. et dicitur credo, et dicitur prefatio communis et dicitur in principio erat verbum. omnia dicuntur cum cantoribus ut in Dominicis Adventus, et cum paramentis ut in Dominicis Adventus. et canonicus cantat Missam.


2v/4 Item vesperas vigilie Ascensionis domini. Haec sunt officia ad
quae ordinaria tenetur Reverendus Dominus vicarius noster.
- Sed redeamus ad officium Nativitatis domini unde digressi sumus. Post salve regina finito completorio, Dominus vicarius incohat Matutinum <inuitatorium. cantant duo ministri cum pluuialibus indutis>. <organa pulsantur in fine cum libro psalmi. & sp//![?]\ Responsoria>. Lectiones primi nocturni cantant cantores. Antiquitus consueuerant canere tres pueri clericij, singuli singulas; secundi nocturni. tres subdiaconi <tres sermones> juniores in subcanonicatu, priores. 5. lectiones. tria Euangelia terciij nocturni. tres canonij eo ordine quo subcanonicij. Sum(m)us pontifex hac nocte cantat nonam lectionem, videlicet Euangelium beati joannis, in principio erat verbum, ut in ceremoniali romani apparat, et dat benedictionem ad Missam, sed non indulgentias. Dat tamen ad Missam maiorem diej indumentias. Ad tercium nocturnum omnia luminaria sint acces. Sed antequam cantetur primum Euangelium. Decantatis Matutinis et Missa cum omnia pompa. Et aduerte quod in tribus Missis huius Diei cantantur tres prophetiae ante Epistolas, singulae ante singulas, per aliquem sacerdotem aptum uoce et cantu, in superpelicio. quandoque etiam per aliquem optime uocis et suauiter canentem puerum, si possit haber. Decantatus igitur Matutinis et Missa ut prediximus et data benedictione per Reverendissimum Dominum legatum, si adsit, uel per celebrantem de eius licentia, non publicatis jndulgentijs ut prediximus <sed in missa noctis non detur benedictionem [sic] per Reverendum Dominum legatum. in missa dicta detur benedictionem & indulgentiam.> Canitur Euangelium, scilicet liber generationis jesu christi ab uno diacono uel subdiacono /uel etiam canonico/, ut magistro cerimonialum uidebitur, in superpelitio, cum stolla <de pertiche> transuersa more diaconi in pulpito lectionum in tono feriali presentibus cruce et cereis. accepta prius benedictione a celebrante <uel ob angustiam loci ad altare /// à diacono ut fit quotidie /// >.

2v/5 quo finito statim diaconus et subdiaconus intonant Te Deum laudamus. hoc fiebat quando cantores canebant Te Deum alternatim cum organis. sed posteaquam Magister capelle Dominus Adrianus [Willaert] componsuit omnes versus ipsius Te Deum, cantores intonant, ut commodiorem sibj uocem accipiant. quo expleto per cantores alternatim, Diaconus et subdiaconus cantant Versum caro factum est alleluya, Longum, Responsorium et habitavit in nobis alleluya. Deinde celebrans versus ad Altare cantat orationem ut in vesperis premisso Domino oobiscum. et expleta oratione et replicato Dominus vobiscum, organista sonat, pro benedicam(us) domino. cantores uero cantant Deo gratias. postremo, fidelium anime etc. pater noster. Dominus det uobis etc. Salve regina etc. versus et responsorium et oratio de more. et est finis.
Nota quod Reverendissimus Dominus legatus Apostolicus anno Domini 1538 uoluit quod sacerdos celebraturus Missam maiorem, accederet ad cathedram Domini Ducis ad faciendum confessionem jussu ad respondendum jussi domino legati, quia cum Dominus legatus Adest, ipse facit confessionem, et sacerdos celebrans respondet ei ut clericus. <simul cum serenissimo principi> <ita com///fit serenissimus Dominus Dominus Silvester Valerius anno Domini i699. Sic me Duramano Magistro anuente>. et in fine confessionis <praedictorum> osculatur ei dexteram manum. Et hoc uoluit tunc quia serenissimus Dominus Dux laborans morbo crurum non poterat genua flectere ad Altare, neque inde surgere sine multorum seruorum auxilio. fuit enim serenissimus Dominus Andreas gritus, qui fuit magnae malis corporeae.

Nota etiam quod si Reverendissimus Dominus patriarcha aut alius Episcopus celebrat, ipse facit confessionem, uel ambo simul. et Dominus Dux respondet, et hoc facit etiam alius canonicon celebraturis quando sua serenitas uenit ad Ecclesiam ut Missam in cantu audiat. Episcopus uero celebrans permittente Domino legato Dat solemnem benedictionem, sed indulgentia pronuntiatur sub nomine Reverendissimi Domini legati. Licet Reverendissimus Dominus patriarcha quirinus cum celebraret uoluit suam indulgentiam primo pronuntiari. Tunc Dominus legatus uoluit suam indulgentiam pronunciari, quia dissident inter se de loco et maioritate. quandoque etiam Reverendissimus Dominus legatus permittit ut canonicon celebrans det benedictionem eo presente, presertim ubi est consuetudo, sicut fit cum celebratur Missa in Die sancti Ysidori in eius sacello. Nec accedimus ad suam dominationem pro benedictione incensi. Sed omnia celebrans facit tantum benedictionem non dat, nisi quandoque ut supra.

In Die Natiuitatis Domini in Aurora cantant ille de canonica tantum Missam in Aurora in cantu planu sine organis. Missam uero maiorem cum omni pompa praesente serenissimi princi e et illustissimo senatu, cum suis prophetij ut praediximus precedentibus Epistolae sine aliquo intermedio. sed statm finita prophetia incohatur Epistola. <jn missa diej loco in principio de euangelium de epiphania per diaconum ad, altar. Et si ueniet in die mercurij, non faciamus aliquam processione diej mercurij /// d' ///dicationibus, sacrista habet curam jnuitandi, de ordine domini ducis, cui uult /// > Ad vesperas Antiphona Tecum principium, cum suis psalmis - ut in orationalj folio Lxxxvj, quae Antiphonae cum suis psalmis Dicuntur quotidie usque ad octauam Epiphaniae tan in festiuitatibus, quam in octauis Natiuitatis, sancti stephani, & joan-
nis, sanctorum Innocentium, iuxta ritum antiquum nostrae Ecclesiae, et est rubrice in nostro orationali folio Lxxvj, sub Tecum principium. < /// > <jn mane hora conuenientis omnes sacerdotes cuiusque gradus & ordinis accipient pluuialia jn sacrario. jta tamen quod nobiliores accipient preciosiora, & prece-
dente cruce inter quatuor cereos argenteos. jtur ad scalam nouam marmoream [Scala "dei Giganti"], quae est in fronte portae aureae palatii & cum dominus dux cum senatu descendit, jncipit processio, & eximus de palatio per portam auream, nisi plueret, et intramus ecclesiam per portam magnam, & ascendimus chorum ///>.  

3/4 Jn die sancti Ioannis evangelistae cantatur Missa in eius sacello  
Jn Die sanctorum innocentium canimus primas vesperas et Missam in eorum sacello, et utimur paramentis violaceis, et non pulsantur organa, nisi hoc festum uenerit in Dominica. tunc etiam pulsantur organa, et utimur paramentis rubris.  

3/5 Jn octava semper utimur rubris. Et quia crux magna est super altari in sacello, propter quod non portamus crucem cum cereis, ut praecedant nos in uia, nisi fuerit dies mercurij, propter processionem fiendam. < /// >  

3/6 <De dominica infra octuam nativitatis et de illo die uacuo post festum sancti Thome martyris quere k. 34,23>.  

3/7 Jn circumcisione Dominj Missa propria in nostro missali. Omnia fiunt solemniter ut in nostro orationali et Antiphonarijs. et in primis et secundis vesperis omnes psalmi cantantur à duobus choris cantorum. Olim caneabantur à capella parua, cum essent Duae capellae cantorum, & parua, et magna. sed hodie parua extincta est. <& in ///>. Antiphona ad Magnificat, scilicet, Magnum hereditatis mysterium, que dicitur in secundis vesperis. quere ante communem apostolorum, in antiphonario. <in alio antiphonario ante communem sanctorum missa ut in missali & gradualibus missae>  

3/8 Jn octaua sancti Stephani dicitur <alia rubrica, ad k.22> credo in Missa. <propter octauam s. joannis evangelistae> <in his {oct} dominus {p'la} quotidie infra octuam ///> < /// >  

3/9 Jn octauis sanctorum stephani, joannis evangelistae, et innocentium <Alia rubrica ad k. 22> <f. 2 officium semiduplex, et pulsantur campanae ///>. Dicitur officium beatae virginis, etiam in choro, et in /secundis/ vesperis <dicitur> Antiphona Tecum principium cum reliquis, et suis psalmis, et cetera, ut in orationali nostro diffusius apparat loco suo. /et folio LXXXVI.to/. <sed in diebus /// semper acci{pitur} à capl' a d' [die ?] sequenti, cum commmemoratio antecedenti, ut facit curia romana, sed hymni i d n s [ ? ] intono ////>.  

3/10 Jn vigilia Epiphaniae. Aduerte quod Missa vigiliae Epiphaniae est
multum diuersa ab ea quae est in Missalibus secundum curiam romanam, quare admonendus est celebrans ut accipiat Missale secundum ritum nostrae Ecclesie, et non secundum curiam romanam, quia gradualia nostra signant Missam secundum nostrum ritum ut conueniat chorus cum celebrante. et dici-tur ut in diebus simplicibus <nisu uenerit in dominica. tunc dicitur cantoribus // / diebus simplicibus> <et dicitur semper cum paramentis Albis> <[noted below the column:] {ante p.as} canonicus jnduat se amicta camisa {cingulo}// / {postea} pluualii, et ///.>

3/11 In primis vesperis, Antiphona o admirabile comertium, psalmi, omnes laudate [i. e., all the five psalms beginning with Laudate], qui non can-tantur per canores propter prolisitate officij benedictionis aquae nisi ex jussu serenissimi principis aut alicuius (ex) dominis procuratoribus nostris, qui uellet adesse, et audire vesperas solemnes. Et Dicta oratione, Dum pulsantur organum, et canores cantant motetum pro Deo gratias, quatuor ministri cum duobus cereis vadunt in sacrarium [fol. 3 verso]

prima et ultima eius verba, cantat illos tres versus, ut in libro benedictionum. et
chorus semper respondet, ut ibi <super antiphonarijs in fine>.

3v/2  Et postea moderate procedit, et chorus respondeat, et non
respondent, Amen, ut opus fuerit. quam autem cantatur Epistola, <in tono
feriali>, Graduale, et euangelium <in tono feriali>, canonicus semper manet in
loco Aedomadarij; ad primum et secundum Euangelium accipitur benedictio.
Et quando benedicetur sale a diacono, accipitur sale à mensa, / /// Et tenet ///
in manu à legile /// ponit eam in aquam & tergat manum lintheo /// et pano
mundi>. Sit parata Mensa in sacarium cum mantili mundissimo, supra qua
sint duo candellabra argentea, cum candellis accendis ante incohaesionem benedictionis.

3v/3  In medio Mensae sit crux granatarum, sit sal, sit lintheus, sit cra-
ter argenteus ad exipiendum aquam, fluentem de ligno crucis, cum ter in
puteum mergetur deferendum serenissimo principi. sit cingulum ad ligandum,
post tergum pluiale benedictionis, ne sit implicitus, dum mergit crucem in
aqua. sit situlus argenteus uacuus cum suo aspersorio. Qua mensa portatur
ante Altare maius, quando dicitur motetum à cantoribus in vesperis pro Deo
gratias, que antea erat parata in sacrario.

3v/4  Mane autem Vigilie ponatur putheus in medio chori qui habet
duos gradus ligneos. infimus est quadrus, altior est rotundus, et seruantur sub
confessione ad Altare sancti victoris. Hos gradus et putheum facit sacrista
cu cuius est Aedomada ornari Auleis siue spalerijs decenter <cum 40 candellabris
cum suis candellis in 40 angulis supra puteum> et implent putheum aquae <ille
qui debet>, putheus autem solet seruari in ulta dominorum canonico rum. vide
ut teneat. - Sed redeamus unde digressi sumus. Dicta seu cantata maior parte
praefacionis, Diaconus et subdiaconus cum quatuor cereis uadunt in sacrar-
ium, et cum summa reuerentia - diaconus habens lintheum, serico et auro la-
boratum, super scapulas, accipit crucem, quae habet insertum lignum Dominice
crucis, quam crucem continue Duo acoliti, parati ut in vesperis, thurificant.
quatuor intorticia precedunt. postea duo cerei argentei, deinde subdiaconus,
postea diaconus cum cruce, utrinque habens acolithos parum antea thurifi-
cantes. post crucem imediate duo alij cerej argentej. postremo quatuor alia
intorticia, delata ab octo sacerdotibus iuuenibus modestis. et hoc ordine uadunt
in chorum relinquentes Altare maius ad dexteram (et aduerte quod legile can-
torum post vesperas trahitur per ministros seu guardianos extra chorum ad
latus sancti petri, quia ad vesperas manet ante putheum aquae pro cantoribus,
locu suj) <et quando canonicus sit positus, silet, & organum pulsat, usque
Cum autem Diaconus et reliqui peruenerint ad Aquam, hoc est ad putheum, Canonicus ponens genua in terram, accipit crucem à Diacono, stante. data uero cruce, diaconus flectit genua, et canonicus surgit, et mergit eam ter in aquam; cum verbis ut in libro benedictionum <qui aquam amaram, hic mergat sacerdos crucem in aquam tribus uicibus signando fontem cum crucem, et replicando uerba q' aqua etc. tribus uicibus>. et crater supponit cruce extracte ex putheo, ad exipiendum aquam defluentem de cruce <per sacristam in superpellicio cum stolla, totis quibus uicibus>. quo facto restituit crucem diacono accipienti illam genibus flexis <& sacerdos eam incensat etc.> qui surget, et redit in sacrarium eo comitatu et ordine quo supra <diaconus et similiter sacrista cum illis, cum aqua benedicita.> Tunc canonicus procedit in benedictione. <{de} sanctis dicitur de /// cum organis. pleni sunt caeli, & cetera et dum peruenerit ad sacrarium> Diaconus uero et subdiaconus redeunt in chorum cum cruce magna. <portata de accolitho suo>, et cereis tantum <qui ponuntur locis suis>, et cum dicitur pater noster sit paratum thuribulum, et portitor crucis. 

finita uero benedictione incensatur aqua à benedicente. </// et elleuatuer mensa à clericis> qui statim aspergit Altare post thurificationem <aque> accepta aqua per diaconum in situo argenteo, aspergit inquam cantando, asperges me domine, tenens genua defixa in terram, et chorus prosequitur jsopo et mundabor, etc. et decantato semel, asperges me, etc;

[fol. 4]

Crux, et cerei deferuntur ante pulpitum lectionum. Dum hec fiunt et cantantur, omnes sacerdotes in choro similiter et ceteri asperguntur aqua benedicita à benedicente. Hodie tamen à diacono, licet olim cleru in choro à benedicente aspergetur. et aspersis omnibus de choro, unus sacerdos discretus in superpellicio circuit totam Ecclesiam omnes aspergendo, habens secum unum clericum ferentem situlum cum aqua benedicta. et decantato secunda uice à choro asperges me, etc., vnus diaconus ordinarius, uel etiam alius sacerdos in superpellicio cum stolla, accepta prius alta uoce benedictione, cantat Evangelium, quod factum est cum baptizaretur omnis populus, in tono feriali <in eodem pulpito lectionum, ubi accepit benedictionem à canonicis benedicente [sic] aquam.> quo finito <crux et cerej deferuntur ad altare majus locis suis> diaconus et subdiaconus statim intonant Te Deum laudamus, et pulsantur campane. quo finito, uel à choris - uel alternatim à choro et organis, diaconus et subdiaconus cantant versum, Reges tarsis et insule, etc. responsorium Reges arabum etc. longum. postea canonicus cantat orationem Diei, premisso, Domi-
nus uobiscum. et finita oratione, repetitur Dominus uobiscum. postea cantatur benedicamus domino, magnus <uel organa ipsum benedicam(us) sonant> et respondetur a choro, Deo gratias. postea sacerdos dicat fidelium anime, et salue regina, et reliqua ut in vespesis, et est finis.

4/2 Sed nota quod quandocumque cantuntur lectiones aut Evangelia, aut quicquam aliud in pulpito lectionum, ponitur per punctatorem unus cereus ex his qui solent poni in cornibus Altaris magni, super clauo ad hoc fixo in eodem pulpito, et ascenditus tempore suo <in suo bacili de subitus, ne fluat in choro>, etiam si lectiones cantentur in Die, sicut in matutinis corporis christi, et aliis <cum panno super legile pulpitj>. et in predicto officio benedictionis aquae, petuntur due candelle unius unce singulae, quae ministrant lumen canonico cantanti exorzismos, et Diacono cantanti ultimum Evangelium, in pulpito lectionum. petuntur inquam, à gubernatore cerae, quae seruat in sacelario superiori. haec minime volui dixisse, ut successores in nullo ualeant hesitare, jgitur dum officium benedictionis peragitur, cereus sit accensus super pulpito lectionum, et ante vesperas <ut ad benedictionem aquae> lampades omnes maiores, et minores, in choro, ad sacramentum, ad sanctum petrum, et sanctum clementem, nec non ad sanctuarium, accense sint, ut moris est. < /// >

4/3 In die epiphanie, post Euangulum Missae maioris, fit sermo a diacono in pulpito Evangelij, et publicantur festa mobilia jliius anni, etc. Quando Epiphania in Domenica venerator, sabbato sequenti fit officium Dominicae, et in secundis vesperis fit commemoratio Dominicae.

4/4 De Dominica infra octauam Epiphaniae, faciamus de ea, cum commemoratione Epiphaniae, et leguntur sermo sancti Augustini episcopi, et homelia. Et dicitur Versus omnes de sabba venient. Responsum. Aurum et thus. etc. in vespes pro <commemoratione Epiphaniae, cum antiphona quae comparet in primis vespere, quam in laudibus>, & in secundis vesperis dicuntur antiphonae diej epistola pro commemoratione epiphaniae & dominica dicitur versus Reges /// > /Dominica/.

4/5 In die octauam Epiphaniae dicuntur chirie, gloria, credo, sanctus, et Agnus Dej, ut in Diebus <simplicibus> /semiduplicibus/. Et in die octae, dicuntur ut in semiduplicibus diebus, psalmi ad matutinum, laudes, et vesperas, dicuntur sub una antiphona per totem octauam. <videlicet ad matutinum
nouem psalmos cum tribus ///>. exceptis in vesperis sabbati. matutinis, laudibus, et vesperis Dominicae. <et in die \{oct3 = octavae\}, in missa versis & laudibus.> que dicuntur omnes antiphonae. id est ut in festis semiduplicibus. <et pulsantur quotidie campane /// >. Et infra octauam dicuntur orationes, Deus qui salutis, et Ecclesiae, ad Missam. habemus tres antiphonae in antiphonario que dicuntur ad benedictus et ad Magnificat per octauam in rotulo. <semper triplicando>. [erased from A to B: A] / Feria quarta Epistola et Euangelium proprium que dicuntur ad Missam <Et post secundam epistolam versus sv? oct3am e?itur luminaria supra altare & /festones/ etc. ///>. et ad matutinum leguntur tres lectiones de homelia Euangelij <et due de sermone, tercia de homilia euangelij, et sic per totam octauam>. feria sexta Euangelium proprium, quod dicatur ad Missam, ut apparet in nostro Missali, et epistolario magno uide ibi. <et hoc quando epiphania uenit in sabbato, ut feria 6a. ut feria 5a. ut sit posita ///>. [B]

4/6 Jn octaua Epiphaniae <post octauam /// >. Jn primis vesperis Antiphona Tecum principium, <et similter in secundis ///>, cum suis psalmis, ut in nostro libro orationali. Responsorium, Hic est dies preclarus, quod est ultimum diei octae presentis. Ad Magnificat Antiphona Baptizat miles Regem <et secundis /// antiphona ad magnificat, /// > et cetera omnia ut in predicto orationali loco suo. officium est semiduplex. <ad missam una oratione /// >. et non dicitur officium beate virginis. <///> <Capitulum sequens, verte à tergo in principio prime columnae>.

4/7 Sabbato septuagesimae. Jn sabbato septuagesima in vesperis ad singulos uersus ipsius, canticj hoc est ad Magnificat etc. canimus sexies alleluya. videlicet ter ad singula Emistichia, hoc ordine. Magnificat, alleluja. alleluya, anima mea dominum, alleluya, alleluya, et sic de singulis usque ad finem, et benedicamus domino, cum duplici alleluya. <et ponuntur panni violacei ad altare et /// sabbat/// dominicis diebus usque /// et // / paramenta violacea ponuntur>. Jn vesperis dominicae Antiphona sede à dexteris meis, usque ad dominicam in palmis inclusuie. si fiat offitium dominicae, psalmus Dixit, cum reliquis Antiphonis, et psalmis, ut in psalteriis. Quodcumque festum etiam duplex venerit in dominicis diebus à septuagesima usque ad octauam paschatis inclusue, transfertur, sicut etiam in dominicis Aduentus domini organa non pulsantur, nisi feria secunda occurreret festum duplex. etiam translatum à Die Dominico. <Et quotidiem dicitur \{tras ?\} usque ad pascha, loco alleluya, in dominicis et festis.> <in Missis> <Et ad omnes horas, quotidiem usque ad pascha loco alleluya dicitur in ///. et si \{cettè\} parabola, dici-
tur dominus. - Si festum purificationis in dominica LXXa, venerit, fit benedictio candellarum cum sua processione, cum dominio in paramentis violaceis, et similiter missa, sine organis. parat chorum propter dominio [i.e., the Government] & non aliud. palla clausa ///>.

[fol. 4 verso]

4v/1 Si tempus breue fuerit à Dominica post octauam Epiphaniae usque ad septuagesima, jta quod Dominicalia officia non possint expleri suis diebus, officia residuarum Dominicalum distribuuntur per Æbdomadam ultimam, si festum non impediat. Missa dicitur cum paramentis viridis ut in alijs dominicis, cum gloria in excelsis, Kyrie, gloria, sanctus, et agnus dei dicuntur ut in diebus simplicibus.>


4v/3 In Die jouis pinguis. Jn tali die vespere in nostra Ecclesia non dicitur, quodcumque festum aut vigilia festi occurrat ea Die, quamuis solemnissimam, quandoque enim occurrit Translatio corporis sancti Marcj, uel etiam vigilia Translationis, ut anno Dominij MD.xvj. et tamen Ecclesia non fuit aperta nec diximus vesperis in choro, sed unusquisque priuatim. Et Dominus Dux uoluit ut serueretur consuetudo, ad euitanda scandala, propter turbam eo Die tumultuantem. Etiam anno Dominij M.D.xL. tali die occurrit festum sancti Mathie Apostoli, et tamen Ecclesia permansit clausa post prandium. Et in anno Dominij M.D.xLjj. more veneto, festum purificationis beatae virginis marie venit Die veneris ante Dominicum quinquagesimae, ita quod in vigilia festi serenissimus princeps cum illustrissimo senatu tenetur ire ad Audiendas vesperas ad sanctam Mariam formosam, et eodem die, qui fuit dies jouis pinguis solentur fieri quidam joci et festum in platea sancti Marcj [Piazza San Marco], ad guae spectacula accedit serenissimus princeps et senatus.>

4v/4 tamen egrotante Domino Duce Dominij consiliarij pie et sancte decreuerunt ire ad vesperas ad sanctam Mariam formosam, et spectacula distulerunt ad Diem Dominicam sequentem. Jn dies jouis predicta semper caniores cantant quandam Missam jocundam, et jnchohabant olim à kyrie eleison. Hodie cantant totam Missam, quae dicitur, de la bataglia, quae composita fuit
ob victoriam christianissimi Regis francorum de Eluetijs. <et dicitur pulsata media tercia cum gloria et credo, cum cereis cruce et incenso <ad altare maius> ut in duplicis festis>
4v/5 [A: see below] <Et quandoque dominus dux uult audire ipsam missam ad fenestram [the window in the anteroom of the Cappella San Clemente] et cum consiliarij cum pluribus nobilibus manent in choro, antequam incipitur missa intelligat magister chori se uelit serenissmus princeps adesse ad fenestram expectet eum cum senatu ita // fuit sub 1562 /// Dominus Hieronymus de priolis serenissimo principi, die 5. februario>. <Missa supradicta dicitur propter uictoriam abitam contra patriarcham aquilegiensem, etc. ut notatum est de alijs uictorijs; ad K. 55, à targo> < /// > <1559 à natiuitate die, 2, februiraj quando [abbrev.: or quae] est purificationis marie, fuit dies jouis pinguis, sub ducatu serenissimi principis Domini Laurentij de priolis, fecimus festum purificationis cum domino in mane ad missam in ecclesia. cum distributione candellarum etc. etiam post prandium vespere solemnnae cum pluribus nobilibus in choro. sed festum in plathea translatum fuit in die dominica - ///, sed missa solita, de ordine serenissimi principis non fuit cantata sic nolente.> [A, text marked A above, possibly here].
4v/6 De die martis carnis priuij. Hac die canteros non veniunt ad Missam neque ad vesperas, licet olim consueuissent venire, et quandoque canteurint Missam in cantu figurato ex arbitrio, moti ex jucunditate Diei. verum si hac die occurreret festum Duplex, canteros agerent omnia tan in Missa quam in vesperis, secundum eorum obligationes, et similiter organiste, et semper in tali Die post vesperas diei dicuntur vespere defunctorum tantum. Et nota quod non dicitur psalmus, lauda anima mea domine etc., quia officium hodiernum fit de sanctis, non autem de feria. vide rubricam in nostro orationali loco suo. post vesperas coheripientur altaria, et cruces, cortinis. Et fiunt cineres per sacristam ramis oliui benedicti, pro sequenti die imponenda capitibus, post bendictionem. <Etiam coherit crux magne que est super choros ad apostolos [i. e., on the roodscreen], cum sua cruce rubra. Sed crux que est in altari argenteo, eleuatur, usque ad feriam quartam post pasquam, postea reponitur>
4v/7 De feria quarta cinerum. Hodie facta processione hora soltia in qua sit paratus canonicus qui cantaturus est Missam et benedicturis cineres paramentis rasi violacej. et similiter diaconus et subdiaconus. licet hodie ad processionem paratur unus subdiaconus et ministri cum paramentis zambellani violacei. Ego tamen magis laudo quod fiebat prius. peracta inquam processione <& /// cerei cum apparatis uadunt in sacrarium> jncohentur hore immediate sonata tercia, sexta, et nona <et dicuntur omnes preces ad <omnes> horas
huius feriae.> quia prima in quadragesima dicitur statim post laudes matutinas, preter quam in tribus diebus ultimis quadragesimae, in quibus dicitur in choro, cum ceteris horis statim post Aduentum Domini Ducis ad Ecclesiam. quibus horis expletis large tamen et moderate, canonicus benedicturus cineres exeat de sacrario ((ubi permansit dum hore di cerentur.)) cum pluvailli rasi violacej cum diacono et subdiacono induitis turricellis violaceis cum cereis <et cruce, & uenient ad altare.> et facta debita coram Altari reuerentia ascendit solus ad legile super quo legili sit pannus sanguineus uel rasi violacej, et liber benedictionum, quod legile sit super gradu altiori et eminenteri Altaris ad cornu Euangelij ita ut sacerdos Dum benedicet cineres vertat faciem ad fenestram Dominj Ducis qui solet ibi esse cum dominis consiliarijs ad hoc officium benedictionis, et Missae. quare antequam finiantur horae intelliget magister chori si uelit serenissimus princeps adesse ad fenestram, Expectet eum, obseruans aduentum eius. si minus procedat ad benedictionem statim expletis horis. sed antequam incohatur benedictio <videlicet dum dicitur nonam> sacrista cuius est Æbdomada <dicitur nona.>

