Jonathan Knowles

Professor of Philosophy at the Norwegian Univeristy of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway


My broad areas of interest are philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology/cognitive science, epistemology/philosophy of science and philosophy of language. Currently I am working on issues of representation in philosophy and cognitive science, seeking to argue for a position which rejects representationalism, plus any kind of substantive realism, but not naturalism (understood as the idea that science gives us our most fundamental knowledge).

Links

Research group: Consciousness, Cognition and Reality.

Project: Representationalism or Anti-representationalism? Perspectives on intentionality from philosophy and cognitive science.

Network: Nordic Pragmatism Network.


Selected publications (for more online papers see my Academia.edu page, for full listing see CV)

Norms, Naturalism and Epistemology: The Case for Science without Norms. Houndmills/New York: Palgrave, 2003/2004. pdf

Pragmatism, Science and Naturalism (edited with Henrik Rydenfelt), Peter Lang GmbH, 2011.

‘Rortian realism’ forthcoming in Nordic Studies in Pragmatism (http://www.nordprag.org/nsp/)

‘Non-reductive naturalism and the vocabulary of agency’ forthcoming in Contemporary Pragmatism.

‘Naturalism without metaphysics’ forthcoming in K. Westphal & S Pihlström, eds., Realism, Science and Pragmatism, Routledge.

‘On Envatment, Experience and Epistemology’ in Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg 2013.

‘Challenging Cartesian materialism: Understanding naturalism and the mind-world relation’ in M. Milkowski & K. Talmont-Kaminski, eds., Regarding Mind, Naturally. London: College Publications, 2013.

‘Naturalised epistemology, reciprocal containment and metaphysical realism’ in J. Hvorecky and T.Hribek, eds.,  Knowledge, Value, Evolution. London: College Publications, 2011.

‘Actions, causes and causal explanation’ in J. Knowles, S. Carson & B. Myskja, eds., Kant: Here, Now and How: Essays in Honour of Truls Wyller. mentis Verlag GmbH, 2011.

Review of Naturalism and Normativity, edited by Mario De Caro & David Macarthur, in Philosophy in Review 31, 2011, 11-15.

‘Naturalism, pragmatism and the retreat from metaphysics: scientific versus subject naturalism’ in J. Knowles, J. & H. Rydenfelt, eds., Pragmatism, Science and Naturalism, Peter Lang GmbH, 2011. preprint pdf

‘Why we don’t need naturalistic epistemic norms’ in M. Milkowski & K. Talmont Kaminski, eds., Beyond Description: Normativity in Naturalised Philosophy. London: College Publications, 2010.

‘Two kinds of non-scientific naturalism’ in M. Milkowski & K. Talmont-Kaminski, eds., Beyond Description: Normativity in Naturalised Philosophy. London: College Publications, 2010.

‘What is naturalism? Towards a univocal theory’ Sats: Nordic Journal of Philosophy, 9, 2008, 28-57.

‘Is naturalism a threat to metaphysics?’ Norsk filosofisk tidsskrift 43, 2008, 23-32.

‘Non-scientific naturalism?’ in S. Pihlström, R. Vilkko & H. Koskinen, eds., Science – A Challenge to Philosophy? Peter Lang GmbH, 2006, 209-220.

Review of Tim Crane’s The Mechanical Mind, 2nd edition, Minds and Machines 15, 2005, 259-264.

‘Varieties of naturalism’ in W. Østreng, ed., Synergies: Interdisciplinary Communications 2003-4. Centre for Advanced Studies at the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, Oslo 2005, 26-29.

‘Reasoning competence’ in W. Löffler & P. Weingartner, eds.,  Knowledge and Belief: Proceedings of the 26th International Wittgenstein Symposium,  Kirchberg 2003, 180-2.

'Is folk psychology different?' Erkenntnis 57, 2002, 199-230 preprint pdf

‘What’s really wrong with Laudan’s normative naturalism’ International Studies in Philosophy of Science 16, 2002, 171-186.

‘Naturalised epistemology without norms’ Croatain Journal of Philosophy II:6, 2002, 281-96.

‘Does intentional psychology need vindicating by cognitive science?’ Minds & Machines 11, 2001, 347-377.

‘Knowledge of grammar as a propositional attitude’ Philosophical Psychology 13, 2000, 325-353.

‘Can we give a foundational, non-psychologistic naturalised epistemology?’ in B. Brogaard, ed., Rationality and Irrationality: Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg 2000: 232-8.

‘Physicalism, teleology and the miraculous coincidence problem’ Philosophical Quarterly 49, 1999, 164-181.

‘The language of thought and natural language understanding’ Analysis 58, 1998, 264-272.

Vitenskap, rasjonalitet og common sense (Science, Rationality and Common Sense) Oslo: Cappelen Akademisk Forlag, 2000, 239 pages.