5/1 facet parari Mensam in choro in loco ubi consueuit manere legile pro Epistola dicenda, super qua sit extensum mantile mundissimum. <et pan num ///> et duo candelabra argentea cum suis candellis libre unius pro quolibet quaes accendantur ad benedictionem cineris. sit preterea Bacile argenteum cum cinere oliuuii benedicti in anno precedenti. sit argenteus situlus cum aqua benedicata et suo aspersorio. Vbi autem canonicus celebraturus perpetuerit ad legile ut praedictum est, stans capitudo jntonat Exaudi nos domine, cum gloria patri. <postea sacerdos genuflectit se ante legile.> et per diaconum et subdiaconum cantantur lethanias. <///> et cum perpetuerint ad jllud, vt nos exaudire digneris, exclusiue, canonicus cantat ter semper exaltando uocem, vt hos cineres benedicere et sanctificare digneris. et hoc facit stans et manu imprimens crucem aduersus cineres. nam intonatis lethaniijs ipsi genua flectit ante legile. <ut supra> postea diaconus et subdiaconus perficiunt lethanias sacerdote iterum genua flectente. <postea sequitur benedictio> Quibus finitis <benedictionibus> et aspersa aqua benedicta et thurificato per ipsum celebrante cinere, remota mensa per clericos cum omnibus quaer super ea erant pero completa benedictione prima imponitur cinis sacerdoti celebraturi missam à seniori canonico, postea celebrans lauat manus, et stans in cornu Epistolae uersus ad altare dicit. 5/2 Dominus uobiscum etc. et cum spiritu tuo oremus, concede nobis domine, ut in ordinarium, que dicitur loco isto, & non in principio ipsi benedictionis. dicta oratione incipitur Missa, et non quando benedictio fit p' oín [?] ut
in missali romani, sed dicta secunda oratione dicitur exorcismus in libro bene-
dictionis /// duo /// in missali /// /> Sacerdos flectit genua ante altare <et maior
canonicus> /et diaconus/ ponet cineres super caput eius dicens, Memento
homo, uel recordare frater, quia cinis es et in cinerem reuerteris, uel puluis.
5/3 sed illud recordare frater non dicitur nisi sacerdotibus. <postea
sacerdos celebrans dat illi maioris canonici cineres etc.>/ postea/ diaconus
accipit bacille de manibus subdiaconi, et ambo flexis genibus accipiunt cin-
erem à celebrante cum verbis prædictis. postea sacerdos stans in porta Altaris
jmponit prius omni clero incipiendo à dignioribus postea laicis ibi se inclinati-
bus cinerem super caput uniuscuiusque et chorus semper dum haec aguntur,
cantat. jmmutemur habitu etc. ut in nostris gradualibus loco suo. repetendo
usque dum sacerdos incipiatur confessionem Missae. nam si multi abundant ad
petendum cinerem diaconus supplet pro sacerdote, cinerem capitis impo-
nendo. sacerdos uero deposito pluuiali et accepta planeta quae sit ibi parata ad
altare <lauat manus in cornu epistole propter immunditia cineris> Accedit <ad
altare> et faciat confessionem et chorus cantat jnтроitum Missae et reliqua ut
moris est. Et aduerte quod quotidiem in quadragesima in Missa de feria ante pri-
 mam orationem dicitur per diaconem, flectamus genua. et subdiaconus respon-
det, leuate. et quotidiem dicimus uersum, Adiuua nos Deus, etc. quamuis solum
secunda, quarta, et sexta feria dicitur uel cantetur tractus, Domine non secun-
dum peccata nostra, etc. et ad pronuntiationem prædicti uersus, omnis chorus
seu omnis clerus chori genua flectit. Et nota quod in hac feria, et omnibus alijs
ferijs summus pontifex cum omnibus qui adsunt ad orationem Missae primam
et post communionem genua flectit et sic permanet usque ad finem omnium
orationum.
5/4 jdem facit antequam incipiatur uersus, Adiuua nos Deus. sic man-
ens usque ad finem uersus. celebrans uero et diaconus et subdiaconus soli non
flectunt genua, ad orationem, sed ad uersum, Adiuua nos, etc. ut est uidere
in libro cerimoniarum romanarum, quod si nos introducere uelmenus, multi ex
nostris contradicerent, nam pro piaculo habent, ut introducatur aliquid novum
apud nos, licet ratione et honestum. Legile pro Epistola dicenda in quadrage-
sima in Missis de feria ponitur prope portam chori ubi solet esse in vesperi
festorum simplicium. Sed si Dominus Dux adasset ad Misse ad fenestram, ego
Dimiterem in loco solito, ut sua serenitas commodius posset audire Epistolam.
ponitur etiam prope portam chori ubi supra in sabbatis quatuor temporum pro
dicendis prophetijs Missarum de feria jllorum quatuor temporum. et subdi-
aconus diciturus Epistolam in quadragesima in Missa de feria deponit plan-
etam. et dicta Epistola reassumit eam. Diaconus vero dicta Epistola vadit in
sacrarium, et plicat sibi planetam, et aptat sibi transuersam ad modum stollae diaconis et sic reuertitur ad Altare, ut cantet Euangelium. in hac Missa non fit incensum nisi ad eleuationem, si tamen incensaretur oblata, bene fieret, nec datur pax iuxta morem antiquam nostrae Ecclesiae. Ab hac die usque ad feriam quartam maioris Æbdomadæ factæ eleuatione Missæ maioris de feria quæ dicitur immediate ante vesperas, Magister chori mittit unum clericum ad campanile, ut pulsentur vespere duplices aut simplices secundum exigentiam festi jllius aut sequentis diej.

et data benedictione Missæ <non dicitur in principio in missa ferie> pulsentur vespere duplices aut simplices secundum exigentiam festi in Ecclesia cum campanis aut campana apud organum minus posita.

5/5 Et finita Missa dicuntur statim vespere. et ita seruatus per tomat quadragesimam, preter dies Dominicos. Licet curia romana incipient vesperes in mane primo sabbato qadragesimae. Preces hac die dicuntur integre ut in secunda feria post dominicam quae est post octauam epiphaniae, ut prediximus in prima Dominica Aduentus. <etiam capitula ad horas>. Et nos non faciamus ultra de feria nisi à feria secunda post dominicam de passione usque ad pascha. <sed faciamus commemorationem quando dicitur de feria in vesperis Laus &c. lectione> Atque ideo quando faciamus de sanctis quotidie [sic] canimus duas Missas in quadragesima. primum secundum </// ante ///> officium hora solita. sonata mediae terciae <cum oratione coc3 ] d' qs [concede, Dominus, quae- sumus], {a.} d. et pro duce> cui intersunt cantores preterquam in die jouis et veneris, nisi sit festum duplex. tunc enim et ipsi intersunt etiam die jouis et veneris si sint

[fol. 5 verso]

5v/1 festa que consueuerint cum cantoribus et organis cantari ut in tabula pendente in sacrario, quam taripham cantorum appellant <sed nouiter his duobus diebus capelle parua cantat missam et vesperas dies jouis & veneris cum suis orationibus>. secundum Missam canimus de feria sine cantoribus, nam pulsata tercia et dato signo in canonica per campanellam statim jncoha- mus horas, scilicet, terciam, sextam, et nonam. postea immediate Missam de feria. Et successiue vesperis. in sabbatis uero primam Missam cantant cantores sine organis tamen, De beata virgine, et jncohatur pulsata media tercia. Qui mos durat usque ad kalendas septembris. à kalendis uero septembris usque ad primum sabbatum quadragesimae exclusiue incohatur Missa etiam in sabbatis Beatae virginis in principio mediae terciae praemissis quotidie lethanijs. à feria autem secunda post dominicam de passione usque ad feriam secundam maioris Æbdomadæ inclusiue primam Missam canimus de cruce et cantores intersunt
Sed aduerte quod anno domini M.D.xLvj. serenissimus princeps et dominus Dominus fransicus donatus uluit quod praedicaretur quotidie in Ecclesia sancti Marcij et sua Serenitas cum Dominis consiliiariis et ceteris de collegio ueniebat quotidie ad predictionem, quae incipiebatur in principio mediae terciae uel circha, et terminebatur statim pulsata tercia. quare om- simus cantare primam Missam de festo, nisi cum erat festum duplex tunc enim cantauimus Missam cum cantoribus loco Missae de feria. et Missa de feria dicebatur tempestiue per unum sacerdotem submissum, ad Altare maius. et ita fiet si predicabitur quotidie in futuris qudragesimis. quod nunquam antea facta est in nostra Ecclesia, quod sit in memoria hominum. quandoque bene praedic- atum est duobus aut tribus diebus in Æbdomada in quadragesima, sed non quo- tidie. Unde cantores magnam habuerunt exemptionem uacandi à Missa ad quam consueuerunt uenire in quadragesima, et ita seruabitur nisi aliud stat- uatur in posterum.

Et nota quod serenissimus princeps noluit aliquem alium praedic- atorem in tribus diebus in quibus diuersi predicatoris solent uocari singulis annis, sed hunc tantum, scilicet in Dominica palmarum. In die veneris sancta, et resurrectionis domini, et in annuntiatione beatae virginis mariae.

Jn Diebus mercurij fiebat processio hora solita, et Dominus Dux non descendebat ad predictionem nisi facta processione. chorus mansit ornatus auleis et tapetibus per totam quadragesimam excepta die veneris sancta et sabbato usque accessum ad fontem.

Et ut omnia posteris innotescant, primus predicator anni predicti fuit venerandus pater et magister Antonius de pinardo ordinis fratrum mino- rum, multae doctrinae et gratiae, et per totam illam quadragesimam habitauit cum duobus alijs fratribus in nostra canonica, et habuit expendas lautas ex pecunijs Ecclesiae à procuratoria nostrae Ecclesiae, et in fine ducatos centum Auri impressionis serenissimi principis Donati, sic uolente et jubente sua serenitas, Gastaldionibus dictae procuratiae qui numerauerunt ei pecuniam, hoc est ducatus centum coram sua serenitate.

Nota quod si praedicabitur in quadragesima quotidie, feria quarta cinerum tantum, hore dicantur usque ad nonam inclusiue statim post matuti- num ita quod sint complectae ante processionem, quia post predictionem predicatur. et postea fit benedictio cinerum et cantatur successiue Missa et vespere de feria. Anno dominj M.D.Lj. cautum est <et> lege jllustrissimi concilij decem, ut de cetero non praedicaretur in ecclesia sancti Marcij, nisi quinquies in anno, juxta morem antiquum, videlicet in natiuitate dominj, in annuntiatione
sanctae mariae <in dominica palmarum, cum dominio in ecclesia in die veneris sanctae, & in die sancto paschae resurrectionis. <semper post prandium.>

5v/7 **De completorio in quadragesima.** Post prandium hora vesperarum cantatur completorium diebus ferialibus et festis etiam duplicitus preter dies Dominicos in quibus completorium cantatur statim post vesperas. nec faciamus aliquod discrimen inter duplex et non duplex nisi quod in non duplicitiam completorium beate [sic] virginis, quod dicimus semper ante completorium maius, sicut vesperas. licet romana curia dicat post orationem silicet visita quesumus Domine, cantatur Ego peccator, etc. per totam quadragesimam usque ad diem mercurii maioris Æbdomadae inclusiuae per aliquem sacerdotem ex junioribus. <usque accessum ad fontem> jncohando à senioribus jllius ordinis et prosequendo quotitie gradatim usque ad ministros clericos, modo sint appellati. Diebus uero dominicis dicantur subdiaconi [sic] ordinarii.

5v/8 quando adest serenissimus princeps cum senatu, dicant diaconi postea per Æbdomoarium fiat absolution. postremo cantatur, Aue regina caelorum, cum uersu, Aue maria gratia plena. responsorium Dominus tecum. oratio porrige nobis deus dexteram tuam, etc. uel omnipotens sempiterne deus qui glorie virginis matris mariae etc., vide /circha finem orationalis nostri./ <in orationali post octauam epiphaniae>. Quodcumque festum etiam duplex uenerit hac feria quarta cinerum, transfertur ad sequentem diem, precescum sua rubrica sunt in nostro oratinali, /folio XXXiii.to/. <feria secunda post octauam epiphaniae.>

[fól.6]

6/1 **Sabbato primo quadragesimae.** Jn hoc sabbato et omnibus alius sabbatis quadragesimae cantores ultra Missam de beata virgine ueniunt ad vespertas et cantant hymnum, silicet Aures ad nostras, qui dicitur usque ad dominicam <de passione exclusiue>. Letare hyerusalem, /inclusiue/ <tantum in sabbatis usque in dominicis diebus ad vesperas.> cantant etiam Magnificat tantum. et de consuetudine ipsi canunt primos versus hymni et Magnificat, et reliqua, alternatim cum choro, et nihil aliud canunt, et ulterius non dicuntur suffragia de sancta Maria, de Apostolis, neque de pace, usque ad octauam pentecostes, ut in orationali /folio XXX.ma / jn sabbato post octauam epiphaniae, et ita semper seruatum est.

6/2 Post prandium in omnibus sabbatis quadragesimae, dicto completorio <Diaconus et subdiaconus <cum pluuiale> cantant vespere et in visitatione /// beatae mariae /// > ut moris est cum Aue regina caelorum. canitur matutinum beatae virginis cum jllis tribus lectionibus, silicet Aue Maria, à tri-
bus pueris clericis quos Magister cantus docuerit, super pulpito lectionum, super quo sit cereus accensus et pannus extensus super suo legili. <excepto si serenissimus fuerit ad fenestram, quando cantabimus hec, & omnia ad legile in medio chori.> et semper quando aliquid cantatur in illo pulpito ((preterquam cum tota capella cantorum canit ibi Missam aut vesperas)), ponit pannus et cereus [sic], quando lumen non est prohibitum, ut in parasceue: et sabbato sancto, quia in illo sabbato non acceditur nisi hora competenti, ut suo loco dicetur. <et post psalmos dicitur Versus, specia tua etc. logia [?]> Responsorium intende {p'p'}ere # &c., ante lectionem.> et in hoc matutino duo responsoria cantantur, ultimam cum gloria patri, et sic per singula sabbata quadragesimae dicuntur duo responsoria incohando a primis quae notata sunt in quibusdam libellis quibus utimur in his sabbatis. dicto igitur secundo responsorio cum gloria patri, dicitur tercia lectio, qua dicta intonatur Te <matrem dei> /deum/ laudamus ad sonitum unius campanae ex illiis quae sunt apud organum minus, quae etiam pulsatur ante incohetionem matutini beatae virginis. /Aduertere tamen quod cantatur Te Deum beatae virginis, hoc est, Te matrem Dei laudamus. /quo finito cantatur versus per duos clericos breuiter, ora pro nobis sancta Dei genitrix. responsorium, versus digni efficiamur promissionibus christi. oratio, omnipotens sempiterne deus qui gloriosae etc. per eundem Christum.

6/3 Dominica prima in quadragesima. In hac Dominica et in omnibus alis quadragesimae, organa non pulsantur, sicut in tribus praecedentibus dominicis <videlicet septuagesimae, sexagesimae, quinquagesimae> neque in Missis neque in vesperris, nisi feria sequenti occurreret aliquod festum duplex. Et si vespere fiant de dominica, Antiphona dicitur, sede à dextris meis cum reliquis antiphonis <videlicet magna jucunditatis, Excelsis, Domus Jacob> et psalmis de dominica ut in tribus dominicis praeteritis. et dicuntur post prandium, hora solita in omnibus dominicis diebus quadragesimae sicut in alis dominicis totius anni. post vesperras autem in Dominico quadragesimae cantatur completorium premisso completorio beatae virginis legendo, nisi sit festum duplex. quia tunc non dicitur completorium beatae virginis, sed antequam incohetur completorium. Detur signum cum campana, ut dictum est supra in praecedenti sabbato, et cantores in his completorij Dominicarum quadragesimae. nihil aliud cantant quam Ave regina caelorum. Et in vesperis dictarum dominicarum tantum, non cantant Deo gratias. Antiphone super psalmis completorij est, viuo ego dicit Dominus. Et ad Nunc dimittis, Antiphona pacem domine <ut velut ? ] salua nos>, quas uide in nostris Antiphonarijs prima dominica quadragesimae.

6/4 Et in psalterijs in fine, et dicuntur usque ad Dominam de pas-
sione, exclusiue <in omnibus completorijs sabbati et dominice, quando completorium fit de dominica>, responsoria quae dicuntur in vesperis à septuagesima usque ad pascha, videlicet in sabbatis ante hymnum. Assignatur in nostro orationale post capitula, singularum dominicarum, et in reliquis anni temporibus, si non assignatur, dicitur secundum responsorium primi nocturni officij occurrentis. De lectionibus quae leguntur ad matutinum in omnibus dominicis quadragesimae cum suis sermonibus, et homelijs, vide in legendario istius temporis. <|q'l'a| per ordinem, de dominica in dominica>

6/5 Dominica tercia in quadragesima. In sabbato ad completorium dicitur hymnus, christe qui lux es et dies, et dicitur usque ad sabbatum Sitientes, exclusiue, tan in sabbatis quam in dominicis diebus, reliqua vise in orationali.

6/6 De Die jouis post terciam Dominam quadragesimam. Hac Die jouis que est medio quadragesimae dicitur ad nunc dimittis, Antiphona, Media vita, et dicitur hac die tantum, quamuis fiat de festo officij. ((etiam si fuerit Die p. [praecedenti ? ]))

6/7 Dominica quarta in quadragesima. Hac Die ad Missam maiorem ponuntur super Altari magno super quodam gradu ligneo qui consueuit esse super Altari sancti Ioannis Euangelistae, qui gradus hodie tegitur quodam panno turcho maculis rubris ac croceis distincto, et ponuntur super eo quatuor vel saltem duo candelabra christalina cum suis candellis accensis, ponuntur, inquam, Rose Aureae quas solet hac Die summus pontifex largiri Romae alicui oratorio uel Domino cuj vult. Et celebrans cum ministris jnduitur paramentis violaceis. Et ponitur super gradu praedicto crux granatarum. Et si occurrat in hac Dominica fieri processionibus ut fit in prima Dominica singulorum mensium, tunc per diaconum et subdiaconum portantur duae

[fol. 6 verso]

6v/1 Rose, scilicet Due Arbores Rosarum Aureae in processione, duas dixi, quia ad hanc diem non plures habemus.

6v/2 Feria sexta post quartam Dominam quadragesimam, semper faciamus officium de sancto Lazaro Episcopo et martire, quem suscitauit Dominus, cuius festum est 17. Decembris, sed officium simplex. <nisi fuerit festum duplex ut in anno 1586.>

6v/3 Sabbato, Et Dominica de passione. In sabbato ad vesperas dicitur, Responsorium secundum primi nocturni, sine gloria patri. hymnus, Vexilla Regis prodeunt. & [versus:] eripe me domine ab homine malo. responsorium, a uiro iniquo libera me.> Ad completorium, Antiphona, Anime impiorum. s. ad psalmos, responsoria breuia, in pace, etc. sine gloria patri. et deinceps non
dicitur gloria patri, neque introitibus Missarum, neque Responsorijs, quando agitur de dominica aut de feria. <usque ad pasca.> hymnus ad completorium, jesu quadragenarie, etc., versus, Dederunt in Escam meam fel. responsorium Et in siti mea potauerunt me acceto. Ad nunc dimittis <Antiphona> A modo dico vobis. Et dicuntur haec omnia excepto hymno completorij per totam passionem <qui dicitur usque ad sabbatum ante dominica palmarum, et postea dicitur hymnum dicamus domino> et deinceps quotidie fit de feria. et preces non dicuntur. <ad 1, 3, 6, 9, vesperas & completorium.> sed tantum pater noster, cum miserere, uel ad laudes de profundis, cum tribus versiculis sequentiibus, et Dominus vobiscum, cum oratione competenti, ut in orationi nostro / folio xxxiiiij, in rubrica quae est in fine quartae columnae/. <in feria secunda post secundam dominicam post octauam epiphania, uide ibi.> Ad horas feriales dicuntur Antiphona ut in Dominica de passione, vidi ibi rubricam. <hymni ad horas de passione ut in hymnarijs nostris, quando agitur de feria.> A dominica de passione usque ad pascha, prefatio dicitur de cruce. <Et quotidie à feria secunda de passione, usque ad feriam secundam maioris Æbdomadae inclusiue, quando sit de feria dicamus primam missam de cruce in principio mediae terciae praemissis quotidie lethanijs.> <jn missa de cruce, secunda, oratio pro duce, tertia, oratio pro p'ctis [?], exaudi. jn missa de feria, secunda, oratio ecclesie, tertia, oratio p'pctis [?], ineffabilem.>

Feria quinta post Dominicam de passione, habemus Evangelium proprium in Missale sancti Marcj, non ut in curia Romana. et dicitur ad matutinum et ad Missam supra missale sanctj Marcj. <non jllud in epistolario, sed de missali magno ut coordinatur cum legendario.>

Sabbato ante Dominicam palmarum. Euangelium proprium ad matutinum, et ad Missam. jn epistolario magno. <ut concordatur cum legendario.>

Sabbato ante dominicam palmarum, Responsorium, fratres mej, sine gloria patri. hymnus, Magne salutis gaudio. Ad completorium, hymnus, hymnum dicamus domino, qui dicitur per totam passionem. reliqua vide in orationalj. <ut supra, in dominica de passione &c.>

Dominica in Ramis palmarum Hodie canonicus celebraturus indutus pluuiali uiolacei cum ministris eodem colore indutis facit benedictionem palmarum et oliuj, et cum beneditit manu, uertat se non solum ad Altare, sed etiam ad pulpitum maius ubi est multum oliui. Signans illud signo crucis peracta uero benedictione ut in libro benedictionum, <ut in ordinario, per meliori litera> et aspersis palmis et oliuo maioris Altaris à benedicente aqua benedicta etthurificatis, et oliuo pulpiti maioris, per diaconum et subdi-
aconum, canonicus qui benedixit offert palmam Domino Ducj, aut pro ducj, si Dominus Dux absit. <cum duobus cereis argenteis> et reuersus ad Altare jnduit planetam quae parata sit deposito pluuiali. jnterim Dominus basilicanus cum alij coadiutoribus distribuit palmas reliquis oratoribus pralatis et alij Dominis. jnterim etiam distributur oliuum per duos juenes clerì qui est in choro, et dum distribuantur cantantur ad choro ille due antiphone, videlicet pueri hebreorum, replicando eas usque in finem distributionis palmarum et oliuorum. jubeat etiam Magister chori alicui clerico ex maioris ut post beneficitionem, accipiat fascem oliui et prestoletur cantores descendentes ab Ecclesia post jactum avium [i.e., the "oselle": silver coins made for the occasion], et distribuat eas ad portam maioris [sic] Ecclesiae [<tentative reading: ] // / el far delle palme per el serenissimo primicerio, senatori, & altrì, & oselli, non so /// de dita spesa, perche la non tocha a noi ma al cap? [capo] della can.a [= cancelleria], al qual obligo & spesa /// alla sua consuetudine, & alli so /// & libri ///> facta distributione palmarum Exit processio per portam maiorem chori et portam Ecclesiae quae est prope sanctuarium, nisi pluat. qui portauit crucem et cereos argenteos, sint induti superpeliceis tantum. vnsquisque habeat ramum oliuæ seu palmam cum oliuo. et in jtinere cantatur Antiphonom Cum appropinquaret jesus jerosolimam, ut in ordinarijs, et cum peruentum fuerit ante januam maiorem Ecclesiae, fit chorus, crux et ceris stantes super gradibus primæ ianuæ.


6v/9 Olim ascensus hic cantorum et cantus ad proiciendas aues fiebat per cantores capellæ paruæ cum Magistro capellæ, sed quia hodie non extat fit ab omnibus cantores hoc officium. <Responsorium {B} ///> Quando uero pluit, processione non exit extra Ecclesiam, sed transit per capellam Sancti joannis baptistae, et cardinalis [i.e.Cardinal Zen's chapel], et omnes cerimo-
niae fiunt sub porticali inter utrumque portam magnam. - <hodie accenduntur omnes lampades etiam la choca [the bird-shaped bronze lamp in the middle of the nave] in mane ad benedictionem /// > <Et si uenerit in prima dominica mensis, non fit alia processio quam suprascripta.> /// el far delle palme per el serissimo, primicerio, senatori & altri, & oselli, non fo ///spesa, perche lo non tocha a mi ma al /// delle can<dele?>, al qual obligo & spese /// alla sua consuetudine, & alli sui sodali & altri, per non /// a mi ditto cau///.>

[fol. 7]

Postea cantatur Missa cum passione, et cantores cantant in pulpito magno. Et passio in pulpito lectionum. &c in tribus choris, ut in die mercurij> post passionem crux et cerej portantur ad Euangelium, et incensum ad pulpitum per diaconum et subdiaconum. nam Diaconus qui est paratus ad Altare non consueuit cantare passionem nec eius Euangelium, sed aliquis sacerdos in superpelicio et stolla, qui sit aptior et uoce, et cantu. et frequenter est unus de numero cantorum. <sed si dicitur [sic] uoluerit, poterit cantare passionem, sine dalmaticas> <finita missa Reverendissimus Dominus legatus dat solemnem benedictionem cum indulgentia ut moris est.> <modus canendi passionem in capella domini papae romae, quere k. 56.>

7/2 Post prandium finita predicatione jncohantur vespere per aliquem ex nostris canonici <residentibus quem uoluerit magister chori> cum pluuialij violaceo. et duo clerici in superpellicijj deferunt duos cereos argenteos. et duo sacerdotes juuenes discreti qui sunt ut plurimum diaconi et subdiaconi ordinarij jllius Æbdomadæ incensant omnes per chorum. <et cantant uersicula tantum.> et haec diem [sic] sint nisi sequenti die fiat de festo duplicij. tunc enim fierent vespere secundum exigentiam festi. post vespera cantatur completorium ut in alijs Dominicis diebus, sed large et moderate. Hymnus, Magno salutis gaudio, dicitur tantum in primis, et secundis vesperis huius diej. <Et Magister chori ordinat canonico cui vult/> <et ad completorium dicitur hymnum dicamus domino, &c. & sic his tribus diebus, ut dixi supra in sabbato.>

7/3 Feria secunda maioris Æbdomadæ. Prima Missa hora solita cantatur de cruce, et cantores non intersunt. tercia, sexta, et nona, dicuntur hora solita terciarum. postea Missa de feria. postremo vesperae de more. Antiphonae per horas dicuntur ut in Dominica de passione, ut alias diximus. ulterius una tantum Missa canitur in hac Æbdomada, nisi occurreret festum duplex usque ad feriam quartam inclusiue. Euangelium proprium in matutino et Missa, in hac secunda feria ut in nostris libris.

7/4 Feria tercæ maioris Æbdomadæ. Hodie quia consueuit esse consilium maius [meeting of the Maggior Consiglio] quod dicitur consilium grati-
arum, jdeo media tercia non pulsatur, quare incohata campana longa maioris consilij aliquantulum. Dato signo in canonica incohantur horae. quibus expletis, cantatur Missa cum passionem et ad euangelium passionis et non antea. crux et cerej et thuribulum portantur de sacrario ante pulpitum passionis. incensum uero in pulpito, per diaconum et subdiaconum qui sunt parati ad Altare. finito Euangeliu crux et cerej portantur ad altare à clericis ordinarijs indutis superpellicijs, et ibi permanent usque ad finem Missae. incensum fit ad Euangeliu et ad elleuationem sacramenti. et nota quod de consuetudine nostrae Ecclesiae, in Dominica palmarum et hodie, unus tantum canit passionem. sed quarta et sexta feria, tota capella cantorum, licet olim singuli singulis cenerent passiones. si uero non esset hodie consilium maius, pulsata media tercia incohantur hore, et successiue Missa et vespere.

7/5 Feria quarta maioris Æbdomadea Facta processione hora solita de more immedia incohantur horae et dicantur cum suis pausis in medij uersibus, et cum omni reuerentia. ordinetur per Magistrum chori prima prophetia uni sacerdoti juveni qui sciat bene legere, et cantare. Crux et cerej remanent ad altare, et ante incohationem Euangeliu passionis, deferuntur ante pulpitum Euangeliu, et incensum in pulpito, ut dictum est supra. Vel si placet facta processione crux et cerej auferantur in sacrarium et reserantur ad Euangeliu, ut dictum est supra feria tercia, et melius erit. <Et dicuntur vespere post missam ut in alijs diebus qudragesimmae.>

7/6 Post prandium dicitur completorium post adventum Domini Ducis ad Ecclesiam, et dicitur cantando ut in preteritis diebus ferialibus sed incohatur per aliquem ex nostris canonicis residentibus, et similiter reliquum officium. Sic etiam feria quinta et sexta sequentibus. Et solent juniores prima die, et sic successiue, maiores secunda et tercia incohare officium.

7/8 Hac die ponantur ad completorium super Altare duo candelabra Auricalchi cum suis candellis accensis, quae dicto completorio auferuntur, et accenduntur jlle quindecim candella, disposte super instrumento ligneo tendente in accutum posito ante medium Altarís super supremo gradu ipsius et incohatur matutinum de more, ordinatis prius diligenter omnibus ordinandis. Et si capita chori essent indisposita, nam ad jallos spectat intonation Antiphonarum et psalmarum, Magister chori ordinet hoc munus alijs aptioribus uoce et cantu.

7/9 Qui Magister chori faciat cedulam affigendam in sacrario, in qua descripti sint qui erunt destinati ad versiculos, ad sermones, ad Euangelia his tribus diebus. <Et ceteris officijs, aut negocijs, ut in cedulis magistri de anno in anno, mutatis mutandis, ad quas me reffero [sic].> Faciat etiam quod Magister
capellae cantorum affigat similiter cedulam per eum factam eorum qui desti-
nantur ad Lamentationes, responsoria, et benedictus, his tribus diebus. Et ad
passionem feriae quartae, et sextae, et cetera que ipsi cantores cantare con-
sueuerunt.

7/10  Jn choro nullum penitus ardeat lumen nisi praedictae quindecim
candellae, quae extinguntur sicut sunt quatordecim psalmi videlicet nouem
trium nocturnorum, et quinque Laudum. media tantum candella remanet
accensa quae est etiam maior. occultanda dum pulsaturet reponenda loco suo
quando oportet, ad nutum Magistri chori. Sit accensus cereus in pulpito lec-
tionum super suo clauo. Ardeant etiam solite lampades ad Altare sacramenti
post Altare maius. Similiter quae solent ardere per Ecclesiam ardeant inquam
usque ad finem psalmi, Laudate Dominum de caelis. quo finito mox omnes
extinguantur, per deputatum, cum cereo qui est super pulpito lectionum,

[fol. 7 verso]

7v/1  ita quod in tota Ecclesia nullum lumen ardeat preter candellam
praedictam occultandam ut supra. His tribus diebus dicuntur tituli sermonum
et Evangeliorum. Et hic ordo seruetur in his tribus matutinis tenebrarum. Et
dicto benedictus Dominus Deus israel, et replicata sua Antiphona, dicitur à
choro kyrie eleison cum duobus versiculis sequentibus, postea kyrie eleison.
Et hic pulsatur cum ramis oliui benedicti anni preteriti, postea dicuntur alij duo
versiculi sequentes. postea kyrie eleison. Et hic secunda vice pulsatur ut supra.
postea alij duo versiculi, kyrie eleison. Et hic tercia vice pulsantur ut supra. Et
fiunt in his tribus matutinis tenebrarum, loco et ordine isto.

7v/2  Et dum pulsatur occultatur candella semper per unum clericum de
maioribus, et elleuaturn ut moris est, ad nutum Magistri chori. finita pulsatione
reponitur candella loco suo, et Æbdomadarius dicit, christus factus est pro
nobis, etc. et respondetur, etc. pater noster dicitur sub silentio. postea
Æbdomadarius jncipit Miserere mei Deus, et chorus prosequitur totum alterna-
tim, genu flexo. postea Æbdomadarius dicit, Respice quæsumus domine, etc.,
et est finis. <alia rubrica, k. 59. à tergo prima columna, vidi ibi, plus distincta.>
<& psalmi k. 56> <lectiones et omnia quere ibi & inuenies, & pone omnia
insimul ordinariae.>

continues file RITCERIM.MC2.
- feria quinta in cena Domini...

and starting from Feria quinta in cena Domini (fol. 7 verso) [cont. on fol. 8 verso]

7v/3  feria quinta in cena domini <uide c 58: 103 - iii> Missa celebratur sicut in festis solemnibus, dictis prius horis legendo, videlicet prima, tercia, sexta, et nona. Sed dum dicitur nonam, punctator ponit octo cereos super cornibus altaris, quatuor a dextris et quatuor a sinistris, super clauis suis. Et quatuor candelabra Argentea super Altare cum suis candellis. et tota praedicta luminaria sint extincta. Et ante inclosionem horarum praedictarum [sic!], tabae ponuntur super Altare. Et pannis solemnis ante altare, sed cohovertum sua cortina. Et tapetae sub pedibus. et haec omnia fiunt ante inclosionem horarum. - Quibus expletis more solito ut in nostris ordinarijs et orationali, statim palla Altaris [the Pala d'oro] quae ante inclosionem horarum erat aperta clauibus tantum, errigitur et detegitur. et accensus circumcircha luminumibus Dominus Dux venit ad confessionem Missae, et cantores incipient jntritum, videlicet Nos autem gloriari oportet, sine gloria patri, sed cum gloria in excel-sis Deo, et credo etc. <in pulpito magno. sed respsiones missae respondentur à choro non à cantoribus.>


7v/5  facta uero communione celebrantis, stratis tapetibus à porta Altaris usque ad portam chori per guardianos Ecclesiae uel clericos si non
à celebrante postea duo alij Argenetei cerej, postremo alij quatuor Accolithi
eul sacerdotes juniores in superpellicijs. ((quia non habemus tot Accolithos)),
cum quatuor intoricijs accensis. Et ingressis omnibus sacrarium flexis genibus,
sacerdos stans super altiori gradu locj
ubi deponendum est sacramentum, uersus facie ad clerum dat benedictionem
cum ipso tabernaculo sacramenti. postea deponit jllud in loco preparato, super
corporali. claudit et thurificat. postea dicit orationem, scilicet Respice ques-
mus Domine. Accolithi qui deferunt thuribulos nauiculas et cereos todie sunt
parati ut in festis solemnibus. et celebrans cum diacono et subdiacono habet
paramenta alba, scilicet Auri rizzi et serij candidi, et quatuor cerej Argenthei
remanent in sacrario cum quatuor cereis accensis ex illis qui solent poni super
cornibus Altaris maioris.

Postea clauditur palla, et Altare tegitur cortina et hoc bene est
aduertendum - quia quandoque per oblusionem Altare non fuit vellatum cort-
ina, usque post prandium ad matutinum tenebrarum, quod fuit inconueniens, et
causa murmurationis multis qui astabant. Debet enim Altare detegi die
sequenti hoc est in parasceve quando dicitur in passione, videbunt in quem
transfixerunt. <Et sacrista mandat ad accipiendum oleum sacrum, ab Ecclesia
castellana [San Pietro di Castello].

Post prandium dicitur completorium Legendo, et jncohatur per
unum ex nostris canonics residentibus sicut praedictum est in die praecedenti,
et continuatur matutinum sed cantando. et omnia fiant ut in superiori die, et
pulsatione similiter ut supra.

In nocte succedente Diej feriae quintae demonstratur sanguis
christi ex pulpito magno et multe simul alie reliquie magne venerationis per
septem canonics, tres residentes et quatuor plebanos. senior canonicus prima
uice habet tabernaculum sanguinis et dum incipit ostendere, jntonat hymnum,
vexilla Regis prodeunt. et alij canonich sequuntur cantantes reliquos uersus
alternatim, tenentes et ipsi singuli singulas reliquias et simul cum sanguine
pretiose eas populo ostendentes. quas jllis porigit et recipit alter sacrista cuius
est Æbdomada. sic etiam in sanctuario sacrista ponit et reponit ex capsis in
locis in quibus seruari consueuerunt. habet etiam maior canonicus qui primum
ostendit sanguinem, super pluuiale uellum sericum circa scapulas. secunda
vice secundus canonicus ostendit cum codem pluuiali et codem vello, quo pri-
mus. et sic successiue. habet etiam sacrista tabellam in qua descriptus est hym-
nus predictus ne ommitantur uersus. cum autem leuantur uel antequam
leuentur relique de sanctuario, quatuor cantores flexis genibus incipient cant-
tare aliquid in laudem salvatoris nostri quod tamen pertineat ad passionem
sicque ceteri qui adsunt genua flectunt. postea surgunt omnes et procedunt de sanctuario ad pulpitum ex quo ostenduntur reliquiae ut dictum est. quo ubi peruentum fuerit, licentiantur cantores - et nota quod consuetudo est ostendere sexies hac nocte sanguinem et reliquias, semel unicuique scholae magnae. \( \text{<et schola passionis>} \) postea uocantur Domini aut matrone Dominorum procuratorum quae erant in alijs pulpitis ad videndum reliquias, et signant se cum tabernaculo sanguinis. et donantur singule à Domino procuratore sancti Marcj qui est in pulpitro reliquiarum, aliquidus candellis, quae tetigerunt reliquias. quo facto reportantur reliquie ad sanctuarium et disponuntur in locis suis, et unusquisque recedit. solet etiam Dominus procurator donare canonicis qui interfuerunt aliquas candellas ex predictis.

8/5 Olim non admittebantur mulieres in pulpitum reliquiarum introire. Cautum et etiam lege ne hac nocte ingreditur Ecclesiam, sicut in nocte Ascensionis Domini - prohibentur viri - Ecclesiam ingredi sed neutrum plene seruatur, licet Domini de nocte cum suis satelitibus exquirant et custodiunt ualues Ecclesiae. sed quis custodiat ipsos custodes [ ! ].

8/6 Feria sexta in parasceue. \(<59. \text{c.a 9i}>\) Posteaquam Dominus Dux cum jllustrissimo senatu mane uenit in Ecclesiam et fecit orationem suam statim incohit horae. videlicet prima, tercia, sexta, et nona, legendo, et dicuntur large, et moderate. quibus finitis jnmediate Dominus vicarius uel eo impedito maior nobilior et aptior canonicus jndutus pluuiale velluti nigri portans tabernaculum cum spina coronae Domini jesu exit de sacrario cum diacono et subdiacono jndutis Dalmathica et turricella velluti nigri. quos precedunt septem clericij modestissime jndecentes induti superpellicjs mundissimis et non laceratis. Duo primi portant duo candellabra Argentea cum suis candellis libre unius nondum accensis. Duo alij sequuntur cum Missali et passionario. postremo tres cum tribus tobaleis mundissimis. medius defert tobaleam maiorem explicandam et extendendam super Altari magno dum sacerdos cum Diacono et subdiacono [fol. 8 verso]

8v/1 prostratis super gradibus Altari orant, quod Altare permansit nudatum à Die externa post Missam ante mandatum. Magister chori praceedit omnes predictos exeuntes de sacrario, et cum peruenit ante Altare. jnclinat se profunde usque ad terram et similiter omnes sequentes, et jngresso Magistro ad Altare, ceteri sequuntur ordine suo, tunc sacerdos et diaconus et subdiaconus prostrati ut predictum est, orant. et jnterim extenditur tobalea maior super Altari. due uero minores tobaleae ponuntur hinc inde super cornibus Altaris plicate tamen auferende ut infra. Postea locatur tabernaculum spinae in medie
Altaris. <super suo scanno damasci nigri.> Deinde ponuntur duo candellabra praedicta, postea Missale et liber passionarius. Postea dato signo per Magistrum chori et cerimonialium, sacerdos cum diacono et subdiacono surgit ab oratione et reuerenter osculatur Altare.

8v/2 Hodie non utimur puluinaribus ad Altare, nec ad passionem, nec ad Euangelium. quia christus non habuit ubi reclinaret caput suum. Depositis candellabris Argenteis super Altare cum suis candellis intregis nondum accensis, punctator ponit octo cereos super cornibus Altaris, quatuor a dextris, et quatuor a sinistris super clausis suis. et quatuor candelabra auricalchi super altari cum suis candellis intregis nondum accensis. facta oratione per sacerdote et ministros et deosculato per eum Altari statim in medio chori cantatur prima prophetia per aliquem sacerdotem qui sit gratior uoce et cantu, etiam si esset de numero cantorum, jubeat Magister chori qui bene nouit omnes cui uelit. prophetie dicuntur sine titulo.

8v/3 prima igitur prophetia decantata, cetera omnia fiant ut in ordinario sunt descripta. qui liber semper sit super Altari ante oculos celebrantis et Magister [sic] chori. Decantatis prophetejs cum suis tractibus integre, cantatur passio. et nota quod hodie cantatur á tota capella cantorum, et qui cantat textum et in fine Euangelium. Locantur in pulpito lectionum, qui autem - uerba christi - in pulpito Epistolae. cetera uero turb a in pulpito magno cantorum. Et cum peruentum fuerit ad jlla uerba, partiti sunt uestimenta mea sibi, Duo Accolithi discreti accipiunt jllas duas tobaleas quae locatae fuerant super cornibus Altaris et reportant eas in sacrarium. sed aduerte quod Accolithus accipiens tobaleam quae est in dextro cornu, exit per sinistrum. et qui in sinistro - exit per dext<e>ram. Et cum in passione uentum fuerit ad jlla verba, videlicet in quem transfixerunt, crux magna quae est supra portam chori, dato signo, detegitur, et cortina Altaris magni leuat ur et remouetur, et non antea. modus autem quo detegitur crux magna, est hic. tectorium cuius habet funiculum alligatum in eius summitate demissum per fenestram cubae magnae, jminentem crucij. in qua fenestra est unus de ministris aut seruientibus ipsius Ecclesiae, et per Magistrum chori mandatum uni clerico discreto qui habeat libellum passionis et mane prope Altare crucifi xi ad capitellum [baldacchino with a wooden crucifix between nave and northern aisle]. jlle uero minister qui est in fenestra cubae obseruat hunc clericum. qui cum peruentum fuerit ad jlla uerba, videlicet videbunt in quem transfixerunt - dat signum, manu elleuando suum byretum. et minister jlle statim elleuat tectorium crucis et dimitit jllud ellatum in medium area ligatum suo fune. sed aduerte quod tectorium jllud est cruci alligatum quibusdam funiculis, quod nisi summo mane dissolveretur, non pos-
set praedictus minister ex fenestra tollere tectorium suo tempore, ut quandoque accidit. quare procuret Magister chori ut summo mane per aliquem seruientem Eclesiae tectorium dissoluatur à cruce, ut possit elleuari tempore suo. sed cum peruentum fuerit ad jllud et inclinato capite tradidit spiritum, celebrans et ceteri omnes tan clericus quam populus genua flectent uersi facie ad Altare, nec inde surgunt nisi dato signo per celebrantem percutiendo manu Missale.

8v/4 peruento autem ad locum qui legitur in tono Euangelij unus sacerdos ex jllis qui cantaturi sunt Euangelium cum stolla trauersa more diaconi genua flectit et dicit ex pulpito, munda cor meum etc. et accipit benedictionem à celebrante. <sed non Romae accipitur hodie benedictio à celebrante, sed dicto à diacono munda cor meum etc. proceditur ad dicendum Euangelium sine benedictione - sine luminaribus. - et sine incenso. ut scribitur in libro cerimoniarium romanarum, loco suo.> finito Euangelio ponitur legile in medio chori, hoc est in medio spacio inter altare et portam chori nudum sine aliquo panno. et celebrans ibi cantat illas solemnnes orationes, Astantibus Diacono et subdiacono. quibus expletis sacerdos cum Diacono et subdiacono redit in sacrarium. et accepta tabella solita in qua insertum est lignum Dominicae crucis, et sublato legili, et stratis tapetibus à porta Altaris ad portam chori per guardianos Ecclesiae uel per clericos si non adsint guardianj, sacerdos cum cruce stat in porta sacrarij, et ibi cantat Agios etc. ut in ordinario, et totus clericus conuenit extra sacrarium ante portam. Et quatuor cantores ad minus postquam finiuit sacerdos, cantant Sanctus Deus etc., in cantu plano ut in ordinario, cum tribus debitis genuflectionibus. ceteri omnes tan clericij quam laicj permanent semper flexis genibus. Sed aduerte

[fol. 9]

9/1 quod soli canonici cum cantoribus et Magistro cerimoniarum procedunt et transeunt per portam Altaris quae est in cornu Euangelij, et exeunt per portam Altaris mediam. reliqui omnes reuertuntur in chorum ad loca sua. secundus actus fit in porta media Altaris, tercius in porta chori, ut in ordinario. et decantato hac tercia uice, Sanctus Deus, sacerdos cantandoEcce lignum crucis, Detegit tabellam in qua insertum est lignum crucis, et elleuatus brachia quantum potest, vertit se circumeirca ad partem cathedrae Domini Ducis, et cantores flexis genibus proseuuntur cantando, jn quo salus mundi pe Pendit, etc. et omnes in Ecclesia sunt prostrati in terra. finita venite adoremus, reuertitur Dominus vicarius cum ceteris eò quo uenerunt ordine, scilicet Magister chori primus nisi sit canonice, nam si serit [sic] canonicius reuertitur cum canonicis loco suo, postea cantores, canonicj, subdiaconus, diaconus, postremo celebrans, et cum peruenerit ad altare, cantorum pars accedit ad chorum dex-
trum, et pars ad sinistru m, cum suis ordinarijs. canonicj uero cum Domino vicario, et diacono et subdiacono. Deposita cruce super puluinarij aureo quod tegitur etiam uello Aureo in media porta Altaris. Depositis crepidulis et pluuiali uadunt praecedente Magistro chori usque ad gradus mediae portae chori. jta ut prima adoratio celebrantis sit prope cathedram Dominj Ducis quae est prope portam chori. <licet alias fuerit alibi.> sed hic est eius locus antiquus, seu malis eam dicere cathedram Dominj primicerij, nam cathedra propria sere-nissimi principis erat ad sanctum clementem.


9/3 finita uero Adoratione accensis circumcirca Altare luminaribus, et super Altari similiter accensis. remota cruce per sacristam ab Altari maiori, et bacili per basilicanum, et deposita cruce post Altare maius in gradu infimo Altaris sacramenti, Dominus Dux uenit ad Altare, et factura confessione secundum nostrum ordinarium, sacerdos ascendit ad Altare et lauat manus, super quo Altari jam erat extensum corporale in fine Adorationis crucis. Diaconus uero et subdiaconus vadunt ad sacrarium et preparatis omnibus per sacristam, Diaconus accipit calicem super quo est patena cum hostia consecrata pridie. <interea celebrans facit confessionem cum domino duce.> cohoperta Animula corporalis, et exeunt de sacrario omnes hoc ordine. Primum duo sacerdotes juvenes, cum thuribulis fumigantes cum incenso et odoramentis preciosissi-mis.

9/4 Deinde duo alij sacerdotes cum magnis intorticijs sine hastis accensis. postea subdiaconus cum Ampulla aquae, postremo diaconus ferens calicem cum corpore dominj, quos omnes Magister cerimoniarum praecessit. super Altari sit ampula cum vino. cum autem ad Altare uentum fuerit, diaco-nus stans super eminentiori gradu Altaris tradit calicem subdiacono existenti
flexis genibus ante eum. qui subdiaconus mutat ampullam aquae ad dextra manu in sinistram, et manu dextra apprehendit calicem. Deinde statim diaconus accipit patenam cum corpore Dominij et offert eam sacerdoti, qui ipsum cum corpore ponit super Altare nihil dicendo.(( Sed nota quod Romae summus pontifex uadit ad locum sacramenti et jllud portat ad Altare, et non diaconus, et eo absent, cardinalis celebrans jllud portat. [NB !!] vide cerimoniale Romanum.)) sed redeamus.

9/5 Deposita patena cum corpore Dominij super Altare ut praediximus, diaconus reassumit calicem, et sacerdos accipiens ampullam vini quae est super Altare juxta ipsum ponit vinum in calicem. ((tamen secundum ordinem curiae Romanae vinum ponitur in calice in sacrario per sacristam uel diaconem, et est expeditius.)) Sed posito vino per sacerdotem ut praediximus, sacerdos accipit patenam cum corpore Dominij et tenens jllud errectum [sic] in patena ambabus manibus jnципit cantare, hoc corpus, et uertit se à latere dextro ad sinistram reudeo ad dextro. et cantores in choro compleant, quod pro uobis tradetur. et statim deponit corpus Dominij de patena et collocat super corporalj nihil dicendo. Diaconus uero tenens calicem, et subdiaconus ampullam aquae dextris manibus flexis genibus super secundo gradu prope Altare. tandiu jbi permanent quandiu sacerdos osteno corpore deposuerit jllud super corporale, et tunc sacerdos uertit se ad jllos. tunc surgent, et subdiaconus offert cum debita

[fol. 9 versus]

9v/1 reuerentia aquam sacerdoti, qui aquam uino puro miscet in calice, nihil dicens.((sed secedum curiam [romanam] aqua miscetur vino in calice, cum superius diximus debere porri vinum in calicem secundum nostrum ritum.)) Posita aqua in calice ut statim dictum est diaconus collocat calicem super Altari loco congruo, et tegit cum animula, et nec sacerdos nec diaconus aliquid dicunt. Deinde fit incensio à sacerdote dicente, jncensum jstud à te benedictum etc. nullus alius incensatur nisi sacramentum, et non aliud. ((facta incensatione sacerdos lauat manus secundum Missalem [sic] Romanum. Licet secundum ritum nostrae Ecclesiae factura confessione ut praediximus lauentur manus quae etiam confessio omissetur more Romano.)) facta incensatione sacerdos inclinat se ante Altare dicens cantando mediiori voce, jn spiritu humilitatis. et cantores in choro compleant ut in ordinario. et completa Antiphona, sacerdos uertat se ad populum et dicat orate pro me fratres. deinde cantet competenti voce, oremus praeeptis salutaribus moniti etc. pater noster, et in fine chorus respondeat, sed libera, etc. et sacerdos jmediate dicat mediiori uoce, Libera nos domine ab omnibus malis etc. qua completa oratione chorus respondeat, amen,
pax dominj et Agnus dej non dicitur, nec datur pax - alicui in detestatione osculi judae.

tum sacerdos frangit hostiam nihil dicens, et unam partem hostiae mittit in cal-
icem nihil dicens.

9v/2 Postmodum uero antequam reliquas duas partes recipiat dicit
omnia quae dicere diebus alijs consueuit, pretermissa oratione, Domine jesu
christe fili dei unijc qui ex uoluntate patris etc. quia facit mentionem de sanguine.
sumptis particulis immediate particulam hostiae cum vino et aqua de
calice reuerenter. Sed aduerte quod jlla duo intorticia magna accensa quae
comitantur corpus Domij ad Altare, permanent jbi quousque corpus Domij
fuerit super Altari. hoc et usquequo sacerdos sumpserit corpus Domijn.
postea remituntur in sacrarium. sed hodie portantur quatuor intortici duo ante et duo
post sacramentum, propter honorificantiam sacramenti. Postcommunio non
dicitur, sed sacerdos more solito accepta purificatione, reuerenter dicit, quod
ore sumpsimus domine, et reliqua usque ad finem, scilicet usque ad jllud, fiat
nobis remedium sempiternum, et non amplius. et nihil aliu dicit. Sed finita
hac Antiphona jncohantur vespere. ((et unus canonicus jncipiat Antiphonam,
calicem salutaris accipiam, et perficiat ut in ordinaris.)) sed hodie celebrans
dicit primam Antiphonam vesperorum, reliquas uero capita chori alternatim.
finitis uero psalmis et replicatis Antiphonis, sacerdos ad Altare dicit versum
Christus factus est pro nobis obediens usque ad mortem. et chorus respondet,
mortem autem crucis. deinde sacerdos dicit Antiphonam ad Magnificat, videli-
cet cum accepisset etc.

9v/3 et completo Magnificat et repetita Antiphona à capite chori, sacer-
dos dicit absque cantu orationem, videlicet Respice quesumus Domine etc.,
et non dicitur miserere, quia est conclusio Missae et vesperorum. ((Romae
tamen summus pontifex hoc loco dicit psalmum miserere. vide in cerimonialj
romano.)) postremo sacerdos accipit tabernaculum cum spina. et stans in
media porta Altaris magni porigit jllud ad deosculandum Domino Ducj, et cae-
teris Dominis usque ad censesores jnclusiue. deinde Magister chori accipit taber-
naculum de manu sacerdotis et porigit caeteris. Sacerdos uero et ministri
udunt in sacrarium. Et postquam omnes deosculati fuerint tabernaculum,
reponitur super Altare, et est finis. <sede uacante, in die ueneris sancta, ommit-
tuntur jlle due orationes pro papa, et in sabbato sancto ad benedictionem cerej,
ommittuntur jlla particula que sit ??etio [?] de papa, etiam in canone dimittitur
pro papa nostro, cetera omnia dicuntur, et sic seruatus fuit in anno 1555, sede
uacante in his diebus.>

9v/4 Die veneris sancta post prandium. Post prandium circa horam
decimam nonam Ascendat predictor pulpitum, et non tardius si fieri potest. hoc est si adfuerit Dominus Dux cum senatu. nam necesse est expectare eius Adventum ad Ecclesiam. predictet autem per horam tantum, uel ad summum per horam et dimidiam. preparatis omnibus et paratis iuxta cedulam Magistri chori affixum in sacrario ante finem predicationis. statim post descendum predictoris ex pulpite, Magister accedat portam chori aut si conducibilis uidebitur manet in sacrario pro ordinandis quae ordinanda sunt Mittat aliquem sacerdotem expertum, qui urgent capitaneos ut faciant expedire uias, videlicet à porta chori usque ad portam magnam Ecclesiae.

9v/5 Et à porta media quae est apud sanctarium [ ! name usually reserved for door between Palace entrance and south transept) usque ad sepulcrum, quod jmititur hodie parieti capellae sancti ysidori. licet olim errigere-tur ad parietem chori [ ! ]. Et ita expediuntur ut detur commodus per eas transitus processioni [sic]. ad sepulcrum sint parata candelabra ad Deponendas cereos qui portantur ante et post corpus Dominij. Olim erant duo cerej tantum, qui portabantur à capitis chori. Hodie sunt sex, qui portantur à sex sacerdotibus ut infra. Sit parata porta sepulcri, quia olim leuebatur, Hodie affixa est sepulcro. Sit pannus cum christo passo passa extendingus super secula posteaquam signatum fuerit, ut infra. Assignetur per punctatores qui Hodie custos est sac-rarij superioris. Decem intorticia non prius accensa unicuique scholae magnae, videlicet Dominis guardianis magnis.

[fol. 10] 10/1 et eorum collegis. si qua uero intorticia fuerint accensa diuidantur Equaliter inter sex Scholas. Audito et per Magistrum personaliter viso quod in choro et in Ecclesia vie svnt apertae et expeditae. <Theodori, Rochi, Misericordie, joannis, Charitatis, S. Marcj> Exeant de sacrario ad jsumm Magistri scholastici sex scholarum prædictarum. primi qui exeant cum intorticijs accensis sunt sanctj Theodorj, et juniores exeunt priores. Secundi sanctj Rochi, et juniores excent priores. Tercj Misericordiae, Quartj sancti Joannis, Quinti charitatis. postea totus clerus Ecclesiae nostrae jn superpellicjjs. post hos due turme cantorum, postea quituar sacerdotes juvenes, cum quatuor camisijs nigri et stollis uiolaceis transuersis supra pectora ut appareant sacerdotes et non baiuli portantes quatuor cereos moiores accensos. deinde duo Accolithi magni et discreti cum Dalmaticis nigris hoc est ordinarij, portantes naiuculas incensi. postea duo sacerdotes, uel duo subdiaconi ordinarij cum dalmaticis nigris <et cum thuribulis> continue thurificantes ad latera portatilis sacra-menti.

10/2 Quatuor canoniej cum dalmaticis vellutj nigri et stollis ad fer-
etrum, jllud suis humeris portantes. post feretrum jnmediate duo alij sacerdo-
tes jnduti ut quatuor praedicti cum duobus cereis maioribus et ij sint
robustiores. deinde scholasticj sancti Marej pro nunc. postremo dominus vicar-
ium, uel eo absente maior et nobilior canonicus cum pluuiiali velluti nigri. <et
stola> et cum corpus Dominj jesu est in porta sacriaj firmetur feretrum et
omnes genua flectant. et per cantores cantetur venite et ploremus. Magister
destinet ad minus duos sacerdotes juuenes aut plures si uidelicet expedire, qui
ordinent in jtinere omnia ordinanda. et faciant procedere et firmare proces-
sionem quando opus fuerit. Sint jnmediate extra portam chori utrinque capse
cum candellis et unicuique detur uma candella librae unius accensa, videlicet
ercicis et sacerdotibus scutiferis et secretarijs, et nobilibus omnibus comitanti-
bus processionem cum Domino Duce.

10/3 cumulative jlle quinque prime schole exierunt extra portam
medium affirmnt se ordinate, et diuidantur hinc inde, ita ut duo ultimi quintae
scholae sint statim extra portam medium sub porticu
[ ! ] expectantes scholasticos sancti Marej qui remanserunt post feretrum. sa-
cerdotes uero, scutieri et secretarij procedunt ulterius, ita ut antiores clericj
aeque procedant cum duobus primis scholasticis scholae Sancti Theodori, quae
prima est ante alias scholas in processione, ut diximus in exitu earum de sacra-
rio. et quia maior est numero clericorum, scutiferorum et secretariorum quam
numerus omnium schollariorum ferentium intorticia, jdeo isti sint rariores, jlli
densiores.

10/4 Et postquam omnes ita dispositi fuerint, expectent usque dum jllis
fuerit jnperator ut procedent. et cum expletum fuerit, venite et etc. ante jan-
uam sacrarij procedant omnes ulterius ordine praedicto. extra portam medium
sub porticu pallatij est vmbella nigra deferenda a sex subcanonicis jndutis
pluuialis samiti nigri, qui eò premituntur expectaturi Aduentus feretri. sed for-
tasse melius esset habere vmbellam ad portam sacrarij si transitus esset liber.
canonicij si qui super sint, sint cum pluivialibus nigris. sed raro super sunt, quia
hodie quatuor ex ipsis portant feretrum quod olim non portabant. et Dominj
plebani canonicij non intersunt, preter Dominum vicarium. cum uero feretrum
est sub vmbella, procedant omnes scholasticj ferentes intorticia. et sacerdotes,
scutiferi, et secretarij, et pariter incedant isti medij jlli, scilicet scholasticj a lat-
eribus. et cum duo ultimi scholae sancti Marej, videlicet guardianus magnus et
eius vicarius fuerint contra duas ultimas hastas vmbellae procedat vmbella et
sub ea pariter feretrum sacratissimi corporis dominj quod Dominus vicarius,
ersensissimus princeps et senatus sequuntur suo ordne cum candellis accensis.

10/5 exeuntes per portam Auream pallatij, sed ante feretrum cantores,
in duabus thurmis cantantes venite etc. et similiter ad pausas. prima thurma ante feretrum sunt quatuor de melioribus, secunda thurma caeteri omnes. prima pausa fit contra petram banni [pietra del bando: cylindrical stone at Piazzetta corner of the basilica, used for promulgation of decrees, city ordinances, etc.], secunda contra portam magnam Ecclesiae, tercia in platea Sancti Bassi [present Piazza dei leoncini]. habeat Magister chori semper duos clericos discretos prope se, quos possit mittere quo voluerit pro executione mandatorum eius. Duo uero aut plures sacerdotes juvenes deputati per magistrum ad ordinandam processionem. Attendant diligenter quando debeant firmare, et quando mouere processionem. et cum viderint umbellam peruenisse ad loca pausarum, faciant omnes genua deponere super terram dum pausatur.

10/6 quum uero processio ingressa fuerit Ecclesiam, scholastici portantes intorticia faciunt chorum à porta magna Ecclesiae ad sepulcrum. et priores qui sunt sancti Theodori remanent ad portam magnam et caeteri procedant ulterius, ita ut ulterior, scilicet Scholasticij sancti Marcij qui sunt in processione in loco nobiliori, debeant firmare prope sepulcrum. Et similiter in die corporis christi. quare studeat Magister chori ea dexteritate qua potest eos sedare ne fiat tumultus, quod si non posset propria auctoritate, accedat ad capita illustri simi consilij

[fol. 10 versus]


10v/2 Adest enim sacrista qui preparauit ceram ad signandum. sit etiam clavis ad aperiendam portam sepulcri si esset clausa, ut quandoque acidit. Signato igitur monumento et restituto annulo magni cancelario, cantores cantant flexis genibus sic caeteris etiam permanentibus, sepulto Domino etc. quo finito omnes surgant, et Dominus dux cum senatu intrat chorum, et unusquisque sedet in sedilibus suis. tunc etiam scholastij cum intorticijs intrant chorum post senatores, jncipientes primi, jlli videlicet sancti Theodori et successiue alij. et
redeunt in sacrarium ad exanguenda et rescindiendo intorticia. clericus autem remanet ante sepulcrum et signato monumento dicitur completorium legendo, cum psalmo miserere, et oratione Respice quesumus domine etc. sint autem aliqui ex custodibus et seruientibus Ecclesiae cum scalis parati ad ponendos cereos super candellabris cum peruenirent ad sepulcrum.

10v/3 finito vero completorio clericus reuertitur in chorum ad loca sua, scilicet in scannis paratis ad utrunque cornu Altaris maioris. Et jncohatur matutinum per canonicum destinatum à Magistro chori et dicitur ut in duobus praecessentibus diebus. nec propter spinam quae remansit super Altari accenditur aliquod lumen, preter jllas. x. candellas. Antequam processio moueatur, videat diligenter Magister si tabernaculum sit bene firmum in feretro, super corporali. quod firmatur per sacristam. Si uero plueret, processio fiat ut in die mercurij quando pluit, scilicet per capellam baptismi et cardinalis [Zen], ordine quo supra, excepto quod omnes scholasticj cum intorticijs precedunt. postea clericus, scutiferi, secretarij, et ceteri ut supra, cum candellis accensis, cantores uero ante feretrum ut supra.

10v/4 prima pausa fiat in Ecclesia, ante portam baptismi, secunda sub porticu inter duas portas magnas Ecclesiae. Tercia etiam sub porticu ad portam quae est contra Ecclesiam sanctij Bassi. Hodie tamen si plueret Ascendimus palatium cum processione ordinata ut supra per scalam quae est contra portam mediam Ecclesiae. et cum Ascendimus ad portam officij aquarum vertimus nos ad leuam quae respicit super Aula palatij et sic procedimus usque ad portam Auditorum ueterorum [Audiitori vecchi]. jnde vertimur etiam ad leuam similiter uersus Aulum palatij. quousque perueniamus ad officium bladorum [ufficio delle biade] uertentes nos ad Dexteram, et cum peruenierimus cum feretro ante officium Dominorum propri [Ufficio del proprio], sit prima pausa. procedimus autem inde usque ad angulum palatij qui respicit super platea prope Dominos de nocte [Domini di notte] et ibi fit secunda pausa. Tercia uero pausa fit in alio capite palatij supra plateam qua uertimur ad officium aquarum. postea descendimus per scalas per quas Ascendimus et intrantes Ecclesiam per portam qua exiuimus.

10v/5 postea flectimus ad parietem capellae baptismi et procedimus usque ad tres sanctos [Tre Santi: relief with Christ, the Virgin and John the baptist, in the south aisle, near the entrance]. jnde flectimus ad dexteram usque ad portam magnam Ecclesiae, et ibi uertimus recta uersus chorum per medium Ecclesiae. cum uero peruenimus contra sepulcrum, flectimus ad sepulcrum. caetera fiant ut dictum est supra. Et haec eadem uia fit si pluret in die corporis christi, nisi quod ea die non flectimus ad sepulcrum. sed ultime cerimonie fiunt
super porta chori. sed aduerte quod si fuerint tribunalia in palatio quae impedi-

tant transitum processionis, amoueantur. et hoc spectat ad commilitonem Sere-
nissimi principis. preuideat tamen Magister chori.

10v/6 Si uero Dominus Dux per aetatem aut ex alio aliquo impedimento
difficulter intercederet, et esset sessus in itinere, possemus [sic] ingredientes
Ecclesiam Descendentes de palatio recta adire sepulcrum sine ambitu predicto,
uel breuis, exire à choro ad portam quae ducit sub porticale prope tres sanctos
et sic procedere ut fit in die mercurij Dum pluit. <vel per portam sancti Clem-
etis et circumcirsca totum palatium et intrantes per portam mediam & ad tres
sanctos usque ad portam magnam et portam chori et ibi terminant ut supra.>

10v/7 In sabbato sancto in mane. Posteaquam Dominus Dux cum senatu
venerit ad Ecclesiam dicitur horae canonicae ut in duabus superioribus die-
bus. et nota quod Dominus Dux hoc mane ingreditur Ecclesiam per portam
mediam quae est sub porticu palatij, et tendit rectam ad orationem ante sepul-

crum. et post orationem ingreditur chorum, et incohantur horae ut predictum

est. quibis finitis, exeant de sacristo infrascripti. Et primo duo clericij
modesti, unus cum libro benedictionis cerej, alter cum Epistolario propter pro-
phetias, ut in ordinario. postea unus sacerdos juvenis indutus dalmathica

[fol. 11]

Veluti rubri. Hodie uero rasi cremesini nouj, ferens cereum
rubrum. Deinde subdiaconus cum bacillj Argenteo, in quo sunt quinque grana
incensi praeparata prius per sacristam, grandia ut oua Anserum, composita ut
quinque nuces pineae. sit etiam gladius ad incedendum cerej licun [lignum
?]. sunt etiam candelle ex his quae ascenduntur ad sepulcrum, cum quibus
accensis calefiunt grana incensi ad imprimentum ea cereo, cuj sit foramen
latum profundum ut possit tuto et comode locari super suo clauo in pulpitio lec-
tionum. hos sequitur diaconus manu dextera ferens arundium in cuius summi-
tate sint tres candelle solito more ligate per sacristam, accense ex igne prius
excusso ex silice per sacristam, et benedicto per Dominum vicarium. Hora
competenti pulsata, scilicet campana primum in campanili, nam hora undec-
ima pulsatur bis campana quae dicitur longa. postea campana mediae terciae
non multum post. Benedictio ignis ut supra. <id est quinque grana incensi in
suo bacille.> <et incensum> <in missali romano, in cathino, in sacrario ante
ciucé[?]> fit cum indumentis ut in ordinario.

11/2 Stans itaque Diaconus in limine sacrarij cantat Lumen christi, et
chorus respondet Deo gratias, et procedens cum ceteris secundo cantat in porta
media [!] maioris Altaris. tercio cantat in porta chori facie uersus ad Eccle-
siam, semper exaltando uocem. Deinde omnes Ascendant pulpitum lectionum praecedente Magistro chori, preter celebrantem qui paratus cum pluuiali violaceo super camisio postremus exit de sacrario cum praedictis sed remanet ad Altare, et non ultra progreditur. cum autem intrauerint pulpitum predicti cereus sic extinctus jmmo nondum accensus locatur super clauo suo, sub quo sit patina aeris rubri ad excipiendum cereum fluentem cum cereus accensus fuerit, ne fluat super senatores infra sedentes: tunc diaconus bene et moderate cantat benedictionem cerej. interim nullum lumen ardeat in Ecclesia, preter jllas tres candellas, cum autem peruenerit diaconus in benedictione ad locum affigendorum quinque granorum incensi, tunc silet. et qui adsunt calefaciunt cum candellis accensis ex jllis tribus, quinque grana incensi. et quinque cauer- nas factas prius in sacrario in cereo in modum crucis et affigunt grana sic cale- facta ipsi cereo diligenter ne labantur.

11/3 Erecto cereo cum granis affixis procedit diaconus, et accenso cereo tempore opportuno, accenduntur luminaria per Ecclesiam et super Altare maius, non in cornibus Altaris, quia non sunt posite. ponuntur dum fit benedictio fontis, sed ille quatuor candelle solum accendantur posite super quatuor candelabra Auricalchi ante incohationem horarum super Altari. Et nota quod omnia luminaria accenduntur cum lumine accepta ex cereo benedicto. qui cereus accenditur ex lumine trium candellarum quae sunt in Arundine. jmperet Magister chori jlli ad quem spectat accendere luminaria maioris Altaris quod accipiat lumen ex cereo, et similiter faciat qui accendit lampades per Ecclesiam. finta cerej benedictione cum diaconus orat pro imperatore. Dicat pro serenissimo jmperatore. Et cum orat pro Domino Duce, Dicat pro Jllustrissimo, etc. ut in libro. finita deprecatione cum Amen <diaconus cum ///udine3 [arundinem], & ///ri [candellabri?], eo comitatu quo uenerunt, et uertunt ad altare maius> et statim incohatur prima prophetia. et cantantur quinque tantum prophetie, sine titulo, ut in Epistolario et ordinario, à quinque canonicis inuitatis per sacristam ex nostris residentibus, qui si non esset ad numerum, suppleat canonice plebanj proximiores Ecclesiae nostrae.

11/4 Et antiquores canonicj cantant priores prophetias. Dum cantanatur prophetiae et tractus eorum, cleris trium capellarum nostrarum, videlicet sanctj juliani, sanctj geminianj, et sanctj Bassi, scilicet Domini plebani cum suis titularis, uel mansionarijs ubi non sunt titolari. adeo ut sint sex pro vice, vadunt ad fontem cum stollis in superpellicijs. sunt enim tres turme, sicut tres capelle. Et incipiunt jre ad fontem in principio terciae prophetiae ut in ordinario. Et vadunt dicendo Laetanias [sic] quas complent circa fontem, cedentes se ex turmam, et reuertentes in sacrarium. Et ultima turma dictis laethanjs jbi
permanent donec eò accedamus omnes cum Domino Duce et senatu ad benedictionem fontis. et nota quod propter tractas legile cum suo panno violaceo uel leonino ponitur in choro in loco quo solet cantari Epistola et amouetur quando opus fuerit, scilicet finitis tractibus qui cantantur à duobus cantoribus indutis pluivialibus sanguinis et alij duo cantores sic indutis respondent jllis ad legile in choro.

11/5 et mutantur cantores ad singulos tractus. et nota quod quando dixi superius quod accenduntur luminaria per Ecclesiam, jntelligo etiam quod accendantur etiam omnes jlle lampades parue quae çrent [? or çrent # ] cuidam instrumento ferreo pendente in medio Ecclesiae, quod dicunt la chiocha. Sit etiam preparata stoppe super alio instrumento ferreo pendente ante portam magnam Ecclesiae intrinsecus, quod uocant, la maregna. expletis quinque prophetis cum omnibus ordinatis in ordinario, Incipit processio omnibus prius preparatis preparandis. Et precedent quatuor clericj ex maioriibus portantes de more quatuor dopleria in hasis. deinde sequantur per ordinem totus clerus. jmmediate ante Dominos canonicos incedunt cantores induti pluivialia sanguinis, cantantes ut in ordinario. hos sequuntur canonij [fol. 11 versus]

11v/1 postea vmbella ex panno serico, scilicet damascino albo. Delata à quatuor sacerdotibus ex numero juuenum inter quatuor cereos Argenteos delatos à clericis ordinarijs in superpellicijs. et similiter portantes vmbellam et cereos in hastis. sub vmbella sit unus sacerdos indutus Dalmatica olim velluti rubri, nunc rasi cremesini noua. portant Ampulam olej sanctj super patena quod accipitur ab Ecclesia cathedralj [San Pietro di Castello] per aliquem ex nostris sacerdotibus eo missum in Die jouis sancta, Duo subdiaconi ordinarij in superpellicijs thurificantes oleum sanctum, diaconus et subdiaconus. postremo omnium uenit jlle qui fert cereum nuper benedictum. Deinde Dominus Dux cum senatu. vnus puer portet librum benedictionis fontis. Jn capella baptismi sint paramenta alba induenda post benedictionem fontis. sit planeta cum dalmaticis, sint pluivialia damasceni albi pro Dominis canonicis, sint etiam pluivialia sericha turcha pro cantoribus, sit pannis et bacille Argenteum et gutum aquae plenum ad abluendas manus sacerdotis, et lintheus ad tergendas mundissimus, sit etiam scurella Argentea si aliquis velit se baptizari ut quon-doque accidit.

11v/2 Finita benedictione fontis, et pronuntiato ter per Diaconem si quis adsit qui uelit baptizari lingua tamen materna. Et si forte adesse aliquis qui diceret se uele baptizari, opporpet eum baptizare. presertim si esset cathecumius [sic] hoc est instructus in his quae credenda sunt, quod accidit anno
Domini 1545, quidam enim adolescens captus ex turcis et instructus in fide obtulit se baptizandum ad uocem Diaconij inuitantis. erat cum Domino suo quodam iure ueneto Dominio, blancho, et baptizatus fuit ab ipso celebrante qui fontem benedixerat. quo facto per diaconem et subdiaconem intonatur Te Deum laudamus. et omnes statim jnduunt paramenta ut supra. et processio-aliter reuertimur in chorum cantando Te Deum etc.

11v/3 via processionis est ista. Egressi de capella baptismi ordine quo venimus declinamus ad leuam post ultimam columnam siue pilastrum usque ad portam magnam Ecclesiae. et inde dirigimur ad chorum. et cum Dominus Dux est prope - instrumentum inuolutum stuppa predictum figit gradum et similiter omnes, et qui cantabant Te Deum silent, et diaconus accipit cereum de manu gerentis, et ter exaltando uocem cantat, Attendite, et statim accendit stupam in modum crucis submittendo cereum. et chorus prosequitur Te Deum, et statim expulsor canum cum scopis diligenter colligit reliquis stuppe cadentes in terram combustas, quas probicit in ignem. hoc interim omnes intrant chorum, qui cum manserit nudus à Die jouis sancta post officium in sera usque ad sabbatum usque ad nostrum accessum ad fontem.


11v/5 Subdiaconus et Diaconus numquam recedunt ab Altarj. crux non portatur ad Altare hodie, nec in Die cenae Dominj, nec in parasceue. sacra communione sacerdos intonat cantando Antiphona, vespere autem sabbati, et cantores explent jllas quinque Antiphonas, ut i ordinario. <et dicitur psalmus laudate dominum omnes gentes> postea sacerdos intonat Antiphonam ad Magnificat, Respondens autem angelj, et cantores complent.

11v/6 Et finitis vesperis ut in ordinario, Diaconus cantat benedicamus
Domino solemniter cum Dupliciti Alleluya, et non dicitur Evangelium sancti
joannis à Diacono cantando, sed dicitur Regina caeli laetare, quia haec
Antiphona nondum posita est, nec rationabili ter debet dici in publico, nisi
prius sit decantatum publice ad sepulcrum, surrexit christus, quia in ea Dicitur,
resurrexit sicut dixit. nec obstat quod in Euangelio huius Misse dicatur, sur-
rexit enim sicut dixit, et in praefatione, et uitam re surgendo reparauit, quia
haec Missa est huius noctis sequentis, et haec Antiphona ueré non ponitur ///
Data igitur benedictione, est finis. Misse est vesperorum. <poi se tirano gia le
stuore, et tauole del choro per li guardiani, & se la?bano nel magazen del
oglio.>

[fol. 12]

12/1 In Die sancto Dominicae Resurrectionis. Omnis <noster> clerus
cuiuscunque gradus paulum post ortum solis conueniat in sacrarium, et studeat
Magister chori quod omnes qui habent specialia officia praparentur et induan-
tur paramentis sibi spectantibus. Duo Accolithi pro thuribulis hodie induant
dalmathicas albas damascenas super camisij. Si Dominus vicarius celebrat
Missam ut debet, duo subcanonicalj cantant Epistolam et Euangelium et hoc est
ordinarium semper, licet quandoque aliter fiat. Diaconus uero et subdiaconus
ordinarij quorum est æbdomada parantur cum Domino vicario pro Accolithis.
preparatis omnibus et Disposito thesauro super Altari indutis omnibus pluivial-
ibus preciosioribus Dominis canonici et reliquis junta gradus suos exitur per
portam sanctj clementis, et Ascendimus scallam magnam <nouam> [Scala dei
giganti] et precipuam palacij quae est <ad leuam sub porticu> contra portam
Auream palatij, et firmamus sub porticu superiorj palatij antequam Ascenda-
mus scallam quae ducit ad Domum Domini Ducis praeecedentibus crupe et
cereis. sit unus clericus qui habeat librum ordinarium nobiscum, alium ordi-
narium habeant cantores qui remanent in Ecclesia ad portam magnam clausam
cum pluivialibus turchis. aduertat Magister chori quod uia sit expedita et
munda à porta magna Ecclesia ad portam chori, et usque ad sepulcrum, quia
solet esse occupata sedilibus propter predicationem, quare expeditiur usque ad
reditum Domini Ducis in palatium.

12/2 postquam igitur Ascendimus scallam predictam facto choro
Dominus vicarius cum Diacono et subdiacono praeecedente Magistro cerimon-
iarum. Ascendit scallam ligneam [!] quae ducit ad Domum Dominj Ducis, fer-
ens cum ministris indutis sacris uestibus et ips [i. e., Magister cerimon.]
indutus sacerdotalibus indumentis, tres cereos accensos ibi in palatio, cerea
albae, ponderis librarum duarum singulos, acceptos in sacrario à custode cerea.
et ingressus porticum Domus Ducalis obuiat ibi Domino Ducj cuj reuerenter
porrigit unum ex his tribus cereis accensis, alium Domino procuratorj Ecclesiæ, qui est prope Dominum Ducem et in hac processione tantum precedit omnes, etiam Dominos oratores, sed in reeditu minime. <et non pulsatur sua campanella solita.> Ex exitus de palatio per portam Auream nisi plueret, tunc enim intramus Ecclesiam per portam sancti clementis. <uia qua uenimus.> et cum nostra crux intrat in plateam campane pulsantur. Et tria vexilla magna ante Ecclesiam sunt ellata summo mane et explicata uentis. hodie jlla tria vexilla sunt laceraeta et non elleuantur donec reficiantur noua. precones precedunt, postea tibicines statim ante crucem, post ea crux cum cereis.

12/3 Deinde clerus Ecclesiae ordinate juxta gradus suos jnferiores prope crucem, et sic successiue. et cum peruentum est processionaliter ad Ecclesiam procedunt omnes usque ad secundam januam magnam Ecclesiae quae clausa est. et omnes alie porte clause sint preter Duas paruas, scilicet quae tendit in canonican, et in palatium ad sanctum clementem. et facto choro inter jllas duo januas magnas sub porticu Ecclesiae quo melius fieri potest, jntrat enim etiam Dominus Dux eò sub porticum cum procuratore et oratoribus. tunc celebrans accedit ad januam clausam et pulsat ter cum Annulo aeneo pendente ex ipsa, tribus jctibus pro qualibet uice, jta ut sint nouem jctus. et cantores interius cantant quem queritis etc. ut in ordinario. sint autem qui respondeat extrinsecus super ordino cantantes, et elligantur à Magistro aliqui qui sciant bene cantare et habeant uoces aptas. cum autem dicunt, cantores venite et uidere etc., panduntur valuae Ecclesiae et omnes intrant Ecclesiam et procedit clerus ordinate ad sepulcrum. et Dominus Dux cum peruenerit contra sepulcrum firmat se facie ad sepulcrum uersa. tunc celebrans Ascendit ad sepulcrum quad fuit apertum summo mane aut prius in sero, et locatum sacramentum per sacristam in Altari suo.

12/4 Et jmmisso capite in sepulcrum utrinque cantat in porta sepulcri, Surrexit christus, et chorus respondet Deo gratias. Deinde in medio spacio, tercio apud <Dominum> Ducem in debita distantia. et postquam cantauerit tercio surrexit christus, semper exaltando uocem, Sacerdos accedit ad dominum Ducem et deosculatur eum et procuratores Dicens Surrexit christus. et jlli respondent Deo gratias. deinde sacerdos deosculatur Diaconum et subdiaconum jdem Dicens. jlli uero osculum dant propinquoribus sibi, et hic successiue usque ad minimos clericos qui adsunt, Dicentes et respondentes ut supra. Postea Dominus Dux cum senatu Ascendit chorum, nos uero, hoc est totus
clerus remanet ad Sepulcrum, preter cantores qui Ascendunt pulpitum lectionum ubi cantant Missam, quia hodie Dominus Dux facta confessione Missae Ascendit pulpitum magnum in quo audit Missam. si uero Dominus Dux remanet in choro ad Missam, cantores Ascendunt pulpitum magnum ad canendum Missam.

[fol. 12 versus]

12v/1 Ad sepulcrum uero dicitur prima legendo more nostro, et non secundum curiam, et in ordinaerijs paruis, et in orationali quem mittat sacrista ante incohaionem primae, et sit apud celebrantem, Dicta prima sine Regina caeli, quia continuatur Missa. Olim post primam fiebat chorus et cantores cantabant introitum ex pulpite suo, et sacerdos intonabat gloria patri, quo intono omnes intrabant chorum etiam Dominus Dux qui facta confessione Ascendebat pulpitum. Nunc uero dominus Dux jntrat chorum et accepto osculo à celebrante ut praedictum est, nos uero dicta prima, et facta confessione Dominus Dux Ascendit pulpitum magnum.

12v/2 Serenissimus autem Dux Dominus Andreas griti nollebat Ascendere in pulpitum sed residebat in sua sede in choro. In pulpitum duo tantum canonicij Ascendunt cum Domino capellano ad dicendum introitum Misse, kyrie, gloria, et reliqua ut moris est, ob angustiam loci. reliqua pars senatus solebat sedere ad sanctum clementem in sedilibus ibi preparatis, et Domini procuratores tantum in scanno precipuo quod continuatur cathedra Dominij primicerij post canonicos illius lateris, et cleru totus erat in choro. Nunc autem licet Dominus Dux sedeat in pulpite, senatores nollunt sedere in sacello sancti clementis sed in choro, et cleru reducitur ad cornua altaris maioris. Missa jtaque more solito cantatur.

12v/3 Post prandium predicetor et omnes predicatores in nostra Ecclesia uocantur ad arbitrium Dominij Ducis, et sacrista eos inuitant nomine suae serenitatis, hoc est ille sacrata cuius est Annus inuitandi, uel alius cui jüsserit Dominus Dux.

12v/4 Post predicetionem Dominus Dux et senatus vadunt ad sanctum Zachariam et ibi audient vesperas. vadunt inquam cum triumphis. maior ex septem canonicis qui fuerunt in nocte jouis sancta in pulpite ad ostendendas reliquias, remanet in nostra Ecclesia in Die resurrectionis ad incohandum vespertas. maior uero ex illis sex canonicis qui comitantur Dominum Ducem ad sanctum Zachariam cum pluialibus albis intonat ibi vespertas secundum ritum Ecclesiae nostrae sancti Marcj, posteaquam Dominus Dux discesserit post predicetionem ab Ecclesia Sanctj Marcj, vespere incohandur à kyrie eleison, ut in ordinaerijs paruis omnia, uide ibi et non errabis. psalmi cantantur à pueris,
hoc est à capella parua intra dextrum cornu Altaris maioris et parietem super quem erectum est organum minus. sed aduerte quod hodie capella parua non extat, et magna uadit cum Domino Duce ad vesperas concinendos in Ecclesia sancti Zachariae, vnde <si non esset capella parua> ne Ecclesia Sancti Marcj in die tantae solemnitatis remaneat spoliata prorsus cantoribus, solet fieri diuissio, una pars cantorum remanet in Ecclesia sancti Marcj, altera uadit ad sanctum Zachariam.

12v/5  Cantatis tribus psalmis, et in fine uniusquisque pulsato organo, cantores qui adsunt cum pluuialibus turchis in pulpito Euangelij olim, nunc autem in pulpito lectionum uel in medio chori cantant Alleluya, haec dies, pascha nostrum, Alleluya, ut in ordinaris paruis. Postea canonicus qui incohauit vesperas, post praedicta intonat Antiphona ad Magnificat, ut in orationali, quia liber orationalis semper deseruit in choro, et ordinaris parui deseruint nobis ad fontem. finito Magnificat, pulsato organo [or: pulsata organa], et cantata oratione cum Dominus vobiscum, sine per Dominum nostrum, praecedentibus cereis jtur ad fontem ordine solito. subcanonicij incedunt ante cantores quia indutj sunt pluuialibus. post cantores </qui induti sunt pluuialia incedunt sub-canonicij postea/> Dominj canonicij. postea deferentes thuribulos et nauiculas unus quorum portat ordinarium.

12v/6  Deinde quatuor ministri cum pluuialibus. Postea canonicus qui intonauit vesperas, omnes quique cum pluuialibus albis. postremo omnium, est unus sacerdos de numero juuenum cum pluuiali rubro qui fert cereum paschalem accensum. et nota quod quotidie usque ad sabbatum in albis inclusiue jtur post vesperas ad fontem, cum cereo, et Magister chori precipit cuj uult ut ferat jllum.

12v/7  Sed ordo est ut senior ex numero juuenum ferat in die sancto paschatis, et sic successiue. in primis tribus Diebus portatur cereus rubeus cum pluuiali rubro. in reliquis portatur albus insuperpellicio, quia rubrus locatus est super candelabro aeneo in medio chori, et non remouetur inde usque ad vigilium Ascensionis Dominj post missam maiorem. in itinere à cantoribus cantatur in Die resurrectionis, ut in ordinar. in sacello fontis intonatur per Dominum canonicum Antiphona, Alleluya, et cantores terminant. Decantatis postea duobus residuis psalmis, cantores cantant, alleluya, hec dies, pascha nostra, et Alleluya, ut prius in choro.

12v/8  Postea intonatur Antiphona ad Magnificat per sacerdotem, ut in ordinario. qua expleta per cantores, et cantato Magnificat per cantores et chorum alternatim, et replicata Antiphona, cantatur oratio cum Dominus vobiscum, sine per Dominum nostrum, ut in choro. Deinde jtur ad sepulcrum
cantando surrexit etc. ante quod accendatur omnes cerej qui adsunt cum recedimus à choro per punctatorem. et facto choro ante sepulcrum de more, cantato per ministros, versus surrexit [fol. 13]

13/1 dominus de sepulcro Alleluya, breui, et responso à choro. sacerdos cantat orationem cum oremus tantum, ut in ordinarium paruo cum per Dominum nostrum etc. postea Dominus ubiscum, et Responsorium, et cum spiritu tuo. statim cantores cantant Surrexit christus etc. ante sepulcrum posito ibi legili cum panno. et chorus respondet octies alleluya jterum cantores cantant, et chorus replicat octies alleluya. postea sacerdos dicendo fidelium animae etc. pater noster, Regina caeli per omnes qui sunt in choro, versus gaude et letare virgo Maria alleluya. responsorium quia surrexit dominus alleluya. Oratio, Deus qui per resurrectionem filij tui domini nostri jesu christi etc. et responso Amen, intramus chorum eo ordine quo exiuimus et unusquisque recedit ad libitum.

13/2 Quandoque tamen ad petitionem quorundam ex Dominis procuratoribus aut primarijs senatoribus dicimus legendo completorium in sacrario, Magister chori ut morem gerat, magnalibus id petentibus, rogat aliquos de canonica qui uelint interesse et alios juvenes si potest eis persuadere. et dicitur completorium juxta ritum Ecclesiae nostrae.

13/3 Hodie tamen si propter jmbrem aut grauis alia de causa serenissimus princeps cum senatu uellet audire vesperas in Ecclesia sancti Marcj, necesse esset dicere vesperas integras, scilicet cum quinque suis psalmis [!] in choro, et post Magnificat terminare vesperas cum per Dominum nostrum etc. post orationem, ut alias fit, cum Regina caeli ut supra. nec jretur ad fontem, nec ad sepulcrum, ut quandoque accidit. Ab hac die inclusiue uelque dum ponitur cereus rubrus benedictus in choro super suo candellabo aeneo, semper ponatur cereus in pulpito ad quodcunque officium, accensus.

13/4 De feria secunda et tercia post pascha. Misse cantantur solemniter circa horam terciam. in vespertis autem omnia fiunt sicut in die resurrectionis quo ad ordinem cerimoniarium. Antiphona ad Magnificat, et orationes in choro dicuntur, ut in orationali. in capella autem fontis, ut in ordinarijs paruis. <sed aduerte ut semper in missa maiori et vespertis cereus paschatis ardeat in pulpito lectionum super suo clauo, q3q3 q3 [quod quandoque?] oblitus fuit in missa, secundae feriae>.

13/5 De feria quarta post pascha feria quarta canitur Missa ut in festis simplicibus <kyrie, gloria, sanctus & agnus dei paschalis & dicuntur usque ad octauam paschae> et post Missas clausa Ecclesia dissoluitur et amouetur sep-
ulcrum, et errigitur cereus aureus in medio chori. olim errigebatur cereus aureus ut prefertur, uel potius columna lignea pulchra laborata et auro undique tecta, mirae magnitudinis, in qua locabatur cereus paschatis. erat enim uacua intrinsecus, et accendebatur inferius per quandam fenestrellam quae erat in praedicta columna, et per quendam funem elleuabatur ita ut maior pars cerei supereminentem columnae, et similiter deducebatur per funem arte concinatum, et extinguebatur per fenestrellam per quam fuerat accensus. Seruabantur autem columna haec in parte Ecclesiae supra saccellum sancti Ysidori, et erat non minimi ornamenti.


13/7 Deinde statim itur ad fontem cantando in Die resurrectionis, et ad fontem cantitur oratio quae competit ut in ordinario, cum oremus tantum, et sine per dominum nostrum. Postea dirigimus ad portam chori semper praece-dentibus cereis. <qui sint parati ad januam sacristsiae, et in fine magnificat portantur in choro, ad altare maius.> et in jtinere redeundo à fonte cantatur, surrexit christus. post omnes in his processionibus semper defertur cereus non jlle paschalis qui est super candelabro aeneo, sed alius albus quem parat <cum cereis qui ortantur ad altare maius ut supra> et ad Magnificat vesperegum accendit pontator [appunctator] ad hoc ut feratur ad fontem. Sed melius esset quod jretur cum cereo benedicto ad fontem per totam Aebdomadam, quia unus est christus qui pro nobis mortuus est, qui et Resurrexit.

13/8 Cum vero cereus benedictus locatur super candelabro aeneo in medio chori, cauerne in quibus fuerunt quinque grana incensi, debent respicere contra portam chori, quia dominus ostendit discipulis manus et pedes et latus perforatum, quare debent uerti ad oculos populi intuentis. [!] foramina enim jlla quinque in cereo, referunt quinque plagas seruatoris nostri. fertur igitur
cereus albus ab uno sacerdote de numero juvenum post omnes etiam post Æbdomadarium jnsuperpellicio tantum. et in reditu facto choro ante crucem magnam quae est supra portam chori ubi sunt simulacra Apostolorum, duo clerici cantant versus, Dicite in nationibus alleluya. Responsorium quia Dominus regnauit à ligno alleluya. postea Æbdomadarius cantat cum oremus tantum, orationem competentem. postea Dominus uobiscum. Deinde cantant duo pueri Benedictamus Domino, <in missa non feruntur cerei nisi /// feria quarta neque datur neque confessione neque pax et cantatur Epistola, et euangelium in tono feriali per totam Ebdomadam.>

[fol. 13 versus]

13v/1 alleluya, alleluya, Responsorium Deo gratias alleluya alleluya. postea fidelium anime, pater noster, Regina caeli etc. oratio de more. et responso Amen, omnes bini et bini ascendunt chorum, et redeunt ad prapria. Et uelamen crucis magne quod est in area elleuatum, extollitur et locatur loco suo per guardianos Ecclesiae.

13v/2 Sabbato in Albis. Missa canitur de die à capella <cantorum ut in cantu plano, sine cantoribus> parua cum commemoratione virginis sed aduerte quod hodie capella parua non extat, ut alias diximus. jdeo cantatur Missa in cantu plano sine cantoribus, nam caniores teneantur cantare Missam beatae virginis omni die sabbati, nisi quando sunt Missae propriae, ut in hoc sabbato, et quando fit de aliqua octaua. sed in octaua fieret de festo occurrente, de sabbato occurrent festum: caniores cantarent Missan de beata virgine, cum commemoratione festi et octauae. Si uero in sabbato non occurreret festum sed fieret de octaua, cantaremus Missam de octaua in cantu plano sine cantoribus. sed si octaua esset alicuius solemnitate beatae virginis, semper caniores cantant Missam in sabbato, quia Missa est de beata virgine. et quoties cumque in sabbato cantamus Missam beatae virgine cum cantoribus, Epistola et Evangeliwm cantantur sicut in festo Duplicij, et similiter praefatio et pater noster et orationes. jn quadragesima uero licet sit Missa propria de feria, non propterea omititur Missa de beata virgine, quia postea cantatur etiam Missa de feria in cantu plano.

13v/3 sed posteaquam inceptum est praedicare in quadragesima quotidié, Missa beatae virginis omititur, quia tempus praedicationis occupat quo consueuit cantari Missa de beata virgine. sed si praedicator uellet quiescere in Die sabbati, ut faciunt quidam Missam de beata virgine cantaretur in Sabbato juxta morem Ecclesiae. hodie vespere dicuntur cum Deus in adiutorium meum intende etc., omnia ut in orationali. psalmi dicuntur de feria ut notantur in sabbatis pronuntiato alleluya super Antiphonam Benedictus quae est in sabbato.
post psalmos septimi <et sexti> toni ter alleluya, cantatur super dicta Antiphonam, Benedictus ante vespas Diej dicuntur vespere beatae virginis, <cum antiphona regina caeli ad magnificat> omnia uide in orationali. et quotidie fit commemorationio de cruce, de beata virgine, de sancto Marco Evangelista, et de sanctis, usque ad ascensionem, tan in Dominicis diebus quam in ferialibus et festis. Exceptis festis duplicitibus in quibus non fiunt praedicte commemorationes, dicta oratione Diej et commemorationibus praedictis, cum per Dominum nostrum jesum christum etc. et responso Amen.

13v/4 jtur de more ad fontem, ubi omnia fiunt ut in ordinario. fons hodie euacuatur per unum sacerdotem quem eliget sacrista. jn reditu omnia fiunt ut in tribus superioribus diebus. jlle uero sacerdos qui euacuat fontem, posteaquam clerus recessit à sacello, claudit se intra sacellum, ne quis accedat ad fontem et tangat aquam fontis oleo sancto perfusam, et impediat eum ad euacuandum. quo euacuato et loco cum aqua munda ipse tergit brachia et manus et inde recedit clauso fonte.

13v/5 jn Dominica Apostolorum. Post ortum solis, crux cerei et paramenta mittantur ad sanctum Geminianum, et qui Cereos ferunt parati sunt ut in festis solemnibus similiter et thuriferariij quorum alter fert crucem. vocabuntur olim omnes canonici sed hodie non interunt nisi residentes. et quatuor canonici plebani qui cum dubos residentibus canonici comitantur Dominum Ducem cum pluualibus albis. et qua hora Dominus Dux descendit de palatio jtur ad sanctum Geminianum cum solitis triumpfis ut tenetur. totus clerus Ecclesiae nostra confert se ad sanctum geminianum in superpellicijs cantaturus ibi terciam. olim ut in ordinarijs nostris totus clerus ascendebat palatum etiam plebanj canonicij, et comitabantur Dominum Ducem. nunc uero non ascendimus palatum, neque comitantur suam Serenitatem, nisi in reditu tantum. cantores uero inde pluualibus solitis prestolantur reditum nostrum à sancto Geminiano et ibi jungunt se nobis.

13v/6 Cum uero sua serenitas peruenerit ad portam templi, Excipitur à Domino plebano, cum aspergine, jncenso, et pace, sua serenitas, Domini oratores, et prelatj tantum, si qui adsint, et dictis seu cantatis orationibus solitis per Dominum plebanum ipsius Ecclesiae, Dominus Dux procedit ad Altare maius, ubi facta oratione flexis genibus, Dominus canonicus celebraturus Missam in sancto Marco incipit terciam. jpse enim cum Diacono et subdiacono praecisserat Dominum Ducem, et in Sancto Geminiano induerat se paramentis albis cum ministris predictis, et prestolabatur aduentum serenissimi principis. Dictis psalmis ante incovationem capituli, sacrificulus seu capellanus Dominj Ducis porrigit suae serenitati candellabrum Argenteum quod clericus serenita-
tis suae publice gestat cum jtur cum triumphis.

13v/7 porrigit inquam cum candella accensa ponderis librae unius, quod Dominus Dux accipit et tenet jllud usque ad finem orationis. tunc Dominus capellanus reassemit jllud et restituit clericio ferendum. et dicto Dominus vobiscum post orationem, statim ministri exuunt [sic] canonicum pluiali, et induunt eum planetam. et chorus Descenditur praecedentibus cruce et cereis usque extra portam Eclesiae, et ibi se firmat facto choro donec pulsato organo Decantetur Deo gratias cum duplici alleluya. et dicatur Regina caeli cum suis versibus et oratione. sed hodie ut plurimum

[fol. 14]

14/1 omititur, Regina caeli. incensa sint duo clericij aut juvenes qui congregent cancertos et reliquis, et faciant jre ordinate in locis suis post crucem et cereos, et sic procedit processio per uiam planam quae est prope procuratias. Olim incedebatur per mediam plateam recta, contra januam maiorem Ecclesiae nostrae sancti Marcj, sed quia uia illa est inequalis non plana et obnoxia soli, jdeo jtur ut praedixi. praecedunt nostram crucem commendantiores siue pre-cones, vexilliferi et tibicines. maior canonicus qui adest jnduit pluuiale, quod exuit [sic] sacerdos celebraturus et est ultimus in nostro capitulo. post nostrum capitulum, sequitur capitulum sancti Geminiani. Deinde post gastaldiones Domini Ducis, nostri sex canonicij, qui cum pluui-libus albis comitantur Dominum Ducem, ante quos immediate sit clericus suae serenitatis.

14/2 Deinde post omnes secretarios collegij incedunt duo cancellarij inferiores, ij olim erant sacerdotes plebani, nunc sunt laici, et tamen tenent locum post omnes secretarios illustri-jj consilij Decem, ante quos est plebanus sanctj Geminiani. post hos omnes, jmediate ante magnum cancellarium incedit canonicus celebraturus Missam in sancto Marco, jndutus Missalibus paramentis cum suis ministris cum jmediate precedentibus. et firmata processione in loco debito ubi fuit olim Ecclesia sancti Geminiani [!], qui locus est contra uiam quae Ducit ad pontem taxillorum ubi firmatur Dominus Dux, cantores cantant Responsorium, Dum transisset sabbatum, cum suo uersu, sine gloria patri, super uno ex nostris ordinarijs ubi notatur tale Responsorium. quo finito Dominus plebanus sancti Geminiani agit gratias Domino Ducj quod uisa-tauerit Ecclesiam suam, et jnuitat serenitatem pro anno sequenti, et alia dicit ad libitum, sed studeat breuitati.

14/3 facta uero responsione per Dominum Ducem, processio intrat Ecclesiam sanctij Marcj et firmata cruce et cereis ad portam chori et facto choro in medio Ecclesiae cantit per cantores primus introitus, et per sacerdo-tem intonatur gloria patri et filio et spiritui sancto. postea processio intrat cho-
rum cantando sicut erat etc. et facta de more confessione Dominus Dux Ascendit pulpium magnum, ex quo audit Missam solemniter decantatam.

14/4 Duo tamen canonici Ascendunt pulpium, ad jntrotum, Kyrie, gloria, patrem [sic], sanctus et Agnus dej, ob Angustiam loci. sed quia serenis-simus Dominus Andreas Griti nollebat Ascendere pulpium, sed sedebat in choro, procession non firmabatur in Ecclesia pro introitu cantando, sed ingrediebatur chorum, et fiebat confessio, et introitus cantabatur Dum fiebat confessio, ut in aliiis solemnitatibus. et nunc cantores cantant missam maiores in pulpito magno, quando Dominus Dux sedet in choro. <Et ad Euangelium Misse Dominus Dux tenet candellabrum in manu usque in finem. quere ad k. 92 signo x ut supra & omnia inuenies>

14/5 Post prandium vespere cantanth sicut in alijs dominicis diebus nihil addendo. uide omnia in nostro orationali. psalmi cantantur septimis tonis in fa uel in re sub Antiphona alleluia <et sic fit in alijs dominicis usque ad ascen-sionem.> <quando dicitur supra antiphona dixit dominus, alleluia.> Et quoti-die tan in laudibus, quam in vesperis, psalmi dicuntur sub una antiphona tantum, usque ad octauam penthecostes. <his temporibus cum pluuiali Alba. Alijs temporibus cum pluuiali viridj. in dominicis.> Anno domini 1557, festus sancti marcij, venit in dominica apostolorum, et factum fuit de festo cum com-memoratione dominicae. uide k. 27. /90./ 92.>

14/6 De tempore paschali <quere à carta 25. in fine quarte columna. - melior.> A' pascha usque ad octauam penthecostes exclusiue, semper in matu-tinis Dominicalibus, </tres psalmos dicuntur ut in ferijs infra octauam pasche, uide in ordinaro /// /> siue sanctorum. Dicimus tres psalmi sub una antiphona tantum. <videlicet feria 1.2.5. & nocturnum feria 3. 6. 20 nocturno feria 4 & sabbato 30 nocturno cum suis psalmis, ut in ferijs in octauam paschae, ut in ordinario ro(mano).> et tres lectiones, Due De libro uel legenda, tercia uero de homelia. Et dicuntur laudes et vesperi sub (una?) antiphona tantum. <in omnibus festis, tan duplicibus, quam simplicibus, usque ad octauam penthecostes.>

14/7 Exceptis festis, Annuntiationis virginis Mariae, sancti Marci Euagelistae, uenientibus ut infra - et festum Ascensionis. in quibus Dicuntur omnia ut in alijs temporibus. ceteris uero Diebus Dominicis et festis etiam Duplicipibus, dicuntur, <sub una antiphona> ut supra dictum est. <Et dicuntur duo alleluia in Missis, primum de tempore, <paschatis surrexit christus, quere in 2a dominica post pasquam> aliud de sancto decurrente, et post introitus Misae, offertorium, communionem, additur alleluia. et post omnes antiphonas similiter.>
De Diebus octo ante, et octo post, Diem Ascensionis Dominicae. Predictis diebus cantores quotidie cantant, organa sonant in vesperis nisi sint festa dupplicia in quibus cantentur etiam Misse per cantores. & organa sonantur. pluuialia etiam satis honorifica ponuntur, colorata juxta exigentiam festorum. et Dicuntur à nobis officia Duplicia, licet reuera non sint, propter quaedam accidentia quae solent accidere in festis Duplicibus, videlicet his Diebus quindecim non Dicuntur in choro vespere de beata virgine, nec responsorium in vesperis nec fiunt comemorationes de cruce, de beata virgine, de sancto Marco, et de sanctis martyribus.

14/8 summuntur quotidie ad vesperas tria pluuialia, etiam in dominis que cadunt ante et infra tamen non duplicantur Antiphone. nisi in festis duplicibus jncensatur Altare maius, et Altare sacramenti, chorus, campanile sonat ut in festis dupplicibus quotidie jis quindecim diebus et haec fiunt propter honorificentiam Ecclesiae quia multi aduene conueniunt ad ciuitatem venetiarum propter nudinas, et propter indulgentiam quae uiget in nostra Ecclesia per totam octauam Ascensionis, licet non ita ampla per octauam, sicut in vigilia et die, á primis vesperis ad secundas in clausis diebus et haec fiunt propter honorificentiam Ecclesiae quia multi aduene conueniunt ad ciuitatem venetiarum propter nudinas, et propter indulgentiam quae uiget in nostras Ecclesias ad quod me refero. primis octo diebus fit de sanctis occurrentibus, sed post Ascensionem fit quotidie de eius octaua, nisi festum duplex occurrat, tunc fit de festo duplci cum commemoratione octauae. Et feria sexta & sabbato fit de sanctibus occurrentibus, sine aliqua commemoratione ferie, cum off. bre [officio breve] etc; Et si non eget festum fit de feria, ut in rubrica ordinatur, cum officio breve etc., sed ad magnificat dicitur antiphona <beata maria virgo & in antiphona, beata dei genetrix> /regina celi/ cetera omnia ut in rubrica.

[fol. 14 versus]
14v/1 De tribus Diebus Rogationum. His tribus diebus Rogationum dicta Missa de festo occurrente more et hora solita, fit processio cum laetanijs minoribus post horam terciarum, in qua intersint omnes canonici tan plebani quam residentes et totus clerus Ecclesiae. in his processionibus quatuor intorticia in hastis accensa delata à quatuor accolithis insuperpellicis prece dunt omnes. Deinde crux gemata inter quatuor cereos Argenteos delatos à clericis ordinarijs indutis superpellicis mundissimis et similiter crux deferatur ab altero ex thuriferarijs ordinarijs tocius anni qui sit et ipse insuperpellicio, sacerdos <subcanonicus> celebraturus cum suo Diacono et subdiacono indutur paramentis Rasi violacej his tribus Diebus Rogationum.

14v/2 cantato à cantoribus spiritus sancte Deus miserere nobis Letan-
iarum, Exeant ex sacrario quatuor intorticia in hastis, et crux inter quatuor
cereos Argenteos et intrent chorum, et facta ab omnibus reverentia coram
Altari portiores intorticiarum hastarorum procedant usque ad portam chori et
ibi se affirment, remanente cruce cum cereis Argenteis ante Altare in medio
chori. et decantato sancte Marce lethaniarum procedatur et fiat processio.

14v/3 Via processionis sit ut in primis Dominicis mensium, et in Diebus
mercurij. mittat ante Magister chori unum qui faciat expedire uiam nisi sit
expedita. peracta uero processione, canitur Missa quae est in letaniis maiori-
bus, videlicet introitus Exaudiuit de templo sancto suo etc., kyrie eleison, sanct-
tus, et Agnus Dei, cantantur in tono paschali his duabus diebus. Epistola et
Evangeliun ut in festis simplicibus, et quatuor cantores tantum quos uult Mag-
ister capellae cantant laetanias <his duabus diebus> et clerus respondet - et rel-
iqui cantores non intersunt.

14v/4 In vigilia uero Ascensionis cantores omnes eas cantant diuisi in
Duobus choris alternatim. Et cantant Missam de vigilia <proprium, ut in nostro
missali, gradualibus et epistolario magnu assignatur.> cum organis sine gloria
in excelsis tamen, nam Magister ceremoniarum Domini papae in tractatu quem
inscrisit ordo Missae Dicit, et in secunda tercia et quarta feria, quae Roga-
tionum seu laetaniarum minorum nuncupantur ante festum Ascensionis
Domini, gloria in excelsis Deo in Missis Diej earundam non dicitur, licet in
matutinis Te Deum laudamus habeantur. cum ergo dicit in Missis dierum
earundem, Missa vigiliae est Missa diej earundem laetaniarum, quare in ea
Missae, non est gloria dicenda.

14v/5 In hac vigilia canonicus cantat Missam post processionem in albis
indumentis, et cantores eam cantant et organistae pulsant organa, ut praedixi-

mus, quae Missa dicitur ut est in Missali proprio nostrae Ecclesiae. <sit super
altare, missale nostrum dominicale> et in nostris gradualibus. Epistola et eu-
gelium et reliqua cantantur festiue. <uide in epistolario magnu loco suo.> et
non fit incensum. </his tribus diebus in missis {lumin?} non dicitur gloria
neque credo neque in principio cantando./> <notandum est, quod si in uigilia
ascensionis domini fuerit aliquot festum duplex, ut accidit anno domini, 1562,
quando fuit festum sancti joannis ante portam latinam, non obstante rubrica
locu suo in missali s?3 curiae ro(manae) etc. semper canimus duas missas,
prima de sancto, secunda de vigilia, ut in omnibus uigilibus & ///.>

14v/6 Post Missam vigiliae elleuatur cereus paschalis cum suo candel-
bro de choro et locatur loco suo. Et etiam velamen crucis magnae quod est in
aera elleuatum extollitur et locatur loco suo. </// 1559 k. 52 k. 89 paratur altare
in missa uigiliae, cum candellis ut in duplicibus consuetudo est. Sed non canta-
tur, In principio erat verbum. data benedictione, dicitur dominus det nobis.

14v/7  

In vigilia Ascensionis Domini post prandium, Post prandium hora congrua et oportuna omnes canonici ceterique omnes, scilicet reliquis clerus conueniant in sacrarium, ubi sint omnia paramenta Ecclesiae, scilicet pluvialia praeparata - et ibi maiores canonici jnduant se preciosiora et reliqui juxta gradus suos. et praecedentibus cereis Argenteis et cruce cuius baiulus habeat Dalmathicam Damasci albi, processio Exeat da sacrario, et Exit de Ecclesia per portam angustam sancti clementis, et procedit ad scallam magnam marmoream palatij, et ibi quiescit donec descendat Dominus Dux. interea Magister cerimoniarum mittat aliquem juventem modestum qui faciat expedire vias nisi sint expedite, nam sepe taberne errecte propter nundinas tendunt funes et velaria ad solem arcendum ut non sit transitus expediens, et quandoque etiam angustantur uie capsis scannis et alijs impedimentis, quare procuret qui missus fuerit à Magistro ut transitus sit commodus et apertus.

14v/8  

Et cum serenissimus princeps incipit descendere ex palatio cum illustrissimo senatu, Magister dirrigit processionem uersus plateam more solito, ut in vigilia sancti Marcj, et facit illam lento gradu incedere cum summa modestia et reuerentia, et postquam Ecclesiam ingressa fuerit processio et chorus, facta oratione per Dominum Ducem ante Altare [sic], uel saltam reuerentia, sua serenitas Ascendit pulpitum magnum et ibi audit Vesperas. Licet serenissimus quondam princeps Dominus Andreas griti nollet Ascendere pulpitum, sed permanebat in choro in sua sede et ibi audiebat vesperas. reuersus est tamen hic serenissimus princeps ad morem antiquum. Ascendit enim pulpitum ut olim, ibi audit vesperas Dominus francisus Donatus Dux illustrissimus, sic uoluit in principio sui Ducatus, sed redijt in sententiam serenissimi principis griti propter incomoditatem locj.

14v/9  

Vespere hodie incohantur per Dominum vicarium nostrum <apparatus cum amicto camiso, et stolla, et pluuiali perlo> cum quatuor subdiaconicis ministris <cum pluvialibus presiosioribus [sic] indutis> et dicuntur solemnissime. organistae tamen potius tendant ad mediocritatem quam ad prolixitatem propter indulgentias. Aniphona ad vesperas, subleuatris oculos cum reliquis, super quinque psalmos [!] omnes laudare. canores cantent in pulpito nouo lectionum, licet anguste mancant in eo. cum uero serenissimus Dominus Dux sedet in choro tunc

[fol. 15]  

canores locantur in pulpito magno unde ostenduntur reliquie in nocte jouis sancta. Et hic seruetur de cetero, et semper, quando Dominus Dux sedet in choro, <post vesperas expoliatur chorus & sic permanet expoliatus.
quere ad k. 88. et inuenies &c. 1558. adi. 18. mazo la uigilia della sensa quello che intrauene> <jn omnibus alijs solemitatibus quando dominus canonicus intonat vesperas, semper /// ora?? /// in superpellicio coloris /// convenientis, & desuper pluuialibus eiusdem coloris, & hoc fit in omnibus solemitatibus duplicibus ///, quando ///it3 [aperitur] pala, et quando Dominus canonicus intonat vespere, /// {tercius tribus} /// >

15/2 Jn jsta nocte quatuor cantores intersunt ad extraendum sanguinem de sanctuario cum alijs reliquis, canentes alicue laudes ad propositum. sed prius dederunt in nota Dominis de nocte cum sacristis et reliquis. Et demonstratur in ista nocte sanguinem et reliquas ut in nocte jouis sancta, sed solum mulieribus et non alijs. <cum hymno, jesu nostra redemptio, &c.> <La procuratia p'nr? lass? copra. 2. bigozi [bigoncie = barrels] de uin bianco, per da beuer a tutte quelle donne che uorano uener in chiesia, in simil notte.>

15/3 Jn die Ascensionis Domini nostri jesu christi. 
Jn die Ascensionis non canitur Missa in nostra Ecclesia quia Dominus Dux cum senatu uadit cum naui bucintoria ad desponsandum mare suprema pompa. ((cum 6. canonics indutis pluuialibus albis.)) et postea uadit ad Ecclesiam sancti nicolai in litore et ibi audit Missam quae cantatur a cantoribus nostris, licet celebrans et diaconus et subdiaconus et reliqui Altaris ministri sint monachi jllius monasterij. <et ad offertorium Missae serenissimus princeps offert cechinum impressione ipsius.> Non cantatur etiam Missa in nostris Ecclesiis propter indulgentiam plenariam, ne jmpediata' [sic] pia mens populorum confluendum ad Altare maius, in quo creditus esse corpus beatj Marcj Euangelistae, licet olim multo plures confluenter ad indulgentiam consequendam, etiam ex remotoribus locis et prouincijs, sed hodie rapuerunt corda fidelium et arder jlle spiritus ellanguit, ut uix pauci credent indulgentijs, propter errorem lutheranorum hereticorum, qui uigent in presens, propter peccata nostra, sed Deus ex alto respiciens oues suas discipatas, miserebitur eis, purgens Ecclesiam suam et jlluminans, et auferens omnes errores a cordibus eorum qui minime resistere volent spiritui sancto.

15/4 Si uero Dominus Dux hodie non accederet ad desponsandum mare propter tempestatem, quia tamen hodie serenitas Sua celebrat solemne conuiuium jdeo senatus conuenit ad palatium. et olim Missa celebrabatur in sacello sancti nicolai in palatio, nunc uero quia saecellum nouam est angustius et incapax ideo uenitur ad Ecclesiam, et in ea celebratur missa solemnis, et in Dominica sequenti uel alia die festa [sic] post Ascensionem domini cum mare fuerit tranquillum, Dominus Dux uadit cum solita pompa ad desponsandum jllud.
Et Reverendissimus Dominus patriarcha accedit cum suo nauigio et suis canonicis et cum psalmis et orationibus benedicet aquam quam tulit in uase ligneo satis ample, et proicit eam in mare antequam Dominus Dux desponset illud, in cuius desponsatione proicit anulum aureum ex propi in mare dicens uestrum habet Magister capellae cantorum. <Sed si plueret, missa canitur cum dominio in nostra Ecclesia et in dominica proxima itur ad desposandum mare etc., per canonicum cui uult, d. {c} et cui spectat in rotulo.>

Post prandium aperitur palla, licet olim non aperiretur, et dicuntur omnes Antiphonae laudum super quinque psalmos, [!] videlicet Dixi cum reliquis, in fine Laudare Dominum omnes gentes. preciosissima pluivialia ponitur in hac solemnitate. <ut in secundis vesperis pluivialia alba> vespere incohantur hora uigesima et non ante. ///</> omnium laudum et Missarum celebrandam, ut predictum est. Cantores nostri in accessu et recessu à litore, sunt in bucintoro Domini ducis et cantant aliquid boni, et suaue prolatum, presertim in reditu, cuius rei curam habet Magister capellae cantorum. <Sed si plueret, missa canitur cum dominio in nostra Ecclesia et in dominica proxima itur ad desposandum mare etc., per canonicum cui uult, d. {c} et cui spectat in rotulo.>

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15/7 Ecclesiam remitatur quotidie septima pars peccatorum, ita ut quotidian die visitantes per octauam in fine consequatur plenariam remissionem peccatorum suorum, ut apparat in litteris apostolicis quae servantur à Dominis canonicis. Arq3 [?] jdeo quotidie fit officium de octaua, nisi festum duplex occurrat, tunc enim fit de festo duplici cum commemoratione octauae, in vnisque vesperis, laudibus, et Missa. per hanc octauam psalmi quotidie dicuntur sub una antiphona, quia haec octaua occurrat intra tempus resurrectionis et pentecostes. in die uero octuau in secundis vesperis omnia dicuntur ut in die Ascensionis, sed sub una antiphona tantum. <Ad missam infra octauam fit incensum cum cereis et pax [sic] ut in duplicibus maiorus.>

15/8 De Dominica infra octauam Ascensionis Dominij. Omnia fiunt ut in nostris libris suo loco ordinatum est, cum commemoratione de Ascensione in vtrisque vesperis, laudibus, et Missa. vespere huius Dominicae incohantur per canonicum basilicanum, et ponuntur duo cerei Argentei propter honorificentiam Ecclesiae, quia multi solent adesse Aduenae [!]. versus de Dominica in vtrisque vesperis est, Dominus in caelo, alleluya, et versus de Ascensione est, Ascendit Deus in jubilatione alleluya. <feria, quarta, euangelium proprium ad matutinum tantum>

15/9 in octaua Ascensionis Domini Officium est Duplex in nostra
Ecclesia, quamuis sit semiduplex secundum curiam [romanam]. et si in hac die cadit aliquod festum duplex transfertur in sextam feriam, et ultra, si sexta feria esset alius festum duplex, et de octaum [sic] fit die suo, ut in rubrica, quae habetur in festo sancti bernardini. et omnia fiunt in utrisque vesperis, matutino, laudibus, et Missa, sicut in die Ascensionis. <sed sub una antiphona ut in tempore paschatis.> Et si feria sexta et sabbato post octauam occurrat aliquod festum fit de festo, ut in rubrica statim post Dominicam infra octauam Ascensionis, uide ibi, et obserua omnia diligentemente. Et si in his duobus diebus fiat de aliquo festo, nulla fit commemoratio de feria, scilicet de Ascensione, neque de dominica, quia

[fol. 15 versus]

15v/1 quando fit de festo, numquam fit commemoratio de feria, nisi in adventu, et quadragesima, ut in hac rubrica ueneris et sabbati post octauam Ascensionis, et in paragrapho sexto decimo Aduentus Domini. <feria sexta due lectiones de smge [sermone] ascensio(nis) secunda homelia dominicae /// due lectiones de ?mge [sermone] dominicae, tercia de homelia vigiliae.> feria sexta si fiet officium mixtum de Ascensione, Missa dicitur de dominica octauam Ascensionis, cum primo alleluya de Ascensione, et secundum de Dominica. Et dicitur officium beatae virginis, his duobus diebus, cum antiphona ad Magnificat, beata mater, et ad benedictus, beata Dei genitrix <si fit de ascensione, aut de festo simplici, sed in festo duplici, non dicitur officium breve.> sed pro salve regina, dicitur Regina caeli, usque ad octauam penthecostes, idest usque ad vesperas sabbati exclusiue. </// dicitur sub una antiphona, sine commemorationibus, hymnibus de duobus alteris, <ut in nostris psalteribus assignatus> unus in tono de sacrarum solemnijs, alius in tono de gloriosa domina. <uel suum proprio jesu nostra redemptio, in suo tono.> si fit de sanctis omnia ut in tempore paschali.>

15v/2 In vigilia penthecostes. <63-> Pulsata media tercia campanella in canonica, et posito cereo accession, et panno solito cum Epistolario in pulpite lectionum, parato legili cum panno sanguineo uel leonino juxta dextrum cornu Altaris loco solito, <idest uersus sanctum clementem> super quo sit Missale apertum. et sit stratum tapete ante legile. super caput soliti scanni super quo sedet sacerdos, olim sternebatur panno viridis, hodie sternuntur Auleis. Et con-gregato clero in choro, sacerdos celebraturus quia est subcanonicus cuius est Æbdomada, paratus more solito cum diacono et subdiacono cum paramentis Aureis quae dicuntur peloseti. <cum damasceni aurei> desuper habens pluiali rasi violacej, ministris similer dalmaticas rasi violacej habentibus, venit ad Altare, ante quod ipse et ministri faciunt profundam reverentiam.
postea uadunt ad locum sibi preparatum, et statim incohatur prima prophetia, scilicet tentauit Deus Abraham, per primum et maiorem canonicum ex residentibus. et si desint quinque residentes, suppleant subcanonicij gradatim incipiendo à senioribus.

<et magister chori ordinat prophetie /{qui uult} /canoni? /// residentes> et dicuntur prophetie sine titulis, et sine flectamus genua. Secunda prophetia, factum est, tercia, Apprehenderunt septem mulieres. quarta, Audi iisrael mandata uitae. quinta, facta est super me manus domini. orationes ut in Missali, quae sequuntur ipsas prophetias. tractus jdem et eo ordine quo in sabbato sancto. <id est post secundam, terciam, & quartam prophetiam, ut in gradualibus>

15v/3


15v/4 cum autem peruentum fuerit ad kyrie eleison laetaniarum, kyrie eleison pro Missa solemniter incohatur per organistas <et cantores ut moris est>. et sacerdos cum ministris reuertitur ad Altare, precedentibus cereis tantum <quatuor argentiae,. cum coris, sine cruce, sed crux parua ponitur ante officium super altare loco suo>. et facit confessionem in loco solito,. et postea Ascendens ad altare. <incipit missam per kyrie eleison>. finito kyrie eleison ultimo <a cantoribus & organum [sic]>.. jncipit solemniter, gloria in excelsis Deo, et campane ter pulsentur. et nota quod si Hodie occurrat fieri officium aliius sanctij, non tamen propterea canimus duas Missas, sed in Missa paschali dicimus collectam jllius sanctij de quo fecimus officium <etiam si fuerit festum duplex ///>. tercia uero oratio dicitur de domina scilicet concede nos <sed si non fuerit festum, dicitur una oratio tantum in ///>. post Epistolam jnmediate à duobus cantoribus cantatur aleluya, et reiteratur ab omnibus cantoribus, postea pulsatur organum loco uersiculi confitemini, pulsato organo, dicitur à duobus cantoribus tractus, videlicet laudate dominum omnes gentes, postea ab omnibus cantoribus dicitur, quoniam confirmata est. Luminaria non portantur nec
elleuantur <idest cerei non elleuantur> ad euangelium, quod canitum super Altare, sed incensum tantum, si tamen incensaretur obleta, bene esset. Credo dicitur in hac Missa juxta morem et ordines Ecclesiae nostra, prefacio, per christum Dominum nostrum qui Ascendens super omnes caelos etc. <cum suis communicantes {d} hac uir' etc. # > jn principio erat verbum non consuevit dici in hac Missa, sed data benedictione per celebrantem dicitur per maiorem canonicum cuius est chorus, Dominus det nobis suam <sanctam> pacem, <etc.> et Regina caeli, cum suo uerso, responso et oratione.


15v/6 In die sanctissimo penthecostes. Dominus Dux uenit ad Ecclesiam cum senatu, et sedet in choro, et cantores in pulpito magno cantant Missam cum omni pompa et solemnitate. Post prandium hora solita aperta solemni palla superius et inferius ut in Missa maiori factum est, et etiam in primis vespem, vespere cantantur cum omni solemnitate, psalmi de Dominica dicuntur cum omnibus antiphonis de laudibus, omnia fiunt ut in nostro orationali. his tribus diebus Misse et vespere cantantur cum omni pompa et solemnitate unformiter, quamuis Dominus Dux non ueniatur, nisi prima die ad Missam, ij enim tres dies censentur una dies. <et si hec solemnitas uenerit in prima dominica mensis june non fit processio ula [sic: ulla], et sic semper ///>. feria secunda ad matutinum jnuita-

[fol. 16]

16/1 torium Repleti sunt omnes spiritu sancto alleluya, ut in nostris Antiphonariis. Laudes sub una tantum Antiphona, et consequenter et vespere, ut in nostro ordinario in quadam appostilla quae est in margine inferiori in loco proprio, licet appostilla non dicat nisi de laudibus, tamen rubrica nostri orationalis uidetur jn uere quod omnes Antiphonae dicantur cum dicatur jnfra octauam fit officium sicut in die etc. sed de consuetudine secunda et tercia feria dicimus omnes antiphonas, jn laudibus et vespereis, sicut in dominica, quia facimus officium duplex. quarta uero feria et reliquis dicimus vesperas et Laudes sub una tantum Antiphona. feria quarta et deinceps una tantum Missa cantitur. vespere cantantur ut in festis simplicibus sed non dicitur officium beate Virginis. sed auerte quod in hac Æbdomada post Epistolam dicuntur
duo versus cum duobus alleluya. primus versus cum suo alleluya, ressumitur quotidie de die penthecostes, videlicet, alleluya Emitte, secundus uero cum suo alleluya, ut quotidie suo loco assignetur. his temporibus huius Æbdomadae non dicitur flectamus genua, sed dictis kyrie eleison, dicitur tantum oremus, de prophetia, in prophetiam. finitis uero prophetijs, dicitur gloria in excelsis Deo etc. et dicitur kyrie, gloria, sanctus, et agnus Dei paschalis his quatuor diebus. <feria quarta, quinta, et sexta, in vesperis haebdomadaris finito capitulo Responso a choro deo gratias, genu flexu ante legile, intonat, veni creator spiritus, & chorus prosequitur totus>.  

16/2 Sabbato post penthecostis. Missa dicitur tantum de die pulsata medicata terciarum de more. <uel due misse? si? p'p' cantores pa & du? /// et et tp'ib'# >. <quarta feria> post prophetiam Danielis, scilicet Angelus domini, dicitur alleluya, cum suo versu jmediate sequente, scilicet benedictus es Domine etc., post uero Epistolam pauli, versus qui est in loco proprio cum suo alleluya precedente, ultimo loco, tractus, ut ibi dicitur <et si uidebitur dicere sequentia, sanctus spiritus ad sc [?] nobis gra , /// fieret>. Et deinceps quotidie dicitur graduale, cum suo versu in Missa.  

16/3 Vespere ut in nostro orationali. Et nota quod de dominicis reliquendis </// obseruand? rubricam secundum curiam romanam /de dominicis/ in {l}in//edis dominicis propter concordiam missarum, ut non discrep???? /// cum curia romana in missis dicendis, ut aliquando accidit propter multam discrepantiam dominicarum, & bene est ut /// >. /semper haec est prima, scilicet Dominica sanctissimae trinitatis, ut in rubica orationali nostri folio Lxxvij./  

16/4 In hac vigilia et in die psalmi canta(n)tur cum omni pompa. et dimissa Regina caeli, ponitur salve Regina. psalmi in primis vesperris sunt, leuui oculos meos, Ad te leuui, De profundis, memento, laudate nomen domini. <& ad matutinum, quere in homiliario dominicalj istius temporis loco suo, sermo et homelia sua. Et in secundis vesperris psalmi communes cum laudate domino in fine>. quere a k. 17 quarta columna.  

Rubrica dominicarum post penthecostes. verte duo folia. k. 17.  

16/5 In die sanctissimae trinitatis. Missa canitur circa horam terciarum cum omni pompa et est in nostro graduali folio cLxvij.to post officia xxi-iiij.arum dominicarum. tamen hac dies dominus Dux non uenit ad Ecclesiam. vespere etiam solemnissime cantantur in duobus choris cantorum. psalmi dicuntur communes cum laudate Dominum omnes gentes in fine, ut in nostro orationali. <et fit commemoratio de dominica prima post penthecostj, cum nona lectione de homilia Dominice, ut in nostris libris, homeliarijs, non secundum curiam romanam.>
in vigilia sacratissimi corporis christi. Vespere cantantur solemniter, sed quando consequenter dicimus completorium et matutinum, non consueuimus cantare psalmos in vesperris per cantores in duobus choris ob prolixitatem officij. Post vesperas dicitur completorium legendo, Antiphonae, et hymnes ad completorium ut in orationej. Ante jncohationem completorij semper pulsatur una campana ex his quae sunt prope organum uestus pro signo. Ante jncohationem matutini pulsantur duplices campane si matutinum est duplex, si uero simplex, una tantum, et sic antequam jncohetur Te deum laudamus, pro laudibus, nisi quando non pulsantur campane, in quibusdam diebus maioribus Aedomadae.

post completorium cantatur matutinum, organa pulsantur in fine cuiusibet psalmi, et similiter ad responsoria. cantores cantant tantum Te Deum. Laudes dicuntur legendo usque ad capitulum, à capitulo in antea omnia cantantur, in cantu plano, et organa pulsantur, videlicet, ad hymnum, ad benedictus, post benedictus, et ad benedicamus domino. <& ad matutinum quere in home-liario dominicali istius temporis, prope finem.>


[pol. 16 versus]

patriarcha, uel quilibet alius Episcopus in loco preparato apud dextrum cornu Altaris. Decantato Euangelio, credo dicitur à quatuor ex nostris canonics coram Domino Duce cum capellano suae serenitatis de more. <et alia solita.> Et postquam Reverendissimus Dominus patriarcha deosculatus fuerit Evangelium, deosculatur Dominus Dux statim post. <et domini oratores
immediate> et non legitur Euangelium coram sua serenitate, quamuis Dominus Archidiaconus inscius nostrae consuetudinis et cerimonialium semel legerit inaduertenter. <ex cerimoniali romano, in festo corporis christi. - cardinalis celebrans non capit mitram, quando incensatus erit, neque eum manus lauare debet in altari, sed stans in cornu Epistolae sine mitra illa lauat. /// sacramenti, quia sacramentum est supra altare in tabernaculo magnus.>

16v/2 Prima schola batutorum quae venit in plateam mittit ad Elleutiae corporis christi duodecim cereos Aureos, qui facta communione reportantur ad suum vexillum, et si non fuerit in tempore opportuno, apunctator mittat duodecim ex nostris cereis ut moris est quando fit officium solemne. finita Missa, data solemni benedictione, et decantato Euangelio sancti joannis, jncipit solemnissima processio, cuius ordinem vide infra.

16v/3 (Sed auerte quod quando adest Reverendissimus Dominus legatus ipse pretendit esse maior quolibet ordinario, jdeo non uult cedere Domino patriarche quia ab ipso domino patriarcha ad ipsum dominum legatum apostolicum appellatur. Nec Dominus patriarcha uult cedere ipsi domino legato, dicens quod ipse sit nuntius apostolicus, et non legatus cum insignibus, santa cruce etc., quibus utuntur legati a latere. quare dominus patriarcha vult facere primam confessionem, dare benedictionem solemnem eo precedente, et quod sua indulgentia publicetur ante jndulgentiam Domini legati. vnde Reverendissimus Dominus legatus viso hoc, noluit ut aliqua sua jndulgentia publicaretur)).


16v/5 in die sacratissimi corporis christi ordo processionis. <carta 64, 96, 97> Sit parata platea circum circa more solito pannis albis tegentibus uiam per quam jutra est processio, super Antenullis et hastis solitis. sint arbores uiventis alligate singulis Antenullis circum <aream> plateam et aulam palatij serenissmi principis, et ad singulas quasque Antennulas sint alligata dobleria
Aurea ut moris est, omnium et singularum confraternitatum paruarum siue scholæm sacramentorum pe??e(?) chiar3 [?] huius ciuitatis, et ut hoc fiat, per aliquot dies antea Magister chori comparat coram illuïtrissimis capitibus Decem ut mittant unum ex suis nuntijs Dominis prouisoribus communis, ut et ipsi mittat per omnes Ecclesias ciuïtatis nuntios suos qui imperent gastaldior-ibus scholærum sub paena etc. ut singule schole parue et sacramentorum mittant suos nuntios cum quatuor dopletij Aureis in die sacratissimi corporis christi cum suis intorticijs alligandis singulis Antenullis in aula serenissimi principis et circum circa plateam, quæ quidem intorticia accendantur per dic- tos nuntios scholærum quam primam capitulum castellanum peruerit ad ipsós procedendo in processione, quæ intorticia non extinguantur nisi posteaquam transierit corpus domini cum uniuerso senatu.

16v/6  et ut hoc ordo seruetur sint deputati omnes officiales huius ciuita-tis cum suis praepositis jd est capitibus guardiae, ut aiunt, ad Antenullas cir-cum circa plateam, ut fatiant [sic] accendere praedicta intorticia oportune, neque permittant extingui nisi omnibus peractis ut supra, neque sinant auferi arbores nisi in fine ut supra, neque sinant seu permittant ullo pacto aliquem angustare uiam et jngredi sub pannis extensis super hastis, neque cum perso-nis, neque cum scannis, aut aliquo alo instrumento, jmno juxta posse et dexteritatem ipsorum teneant omnes remotos et extra uiam pannis tectam qua transit processio.

16v/7  et ut haec omnia fiant, Magister chori per sex aut octo Dies ante solemnitatem prouideat cum excellëissimis capitibus illuïtrissimi consilij Decem, quæ quidem capita solent inuingere suo maiorì capitaneo, ut ipse imponeret predictis capitibus guardiae ut servent et à suis officialibus seruari faciant quae supra diximus, pro reuerentia sacratissimi corporis christi, et pro decore huius ciuitatis, quia huic solemnissime processioni intersunt ultra cet-eros multi nobilissimi peregrini ex multis et primis nationibus tocius occiden-tis qui de proximo nauigaturi sunt jerosolimam ad uisendum sepulcrum Domini nostri jesu christi.

roman. Norvegiae, Acta, 1975] Denique cum omni ornatu et pompa. Et si qua(e) ex hijs sex scholis non venerit in tempore, non fiat mora, sed permittat Magister chori, jmmo jubeat ut religiones fratrum

[fol. 17]
17/1 statim succedant ordine suo. et schola seu schole quae non adfu- erit tempore congruo, non transeant nisi post omnes religiones fratrum, ante religionem sancti georgij in Alga, uel etiam post. <et hic ordo seruat ur ad omnes processiones de ordine excellensissimis capitis [sic] illustrissimi con- silij decem.> habeat Magister chori semper tres aut quatuor discretos juvenes sacerdotes, qui studeant et obseruent quod processio sit semper continuata pariformiter, absque alia disiucatione [hybrid noun: disiuncatione ?], jnterpo- latione, et mora. et cum jnceperint transire per chorum congregationes presbit- erorum secularium, jubeat Magister chori ut omnes nostri de Ecclesia jnduantur paramentis suis, secundum ordinem cedulae Affixae in sacrario, quae consueuit fieri per Dominum vicarium nostrum et Magistrum chori per aliquot dies antea, singulis annis, quae seruat per Magistrum chori in annum sequentem, quia facilius paucis Additis uel mutatis reformatum et cum ceperit transire nona et ultima congregatio, omnes praedictj parati exeant de sacrario, ordinate, scilicet jnferiores primi, maiores uero postremi.

17/2 scholares uero magnarum scholmarum, scilicet magni guardiani cum suis collegis Decem, videlicet singularum scholarum, ita ut omnes sint sexaginta. </uel 16 pro schola, jdest tota bancha, ita no // 96/> cum suis intor- ticijs accensis <suis insignibus.> parati sint ad Altare sancti petri. <uel in canonica.> praeuideat Magister diligentissime, quod omnia parata sint oppor- tuna. post transitum capituli castellani statim jncipiunt transire nostri, videlicet crux cum cereis et omnes nostri, scilicet clerij et ceteri qui sunt in superpel- licij, per portam chori, et uertent se ad portam palatij. uia uero sit expedicta [sic]. sed ante crucem precones et scutifferi [sic]. postea parati Missalibus indumentis. <ut in cedulla.> post uero Dominj canoncij cum pluuialibus preci- osioribus. senior canonicus fert pluuiale de perlis, si Dominus patriarcha uel Dominus Episcopus non portauerit, sed permanserit cum sui paramentis <uel induerit se pluuiale album super rochet am cum stolla pendente.> <uide>. (( Cantores uero remanent processuri ante corpus Domini cantantes ut moris est, in duabus turmis hymnus pange lingua gloriosi totam replicando, etc.)). post Dominos canonicos, transeant officiales scholarum cum suis intorticijs accen- sis, juniores primi, seniores uero postremi uniusquisque scholae.

17/3 Prima schola est sanctj Theodori, Secunda, sancti Rochi, Tercia, Misericordiae, Quarta, sancti joannis, Quinta, charitatis, Sexta, et ultima,
Sancti Marci, procedendo, videlicet per ordinem. Transactis scholis jncedunt, scilicet officialibus scholarum cum suis intorticijs sequuntur omnes secretarij. (sed hodie omnes volunt remanere post vmbellam)). <quere a carta 96.> postquam immediate deberet esse Episcopus celebrans cum suis ministris, et post eum magnus cancellarius tantum ante Dominum Ducem, post secretarios si precedant vmbellam sequitur crux Reverendissimi domini patriarchae, cum suis capellans, postea omnes canores in duabus turmis. Deinde sacratissimum corpus Domini in tabernaculo mirae pulchritudinis delato à quatuor capellans monialium quos inuitant sacristae, qui induuntur solitis turricellis albis et habent prope se duos clericos ferentes quatuor hastas furcatas ad deponendum tabernaculum seu portatile cum fiunt pause. desuper est vmbella Aurea delata à sex canoniciis nostris, quatuor plebanj et duo residentes. <cum pluuialibus albis, uel à sex presbyteris cum cottis, et sex eq?>. à latere sunt utrinque duo sacerdotes juvenes in habitu leuitarum cum thuribulis fumigantes. post vmbellam </// domino patriarchae /// hic est melior locus, domini patriarchae/> sequuntur ferentes baculum et Mitram. hic à sinistri s jlle à dextris, deinde Astentas, subdiaconus et Diaconus, et duo Accolithi qui leuent utrinque sim-brias [? # ] pluuialis Episcopi, quas si non, tollent preceding diaconum et sub-diaconum et Astantes. Postea Reverendissimus Dominus patriarcha, uel Episcopus. Deinde serenisimus Dominus Dux cum dominis oratoribus et toto dominio et peregrinis cruce signatis.

17/4 Si uero secretarij remanent post Episcopum celebrantem, hoc fit ad duritiam cordis, nam cedunt canonico et suis ministris jncedentibus cum Domino Duce cum Missalibus jndumentis, quanto magis cuilibet Episcopo sacris uestibus induto, omnes qui comitantur Dominum Ducem in hac processione accipiunt ad portam chori unam candellam singuli accensam librae unius, quam in fine processiois restituunt preter peregrinos. Nostra crux cum cereis firmatur ad portam palatij quae est juxta carceres, et sic successiue omnes nostri firmentur suo ordine in palatio, à lateribus habentes scholares ferentes intorticia, donec corpus Domini perueniat in Aulam palatij sub vmbella. Reverendissimus Dominus patriarcha, seu Dominus Episcopus, Astantes, Dia-conus et subdiaconus, Accolithi, ferentes corpus Domini et vmbellam, et thuri-ficantes, omnes induti sint albis indumentis suo ordini congruentibus. quum uero omnes fuerint in Aula palatij suo ordine, Magister chori jubeat ut omnes procedant ordine predicto. Noster cleris habens à lateribus scholasticos cum luminaribus, incedat pariformiter cum ipsis scholasticis ita tamen quod ultiumi duo maiores scholae sancti Marcj, videlicet magnus guardianus et eius vicar-ius, sint iuxta duas ultimas hastas vmbellae.
Magister habeat tres aut quatuor sacerdotes juvenes qui discurrent modeste tamen, in diuersas partes processionis, et sicut in continuo motu facientes incedere aut siistere [sic] omnes ut et quando opus fuerit. tres pause fiant in processione. prima contra portam Auream palatij antequam portantes tabernaculum flectent se ad petram banni, ut Dominus Dux et senatus subsequens videat [sic] tabernaculum. Secunda in capite plateae ad sanctum geminianum in fronte viae, ut uidebatur tabernaculum ut supra. Tercia apud sanctum Bassum. quibus peractis

[fol. 17 versus]

17v/1 jntrret nostra crux cum clero et ceteris suo ordine Ecclesiam per eius portam quae est é regione Ecclesiae Sanctj Bassi, <uel baiulorum> et procedat per porticale ad portam maiorem Ecclesiae quam jngridatur, et procedat ad portam chori et ibi se firment cereos et crucem. scholaes cum jntorticijs firment se à porta chori ad portam magnam Ecclesiae diuisi utrnque in modum chori. cum uero corpus Domini jntrat Ecclesiam ferentes vmbbellam dimittant jllam in dextris Ecclesiae apud portam magnam, et tabernaculum deferatur usque ad portam chori et ibi deponatur. et Reverendissimus Dominus patriarcha, uel Dominus Episcopus celebrans, accipit de manu sacristae tabernaculum cum corpore Domini, et stans in suprmo gradu portae chori, et decantato à diacono et subdiacono versus panem caeli dedit eis alleluya, Responsorium omne delectamentum in se habentem alleluya. Episcopus inquam cantat orationem diej, cum Dominus vobiscum ante et post. Et dicto benedicamus Domino de Apostolis per ministros, et responso Deo gratias, dataque benedictione cum tabernaculo sacramenti Domino Duce et senatu ceterisque omnibus genuflexis, <per dominum patriarcha, uel Episcopum dicendo, benedicat {uos} /// ors? /// pater + & filius + & spiritus sanctus +. et responso Amen, statim> jncohatur in cantu per ministros Te Deum laudamus. Tunc omnes redeunt. et nos prosequentes Te Deum usque ad finem reuertimur ad Altare sacramenti ubi deponitur corpus Domini in loco proprio. et finito Te Deum, omnes redeunt ad propria.

17v/2 Et aduerte quod olim corpus domini in hac processione ferebatur in quodam tabernaculo paruo quod firmabatur in calice maximo Aureo qui firmabatur et ipse super portatili Aurato. <uel Reverendissimus Dominus patriarcha, aut alius Episcopus, fert tabernaculum paruum cum sacratissimo corpore christi, svb vmbella in processione, et magnum tabernaculum restat super altare maius, ut est melius & commodius, & dat benedictionem cum ipso tabernaculo finita processione.>

17v/3 Sed hodie posteaquam Domini procuratores sanctj Marcj emerunt
quodam tabernaculum mirae magnitudinis ac pulchritudinis, delatum ex panonia et tunc corpus Domini locatur in eo, et circumfertur, sine alio calice uel portatili. quare cum peruenitur ad portam chori adsit ibi sacrista cum tabernaculo paruo quod predixi et sine mora abstrahet corpus domini de tabernaculo magno, et inserat in paruum, et ita porrigit Domino Episcopo celebranti, ut cum eo comode possit dare benedictionem Domino Ducj et ceteris, quia magnum tabernaculum est grauissimum et intractabile, presertim ab uno, cum uix quatuor sacerdotes possint jllud deferre. habeat etiam sacrista librum orationalem ad portam chori super quo Dominus Episcopus possit cantare orationem diej predictam. Si uero hac die plueret ut quandoque accidit, fit processio per palatium sup. cuius ordinem uide ante, in die veneris sancta, karta {10}. <jn secundis vesp eris, antiphona ce? b3 cum aliquis. psalmi omnes laudate, i, op?o plano>

17v/4 infra octauam corporis christi.

<alia rubrica a k. 95.> Offitium [sic] octauae corporis christi quomodo fiat per singulos dies octauae vide in nostro orationali in loco proprio, quia non sequitur ordinem curiae romanae sed quotidie diuersimode ordinat. <et dicuntur kyrie gloria etc., ut in semiduplicibus diebus.> jn die uero octaue officium Duplex. Missa canitur ad altare sacramentij, etiam chorus fit ad sacramentum. omnia dicitur [sic] sicut in die. </ quando fit/ <infra octauam.> commemoratio dominicae, secundae, dicitur Sm, Rm. homo q' da [dr?], ut in curia romana. quere in antiphonarijs in primis uigilis corporis christi. cum commemoratjon dominice in utrisque vesp eris matutine & missa, cum sua lectione de homilia dominicae. & sic fit semper quando sit de festum in dominicus diebus de qui- bus faciamus commemorationem.

Continues on file RITCERIM.MC3

Continued from file RITCERIM.MC2
Dominica infra octauam

17v/5 resumitur totum officium de die, ut in rubrica in orationali loco suo posita, sed ad matutinum legitur vrbanus Episcopus, et homelia ut in festo, cetera omnia sicut in die, cum totis antiphonis et psalmis et responsorijs, in vesp eris, matutino, et laudibus, sed fit officium semiduplex.

17v/6 <De festiuitatibus uenientibus in die ultima infra octauam corporis christi, nihil tunc fit, exceptis festo sancti joannis baptiste Et sanctorum
Rubrica Dominicarum post penthecostes.

17v/7 Notandum est quod ab octaua penthecostes usque ad Adventum Dominij jnclusiue, sunt ad plus xxvij Dominice, et ad minus xxiiij, quando ergo sunt xxiiij Dominice, in qualibet Dominica ponitur suum officium, et non permittitur propter aliquod festum quod non fiat commemoratio de Dominica. Et quia nos habemus xxv, officia. in ultima Æbdomada ante Adventum, cantabitur Missa Dominice xxv, in aliqua die uacua jllius Æbdomada tantum. officium cantuale ut in Dominica xxiiij, in Missalj sancti Marcj assignetur, secreta, et post communio ut in xxiiij, dominica, in Missalj sancti Marcj. Epistola et Euangelium proprium in dicto Missalj, et in Epistolario magno loco suo. <assignatur.> Cum uero sunt [sic] xxv. Dominice, nulla dimittitur quod non fiat commemoratio de Dominica. Cum uero sunt xxvj, Dominice, dimittitur jlla quae cadit /in festo/ sanctissimae trinitatis [last two words first cancelled, then restituted; thus also below: *]<sancti joannis baptiste.>

17v/8 Cum uero sunt xxvij, Dominice, dimittitur jlla que cadit infra octauam corporis christi [*]<sancti laurentij>, cum supra dicta <dominica>. Cum uero fuerit xxviiij, Dominice, dimittitur jlla que cadit infra octauam sanctij joannis Baptistae [*]<natiuitatis Virginis marie.> cum duabus supradictis. <dominicis.> Si autem post octauas occurreret aliqua feria, resumatur officium precedentis Dominicae. Et sic nunquam errabitur de dominicis ponendis, uel commemorationibus faciendis. <Sed semper quando festum omnium sanctorum /venit/ <uenerit> in dominica, dimittitur jlla dominica. /// ista rubrica est ///. <et nota quod in aliquibus annis obseruamus rubricam secundum curiam romanam, de dimittendis dominicis, propter concordiam missarum ut non discrepamus tantum cum curia romana in missis paruis dicendis, ut aliquando accidit propter multam discrepantiam dominicarum quando hora est cantorum in choro et in ecclesia sed hab??>. 

17v/9 De libris ponendis.

Nota si uis scire quo tempore ponantur libri nouj ac ueteris testamenti, sermones, et homelie, vide nostrum ordinarium. sed est fere jdem ordo qui seruatur à curia romana.

[fol. 18]

18/1 De hystorijs ponendis. De hystorijs ponendis singulis mensibus anni, vide in rubricario romano, secundum ordinem alphabetj de litteris dominicalibus, currentibus ipsius anni, que ordinati inuenies, et non errabis.
quando etiam oportebit fieri de feria propter librorum ponentiarum jllius mensis. <k.51 à tergo, k. 21> <Aut, uide ibi & pone hic.> De hystorijs ponendis in Dominicis mensis septembris, vide rubricam loco suo, quam si seruaueris, non errabis. <et pone hic k. 51.to.>

De legendis sanctorum.
18/2 <uide in orationali nouo de mense in mensem locis suis.> Circa lectiones proprie de sanctis occurrentibus per annum, vide in ordinario, seu orationale, uel calendario ueterq' [sic], et inuenies omnia, librum, et cartas assignatas, qui liber seruatur in tertia capsa sacristiae. Similiter de libris, et sermonibus totius anni, vide in legendarios, et in libris bibliae, et inuenies omnia, de tempore in tempus, locis suis.

De Responsorijs ponendis.
18/3 Aduerte etiam quod nos in vespis festorum non duplicium, et in Sabbatis, canimus vnum Responsorium ante hymnum, secundum silicet [sic] primi nocturni, nisi proprium assignetur, cum gloria patri, sed in sabbatis non, nisi quando fit de Dominica die sequenti, nec semper quando fit de Dominica, sed quando hystoria primo ponitur, vnde si in vno mense vna tantum hystoria poneretur, semel tantum in jlllo mense caneretur Responsorium, ut dictum est, licet ex nostris libris appareat quod etiam in festis duplicibus, et ualde solemnibus, caneretur jllud Responsorium, sed abijt in desuetudinem, <nec elicetur infra aliquas octauas, nisi poneretur hystoria, que non possit cantari in alio die dominico>.

De psalmis canendis in omnibus solemnitatibus.
18/4 Jn omnibus solemnitatibus, olim psalmi cantabantur à capella parua, et à cantoribus qui ex pratica [sic] cantant, si habeantur, si dicebantur cantare, more gregoriano, hodie hic mos canendi, abijt in desuetudinem, et cantores maioris capellae cantant omnes psalmos, et reliqua, et psalmos cantant, diuisi in duobus choris, videlicet quatuor cantores, in vno choro, et reliqui omnes, in altero, quia capella parua non extat.

De salve Regina in Dominicis Diebus.
18/5 Jn omnibus Dominicis Diebus ab octaua penthecostes usque ad Adventum quando facimus totum officium de Dominica, et quod non fiat memoratio de alijs octauis, nec Duplex officium pro feria secunda, semper post vesperos jmus cum processione ad ymaginem virginis Mariae. [!] cantando Salue Regina in cantu plano, jntonata ad Altare maius, à Duobus clericis, et cantores cantant jllis tribus versiculis, in cantu figurato ad dictam ymaginem, respondendo alternatim à choro, ut moris est. /Et dicta oratione pro
parae [Deiparae = the Virgin] in choro elleuatur legile cum suo panno et cum oratione per clericum, et portatur ad Dictam ymaginem/ <super legili ibi portatum per guardianum ante vesperas./ >& portatur orationale per clericum> pro oratione Dicenda post salue Regina <ut in medio ecclesie, q?t sit ch?? pro cantoribus cantantibus ibi /// ///> versus omnipotens sempiterne Deus, qui glorious etc., que est in fine orationalis <ut in graduali noui ///>. et dicitur versus a clerus, versus, dignare me etc. responsoriu, Da mihi uirtutem etc. postea oratio ut supra, et in reversione processio in choro, jntonantur à capite chori cuius est Æbdomada, in tono de o gloriosa Domina, Maria mater gratiae, et gloria tibi domine, et est finis. <Et in omnibus festiuitatibus sanctae mariae, quando portatur anchonam super altare, et reportatur in sachristia, semper tamen ineundo quam in redeundo, cantantu Maria mater gratiae, et gloria tibi domine, intonata à ministris apparatis, uel à magistro chori. in ch. & tot.3 chor.3 complet. [?]> De modo incensandi Altare, in Missis et vesperis. 18/6 Celebrans <sine mitra, uel ?? r.> stans ante medium Altaris, primo inclinat caput uersus Altare /minister/ reuerentiam faciens. tum si sint ibi oblata, idest calix et hostia faciat super ea ter signum crucis cum thuribulo, incipiens ab Altari et ducens versus se, et deinde intrans uersum. tunc facit super eadem circulos duos cum thuribulo à dextra in sinistrum, et tercium é contrario à sinistra in dextram. Deinde iterum se inclinet crucj, et eleuatis manibus tertio thuribulum tractim ducens jllam reuerenter incensat. et reuersus caput jlli inclinat. tum incensat bis imaginem à dextra parte crucis, et tocies [sic] imaginem à sinistra. Procedit deinde à sinistra, et tractim incensat superiorem partem Altaris, siue sìnt ibi jmagines, siue picture, siue candelabra tantum. Si uero sunt super Altari imagines, incensata cruce, quae est in medio, procedit ad sinistram partem crucis, ut diximus. Cum peruenerit ad cornu Altaris sinistrum ubi dicitur Epistola, flectis manum [sic] se inclinans aliquantulum dextrorum, et incensat inferiorem partem ipsius cornu bis ducens thuribulum. tum assurgens uertens se, incensat superiorem partem Altaris usque ad crucem. et iterum se inclinans, incensat reliquam partem superiorem usque ad cornu dextrum, ubi pariter se inclinans incensat, ut de sinistro diximus, vertens se. deinde incensat inferius anteriorem partem Altaris, à dextro in sinistrum cornu, et cum transit ante crucem, uertit se ad eam, et jlli caput inclinat. cum est in sinistro cornu, firmans se, tradit thuribulum diacono. >& accepit /// > et à diacono incensatur. <ex de libro tercio sacrarum cerimoniaerum, sectio quinta, capitulo secundo, de incensatione altaris, & aliorum ordinarie in libro dicto, cap. 137.> <vt habetur etiam in libro pontificali ad cartas, cciij, ubi agi-
tur de vesperis pontificalibus.

[fol. 18 verso]

Lectiones que leguntur ad matutinum per totum Adventum, in dominicis diebus et festis.

18v/1 et primo Dominica prima de Adventu in primo nocturno legitur liber ysaiae prophetae. in secundo nocturno, Sermo Sancti joannis chrisostomi Episcopi, in libro sermonum de Adventu, versus Omne capud [sic] languidum, propicia diunitate fratres diletissimi. in tercio nocturno, Lectio sancti Euangeli secundum Matheum. v: in illo tempore cum appropinquasset jesus yero-solim homelia lectionis eiusdem beati joannis os Auri, puro res ipsa exigit, Et successiue in eodem libro sermones per totum Adventum.

18v/2 Dominica secunda de Adventu domini in primo nocturno legitur de ysaia propheta. in secundo nocturno, Sermo Sancti Ambrosij episcopi satis abundeque dixisse me credo. in tercio nocturno, Lectio Sancti Euangeli secundum Lucam. in illo tempore dixit jesus discipulis suis. Erunt signa in sole. homelia lectionis eiusdem beati gregorij papae, Dominus ac redemptor noster.

Dominica tercia de Adventu domini in primo nocturno legitur de ysaia propheta. in secundo nocturno, Sermo sanctj maximi Episcopi, etiam si ego taceam fratres, uel aliud sequens. sermo sanctj Augustini Episcopi, vos inquam conueniam o judej. In tercio nocturno, Lectio sancti Euangeli secundum Matheum. in illo tempore cum Audisset joannes in vinculis. homelia lectionis eiusdem beati gregorij papae, querendum est nobis fratres charissimi.

Dominica quarta de Adventu domini in primo nocturno legitur de ysaia propheta. in secundo nocturno, Sermo sancti Augustini Episcopi, legitmus sanctum Moysem. in tercio nocturno, lectio sancti Euangeli secundum joan-nem. in illo tempore Miserunt judej ab jerusalimis sacerdots. homelia lectionis eiusdem beati gregorij papae, ex huius nobis lectionis.

Jncipiunt Sermones sancti Leonis papae, in temporalibus.

18v/3 videlicet feria quarta, feria sexta, et sabbato, Adventus. [in the manuscript, connecting vertical arches are drawn between the lines here marked with identical letters a joined to a, b to b, and c to c]  a) feria quarta. Sermo sanctj leonis papae, Si fideliter Diletissimi. b) feria Sexta, Sermo sanctj leonis papae, presidia diletissimi.

c) sabbato, Sermo sancti leonis papae, cum de Adventu regni Dej.

a) feria quarta, Lectio sancti Euangeli secundum Lucam. in illo tempore Mis-sus est Angelus gabriel. homelia beati Ambrosij Episcopi, patent quidem diuina misteria.
b) feria Sexta, Lectio sancti Evangelij secundum lucam. in illo tempore Exsurgens Maria. homelia originis, melior ad deteriores ueniunt.

c) Sabbato, in xij lectionum. lectio sanctij Evangelij secundum lucam. in illo tempore. Anno quinto decimo. homelia beati gregorij papae. de eadem lectione, Redemptoris precursor.

18v/4 in vigilia Natiuitatis Domini. Lectio sanctij Evangelij secundum Matheum, cum esset desponsam. homelia originis, de eadem lectione. <in nocte natiuitatis domini ad matutinum & in primo nocturno lectio prima de ysaia, primo tempore. lectio secunda, consolamini, lectio tertia, cō sui?e [...]. in secundo nocturno & primo sermo sancti leonis papae primi salvator noster dilectissimus. & secunda sermo sancti maximi confessori hodierni misterij sacramenti & tercia sermo sancti augustini episcopi audite filij lucis in tertio nocturno ? euang. exijt e??ctu, secunda pas?? et? tertia in principio erat uer bum.>

18v/5 Dominica infra octauam Natiuitatis Domini, jd est prima post Natiuitatem, legitur sermo sancti Leonis papae, Exultemus et speciali jocunditate letemus. Evangelium secundum Lucam. Erant joseph. homelia originis, congregemus.

   Dominica infra octauam Epiphaniae, legitur sermo sanctij Augustini Episcopo, fons Evangelium doctrinarum, uel usus alius de sequentibus. Evangelium in illo tempore cum fratres esset jesus annorum duodecim, cum home lia sua.

   in octava Epiphaniae, legitur sermo sanctij Augustini, Episcopi, Evangelia scriptura, uel alius sermo sequens, <&> homelia sua.

Dominica secunda post Epiphaniam; legitur Epistola pauli ad rommanos, <et> homelia sua.

   Domenica tercia post Epiphaniam, legitur Epistola pauli ad corinthos, <et> homelia sua.

   Dominica quinta post Epiphaniam, legitur Epistola pauli ad galathas, <et> homelia sua.

   Dominica septuagesimae, legitur liber genesis, sermo, et homelia. <sua>

   Dominica sexagesimae, legitur de libro genesi, sermone et homelia. <sua>

   Dominica Quinquagesimae, legitur de libro genesi, Sermone et homelia. <sua>.

   feria Quarta jnitium quadragesimae, legitur sermo gubernator prudens, <&> homelia sua. Et fit quotidie nona lectio, <de> homelia feriae. <usque ad feriam quartam maioris Æbdomadeae inclusiue, in diebus etiam festiuis>.
Dominica prima Quadragesimae, legitur de Epistola secunda pauli ad corinthos, Adiuuantes, sermone et homelia sua.

Dominica secunda Quadragesimae, legitur de libro genesi, sermone et homelia sua.

Dominica tercia Quadragesimae, legitur de libro genesi, Sermone et homelia sua.

Dominica Quarta Quadragesimae, legitur de libro Exodi, sermone et homelia sua.

Dominica de passione, legitur liber hyeremiae prophetae, sermo et homelia sua.

jn ferijs, leguntur homelie sole, <currentes de die in diem quando facimus de feria>

Dominica in Ramis palmarum, legitur de hyeremia propheta, sermone, et homelia.

jn matutinis tenebrarum.

19/2 feria quinta in primo nocturno, tres lectiones leguntur de lamentationibus hyeremiae prophetae. jn secundo nocturno, lectio prima, Sermo beati Augustini Episcopi de psalmo, Exaudi deus orationem meam, usque, inde est jlla vox. lectio secunda, inde est jlla vox, usque, absorberuntur. lectio tercia, Ergo hoc, usque, hunc timete. jn tercio nocturno, Lectio prima, Lectio sanctj Euangeli secundum joannem. Ante diem festum paschae, usque, transierunt. lectio secunda, Nunc ergo, usque, transeamus. lectio tercia, de hac nobis, usque, de hoc mundo ad partem.

19/3 feria sexta in primo nocturno, tres lectiones leguntur de lamentationibus hyeremiae prophetae. jn secundo nocturno, Lectio prima. Sermo sanctj joannis constantinopolitani Episcopi, hodierna die Dominus noster, usque bonorum thesaurus. lectio secunda, propter hanc non erramus, usque, Deinde causam. lectio tercia, Deinde causam, usque, in finem lectionis, uel capituli. jn tercio nocturno, lectio prima, Capitolium quod sequitur superiorem, videlicet, Audi igitur nunc, usque inter iniquos deputatus est. Lectio secunda, cuius igitur rei causa, usque, pro genere humano oblata. lectio tercia, Et ideo communis est, usque, in finem lectionis, uel capituli. jn tercio noct.

19/4 Sabbato sancto in primo nocturno. due lectiones leguntur de lamentationibus hyeremiae prophetae. tercia uero oratio hyeremiae prophetae. jn secundo nocturno, lectio prima, Sermo sancti Augustini Episcopi, judei ergo, usque, et reliqua. lectio secunda, vigilanti verbo, usque, dormientis effulsit. Lectio tercia, Magna fuit mors christi, usque, carne venturus. jn tercio noc-
turno, lectio prima, lectio sancti Euangelij secundum Matheum, vespere autem sabbati, usque, propter iustificationem nostram. lectio secunda, quod ipsum quod3, usque, esse perducturum. lectio tercia, sed et aliud nobis, usque, sine fine finantur. <cetera alia in matutinis tenebrarum, quere ad k. 56.>

19/5 Dominica Resurrectionis Domini, legitur homelia sua, et quotidie usque ad octauam, Leguntur homelijs sui. quia à pasqua usque ad penthecostes, leguntur tantum tres lectiones in matutinis.

Dominica in octaua paschae, leguntur due lectiones de Apocalipsi, tercia vero de homelia sua.

Dominica tercia post pascha, legitur de Apocalipsi, et homelia sua.

Dominica quarta post pascha, leguntur Epistole canonice, et homelia sua. <videlicet prima epistola sancti jacobj, jacobus dej, etc.>

Dominica quinta post pascha, leguntur de epistole canonice, et homelia sua. <videlicet prima epistola sancti joannis, & fuit ab initio etc.>

in diebus rogationum, lectio tercia, lectio de homelia lethaniarum.

in uigilia ascensionis, lectio tercia, lectio de homelia uigiliae.

in die ascensionis, leguntur due lectiones, actibus apostolorum, videlicet primi quidem de sermone3 <& homelia sua.>

Dominica infra octauam Ascensionis, legitur due lectiones, de actibus apostolorum, & de homelia sua.

<feria quarta, legitur homelia sua, videlicet, si manseritis in /// etc.>

Dominica penthecostes, leguntur tres lectiones leguntur de sermone sanctj Augustini Episcopi, et tres de homelia sua. Dominica infra octauam corporis christi, legitur Vrbanus Episcopus, et homelia de corpore christi. ///</>

De Dominicis sequentibus post penthecostes, usque ad adventum domini, leguntur libri secundum exigentiam temporum, de mense in mensem legendarum, ut habentur in rubricario romano, uide ibi, et non errabys. <sed libri Regum leguntur in mensibus junj et julj. ceteri uero libri leguntur secundum tabulam litterarum dominicarum, quere ad k. 51. à tergo>

Et de Dominicis vacantibus, uide rubricam folio ante, secundum nostrum ritum. sed de restantibus semper faciamus de eis, nisi festum duplex occurrat, tunc faciamus de festo duplici cum commemoratione de dominica, in utrisque vespéris, matutino, et Missa. Et ad matutinum semper legitur nona lectio de homelia dominicae. Et nota quod habemus viginticinque Dominice. </ergo illa rubrica patitur et non est secundum ritum sanctj marej sed prius est falsata & opportet moderare illam/>. 

De Missis dominicalibus tocius anni

19/6 in prima dominica Adventus, introitus, Ad te leuauui. oratio, excita
quaesumus Domine. Epistola, Scientes. Evangelium, cum Appropinquaret. <in omnibus dominicis per annum à sacerdote celebratur missam [sic] aspergetur aqua benedicta altare maius, genu flexu cum antiphona asperges me etc., ut habitur ad k. 49 in constitutionibus capitulum xvij. et in missalibus in fine etc.>

jn secunda dominica Adventus, jntritus, populus syon. oratio, excita quaesumus Domine corda nostra. Epistola, Quemcumque scripta sunt. Evangelium, Erant signa in sole.

[jn secunda dominica Adventus, jntritus, populus syon. oratio, excita quaesumus Domine corda nostra. Epistola, Quemcumque scripta sunt. Evangelium, Erant signa in sole.]

[jn secunda dominica Adventus, jntritus, populus syon. oratio, excita quaesumus Domine corda nostra. Epistola, Quemcumque scripta sunt. Evangelium, Erant signa in sole.]

[jn secunda dominica Adventus, jntritus, populus syon. oratio, excita quaesumus Domine corda nostra. Epistola, Quemcumque scripta sunt. Evangelium, Erant signa in sole.]

[jn secunda dominica Adventus, jntritus, populus syon. oratio, excita quaesumus Domine corda nostra. Epistola, Quemcumque scripta sunt. Evangelium, Erant signa in sole.]

[jn secunda dominica Adventus, jntritus, populus syon. oratio, excita quaesumus Domine corda nostra. Epistola, Quemcumque scripta sunt. Evangelium, Erant signa in sole.]

[jn secunda dominica Adventus, jntritus, populus syon. oratio, excita quaesumus Domine corda nostra. Epistola, Quemcumque scripta sunt. Evangelium, Erant signa in sole.]

[jn secunda dominica Adventus, jntritus, populus syon. oratio, excita quaesumus Domine corda nostra. Epistola, Quemcumque scripta sunt. Evangelium, Erant signa in sole.]


feria quarta quatuor temporum de Adventu, jntritus, Rorate. oratio, presta quaesumus. prophetia, Erit in nouissimis diebus <in tono prophetiae>. jtem alia oratio, festina quaesumus Domine. prophetia, locutus est Dominus. <in tono epistole ferialis.>, Evangelium, Missus est.


Sabbato quatuor temporum de Adventu, jntritus, veni ostende. oratio, Deus qui conspicis. prophetia, clamabunt. oratio, concede. prophetia, letabitur deserta. oratio, jndignos. prophetia, super montem. oratio, presta quaesumus. prophetia, christo meo cito. oratio, preces populi. prophetia, Angelus Domini. oratio, Deus qui tribus pueris. Epistola, rogamus uos. Evangelium, Anno quinto decimo.


jn vigilia nativitatis Domini, jntritus, hodie scietis. oratio, Deus qui nos. prophetia, propter syon. Epistola paulus seruus jesu christi. Evangelium, cum esset despensata.

<jn tribus missis natiuitatis domini omnia ut in curia romana, exceptis prophetis quae dicuntur ut in nostro missali & epistolario assignatus, & in fine terciae missae dictur evangelium de epiphania loco in principio erat uerbum, per diaconum ad altare maius.>


<jn cirumcisione domini, jntritus vultum tuum, oratio deus qui salutis, Epistola apparuit benignitas cu post q3 cosu []).>

<jn vigilia Epiphaniae, jntritus, Lux fulgeb. oratio propria, Epistola,
bis judeorum.


Dominica Resurrectionis Domini, introitus, Resurrexit, oratio, Deus qui hodierna die, Epistola, Expurgate uetus fermentum. Evangelium, Maria Magdalene. <ad aspersionem aquae antiphona quere in ordinarijs paruis, et in antipohonarijs huia temporis>.

Dominica in octaua pasche, introitus, Quasimodo. oratio, presta quasemus omnipotens Deus. Epistola, omne qui natum est ex Deo. Evangelium, cum esset sero.

[fol. 20]

20/1 Dominica secunda post pascha, introitus, Misericordia Domini. oratio, Deus qui in filij tui. Epistola, christus passus est. Evangelium, Ego sum pastor bonus.

Dominica tercia post pascha, introitus, jubilare Deo. oratio, deus qui errantibus. Epistola, obsecro uos. Evangelium, Modicum et jam.

Dominica quarta post pascha, introitus,cantate Domino. oratio, deus qui fidelium. Epistola, omne datum optimum. Evangelium, vado ad eum.


<jn vigilia ascensionis, introitus, omnes gentes. oratio, presta quasemus. epistola, Multitudinis credentium. evangelium, {et} subleuatis occulis jesus.>


jn vigilia pentecostes, Missa dicetur ut moris est cum suis prophetijs.

jn die sancto pentecostes, introitus, Spiritus Domini, oratio, deus qui hodierna die. Epistola, Dum completeruntur. Evangelium, Si quis diligit me.

<Nota quod à pentecoste usque ad Adventum Domini in omnibus sabbatis et dominicis Diebus ad vesperos [sic], quando facimus officium de Dominica, Accipimus capitulum proprium de Dominica, Assignatum ante orationes Dominicales in nostro orationali, vide ibi. <& in laudibus etiam ///.>

Dominica prima post pentecostes, introitus, Domine in tua misericordia. oratio, Deus in te spera(nte). Epistola, Deus charitas est. Evangelium, homo quidem erat diues, <hodie uero ad aspersionem aquae resumitur antipho-
nam, asprges me etc.>

Dominica secunda post penthecostes, jnтроitus, factus est. oratio, sanctj
nominis tui. Epistola, Nolite mirari. Euangelium, homo quidam fecit cenam
magnam.

Dominica tercia post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Respice in me. oratio, Dep-
recationem. Epistola, humiliamini. Euangelium, Erant appropinquantes.

Dominica quarta post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Dominus jlluminatio. or-
tio, protector in te <sperantium>. Epistola, Existimo eum. Euangelium, Estote
misericordes.

Dominica quinta post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Exaudi Domine. oratio,
Da nobis quaesumus Domine. Epistola, omnes vnanimes. Euangelium, cum
turbe jnuerent [sic].

Dominica sexta post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Dominus fortitudo, oratio,
Deus qui diligentibus te. Epistola, Quicumque baptizati. Euangelium, nisi
habundauerit [sic].

Dominica septima post penthecostes, jnтроitus, omnes gentes. oratio,

Dominica octaua post penthecostes, jnтроitus, suscepimus Deus, oratio,
Deus cuius prouidentia. Epistola, Debitores sumus. Euangelium, Attendite à
falsis prophetis.

Dominica nona post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Ecce Deus. oratio, Largire.
Epistola, Non simus. Euangelium, homo quidem erat diues.

Dominica decima post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Dum clamarem. oratio,
pateant. Epistola, Scitis quoniam cum gentes. Euangelium, cum appropinquas-
set jesus.

Dominica vndecima post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Deus in loco, oratio,
Deus qui omni potentiam. Epistola, Notum vobis. Euangelium, Dixit jesus ad
quosdam.

Dominica duodecima post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Deus in adiutorium.
oratio, omnipotens sempiterne Deus. Epistola, fiduciam talem. Euangelium,
Exiens jesus de finibus.

Dominica tertiacedima post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Respice, oratio,
omnipotens et misericors Deus. Epistola, habrae [Abrahae] dict(a)e sunt.
Euangelium, beati oculi.

Dominica quartadecima post penthecostes, jnтроitus, protector, oratio,
omnipotens sempiterne Deus da nobis fidei. Epistola, Spiritu ambulante. Eu-
gelium, Dum iret jesus in hierusalem.

Dominica quintadecima post penthecostes, jnтроitus, jnclina. oratio, cus-

20/2 Dominica Sextadecima post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Miserere mihi Domine. oratio, Ecclesiam tuam. Epistola, obsecro uos me. Euangelium, jbat Jesus in ciuitatem.

Dominica decima septima post penthecostes, jnтроitus, justus es. oratio,
<aut tua nos domine> fac nos Domine quaesumus. Epistola, obsecro uos ego uinctus. Euangelium, cum intrasset jesus in Domum.

<de feria quaer, sexta et sabbato quattuor temporum, omnia dicuntur ut in missali et epistolario sancti marci ordinatur quod uariat aliquantulum a curia Romana.>

Dominica decima octaua post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Da pacem. oratio,
Da quaesumus Domine populo tuo. Epistola, gratias ago deo meo. Euangelium, Acesserunt ad jesus saducej.

Dominica decima nona post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Salus populi. oratio,
Dirigat <corda nostra>, Epistola, Renouamini. Euangelium, Ascendens Jesus in nauiculam.

Dominica vigesima post penthecostes, jnтроitus, omnia que fecisti. oratio, omnipotens et misericors Deus. Epistola, videre jtaque. Euangelium, Simile est regnum celorum homini regi.

[fol. 20 verso]

20v/1 Dominica vigesima prima post penthecostes, jnтроitus, jn voluntate. oratio, largire. Epistola, confortamini. Euangelium, Erat quidam regul'.

Dominica vigesima secunda post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Dicit dominus. oratio, familiam tuam. Epistola, confidimus in Domino. Euangelium, Simile est regnum celorum homini regi qui voluit.

Dominica vigesima tercia post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Si inquitates cogito. oratio, deus refugium nostrum, Epistola, jmmitatores [sic]. Euangelium, loquete jesus ad turbas.

Dominica vigesima quarta post penthecostes, jnтроitus, Omnes gentes. oratio, Exita domine quaesumus tuorum. Epistola, Non cessam'. Euangelium, loquente jesus ad turbas.

< Dominica, 24, dominica 25, post penthecostes, officium cantuale ut in Dominica septima post penthecostes, videlicet, omnes gentes etc.>

De Antiphonis ponendis ad Magnificat in omnibus sabbatis per totum Annum,
pro Dominicis, uel libris ponendis.

20v/2 Sabbato primo de Aduentu ad Magnificat Antiphona, Ecce nomen domini.
Sabbato secundo de Aduentu ad Magnificat Antiphona, Ecce in nubibus caeli.
Sabbato tercio de aduentu ad Magnificat Antiphona, Ante me non est formatus Deus.
Sabbato quarto de Aduentu ad Magnificat Antiphona, Dabit ei Dominus.
Quando vigilia Natiuitatis Domini venerit in sabbato, ad Magnificat Antiphona, Dum ortus fuerit sol, <et quocumque alio die>.
Sabbato infra octauam Natiuitatis Domini ad Magnificat Antiphona, Dum medium silentium <et quocumque alio die>. Sabbato in octaua Natiuitatis Domini ad Magnificat Antiphona, Qui de terra est <et quocumque alio die>.
Sabbato infra octauam Epiphaniae ad Magnificat Antiphona, fili quid fecisti nobis sic <et quocumque alio die>.
jn omnibus sabbatis ab octaua Epiphaniae usque ad septuagesimam ad Magnificat Antiphona, Abraam.
Sabbato septuagesimae ad Magnificat Antiphona, plantauerat. Sabbato sexagesimae ad Magnificat Antiphona, Dixit Dominus ad Noe.
Sabbato quinquagesimae ad Magnificat Antiphona, pater fidei nostrae.
Sabbato primae Dominicae quadragesimae ad Magnificat Antiphona, Ecce nunc tempus acceptabile.
Sabbato secundae Dominicae quadragesimae ad Magnificat Antiphona, visionem quam vidistis.
Sabbato Dominicae terciae quadragesimae ad Magnificat Antiphona, dixit autem pater ad servos suos.
Sabbato Dominicae quartae quadragesimae ad Magnificat, Nemo te condemnauit mulier.
Sabbato Dominicae passionis ad Magnificat Antiphona, Ego sum. Sabbato Dominicae palmarum ad Magnificat Antiphona, pater juste.
Sabbato Dominicae Resurrectionis ad Magnificat Antiphona, Respondens autem Angelus.
Sabbato in Albis ad Magnificat Antiphona, cum esset sero. Sabbato secundae Dominicae post pascha ad Magnificat Antiphona, Ego sum pastor ouium.
Sabbato terciae Dominicae post pascha ad Magnificat Antiphona, Modicum et non videbitis me.
Sabbato quartae Dominicae post pascha ad Magnificat Antiphona, vado ad eum.
Sabbato quintae Dominae post pascha ad Magnificat Antiphona, vsque modo.
Sabbato Dominae infra octauam Ascensionis Domini ad Magnificat Antiphona, cum venerit paraclitus.

[folios 21-21]

21/1 Sabbato pentecostes ad Magnificat, Antiphona, Si diligitis me.
Sabbato sanctissimae trinitatis ad Magnificat Antiphona, Gratias tibi Deus. <//>

Sabbato infra octauam corporis christi ad Magnificat Antiphona, o quam suavis est. <///<>

<antiphone, Ab octauam pentecostes usque ad kallendas Augusti, cum suis libris.>


<antiphone, A' kallendis Augusti usque ad kallendas septembris, cum suis libris.>

Antiphone subscripsit de Sapientia,

21/2 dicuntur ad Magnificat, quolibet sabbato, usque ad kallendas septembris, videlicet, Sapientia clamitat in platheis. Sapientia edificauit sibi domum. Ego in altissimis habito. omnis sapientia. Dominus possedit me. <Et leguntur parabole Salomonis, liber Ecclesiastes, Liber sapientiae, Liber Ecclesiasticus, vt in tabula de libris ponendis sanctas litteras dominicales. k. 51, a tergo.>

<antiphone, A' kallendis septembris usque ad kallendas octobris, cum suis libris.>

Antiphone subscripsit de hystoria job,

21/3 dicuntur ad Magnificat, in sabbatis tantum, videlicet, cum ego tasset job. Cum Audisset job; jn omnibus his. <Et legitur liber job, vt in tabula, k. 51.> <vnde supra, de mense septembrj [sic]>

Antiphone subscripsit de hystoria Thobiae.

21/4 Dicuntur ad Magnificat, in sabbatis tantum, videlicet, Ne reminis caris Domine. jngressus Raphael Archangelus ad Thobiam. <Et legitur liber Thobiae, vt in tabula, k. 51.> <vnde supra, de mense septembris.>
Sequens Antiphona de hystoria judith, dicitur ad Magnificat, in sabbato, quando ponitur eius ystoffia, videlicet Adonay Domine Deus. <Et legitur liber judith, vt in tabula, k. 51.> <vnde supra, de mense septembri>

Sabbato de hystoria hester, Antiphona ad Magnificat, Domine Rex omnipotens. <Et legitur liber hester, vt in tabula, k.51.> </de libris ponendis sanctas litteras dominicales. E. [?] liber hester ponitur in ultima dominica usque sept. quere ///> <Antiphone A' kallendis octobris usque ad kallendas nouembris, cum suis libris>


Explicit Dominicale. [end]